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ABSTRACT
This study explores the social and economic changes in the mid-Atlantic region
generally, and Baltimore City and its hinterlands specifically, between the late colonial
period and the dawn o f the Jacksonian era. Founded in 1729 by legislative act, Baltimore
foundered as a colonial entrepot until wheat emerged as an important export commodity
in the 1740s. Between the mid-1740s and the American Revolution, the town grew
steadily within the parameters o f the British mercantilist world. Its trade was deeply
dependent on Atlantic commerce, its social structure reflected the mercantile orientation
o f the town and the staunchly deferential colonial household economy. The Revolution
threatened to overturn this world with the promise o f free trade and the possibility that
the new republic could remake the Atlantic world. This promise flickered out with the
return o f European mercantilist restrictions and hard times. Thereafter, merchants
abandoned their revolutionary ambitions, and sought to re-establish old commercial ties
within the British Empire. Artisans sought to strengthen the ties that bound together
workers to workshops in the colonial period, and preserve the deferential social order.
Thus instead o f making a clean break from the colonial to the early national after the
Revolution, Baltimore and the mid-Atlantic entered a postcolonial period in which
merchants and artisans forged a neomercantilist mentalite to perpetuate much o f the
traditional social and economic order o f colonial America.
The postcolonial period continued until the Bank o f England suspended specie
payments in 1797. This triggered a financial panic in the Atlantic world, and caused the
return o f hard times to Baltimore and the mid-Atlantic. Economic misfortune encouraged
a reorientation o f the town’s social and economic life away from the Atlantic world and
towards the backcountry and the frontier beyond. America thus moved from the
postcolonial to the early national. After 1800, merchants and artisans sought to establish
market ties to the backcountry by investing in manufactories, turnpike companies, banks,
and western newspapers. These trends were accelerated by the Embargo o f 1807, and by
1812, a nascent manufacturing class had emerged. This transformation came at a price.
Without technological improvements to augment productivity, manufacturers achieved
economies o f scale by squeezing more labor from their workers, thus destroying the
deferential bonds that held together the household economy and the colonial social order.
The urban transition from workshop to manufactory was therefore chaotic, and eventually
led to the Baltimore riots o f 1812, the largest and most violent the country had ever
witnessed.

RICHARD SMITH CHEW
DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY
THE COLLEGE OF WILLIAM AND MARY
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INTRODUCTION
THE MEASURE OF INDEPENDENCE

In the last quarter of the eighteenth century, Americans experienced two
revolutions. The first occurred on July 4, 1776 when the united colonies declared their
independence from the British Parliament and King George m . The second, which
occurred sometime thereafter, transformed America from an Atlantic-oriented, export-led
society deeply dependent on the Atlantic world, into a westward-oriented, production-led
society seeking to establish a unique national culture. These two revolutions, the
American Revolution and the Market Revolution, have provided the organizing
paradigms over the last few decades for historians studying the Revolutionary era and the
early American republic. Unfortunately, these paradigms have not always proved
complementary. Thanks in part to the hierarchies of knowledge within the historical
profession, which often provide an arbitrary demarcation between those who study
Colonial and Revolutionary America and those who study Jacksonian and Antebellum
America, a sharp interpretive division has emerged between the prevailing paradigms of
America's two revolutions.1

1On the idea of hierarchies of knowledge, see Michel Foucault, The Order o f Things: An
Archaeology o f the Human Sciences (New York: Random House, 1971). The idea of the switch
from an export-led to a production-led economy is not new. At a conference sponsored by the
Eleutherian Mills-Hagley Foundation in 1966, Gordon Bjork proposed the idea that the United
States in 1790 remained as dependent on foreign trade as the colonies had been prior to 1776. He
continued that between 1790 and 1825, with the fulcrum likely centered between 1795 and 1810,
Americans rejected their dependence on the Adantic economy and embraced the idea of
developing a more independent national economy. Bjork did not offer any reasons why this tumof-events came about, he was unable to narrow the chronological framework for the transition, his
1
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Students of American history do not have to search long to discover the scholarly
divide. In his synthesis of the American Revolutionary era, Gordon W ood asserted that
the American Revolution "released powerful popular entrepreneurial and commercial
energies t h a t . . . transformed the economic landscape o f the country." By the end of the
eighteenth century, these forces "created a society fundamentally different" from that of
Colonial British America. Thus, according to Wood, the Market Revolution developed
as a direct result of the American Revolution, and the subsequent emergence of a new
democratic and capitalist social order was largely complete by the time Thomas Jefferson
delivered his first inaugural address in 1801. Wood's revolutionary portrait of American
society in the late eighteenth century does not square, however, with Charles Sellers’s
synthesis of the Jacksonian era. According to Sellers, political independence "loosed
republicanism on the modem world," but "a majority of free Americans [still] lived in a
distinctive subsistence culture" as late as the War of 1812. Unlike Wood's claim that
America experienced an explosion of entrepreneurial zeal, Sellers believes that the
colonial emphasis on "family obligation, communal cooperation, and reproduction over
generations of a modest comfort" continued to guide social and economic relationships
well into the nineteenth century. It was only after 1815 that Americans began to
surmount "deeply rooted patterns of behavior and b e lie f left over from the Colonial era.
Instead of the break with Great Britain causing the social and economic transformation of
American society, it was the much later changes in the nineteenth-century that, according
to Sellers, dissolved the traditional social order in favor o f a "capitalist hegemony over

statistical findings were not broadly accepted by the conference participants, and he did not
pursue the approach any further. See David Gilchrist, ed.. The Growth o f the Seaport Cities,
1790-1825: Proceedings o f a Conference Sponsored by the Eleutherian Mills-Hagley
Foundation, March 17-19, 1966 (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1967), 54-82.
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4
economy, politics, and culture," and "created ourselves and most of the world we know."2
The interpretive divide between the scholarship on the American Revolution and that of
the Market Revolution has produced intellectual confusion in the historiography, making
it difficult to gauge the economic and social consequences of American political
independence, and nearly impossible to determine the origins, or even reach a consensus
over the definition of the Market Revolution. Some historians have begun to express
concern that the intellectual divide is beginning to distort our understanding of eighteenth
and early-nineteenth-century America, and threatens to leave the mental landscapes of
each period badly tarnished.3
It is the aim of this study to bridge the scholarly divide by taking the measure of
social and economic change after the American Revolution, and, by doing so, to
illuminate the origins o f the Market Revolution. Before this bridge can be built,
however, it is important to fully appreciate the nature of the chasm to be spanned.
Despite the numerous cries of alarm, Wood's and Sellers's interpretations have proven
extraordinarily resistant to revision despite the best efforts of social and economic
historians to revise the prevailing paradigms. Recent scholarship demonstrates that the
eighteenth-century American economy was deeply commercial at nearly every level, thus

2 Gordon Wood, The Radicalism o f the American Revolution (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1992), 6.
8, and Charles Sellers, The Market Revolution: Jacksonian America, 1815-1846 (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1991), 3,5.
3 Alfred Young concluded that current scholarship does not suggest "a single paradigm" to
answer the question of how revolutionary was the American Revolution, and Richard Bushman
has expressed concern that the intellectual divide is distorting our understanding of early
American agriculture. See Alfred Young, ed.. Beyond the American Revolution: Explorations in
the History o f American Radicalism (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1993). 318, and
Richard Bushman, "Markets and Composite Farms in Early America," The William and Mary
Quarterly, 3d ser., 55 (1998): 351-74.
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Sellers's claim that a "subsistence culture" prevailed in America until 1815 can no longer
be accepted.4 Yet on the first page of a recent collection o f essays on the Market
Revolution, Melvyn Stokes repeated Sellers's argument, declaring that "a largely
subsistence economy of small farms and tiny workshops, satisfying mostly local needs
through barter and exchange" was replaced by "an economy in which farmers and
manufacturers produced food and goods for the cash rewards o f an often distant
marketplace."3 Wood's claim that the break with Great Britain unleashed commercial
energies that transformed society within a few decades is also in need of revision. Recent
scholarship on rural America has demonstrated that many farmers maintained traditional
patterns of local exchange well into the nineteenth century, resisting much of the
entrepreneurial zeal that Wood claims was overwhelming American society.6 Yet in her
recent study of post-Revolutionary America, Joyce Appleby reaffirmed Wood's

4 See especially Bettye Hobbs Pruitt, "Self-Sufficiency and the Agricultural Economy of
Eighteenth-Century Massachusetts," The William and Mary Quarterly, 3d ser., 41 (1984): 33364; Edward Perkins, "The Entrepreneurial Spirit in Colonial America: The Foundations of
Modem Business History," Business History Review, 43 (1989): 160-86; Carole Shammas. The
Pre-Industrial Consumer in England and America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990);
Winifred Rothenberg, From Market-Places to a Market Economy: The Transformation o f Rural
Massachusetts, 1750-1850 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); Joyce Chaplin, An
Anxious Pursuit: Agricultural Innovation and Modernity in the Lower South, 1730-1815 (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993); and Tim Breen, "Narrative of Commercial Life:
Consumption, Ideology, and Community on the Eve of the American Revolution," The William
and Mary Quarterly, 3d ser., 50 (1993): 471-501.
s Melvyn Stokes, "Introduction," in Melvyn Stokes and Stephen Conway, eds., 7he Market
Revolution in America: Social, Political, and Religious Expressions, 1800-1880 (Charlottesville:
University Press of Virginia, 1996), I.
6 See especially Steven Hahn, The Roots o f Southern Populism: Yeomen Farmers and the
Transformation o f the Georgia Upcoimtry, 1850-1890 (New York: Oxford University Press,
1983); Steven Hahn and Jonathan Prude, eds.. The Countryside in the Age o f Capitalist
Transformation: Essays in the Social History o f Rural America (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1985); Christopher Clark, The Roots o f Rural Capitalism: Western
Massachusetts, 1780-1860 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990); Daniel Vickers, Farmers and
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interpretation, arguing that in the wake of the separation from Great Britain, the bedrock
o f American capitalism emerged; independence allowed the Revolutionaries to cement
"personal ambition to an imagined national enterprise that vindicated democracy."7
Never has there been a more complete fusion of the American Revolution and the Market
Revolution as a single phenomena.
The prevailing paradigms thus plod along, and are now part of the narrative of
college-level textbooks. In Making a Nation: The United States and Its People, students
learn that in the wake o f the American Revolution, "enterprising Americans with a little
capital to invest could rise quickly," and "all along the western frontier, farmers rushed in
to take up new lands," reversing "the trend that was taking place before the Revolution,
when the growing population had sought employment in the cities." Thus it appears at
first glance that the authors have embraced Wood's interpretation. Yet in a later chapter,
students leam that it was only after 1815 that "American settlement in the transAppalachian territories swelled." The narrative thereafter adopts Sellers's interpretation,
presenting the case that in the years following the W ar of 1812, entrepreneurs and
farmers built "the foundation . . . for America’s market revolution."8
The hierarchy o f knowledge that frequently separate historians o f the eighteenth
century from those o f the nineteenth century helps explain why the scholarly divide
emerged in the first place, but it does not clarify why the prevailing paradigms have

Fishermen: Two Centuries of Work in Essex County, Massachusetts, 1630-1850 (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1994); and Bushman, "Markets and Composite Farms."

7 Joyce Appleby, Inheriting the Revolution: The First Generation o f Americans (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2000), 56.
8 Jeanne Boydston, Nick Cullather, Jan Ellen Lewis, Michael McGerr, and James Oakes, Making
a Nation: The United States and Its People, Combined Edition (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice
Hall, 2002), 203-04, 280.
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proven so resistant to revision. To explain the latter, the focus should be placed on how
the word revolution is commonly used in each interpretation. For most Americans,
revolution suggests a violent and immediate change, or a clean break from one form of
political or social organization to another—something akin to a light switch being flipped
in a dark room. This use o f the word requires a "before" and an "after," and leaves
almost no room for an intermediary period. It is this meaning of the word revolution that
is commonly used in both Wood's and Sellers's studies. In both interpretations, American
society moves directly from the colonial to the national, skipping over the post-colonial
period that is common in studies of nearly every other post-revolutionary society around
the world— there is no room for the uncertainties of a postcolonial period.9 Although
they disagree on the precise timing, both Wood and Sellers argue that American society
made a clean break from the colonial to the national, and assign a narrow window of time
for when the moment of transformation occurred. For Wood, the break occurs with the
separation from Great Britain. Although he allows for the idea that it took years for the
Revolution to "run its course," the Revolution was nonetheless "integral to the changes
occurring in American society, politics, and culture at the end of the eighteenth century."
In short, the course was set in Philadelphia by the Continental Congress and thereafter
did not waver. For Sellers, the transition is even tighter, being ushered in by the
Fourteenth Congress in 1815. Led by John C. Calhoun and Henry Clay, the "new-style
Republicans" pushed "national developmentalism far beyond anything envisioned by the

9 Indeed, the idea of an immediate, sweeping revolution is so deeply ingrained in American
scholarship that postcolonial theory, normally the dominant historical methodology in studies of
post-revoludonary cultures, has made almost no impact on the American historical imagination
A notable exception is Edward Watts. Writing and Postcolonialism in the Early Republic
(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1998).
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parochial Federalism of port elites," and "sought to turn the republic irrevocably toward
its capitalist destiny."10
It should be noted here that for studies of the American Revolution that focus on
politics and ideology, the idea of an immediate and sweeping revolution works well
enough because the break with Great Britain did produce immediate and sweeping
consequences. State legislatures ratified new constitutions, local patriot leaders
confiscated property of those who remained loyal to the crown, and requisitions were
made in every community for troops and supplies to fight the invading British. In the
years immediately following the war, the democratic aspirations of the people swirled
into a popular politics that called for social equality, greater economic opportunity, and
an expansion o f the franchise. Although African Americans, women, and Indians did not
fully share the gains made in these early struggles for democratization, the Revolution did
make a difference for these groups. The African American community was politically
galvanized by the Revolution, and slavery became a morally ambiguous and politically
volatile issue for the First time. Women were also energized politically by the
Revolution, and gender emerged as a central concern in republican thinking. And from
the Seneca in the north to the Cherokee in the south, Indians recovered from the
devastation of war through a religious and cultural renaissance that helped redefine
Indian identity itself.11 For studies of social and economic change after the American

10 Wood, The Radicalism o f the American Revolution, 7, and Sellers, The Market Revolution, 69.
u The literature on these various subjects is vast, but see especially Gerald Mullin, Flight and
Rebellion: Slave Resistance in Eighteenth-Century Virginia (New York: Oxford University Press,
1972); David Brion Davis, The Problem o f Slavery in an Age o f Revolution, 1770-1823 (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1975); Sylvia Frey, Waterfrom the Rock: Black Resistance in a
Revolutionary Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991); Patricia Bradley, Slavery,
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Revolution, however, the idea of a sweeping revolution simply does not work. As the
scholarship on the commercial nature of the colonial economy and the scholarship on the
persistence o f local exchange in nineteenth-century rural America demonstrates, there
was never a clean break between a colonial, subsistence society and a national,
commercial one. To insist upon a clean break, either in 1776 or 1815 or at any other
time, creates a metahistory at odds with the historical record.
To gain a better understanding of late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth-century
America, we must alter how we use the term revolution in regard to social and economic
change. In his multi-volume work on the history of capitalism and civilization, Fernand
Braudel provided a useful way to think about the idea of revolution. He observed that
"rapid and slow change are inseparable" in social and economic revolutions, "For no
society exists which is not tom between the forces working to preserve it and the
subversive forces— whether perceived or not— working to undermine it." For this reason,
the term "revolution in the sense of upheaval or overthrow of an existing society" is not a
useful concept in the study of economic and social change unless the idea of revolution
also encompasses "the opposite sense meaning reconstruction."12 It is important to
consider that the idea o f reconstruction is not a question of slow versus rapid change
towards a certain goal; Braudel rejects the idea of a steady progression. Instead,

Propaganda, and the American Revolution (Jackson, MS: University Press of Mississippi, 1998);
Mary Beth Norton, Liberty’s Daughters: The Revolutionary Experience o f American Women,
1750-1800 (Boston: Little, Brown, & Co., 1980); Linda Kerber, Women o f the Republic: Intellect
and Ideology in Revolutionary America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980);
Anthony F.C. Wallace, The Death and Rebirth o f the Seneca (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1969);
and Gregory Dowd, A Spirited Resistance: The North American Struggle fo r Unity, 1745-1815
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992).
12Fernand Braudel, The Perspective o f the World, vol. HI, Civilization and Capitalism, trans.
Sian Reynolds (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), 537-538.
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reconstruction recognizes that those who experience social and economic dislocation will
likely try to preserve a portion o f the past while, at the same time, advocate revolutionary
change on a range of other matters. A period of social and economic reconstruction will
therefore appear rather messy, as economic change may not always keep pace with social
change, or the other way around. It is this theory of revolution, one based on the
importance of the idea of reconstruction, that we can begin to build a bridge between the
American Revolution and the Market Revolution. The approach provides a useful
framework to explore America's post-revolutionary transformation by opening up the
possibility for a post-colonial period in which the American economy and American
society was no longer colonial but not yet national. The approach will take the measure
o f independence by shedding light on how an Atlantic-oriented, export-led society deeply
dependent on the Atlantic world came be a westward-oriented, production-led society
striving to create a unique national identity.

T he Contours

of

C h a n g e I n R e v o l u t io n a r y A m e r ic a

Americans are used to thinking about their country as a continent-spanning
superpower, and of themselves as an independent, democratic people. The country's
origins were much different. Prior to the Declaration of Independence, America
consisted of a string of underdeveloped colonies straddling the edge o f North America on
the outer reaches o f the British Atlantic world. Far from being independent-minded,
most white Americans imagined themselves as part of a Greater Britain. The vast
majority of the population lived within fifty miles of the coast, their governments were
subservient to the British Parliament, their economies were thoroughly dependent on
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British trade and credit, and most social relationships in colonial America were shadowy
recreations of standards set by a steeply aristocratic British society. The American
Revolution promised to change all of this. Monarchial government would be shattered,
Britain's mercantilist dominance would be ended, and a new republican society would
emerge steeped in public virtue. The successful conclusion of the Revolutionary War
accomplished the first o f these goals, but it would take decades before the country's social
and economic relationships would shuffle off the coil of their colonial origins.13
Although a nascent manufacturing class emerged in the 1780s that hoped to break the
country's dependence on foreign trade, the patterns of Atlantic commerce established in
the late-seventeenth and early-eighteenth centuries still guided the American economy at
the end of the eighteenth century. The continuation of the mercantilist system insured
that much of the colonial social order survived into the early republic.
The persistence of traditional society in the wake of the Revolution was quite
apparent to Francois Auguste Rene de Chateaubriand. When the young French aristocrat
arrived in the new republic in the 1790s, he was surprised to discover little evidence that
a revolution had taken place in America. He recalled that as "a man landing as I did in
the United States, full o f enthusiasm for the ancients, a Cato seeking everywhere for the
rigidity o f the early Roman manners," he was shocked to discover that "the United States
gives rather the idea of a colony than a nation; there one finds customs, not mores." He
continued that "at Philadelphia, I could have thought myself in an English town: nothing

13 A recent interpretation of early American politics suggests that Colonial British political culture
persisted beyond the Revolution too. See Elijah Gould, The Persistence of Empire: British
Political Culture in the Age o f the American Revolution (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 2000).
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proclaimed that I had passed from a monarchy to a republic."14 After he had spent more
time in the United States and conversed with the people, Chateaubriand discerned distinct
differences between American and European political sensibilities. Yet his first
impressions o f America proclaimed a traditional society not unlike the Europe he had
recently departed.
Chateaubriand perceived America through the eyes of an aristocratic European, but
many Americans noticed the same patterns of change, or lack of it, in post-Revolutionary
society. In his classic tale, "Rip Van Winkle," Washington Irving provides an ambiguous
portrait of how far American society was transformed by the Revolution. When Rip Van
Winkle awoke from his long sleep, he could scarcely believe his eyes. He remembered
that he and his dog had ventured into the mountains above his village the evening before
and met a stocky fellow with a grizzled beard dressed in a quaint Dutch fashion. He had
followed the curious man farther into the mountains, arriving at what was presumably the
fellow's home. There he gladly accepted the man's hospitality, and after drinking a
liberal quantity of spirits, fell asleep outside on the side o f the mountain. That much was
clear— little else made sense. Upon waking, Rip expected to find his fowling piece lying
next to him, but he discovered instead an old, rusted and worm-eaten musket. He called
to his dog, but his calls echoed in vain through the mountains. Even his personal
appearance was dramatically altered as his beard now reached down almost to his waist.
Yet the biggest surprise awaited him in the valley below. After descending the mountain
and returning to his village, a troop of people surrounded him, demanding to know if he
had voted for the Federalist or for the Democrat in the day’s election. Old Rip had no

14 Francois Auguste Rene de Chateaubriand, Chateaubriand's Travels in America, trans. Richard
Switzer (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1969), 15.
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idea what they were talking about, and decided to declare him self "a poor quiet man, a
native of the place, and a loyal subject of the King— God bless him!" This seemingly
prudent statement did not have the desired effect as the crowd became increasingly
agitated. The authorities soon arrived and realized that the newcomer was really Old Rip
Van Winkle who disappeared twenty years before when he ventured into the mountains.
For Rip Van Winkle, those two decades had passed in a single night; his old life was
gone, and the world around him now was radically different than the one he knew.15
In Irving's story, the commotion and controversy over the election clearly marked
how much the political landscape had changed. For the townspeople, discovering the
newcomer’s political allegiance preceded all other questions, including finding out his
name and where he came from. For Rip Van Winkle himself, the country's political
transformation was so far-reaching that its contours were perplexing. "It took some time"
before Rip could grasp the idea that "instead of being a subject of his majesty King
George the Third, he was now a free citizen of the United States." The difficulty Rip
faced in comprehending the new political order helps demonstrate that for Irving, the
Revolution was indeed revolutionary in a political context. Yet Irving's story also
suggests that the pace of social and economic change did not keep up with the changes to
the political landscape. When Rip entered the town, he stared in amazement at "the rows
o f houses which he had never seen before." The changes were startling, and "he began to
doubt whether both he and the world around him were not bewitched." Yet the
enchantment did not last very long. Unlike the bewildering political changes he
encountered, however, the social and economic changes were just unsettling. The

15Washington Irving, "Rip Van Winkle," in The Sketch Book o f Geoffrey Crayon, Gent. [1819],
intro. William Hedges (New York: Penguin, 1988), 28-42.
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transformation was not so far-reaching that he mistook the place for anything other than
his old village. The place was "larger and more populous," and there were "strange
names . . . over the doors— strange faces at the windows— every thing was strange." Yet
Rip recognized enough o f the old in the new to locate his house and the inn where he
spent many evenings smoking his pipe. Once his identity was known, he had little
trouble settling into his daughter's "snug well furnished house," and resuming "his old
walks and habits."16 For a man trying to make sense of his surroundings by comparing
them to the society he had known in late colonial America, adjusting to the social
relationships in the new republic proved far easier than adjusting to the new political
sensibilities.
The fictional account of Rip Van Winkle's experiences and the personal
observations of Francois de Chateaubriand present a microcosm of post-Revolutionary
change in America. The break with Great Britain in 1776 symbolically cut off the head
o f King George HI, an act that proved as revolutionary as the executions of England's
King Charles I in 1649, France's King Louis XVI in 1792, or Russia's Tsar Nicholas II in
1917. The new United States v/as a bold experiment in republican government over a
fifteen-hundred-mile-long area— nothing like it had ever existed in the history of the
world with the possible exception of the ancient Roman republic. The new political order
demanded a revolutionary change in political relationships, transforming subjects into
citizens and British colonials into American nationals. There was an outpouring of
democratic sentiment that continued long after the Revolution, and the weight of these
changes is clearly felt in Irving's story. Yet the rhythms and patterns of everyday life had

16 Irving, "Rip Van Winkle," 36,40.
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not changed by nearly the same degree. In Irving's vision of the 1790s, the social and
economic changes to American society that immediately followed the Revolution were
significant— what one might expect after a lapse o f twenty years— but the changes were
far from revolutionary. For Chateaubriand, it was unclear whether or not Americans had
changed any o f their colonial habits and traits.
The persistence o f traditional society in the decades after the Revolution is in many
ways remarkable, because, as historian Carl Becker argued, "the American Revolution
was the result o f two general movements; the contest for home-rule and independence,
and the democratization of American politics and society." The former was clearly a
"question of home-rule; the second was the question . . . of who should rule at hom e."17
Countless studies have supported Becker’s dual-revolution thesis, demonstrating how
artisans, journeymen, apprentices, African Americans, Indians, women, and many others
hoped and expected that the Revolution would transform the social structure of colonial
America in addition to removing the authority of the King and Parliament. Studies of
post-Revolutionary America have likewise demonstrated that the American people
remained politicized long after the war and continued the struggle for political
democratization. As historian Merill Jensen argued, "the Revolution was essentially,
though relatively, a democratic movement," and "its significance for the political and
constitutional history o f the United States lay in its tendency to elevate the political and

17Carl Becker, The History o f Political Parties in the Province o f New York, 1760-1776
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1909), 5, 22.
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economic status of the majority of the people."18 Despite the Revolution's "natural"
tendency, however, social hierarchies of race, class, and gender articulated during the
colonial period still informed the ways in which people were subordinated to each other,
and in many cases these traditional social connections were strengthened during the late
eighteenth century. Americans also continued to fix their commercial gaze across the
ocean to markets in Europe and beyond. Their mercantilist leanings kept them as reliant
on foreign trade as they had been before the Revolution. Although a few pioneers began
venturing west of the Appalachians, most Americans continued to cling to the Atlantic
coast; as late as 1795, the port city of Baltimore was the population center of the United
States!19 Although the colonies had severed their political ties to the British government,
American society remained intimately connected to and dependent on the Atlantic
economy.
Historians who have sought to understand the continuing rigidity of the nation's
social and economic structure in the 1780s and 1790s have searched for the presence of
powerful counter-revolutionary forces strong enough to have withstood the Revolution's

18 Merrill Jensen, The Articles of Confederation: An Interpretation o f the Social-Constitutional
History of the American Revolution, 1774-1781 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1940).
10.
19The population center is "the center of population gravity, or that point upon which the U.S.
would balance if it were a rigid plane without weight and the population distributed thereon, with
each individual assumed to have equal weight and to exert an influence on a central point
proportional to his or her distance horn that point." According to the Bureau of the Census, the
population center of the United States in 1790 was 39° 16’ 30" North by 76° 11' 12" West, or
approximately 23 miles east of Baltimore City. In 1800, the center had moved almost due west to
39° 16’ 6" North by 76° 56’ 30” West, or approximately 18 west of Baltimore City. Thus in 1795.
the population center would have likely been between these two points in the vicinity of
Baltimore City itself. After 1800, the population center moved westward at a rate of
approximately one degree of longitude per decade until the end of the nineteenth century. See
The World Almanac and Book of Facts 2000 (Mahwah, NJ: Primedia Reference, 1999), 385.
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"natural" democratizing tendencies.20 The most popular explanation centers on the
centralization o f power in the hands of the few that is supposed to have resulted from the
ratification o f the Constitution, the rise of the Federalist Party, and the implementation of
Alexander Hamilton's financial program.21 In modem America, where the state has
become a powerful engine for directing social and economic development, this argument
may be convincing. It is easy to forget that during the 1790s, the government lacked the
power it now possesses over American life, and that Hamilton himself, who plays a
central role in most of the anti-democratizing theses, tried in vain during the 1790s to end
American dependence on overseas trade and cultivate a domestic manufacturing class.
There were others who also wished to break the nation's dependence on foreign trade, and

20 Many historians of the American Revolution have rejected the idea that there was any rigidity
to the American economy or social structure, and have interpreted the immediate post-war period
as succumbing to what historian J. Franklin Jameson called the "transforming hand of the
revolution." See J. Franklin Jameson, The American Revolution Considered as a Social
Movement (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967; orig. 1926), and Wood, The Radicalism
o f the American Revolution. For an excellent review essay of the so-called "Jameson thesis" in
the American historical imagination, see Alfred Young, "American Historians Confront the
Transforming Hand of Revolution,"' in Ronald Hoffman and Peter Albert, eds.. The
Transforming Hand o f Revolution: Reconsidering the American Revolution as a Social Movement
(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1996), 346-94.
21 The counter-revolution thesis cuts across traditional ideological interpretations of the
Revolution, and encompasses so-called Progressive, Classical Republican (Neo-Whig), LockeanLiberal, and New Left views. For an example of the Progressive approach, see Jensen, The
Articles o f Confederation. For a Classical Republican (Neo-Whig) approach, see Lance Banning,
The Jeffersonian Persuasion: Evolution o f a Party Ideology (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1978). For a Lockean-Liberal approach, see Joyce Appleby, Capitalism and a New Social Order:
The Republican Vision o f the 1790s (New York: New York University Press, 1984). For a New
Left approach, see Michael Merrill and Sean Wilentz, eds.. The Key o f Liberty: The Life and
Democratic Writings o f William Manning, "A Laborer,” 1747-1814 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1993). Also see Richard Rosenfeld, American Aurora, a DemocraticRepublican Returns: The Suppressed History o f Our Nation's Beginnings and the Heroic
Newspaper that Tried to Report It (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997); Larry Tise, The
American Counterrevolution: A Retreatfrom Liberty, 1783-1800 (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole
Books, 1998); and the essays in Alfred Young, ed.. Beyond the American Revolution, and Robert
Gross, ed.. In Debt to Shays: The Bicentennial o f an Agrarian Rebellion (Charlottesville:
University Press of Virginia, 1993).
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convince their fellow countrymen to re-imagine the West in terms o f market development
instead of landed speculation. In the following decade, Albert Gallatin, President
Thomas Jefferson's Secretary of the Treasury, adopted much of the Hamiltonian program
as his own— which seems to abrogate any villainy on Hamilton's part— and Gallatin also
tried, once again in vain, to win Congressional support for building transportation links
across the republic. The frustration of both Federalist and Republican officials to shape
the national economic agenda, at least prior to Madison's radical solution in the Embargo
of 1807, makes the counter-revolution, or centralization-of-power thesis difficult to
accept.
Instead of a top-down approach stressing the primacy of elite political figures, it
seems that a bottom-up approach stressing the primacy of social and economic
institutions would provide a more convincing portrait of the forces that propped up
traditional society after the Revolution. Indeed, as Michael W arner has argued, "the
structuring o f the transatlantic economy as a colonial economy had deep consequences
for almost every aspect of Anglo-American culture," and thus "the market culture of the
[British] Atlantic may have been more responsible than anything else for the practical
sense o f belonging to an imperium." In this context, a colonial culture could persist after
the Revolution because it could be "experienced in many indirect ways."22 Thus to the
extent that Americans relied on a mercantilist understanding of political economy and
looked to the British Atlantic world in search of their future wealth and prosperity, much
of what made pre-Revolutionary America colonial had thus passed into the early republic
unscathed. The institutional structure of the Atlantic economy supported the household
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economy, and the household economy reinforced a social structure common to both
Colonial and postcolonial America.
When Americans ceased to rely on a mercantilist understanding of political
economy and looked to the West to develop a domestic market economy, the structures
upholding traditional society either collapsed or were profoundly transformed to
accommodate the new social and economic order. The switch from an Atlanticorientation and a reliance on foreign trade to a westward-orientation and interest in
developing the domestic market economy occurred after the Panic of 1797. This
financial and commercial crisis shook the foundations of the Atlantic credit system and
the entire Atlantic economy. Between 1797 and America's next major panic in 1819,
market connections to the backcountry and the subsequent changes in urban production
caused significant alterations in the American social structure. These changes had
fundamentally transformed American society, allowing a capitalist social and economic
order to become well established in the consciousness of Americans at the dawn of the
Jacksonian period, and moving America from its postcolonial period to a national one.

T h e Structure o f th e A rg um en t
T he best way to explore America's transition is to focus on an American entrepot
and its relationship to its backcountry and the Atlantic world. The colonial mercantile
economy of the eighteenth century was based on the export of staple goods, usually
agricultural products, from coastal ports. The export trade supported a vibrant household
economy structured around familial and local social connections. This was a face-to-face

22 Michael Warner, "What’s Colonial about Colonial America?" in Robert Blair St. George, ed..
Possible Pasts: Becoming Colonial in Early America (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000),
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society in which the farmers producing the goods in the backcountry would have
interacted with and known many o f the shopkeepers, artisans and merchants in the port.
Thus to understand how mercantilism supported the household economy, and how the
household economy reinforced the colonial social order, requires that the focus be placed
on a specific community and region. To gauge the degree of change in postRevolutionary America, the focus of the study must subsequently remain on that
community and region. O f all the communities in Colonial British America to choose
from, Baltimore and the mid-Atlantic region are arguably the best test cases.
Baltimore Town came into existence by legislative act in 1729, but languished as a
backwater of empire until the mid-1740s. The town was a case study in the importance
of mercantilism to colonial development; without a staple export, the scarcely populated
region was dominated by subsistence farming and the town was unable to grow. Once a
staple product emerged in the mid-1740s, however, Baltimore and its hinterland
ballooned in population. A struggling hamlet of no more than a few hundred people in
1750, Baltimore Town had a population of 6,000, a thriving mercantile trade, and a
blossoming household economy by the eve of independence. The wartime trade during
the Revolution proved a tremendous boon to Baltimore's growth, as the Royal Navy
never blockaded the port during the conflict. At the conclusion of hostilities, Baltimore
was poised to surge ahead as one o f the republic's leading cities, and in the several
decades after the Revolution, Baltimore's population indeed grew faster than that of any
other major American port, including New York City. If revolutionary economic change
happened anywhere in America after the Revolution, it would have happened in

59-60,63.
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Baltimore— the new republic's most dynamic city. Thus Baltimore and the mid-Atlantic
region beyond serve as the ideal test case for taking the measure of independence.
The first four chapters focus on the integration of Baltimore and the mid-Atlantic
region into the British Atlantic economy, and the persistence o f mercantilism and
traditional social and economic patterns in Baltimore after the Revolution. Chapter one
discusses the origins of Baltimore Town and its relation to the mid-Atlantic backcountry
between 1729 and the 1770s. The chapter explores the importance of mercantilism to
colonial development, the reasons for Baltimore's languishing condition between 1729
and 1744, its surge in growth after 1744, and the creation of a vibrant household
economy. Chapter two discusses Baltimore during and immediately after the
Revolutionary War. The chapter explores the threat to Baltimore's prosperity from
Congress's nationalist economic agenda in 1774-1776, the town's subsequent recovery
and growth thanks to Congress's embrace of free trade, the hopes at war’s end that free
trade would remake the Atlantic world, and how those hopes were ended by the renewal
of European mercantilist restrictions that now excluded the United States. Chapter three
discusses the American reaction to the European mercantilist restrictions during the
1780s and 1790s. The chapter explores how a neo-mercantilist approach dominated
American thinking about political economy, how this reliance on foreign trade proved
ruinous in the 1780s, and how the revival of trade during the French Revolution
reinforced the neo-mercantilist economy. Chapter four discusses the persistence of the
household economy and the traditional social order despite several crises and challenges
to traditional society in Baltimore during the 1790s.
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The last five chapters focus on the transition from an Atlantic-oriented to a
westward-looking economy, and the subsequent eclipse of the traditional social order.
Chapter five discusses the hard times following the Panic of 1797, and how this
commercial crisis helped draw together a broad-based effort to re-orient the city’s
economy away from overseas trade and towards the backcountry. Chapter six discusses
the myriad efforts o f Baltimore's merchants and artisans, as well farmers and shopkeepers
in the mid-Atlantic backcountry, to expand the return trade to the backcountry after 1800.
The chapter discusses the importance of turnpikes, banks and credit, newspapers in this
process, as well as the emerging trade rivalry between Philadelphia's and Baltimore's
business communities for market connections in the Pennsylvania backcountry. Chapter
seven discusses the economic impact of the backcountry trade on Baltimore's urban
economy. The chapter discusses how increased competition and opportunity gave rise to
industrialization and a nascent manufacturing class, how the new manufacturers re
envisioned the division of labor, and how the new manufacturers subsequently
demolished customary rights and traditional relationships within the workplace. Chapter
eight discusses the eclipse of the household economy, and how the rise of the
manufacturers forced fundamental changes in artisans' workshops, the changing nature of
gender relations within the urban household, and the disappearance o f the prevailing
ethos of mutual obligations and deference that characterized the colonial social order.
Chapter nine discusses how these emerging tensions within Baltimore exploded into
violence during the riots of 1812. The chapter explores how the polyvocality of the
rioters and the confused nature of the violence demonstrates that by 1812, the city's
working people had not yet developed into a coherent working class with a clear sense of
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class consciousness. The riots thus provide a microcosm of change in Baltimore,
providing the opportunity to peer into the mentalite of the city and discover how far the
market revolution had crept into the consciousness of Americans.
The epilogue, "Frederick Douglass's Baltimore," extends the analysis to the Panic
of 1819 and the hard times of the 1820s, when the fault lines in the city's social structure
that were already visible in the riots of 1812 became more calcified. Even to an eightyear old enslaved boy from Talbot County on Maryland's rural Eastern Shore, the racial
and class divisions that thereafter characterized the new social structure of Jacksonian
America were apparent. If Rip Van Winkle had gone into the mountains again in 1800,
and taken another flagon of liquor from the curious Dutch fellow, he would have found
the transformation in American social and economic relationships in 1820 as
incomprehensible as he found the country’s political changes in the 1790s.
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BALTIMORE AND THE ATLANTIC WORLD
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CHAPTER ONE
CHARLES CARROLL’S BALTIMORE

Few considered the land worthy of their attention, much less their fortunes. For
decades, the marshy shores of Maryland’s Patapsco River remained a backwater,
unsettled and ignored by Indians and Europeans alike. Captain John Smith was not
impressed with the river. When he surveyed the Chesapeake Bay for the Virginia
Company in 1608, he recorded that the Patapsco was the only uninhabited navigable river
along the Chesapeake’s western shore. He wasted little time in the area, commenting
briefly on the river’s red-stained clays and quickly moving on to discuss the more
impressive rushing waters and craggy promontories of the Susquehanna further north.
Little changed with the coming of colonists. The Ark and the Dove carried the First
English settlers to Maryland in 1634, but it was not until 1659 that the First land patents in
the area of the Patapsco. No one took an interest in the river’s northwest branch, where
the town of Baltimore was eventually established, until 1668. Thomas Cole received a
patent that year for 550 acres on the north shore, and the tract thereafter became known
as Cole’s Harbour. Over the next thirty years, however, the land remained mostly
uncultivated and unsettled. As late as the 1690s, Captain Smith would have likely
recognized Cole’s Harbour as the same wilderness he explored more than eighty years
earlier.1 Such were the modest beginnings of the land on which Baltimore Town would

1To Smith, the red clay resembled “bole Armoniack,” and thus he named the Patapsco the Bolus
River. See John Smith, The Generali Historie o f Virginia, New England & the Summer Isles, in
The Travels ofCaptaine John Smith (Glasgow: Glasgow University Press, 1907; orig. 1624), I,
24
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be erected. Within the next century, Baltimore would become an epicenter in the
transformation o f American society and one of the most dynamic commercial centers
anywhere in the Atlantic world. At the turn of the eighteenth century, however, this land,
and the shallow, silty basin it overlooked, held a promise that few had seen and none had
fully appreciated.
The lack of any interest in Cole’s Harbour during the seventeenth century is not
surprising, because the area possessed none of the characteristics that planters deemed
desirable for the cultivation o f tobacco, colonial Maryland’s primary cash crop. Indeed, a
more unpromising spot would have been difficult to imagine for a tobacco planter. The
marshy land surrounding Baltimore rested on the Fall Line between the Tidewater and
the Piedmont regions, and most colonials believed that these soils were ill-suited to the
cultivation o f tobacco. The area soon became known as the “barrens” of Maryland. In a
1722 letter to Charles Calvert, Fifth Lord Baltimore and Lord Proprietor of Maryland,
Philemon Lloyd reported “having traveled over chiefly Barren & Stoney Grounds” to the
western shores of the Susquehanna. He thereafter “Spent three days longer in those
woods & Among the Barren Hills which,” in his opinion, “afford no matter of
Sustenance— except for Berrys.”2 Even if Lloyd and others had judged the Piedmont
soils to be appropriate, Cole’s Harbour could not accommodate the large ships engaged in
43,49. According to nineteenth-century historian J. Thomas Scharf, a number of speculators
received patents for land “in the neighborhood of Baltimore” when Baltimore County was erected
in 1659. In 1661, Charles Gorsuch patented 50 acres at Whetstone Point, but it was Cole who
received the first patent for the land on which Baltimore Town itself was established. Cole
originally received a warrant for 300 acres on the northwest branch in 1668, but revoked the
warrant. He then received the patent for 550 acres later that year. See J. Thomas Scharf, The
Chronicles o f Baltimore; Being a Complete History o f “Baltimore Town ” and Baltimore City
from the Earliest Period to the Present Time (Baltimore: Turnbull Brothers, 1874), 9-11.
2 Philemon Lloyd to Charles Calvert, Fifth Lord Baltimore and Lord Proprietor of Maryland,
September 10,1722, Dulany Papers, MS. 1265, MHS.
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the trans-Atlantic trade. The steady flow of silt that descended into the basin from Jones
Falls, an unnavigable stream that frequently flooded the shoreline, rendered the harbor
too shallow for most large merchant vessels. In the dead of winter, the basin often froze
over completely.
Despite the apparent limitations of Cole’s Harbour, Charles Carroll sensed
something hopeful about the place. Known by future generations as “the Settler” to
distinguish him from the other famous Marylanders who bore the same name, Carroll had
emigrated from Ireland to Maryland in 1688 to become the colony’s attorney general.
His tenure as a colonial official did not last long. After the Glorious Revolution and its
aftermath in British America, Carroll faced the incessant threat of anti-Catholic
discrimination from the newly established Protestant authorities. The downward turn in
his political fortunes encouraged the Settler to reorient his interests away from officeholding towards land speculation and mercantile pursuits. Cole’s Harbour soon caught
Carroll’s attention. In early January 1695, at a time when winter ice usually blocked the
basin’s access to the sea, Carroll surveyed the area. Unlike almost all who had come
before, the Settler saw opportunity along the marshy shores, and made the decision to
acquire the land.3
Over the next twenty years, the naysayers seemingly proved correct about Cole’s

3 For the history of Charles Carroll the Settler, see Ronald Hoffman, Princes o f Ireland, Planters
o f Maryland: A Carroll Saga, 1500-1782 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
2000), 37-97. According to Scharf, Carroll surveyed 1,000 acres in Baltimore County, including
the 550-acre tract known as Cole’s Harbour, on January 13, 1695. Carroll received a patent for
this land, including Cole’s Harbour with additions, on February 10, 1696. Two years later, on
February 17, 1698, Cole’s Harbour was re-surveyed and it was discovered to contain only 510
acres. A new patent was subsequently issued to James Todd on June 1, 1700, and the area was
renamed ‘Todd’s Range.” According to Ronald Hoffman, Carroll finally acquired Cole’s
Harbour (or Todd’s Range) in 1701. See Scharf, The Chronicles o f Baltimore, 11, 14-15, and
Hoffman, Princes o f Ireland, Planters o f Maryland, 120.
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Harbour, as the area continued to be a largely ignored and unsettled backwater of
Baltimore County. As had been the case in the seventeenth century, settlers avoided
Cole’s Harbour because its hinterland seemingly could not support tobacco, the silty
basin and recurrent flooding on the Jones Falls limited the usefulness of the port, and the
marshy lands made the area an uncomfortable place to live. Carroll only managed to rent
land to a few tenant farmers, and in 1711, Jonathan Hanson rented 31 acres to establish a
mill. Yet Carroll’s fortunes were not adversely effected by the sleepy condition of Cole’s
Harbour. By the time of his death in 1720, the Maryland magnate had acquired almost
48,000 acres o f land through marriage, inheritance, land patents, foreclosures, and
purchases. Cole’s Harbour ultimately represented less than two percent of the Settler’s
eventual landed holdings.4
The Settler’s two surviving sons, Charles Carroll of Annapolis and Daniel Carroll
of Duddington, jointly inherited the land around Cole’s Harbour. At first, the brothers
were satisfied to rent land to tenant farmers, and thus manage Cole’s Harbour as their
father had done. A 1726 survey of the area revealed that only a few tenements and a
single tobacco warehouse had been raised on the land since the construction of Hanson’s
mill. Yet the importance of Cole’s Harbour to the Carrolls’ fortunes was increasing.
Displaying the same speculative streak that his father often demonstrated, Charles Carroll
of Annapolis patented a 10,000-acre tract in 1723 in the valley formed by the Potomac
and Monocacy Rivers in what is today Frederick County, Maryland, west of Baltimore.
The Carrolls were not alone in taking an interest in western Maryland. Speculators like
Benjamin Tasker and Daniel Dulany, and even Lord Baltimore himself engrossed lands
4 Hoffman, Princes o f Ireland, Planters o f Maryland, 68-73, and Scharf, The Chronicles o f
Baltimore, 14-17.
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in Monocacy Valley during the 1720s. With the prospects for large-scale settlement of
the backcountry increasing rapidly, the Carroll brothers conspired to raise a town at
Cole’s Harbour.5
The growing importance of the backcountry was not missed by the colonial
assembly in Annapolis, but the question remained where to place a town on the Patapsco
River. The unforgiving conditions at Cole’s Harbour and the shallowness of its basin
worried many legislators that a town on the Northwest Branch would not succeed. The
early favorite among the members o f the assembly was M oale’s Point on the southern
branch o f the river. M oale’s Point was more accessible for merchant ships, and it was
already the terminus for a ruddy wilderness road that cut a path into the western reaches
of Baltimore County. However, John Moale, the English merchant who owned the land
at Moale’s Point, was not prepared to relinquish control over his property. He realized
that the red-stained clays that Captain John Smith had noticed more than a century ago
betrayed the presence o f potentially lucrative iron deposits in the land, and thus Moale
rushed to Annapolis to quash any plan to raise a town there. With Moale’s Point
eliminated from consideration, interest grudgingly swung towards Cole’s Harbour. A
petition by the “Inhabitants in & About [the] Potapsco River” had already been submitted
on July 14 “Praying leave to Erect a Town on [the] Peice of Land belonging to Messrs
Charles and Daniel Carroll,” and the legislators had few alternatives remaining. A bill to
establish “Baltimore Town” was introduced to the assembly on July 23, 1729 and was
s The survey was conducted by Richard Gist for Edward Fell, a Quaker from Lancashire, England
who settled east of Jones Falls at what became known as Fell’s Point. See Scharf, The Chronicles
o f Baltimore, 18. On land speculation in the Monocacy River Valley, including the 10,000-acre
tract “Carrollton,” see Grace Tracey and John Dunn, Pioneers o f Old Monocacy: The Early
Settlement o f Frederick County, Maryland, 1721-1743 (Baltimore: Genealogical Publishing
Company, 1987).
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quickly approved by both Houses before the end of the month. When Lieutenant
Governor Benedict Leonard Calvert signed the bill on behalf of the Lord Proprietor on
August 8, Baltimore came into existence as a legal creation.6
Unfortunately for the Carroll brothers, the act that created Baltimore Town only
succeeded in changing the name of the place. After the town was laid out, there was an
initial surge of interest by twelve investors who immediately bought fourteen of the
original sixty lots. After this initial series of sales, however, the town’s commissioners
did not sell off another lot for six years. Disturbed by the lack of development, and
fearful that naysayers may have been correct in doubting the town’s prospects, Charles
Carroll o f Annapolis ended the six-year drought in 1735 by purchasing 26 of the
remaining lots. He hoped that his efforts to resell the lots would prove more fruitful than
those of the town commissioners, but over the next eight years, Carroll was unable to sell
off any of his lots. The town’s prospects became even murkier when the Maryland
assembly accepted the petition of a rival group of property owners to erect “Jones Town”
immediately east o f Baltimore Town, on the other side of Jones Falls. Neither town
prospered, and as late as 1744, both places existed more as legal entities than as places of
commerce and settlement. Town development along the Northwest Branch of the
Patapsco appeared doomed.7
Despite the inaction of the town commissioners and the establishment of Jones

6 William Hand Browne, et. al., eds.. Archives o f Maryland (Baltimore: Maryland Historical
Society, 1883-1972), XXXVI, 396-97,425,428-29, 464-65. For John Moale’s opposition to a
town at Moale’s Point, see Scharf, The Chronicles o f Baltimore, 19.
7 Wilbur Coyle, First Records o f Baltimore Town and Jones Town, 1729-1797 (Baltimore, 1905),
1-9, and Charles Steffen, From Gentlemen to Townsmen: The Gentry o f Baltimore County,
Maryland, 1660-1776 (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1993), 137-39.
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Town, the primary obstacle to the growth of Baltimore Town was the continued lack of a
cash crop in the hinterland. In a 1754 letter to Frederick Calvert, Sixth Lord Baltimore
and Lord Proprietor o f Maryland, Governor Horatio Sharpe wrote, “if one considers
[Baltimore] with respect to Trade, the extensive Country beyond it leaves no room for
Comparison.” He believed that “were a few Gentlemen of fortune to settle there and
encourage the Trade it might soon become a flourishing place.” Until such time,
however, he feared that the town “cannot make any considerable Figure.”8 Sharpe’s
connection between the growth of Baltimore and the expansion of its hinterland brought
into clear relief the essential problem of urban development in colonial America: for a
town to thrive, it had to become an entrepot or center for processing and preparing
agricultural goods for export. Throughout history, trade has been an important
consideration in the development of cities, but the narrow conditions for urban growth in
British America demonstrate more than anything else how much overseas trade was the
defining characteristic o f colonial life from Nova Scotia to Barbados.9 Baltimore Town
was failing because there were no major agricultural exports from western Maryland
prior to the 1740s, and thus no need for an entrepot. Put another way, Baltimore Town

8 Governor Horatio Sharpe to Frederick Calvert, Sixth Lord Baltimore and Lord Proprietor of
Maryland, May 2, 1754, in Browne, et. al.. Archives o f Maryland, VI, 57.
9 For the development of the British Atlantic's mercantilist economy, see especially David Harris
Sacks, The Widening Gate: Bristol and the Atlantic Economy, 1450-1700 (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1991). For the importance of mercantilism to urban development in the
British American colonies, see John McCusker and Russell Menard, The Economy o f British
America, 1607-1789 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985), 71; Ronald
Hoffman and Carville Earle, “Staple Crops and Urban Development in the Eighteenth-Century
South,” Perspectives in American History, 10 (1976): 7-78; Gary Nash, “The Social Evolution of
Preindustrial American Cities, 1700-1820: Reflections and New Directions.” Journal of Urban
History, 13 (1987): 115-45; and Franklin Knight and Elizabeth Leis, Atlantic Port Cities:
Economy, Culture, and Society in the Atlantic World, 1650-1850 (Knoxville: University of
Tennessee Press, 1991).
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and its hinterland were not yet integrated into the British Empire’s mercantilist economy.

M e r c a n t il is m

and the

M id -A t l a n t i c

The word mercantilism is familiar to students of American history as a way to
describe the commercial realities and predominant beliefs about trade in the lateseventeenth and eighteenth-century Atlantic world. Unfortunately, familiarity with a
word does not always mean that the word is understood. M ercantilism’s basic tenets are
seldom defined, and thus the meaning of the word is usually understood in the context of
its policy manifestations, and not in the context of its philosophical and economic
foundations. Because many of the Britain’s mercantilist policies enacted in the 1760s
and 1770s established new taxes and regulations on American commerce, the meaning of
the word mercantilism can be carelessly reduced to the promotion of trade and a
propensity for state intervention in the economy. During the twentieth century, political
debates over trade policy have further obscured its meaning by conflating the words
mercantilism and protectionism. Not surprisingly, several historians in the mid-twentieth
century decided that if mercantilism is defined in this way, it becomes useless for the
study o f the seventeenth and eighteenth-century Atlantic world and ought to be
abandoned as an unneeded abstraction. Such a radical solution is not necessary, nor is it
desirable. As historian Eli Heckscher argued, mercantilism can be a very useful
intellectual construct as long as “the problem of the relationship o f means to ends [is ]. . .
placed at the centre of every work . . . that wishes to probe the subject thoroughly.” 10
10 Eli Heckscher, Mercantilism, trans. Mendel Shapiro, 2d ed. revised by E J 7. Soderlund (New
York: MacMillan, 1955), I, 2. For a review of the mid-twentieth century debate over the utility of
the word mercantilism, see Charles Wilson, “Mercantilism: Some Vicissitudes of an Idea,”
Economic History Review, 2d ser., 2 (1957): 181-88.
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Thus to gain an understanding of the British mercantilist world and Baltimore Town’s
place within it, it is crucial to carefully define mercantilism by addressing its ideological
precepts.
The growth of overseas empires in the seventeenth century created an interest in
better understanding the causes of the wealth of nations, and politicians and philosophers
in the nations with the fastest growing empires, France and Great Britain, took the lead in
uncovering the fundamental principles of political economy. Mercantilists embraced the
idea of an essentially zero-sum economy in which wealth could neither be created nor
destroyed, only transferred. This view rested on a general theory that money that
possessed an intrinsic or universal value, and it was this general theory of money that
represented the organizing principle of mercantilist thought. Prior to the seventeenth
century, most writers considered money only in relation to a general theory of prices.11
Although the new mercantilist theory of money is discernible in the thinking of early
seventeenth-century writers, including Sir Thomas Mun, Sir William Petty, and John
Graunt, it was John Locke brought the doctrine into specific, theoretical focus in the
1690s in two pamphlets. Locke argued that money, by which he meant silver, was

11 Mercantilist thought was certainly not limited to just France and Great Britain. For mercantilist
alternatives on the continent, see Heckscher, Mercantilism. I, 56-77, 339-72, and Terence
Hutchinson, Before Adam Smith: The Emergence o f Political Economy. 1662-1776 (New York:
Basil Blackwell, 1988), 87-106,248-72, 298-307. On the intellectual advances of early
mercantilist writers towards a general theory of money in the seventeenth century, see
Hutchinson, Before Adam Smith, 27-55. Although the association between value and price had
been a concern of western thought since Aristode, the price inflation of the sixteenth century
invigorated interest in the question. Two outstanding examples were Martin de Azpilcueta
Navarro, Commentario resolutorio de usuras (1556), and Bernardo Davanzati, Discourse upon
Coins (1588). Few sixteenth-century writers attempted to develop a general theory of money.
An important exception was Jean Bodin. In his Les six livres de la republique (1576), Bodin
argued that prices did not rise because of greater quantities of gold and silver, but thanks to the
devaluation of currencies through the debasement of coins. He fell short, however, of directly
arguing the mercantilist position that gold and silver possessed either intrinsic or universal values.
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unique among all the materials and commodities in the world in that it possessed an
intrinsic value. The value o f all other commodities were subject to change, but “silver is
that which mankind have agreed on, to take and give in exchange for all commodities as
an equivalent.” He did not extend the same consideration to any other commodity—even
gold. Unlike silver, gold was “not the money of the world, and the measure of
commerce, nor fit to be so.” The value of silver, and only silver, was a fixed, universal
constant. In regards to policy, Locke believed that government should neither seek to
regulate interest rates nor modify the quantities of silver used in the coinage of money.12
From the perspective of the twenty-first century, where the values of currencies
change from moment-to-moment around the world, the mercantilist belief that money has
an intrinsic, fixed value seems arbitrary. The idea that silver alone has this characteristic
borders on mysticism and seems closer to alchemy than economics.13 Yet Locke’s
formulation was grounded on the confluence o f natural law philosophy and emerging
scientific empiricism. Just as Sir Isaac Newton, Rene Descartes, and Sir Francis Bacon
12 Locke concluded that once denominations were set, and the interest rates had reached their
natural levels, they should not be altered by state authority. Ironically, the immediate goal of
Locke’s pamphlets. Some Considerations o f the Consequences o f the Lowering o f the Interest and
Raising the Value o f Money, and Further Considerations Concerning Raising the Value o f
Money, was to convince Parliament to vote in favor of recoinage and a lowering of the interest
rate from 6 to 4 percent. Evidently the value of British money and the interest rate did not match
what Locke considered to be their “natural levels.” See John Locke, Further Considerations
Concerning Raising the Value o f Money in The Works o f John Locke (London: T. Davison, 1812),
V, 144, 151-52. Despite Locke’s insistence on silver as the universal monetary standard, Great
Britain recognized the gold standard between 1816 and 1931.
13To some twentieth-century minds, however, many of the assumptions that Locke made
regarding intrinsic value were not at all arbitrary. Indeed, until President Richard Nixon took the
United States off the gold standard on August IS, 1971, having a fixed value for currencies
pegged to the value of gold was a fundamental part of U.S. monetary policy. Thus instead of
seeing protectionists as modern-day mercantilists, those who argue for a return to the gold
standard should be seen as the closest approximation to mercantilists in the twenty-first century.
Contemporary advocates for a return to the gold standard include 1996 Republican VicePresidenrial candidate Jack Kemp, and Jude Wanniski, the editor of The Wall Street Journal from
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introduced laws governing the natural world, and Hugo Grotius and Samuel Pufendorf
embraced the tradition of natural law philosophy that perceived a natural order to society,
Locke and other mercantilists sought to introduce natural laws which governed
commerce and trade. What may be considered arbitrary today was, by the early
eighteenth century, accepted as fundamental. To Locke, the rarified position of silver
was as self-evident as one’s natural rights to life, liberty, and property.14
Having established that the centrality of money in the balance of trade, it followed
that the causes of the wealth o f the nations rested in having more silver in proportion to
others. Locke and most other mercantilists did not succumb to a facile reductionism
regarding bullion. Wealth was not a function of the absolute amount of silver that a

1972 to 1978.
14There were mercantilists who maintained that the value of money could change. Those who
identified with Locke's position are usually called “metallists” and those who doubted that money
held an intrinsic value were called “cartalists,” but the differences between these two camps were
not as severe as might be imagined. Charles Davenant, a sometimes Member of Parliament and
the Inspector General of Exports and Imports between 1705 and 1714, was a cartalist. He
maintained that “money is at bottom [valued] no more than the counters with which men, in their
dealings, have accustomed to reckon.” Locke would not have disagreed with this formulation,
having argued that the standard value of money was indeed set by “the universal consent of
mankind.” Davenant only digressed from Locke’s view in that he believed universal consent
could change, “and from hence arises what we commonly call intrinsic value.” Locke doubted
that humanity was quite so fickle, although he did admit that in theory, under extraordinary
circumstances, the value of money could indeed shift. He even reserved a right to governments to
intervene in the economy for the purpose of changing the value of silver when “there [was] an
absolute necessity shown of such a change.” Charles Davenant quoted in Hutcheson, Before
Adam Smith, 52, and Locke, Further Considerations Concerning Raising the Value o f Money in
The Works o f John Locke, V, 139. 144. The differences between the two camps were thus largely
confined to theoretical. One spectacular exception was the divide between metallists and
cartalists over whether or not paper money was inherently inflationary. Benjamin Franklin, a
cartalist, argued throughout his life that paper money represented an acceptable alternative to
silver coins. Metallists usually pointed to the failed schemes of John Law, another cartalist, as
proof of the contrary. A Scottish banker. Law fled to France prior to the Act of Union in 1707.
In Paris, he established the Banque Generate that the government nationalized as the Banque
Royale. With this privileged position, Law created the Mississippi Company and adopted an
inflationary and speculative plan to develop Louisiana. The speculative “bubble” he created
collapsed in 1720. See Hutcheson, Before Adam Smith, 134-40.
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nation possessed, but “in having more in proportion than the rest of the world.” He
argued that “in a country not furnished with mines, there are but two ways of growing
rich, either by conquest or commerce.” During the reign King Louis XIV, France
followed both of these mercantilist strategies by making war against the Dutch and
seeking commerce with Spain. Jean Baptiste Colbert, the king’s chief minister after
1661, interpreted French policies as being a “war of money” against the rest of Europe ir.
which commerce became “a perpetual and peaceable war of wit and energy among all
nations.” Locke considered conquest impractical for Great Britain, and believed that
“nobody is vain enough to entertain a thought of our reaping the profits of the world with
our swords.” Unlike the Spanish, who could mine gold out of the ground, or the French,
who could effectively make war against their neighbors, Locke believed that “Commerce,
therefore, is the only way left to [Britain].” This presented a challenge, because
commerce could only succeed when a nation possessed “an overbalance of trade,” by
which Locke meant a positive balance of trade.15
The “balance of trade” was a means o f measuring the success o f government
policies in bringing silver into the nation. Sir Thomas Mun and Edward Misselden
brought the mercantilist conception of the balance of trade into clear focus during the
1620s, and Sir William Petty and John Graunt brought greater sophistication to its
calculation in the 1660s with their studies of “political arithmetic.” 16 It involved more
15Locke, Some Considerations o f the Consequences o f the Lowering o f the Interest and Rising
the Value o f Money, in The Works o f John Locke, V, 13. Colbert quoted in E.E. Rich and C.H.
Wilson, eds.. The Cambridge Economic History o f Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1967), IV, 526.
16 See Sir Thomas Mun, A Discourse o f Trade from England unto the East-Indies (New York:
The Facsimile Society, 1930; orig. 1621); Edward Misselden, The Circle o f Commerce or the
Balance o f Trade (New Haven, CT: Research Publications, 1974; orig. 1623); and Sir William
Petty, Treatise on Taxes and Contributions (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1980; orig.
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than ju st measuring the difference between the value o f a nation’s imports and exports.
The idea that a trade surplus benefited the economy while a trade deficit hurt the
economy was not a novel concept. For the mercantilists, any activity that effected the
flow of bullion in the Atlantic economy had to be considered as important. Thus earnings
from the carrying trade, including commissions, interest, shipping fees, and insurance, as
well as taxes collected on overseas trade and British government revenues expended in
the colonies were just as important to the balance of trade as imports and exports. In
terms o f policymaking, mercantilists did not simply focus on tariffs, bounties, and quotas
in trade policy. Taxes, government spending, interest rates, laws governing insurance,
regulations over the shipping trades also needed to be properly weighed in the
calculation.17
Mercantilists split over how best to achieve a positive balance of trade. In France,
Colbert believed that it was vital for the state to impose stiff controls over commerce in
all its forms so that France might not be outwitted by its adversaries. To this end, he
adopted prohibitory and protectionist policies designed to centralize economic control
1662). For a general survey of seventeenth-century English mercantilist thought, see Joyce
Appleby, Economic Thought and Ideology in Seventeenth-Century England (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1978).
17Throughout the sixteenth century, writers in both Britain and the continent emphasized its
importance in international trade. In IS49, Sir Thomas Smith argued in A Discourse o f the
Commonweal o f this Realm o f England that “we must alwaies take care that we bie [buy] no more
of strangers than we sell [to] them.” Smith extended his analysis to the state level, arguing that
these principles applied as much to the commonwealth as a whole as they did to the individual.
What was novel in seventeenth-century mercantilist thought compared to Smith’s formulations
was the centrality of money in the balance of trade. See Sir Thomas Smith, A Discourse o f the
Commonweal o f this Realm o f England; or A Compendious or Brief Examination o f Certain
Ordinary Complaints (London: William Smith, 1581), quoted in Hutcheson, Before Adam Smith,
20. The emphasis on a balance was likely the result of the introduction of double-entry book
keeping into England during the early sixteenth century. These techniques had been in use in
Italy since at least the fourteenth century. See Rich and Wilson, The Cambridge Economic
History o f Europe, IV, 500.
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over both domestic and foreign trade in much the same way that his predecessors,
Cardinals Richilieu and Mazarin, had centralized political control. This highly
interventionist approach to political economy, sometimes known as Colbertism,
t Q

dominated French policies for almost a century.

Unlike absolutist France where

Colbert’s policies reigned supreme, late-seventeenth and early-eighteenth-century British
authorities debated the merits of free trade on some issues and promoted state
intervention on others. For example, Charles Davenant opposed a measure being
considered by Parliament in the late 1690s to prohibit the importation of silk from India.
Proponents o f the bill believed that protection was needed for the English woolens
industry, but Davenant argued “trade is in its nature free, finds its own channels and best
directeth its own course; and all laws . . . to limit and circumscribe it, may serve the
particular ends of private men, but are seldom advantageous to the public.” A year later,
however, Davenant reversed course, arguing that “in first appearance those traffics seem
hurtful which export money, but when we come to reason upon things by figures, we find
that such trades are beneficial, when they bring in one way more bullion than they carry
out.” For British mercantilists, free trade and state intervention were not ends unto
themselves, but strategies to be selectively employed towards achieving a positive
balance o f trade.19

18 During the late 1750s and 1760s, Jean Francois Quesnay and the physiocrats challenged the
consensus view of French mercantilism. See Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, The Origins o f
Physiocracy: Economic Revolution and Social Order in Eighteenth-Century France (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1976). For a survey of Colbert’s economic policies and his influence
over French mercantilism, see Charles Cole, Colbert and a Century o f French Mercantilism
(Hampden, CT: Archon Books, 1964; orig. 1939), 2 volumes, and Heckscher, Mercantilism, I.
78-220 and 345-50.
19 Charles Davenant, Essay on the East India Trade (London, 1771; orig. 1697), 1,98-99, quoted
in Hutcheson, Before Adam Smith, 50.
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The debate over free trade versus state intervention extended to British America
as well. In Boston, merchant Thomas Banister also altered his position on the subject
depending on circumstances. In a 1715 letter to the Lords Commissioners of Trade and
Plantations, Banister argued that Parliament ought to provide bounties for American
naval stores so that New Englanders could better afford British manufactures. If not,
England would suffer a double loss; New Englanders would be forced into making their
own manufactures instead of producing naval stores. This would limit overseas trade and
adversely effect Great Britain’s balance of trade. A few years later, Banister argued that
Parliament ought not interfere in any way in the American trade with the French and
Dutch West Indies. The trade employed many ships, and the sale of rum and molasses
for poorer quality fish, unfit in Banister’s estimation for the British West Indies,
produced a positive balance of trade for New England. This silver could then be plowed
into the Atlantic trade in the purchase of British manufactures, thus positively effecting
Great Britain’s balance of trade. Otherwise, the New England colonies, “because of their
unfavorable balance of trade[,] would be forced to manufacture for themselves” to the
detriment o f the British. For Americans like Banister, Parliamentary regulations over
trade did not amount to tyranny, as a later generation would claim, just poorly designed
policy.20
The plurality of arguments over trade strategy demonstrates that the definition of
the term mercantilism, as it applies to the study of the eighteenth-century Atlantic world,

20 Banister quoted in Joseph Dorfman. The Economic Mind in American Civilization, 1606-1865
(New York: Viking Press, 1946), I, 137. Parliament disagreed with Banister’s position, and in
1733, levied duties against the importation of sugar from the non-British West Indies to the
British North American colonies. For the most part, however, the British did not strictly enforce
the provisions of the law until after 1763. See Dorfman, The Economic Mind, I, 135-41.
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should not be reduced to a question of state intervention versus free trade. Until about
1720, it was unclear whether or not the interventionist approach would prevail in the
struggle to direct British mercantilism. Bernard Mandeville strongly supported the
interventionist position, and “had the Mortification for several Years to meet with
Abundance o f sensible People against this position.” To Mandeville’s pleasure, the
interventionists Anally cobbled together a rough consensus in the Parliament in the
1720s, and succeeded in passing several prohibitory and restrictive trade laws aimed at
promoting the export o f British manufactures, particularly woolens. State intervention in
overseas trade thereafter dominated British mercantilist strategy, but it was a means to an
end— insuring a positive balance of trade for Great Britain— and not the end itself.21
The growing mercantilist consensus in Great Britain in favor of state intervention
shaped the economic relationship with the expanding North American colonies. For most
mercantilists, it seemed appropriate that in the colonies, where land was cheap and labor
was expensive, the production and export of raw materials ought to predominate and
manufactures discouraged. In Britain, where land was expensive and labor was cheap,
manufactures ought to be encouraged. This arrangement would allow Great Britain to
achieve a positive balance o f trade with other nations through the re-export of American
agricultural produce. The primacy of manufactures in British mercantilist thought is
clear in Mandeville’s writing: “Spain and Portugal. . . may for ever buy for ready Money
as long as their yearly increase of Gold or Silver continues,” but the British “could not
21 Bernard Mandeville, The Fable o f the Bees: or. Private Vices, Publick Benefits (Oxford: The
Clarendon Press, 1964), II, 111. For Parliament’s actions to protect the woolens industry see
Statutes at Large, 10 William HI, c.2; 8 Anne, c.6; 4 George I, c.7; 6 George I, c.14; 7 George I,
c.7; and 7 George I, c.12. (The citations here refer to the year of the monarch’s reign, and the
chapter in which the law appears. Thus 10 William m , c.7 refers to the seventh chapter in the
tenth year of King William Ill’s reign.)
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continue long to purchase the Goods of other Nations if they would not take our
Manufactures in Payment for them.” Great Britain typically experienced a strongly
positive balance o f trade with the northern colonies in New England and the MidAtlantic, and a strongly negative balance of trade with the southern colonies in the
Chesapeake, Carolinas, and especially the West Indies. The balance of trade with the
Chesapeake and the Carolinas evened out in the 1750s, and swung decidedly in favor of
Great Britain after 1760. Colonies that experienced trade deficits with Great Britain
typically made up the shortfall in their balance of trade through trade surpluses with the
West Indies, building ships for remittance, revenues from the carrying trade, and
smuggling. Yet policymakers in Great Britain did not fret over the imbalances with
particular colonies. As Charles Davenant asserted, ‘T o enquire whether we get or lose by
this or that branch of trade is an endless and uncertain speculation; the only question of
importance, and which indeed should employ the thoughts o f considering men, is, in the
main, do we get, or lose.” As long as the aggregate Atlantic trade provided a relatively
balanced exchange between Great Britain and its colonies, British mercantilist strategy
was satisfied."
Until the Revolutionary crisis became truly heated in the 1770s, most Americans
embraced British mercantilist thinking about the role of the North American colonies
within the Atlantic economy. As late as 1766, in a competition sponsored by John
~ Charles Davenant, An Essay upon the Probable Methods o f Making a People Gainers in the
Balance o f Trade (London, 1771; orig. 1699), I, 386, quoted in Hutcheson, Before Adam Smith,
53, and Mandeville, The Fable o f the Bees, II, 113. On the value of exports to and imports from
England and Scotland by the American colonies, see U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of
the Census, Historical Statistics o f the United States: Colonial Times to 1970 (Washington, DC:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), II, 1176-78. For a detailed study of the colonial balance
of trade, see James Shepherd, “A Balance of Payments for the Thirteen Colonies, 1768-1772”
(Ph.D., University of Washington, 1966). Also see McCusker and Menard, The Economy o f
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Sargent of London, several prominent graduates of the College of Philadelphia composed
dissertations exploring the “reciprocal advantages of a perpetual Union between Great
Britain and her American Colonies.” Although the essays varied in approach, each
emphasized the importance of the balance of trade. Doctor John Morgan, one of the
authors and later a patriot who served as the chief physician to the army, argued that
“while Great Britain is employed in manufactures, America ought to be encouraged in
raising all sorts of commodities, and exporting them to Great Britain.” The benefits to
Britain were clear to Joseph Reed, another author who later became the patriot President
of Pennsylvania. American products enabled Britain “to pay the respective balances to
those countries with whom she trades on a disadvantageous footing.” Steven Watt, a
third author who later fled to British Florida as a loyalist, singled out Sweden, France and
the Iberian nations as the countries for whom American trade righted the British balance
of trade. From the American side, the imperial system allowed for an ever-expanding
standard of living, as Americans became full partners in the growth o f consumerism in
the eighteenth-century British Atlantic world.23

British America, 71-88.
23 Four Dissertations on the Reciprocal Advantages o f a Perpetual Union between Great-Britain
and her American Colonies (Philadelphia: William and Thomas Bradford. 1766), 16,94, quoted
in Lawrence Peskin, ‘T o ‘Encourage and Protect’ American Manufactures: The Intellectual
Origins of Industrialization, 1763-1830” (Ph.D., University of Maryland, College Park, 1998), 23,
30. Peskin argues persuasively that the four dissertations adequately represent the American
public understanding and acceptance of mercantilism. Of the 190 subscribers to the published
edition, Peskin identified 45, of whom 29 became patriots and only 16 remained either loyal to
the crown or neutral. See Peskin, ‘T o ‘Encourage and Protect’ American Manufactures,” 18 n.7.
On the American satisfaction with the British Empire’s expanding “world of goods,” see
Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modem World System HI: The Second Era o f Great Expansion o f the
Capitalist World-Economy, I730-I840s (San Diego: Academic Press, 1989); John Crowley, This
Sheba, Self: The Conceptualization o f Economic Life in Eighteenth-Century America (Baltimore:
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974); Timothy Breen, “An Empire of Goods: The
Anglicization of Colonial America, 1690-1776,” Journal o f British Studies, 25 (1986): 467-99;
Timothy Breen, “’Baubles of Britain’: The American and Consumer Revolutions of the
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Despite the triumphal qualities of British mercantilism expressed in the
Philadelphia dissertations, prosperity was not evenly distributed throughout the empire.
In the West Indies, sugar and coffee were exported at a profit. In the Carolinas, the chief
staples were rice and indigo. Planters in Virginia and southern M aryland had cultivated
tobacco since the early seventeenth century, and though the trade experienced numerous
difficulties in the early eighteenth century, tobacco remained a profitable export and the
chief product of the Chesapeake colonies for the remainder of the colonial period. New
England relied on the cod fishery, as well as exports of whale oil and timber products
such as pitch tar, turpentine, and pine-tree masts. However, those without a staple
product to export could not and did not reap the benefits o f the Atlantic economy, and the
languishing condition of early eighteenth-century Baltimore Town was a classic example.
Without an profitable export crop in western Maryland prior to the 1740s, there was
nothing that Charles Carroll could have done to change the tow n’s prospects. As long as
the region remained a backwater of the British Empire, Baltimore Town would remain a
struggling hamlet.
Given the explosion of overseas trade from the North American colonies in the
eighteenth century, it is peculiar that farmers in western Maryland failed to produce a
suitable export prior by the 1740s. One reason is that the nature o f the soil seemingly
narrowed the possibilities for suitable crops, at least in the minds of the region’s earliest
settlers. Few cultivated tobacco, rice and indigo were inappropriate to Maryland’s
Eighteenth Century,” Past and Present, 119 (1988): 73-104; and Carole Shammas, The PreIndustrial Consumer in England and America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990). David
Shields points out that not all Americans were wholly comfortable with either the political or the
cultural consequences of the growing consumerism. See David Shields, Oracles o f Empire:
Poetry, Politics, and Commerce in British America, 1690-1750 (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1990).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

43
temperate climate, the seafood available in the Bay, including a variety of shellfish,
turtles, and mollusks, were nearly impossible to transport overseas in the eighteenth
century. Instead, early settlers diversified their agricultural yields, growing a mix of
com, rye, wheat, oats, barley, hemp, and flax, as well as raising cows, horses, pigs, and
sheep. Although wheat and com later became important American exports to Europe,
most nations on the continent supplied their own demand for grains in the early
eighteenth century. There were, o f course, numerous short harvests, but supplies from
elsewhere on the continent usually made up for the shortfalls. Thus Baltimore's
hinterland possessed little of interest to Europe, and backcountry farmers settled for an
essentially subsistence-based economy while the town continued to stagnate.24

T he St r u g g le

fo r a

S t a b l e H in t e r l a n d

In addition to the frustrations of the Atlantic economy, several colonial challenges
also delayed the development of an export-oriented hinterland in western Maryland. The
ongoing struggle in the late seventeenth and the early eighteenth century between the
Penn and Calvert families over the rightful boundary between Pennsylvania and
Maryland caused enormous political and economic instability. Until this dispute finally
abated in the 1750s, settlers lived with the persistent threat of harassment from both
Maryland and Pennsylvania officials and violence from their neighbors. The persistent

24On the dominance of mixed agriculture and the lack of staple specialization in early western
Baltimore County, see Elisabeth Kessel, “Germans on the Maryland Frontier A Social History of
Frederick County, Maryland, 1730-1800” (Ph.D., Rice University, 1981), 153-58, and Thomas
Williams and Folger McKinsey, History o f Frederick County, Maryland (Baltimore: Regional
Publishing Company, 1967; orig. 1910), I, 16-18. On European grain self-sufficiency during the
early eighteenth century, see Rich and Wilson, The Cambridge Economic History o f Europe, V,
57-89.
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threat of Indian raids and war with the French also limited the development of a stable
farming population. Until the end of the French and Indian W ar in 1763, intermittent
conflict with the region’s Indian tribes caused enormously high rates of out-migration
from western Pennsylvania and Maryland. Between the proprietary squabbles and the
threats from the French and the Indians, it was unlikely that farmers in Baltimore’s
hinterland would have been able to meet a European demand for grains even if that
demand had existed.
The dispute over the rightful boundary between Maryland and Pennsylvania
centered on the legal definition of Maryland’s northern border in the proprietary charter
granted by King Charles I in 1632 to Cecilius Calvert, Second Lord Baltimore. Article
HI o f the charter specified the border as “that Part of the Bay of Delaware on the North,
which lieth under the Fortieth Degree of North Latitude.’’ Calvert, his successors, and
nearly all Marylanders, interpreted this clause to mean that their colony extended to forty
degrees North latitude, or the fortieth parallel. This was a misinterpretation of the
language. The charter specifies the border as being where the fortieth degree of North
latitude begins, which is at the thirty-ninth parallel.25 However, no one challenged the
Calverts’ interpretation for decades because no one had a vested interest to do so. This
all changed in 1681 when King Charles II granted a proprietary charter to William Penn
for a new colony immediately to the north of Maryland.

25Just as the first degree of northern latitude begins at the equator, or 0° 0” O’, and ends at the
first parallel, or 1° 0” O’, the fortieth degree begins at the thirty-ninth parallel, or 39° 0” O’, and
ends at the fortieth parallel, or 40° 0” O’. Charter of Maryland, 1632, in Francis Thorpe, ed., The
Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and Other Organic Laws o f the States,
Territories, and Colonies Now or Heretofore Forming the United States o f America, Compiled
and Edited Under the Act o f Congress o f June 30, 1906 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1909).
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Penn’s charter specified the southern border o f Pennsylvania “by a Circle drawne
at twelve miles distance from New Castle Northward and Westward unto the beginning
of the fortieth degree of Northern Latitude, and then by a streight Line Westward” along
that latitude. The language o f Penn’s charter ought to have cleared up any
misunderstanding, because the fortieth parallel lies much further to the north of New
Castle than just twelve miles, and a circle drawn at twelve miles distant from New Castle
indeed bisects the thirty-ninth parallel. Clearly, the boundary between the two
proprietorships was intended to be the thirty-ninth parallel, but Charles Calvert, Third
Lord Baltimore, was unwilling to concede the argument. King Charles II could have
stepped in and resolved the dispute once and for all, but the king instructed the two
proprietors to work out their differences between themselves. A meeting between the
two colonial magnates occurred in Anne Arundel County in December 1682, but neither
man was willing to compromise on the hundreds of thousands of acres at stake.26
The boundary dispute generated some commercial antagonism between Maryland
and Pennsylvania during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century, but the
struggle o f wills between the colonial governments began in earnest in the 1720s.27 The
catalyst for the renewed controversy was land speculation in the Monocacy River Valley
by Maryland’s landed magnates. Beginning with the 10,000-acre tract for Carrollton
patented to Charles Carroll of Annapolis in 1723, others quickly engrossed thousands of

26 Charter for the Province of Pennsylvania, L681, in Thorpe, The Federal and State
Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and Other Organic Laws o f the States, and Aubrey Land,
Colonial Maryland: A History (Millwood, NY: KTO Press, 1981), 81-82.
27 At the turn of the eighteenth century, Quaker merchants tussled with Maryland’s Governor
Francis Nicholson over royal customs policies in the disputed area. See Gary Nash, “Maryland’s
Economic War with Pennsylvania,” Maryland Historical Magazine, 60 (1965): 231-244.
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acres in the region. Benjamin Tasker established Tasker’s Chance, a 7,000-acre tract just
to the north of Carrolton, and further up the river, Charles Calvert, Fifth Lord Baltimore,
established Monocacy Manor, a 10,000-acre tract. Daniel Dulany patented thousands of
acres in small parcels throughout the area, as well as a 3,850-acre patent just south of
Lord Baltimore’s Monocacy Manor. All of these tracts fell well within the Maryland
proprietary, but others did not. By the mid-l720s, Maryland settlements extended well
into the disputed territory with Pennsylvania, including a tract claimed by Edward Parnell
at the site of what later became Hanover in York County. Disturbed by the
encroachments into Pennsylvania, officials from the Quaker colony forcefully drove off
the settlers on Parnell’s lands in 1728.28
The actions of the Pennsylvania authorities did not abate the desires of
Marylanders to lay claim to the disputed territory. Once again, Charles Carroll of
Annapolis was at the forefront o f this movement. In 1730, he patented Carrollsburg, a
5,010-acre tract straddling the line claimed by Pennsylvania. More provocative were the
actions of Thomas Cresap, who received a Maryland patent in 1730 for the lands
previously patented to Edward Parnell. Although Maryland Governor Samuel Ogle
personally assured Pennsylvania Governor Patrick Gordon that all disputes “shall always
be avoided as much as possible on my part,” Ogle colluded with Cresap to intimidate and
drive out Pennsylvania claimants. Cresap led about fifty men across the border, and
violence soon followed. John Wright, who established a ferry across the Susquehanna,
related to Governor Gordon that Marylanders had instigated “a violent & Riotous

28 Tracey and Dem, Pioneers o f Old Monocacy, 23-44, and Daniel Wunderland Nead, The
Pennsylvania-German in the Settlement o f Maryland (Lancaster, PA: Pennsylvania-German
Society, 1914), 127.
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Assault” against peaceful settlers. He particularly singled out Cresap’s partisans, whom
Wright claimed had “Killed the horses o f Such of our people” and “Assaulted those who
were sent to look after them, and threatened them Highly if they should Come there
again.” Yet the boldest stroke of all came from Lord Baltimore, who issued a
proclamation in 1732 inviting settlement into western Maryland and Pennsylvania. He
assured all potential settlers that the Maryland government would use “any reasonable
Method that shall be proposed for the Ease of such New Comers in the payment of their
Taxes.” He also pledged that settlers “shall be as well Secured in their Liberty &
property in Maryland as any of his Majestys Subjects in any part o f ’ British America.29
By the mid-1730s, hundreds of settlers were pouring into the region, and armed clashes
between Pennsylvanians and Marylanders proved nearly continuous. Any hope for trade
from the area under these circumstances would have been foolish.
The battle for the backcountry came to a boiling point in 1735. Despite
assurances of mild taxation, Governor Ogle mustered the Baltimore and Harford County
militias, numbering about 200 to 300 men, and dispatched them along with Baltimore
County Sheriff John Hendricks to force collections of taxes from Pennsylvania settlers
who refused to recognize Maryland’s authority. According to John Wright, the
Marylanders harassed him and thirty other Pennsylvanians, but hostilities did nor break
out thanks to the arrival of 150 Pennsylvania militia. With the military solution at an
impasse, both colonial governments issued arrest warrants the following year to
intimidate settlers from the other colony. On September 5, Philadelphia magistrates
29 Maryland Governor Samuel Ogle to Pennsylvania Governor Patrick Gordon, May 7, 1732, and
John Wright and Samuel Blunston to Governor Patrick Gordon, October 30, 1732, in Samuel
Hazard, ed., Pennsylvania Archives (Philadelphia: Joseph Sevems, 1852), I, 326-27, 363-65, and
Lord Baltimore’s 1732 Proclamation, in Browne, et. al., Archives o f Maryland, XXVIII, 25.
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Jeremiah Langhome and Thomas Greene empowered Lancaster County Sheriff Samuel
Smith to arrest Thomas Cresap, and on October 21, Governor Ogle issued a warrant for
the arrest o f sixty people. Pennsylvania authorities struck first when they threatened to
set fire to Cresap’s house unless he surrendered. According to Sheriff Smith, Cresap
replied “with several horrid Oaths & the most abusive Language against the Proprietor &
People o f Pennsylvania,” and pledged that “they shall never have him till he was a
corpse.” Smith ordered the house torched, and Cresap managed to make it out just before
the house was engulfed by flame.

The Maryland Council was outraged and appealed

to the Governor Gordon to release of all Marylanders held in Pennsylvania jails. The
conflict now had the potential to disrupt far more than a few settlements on the
backcountry, and it was at this point that the British finally intervened. Orders in Council
issued on August 18, 1737 ended the conflict, and a provisional line between the two
colonies was set the following year. Royal authorities suspended land grants, and fixed
the border fifteen miles south of Philadelphia, or close to the thirty-ninth parallel. Yet the
Orders also specified that farmers in the disputed area could remain on the land until a
permanent settlement was made. With no action on the part of the proprietors to reach
such a settlement, it was only a matter of time before violence erupted once again.30
The catalyst for renewed conflict was John Digges, an Irish land speculator from
Prince George’s County who had been at the forefront of selling Maryland patents to land
in the disputed area since 1731. Digges was also a swindler. By the early 1740s, he had

30 Deposition of John Wright (1735), Warrant for Thomas Cresap’s Arrest (1736), and Deposition
of Samuel Smith (1736) in Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives, 1,464-65,489,513-15, and Browne,
et. al.. Archives o f Maryland, XXVUI, 99-106, 111-19. Also see Nead, The PennsylvaniaGerman in the Settlement o f Maryland, 121-39, and Dieter Cunz, The Maryland Germans: A
History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1948), 47-54.
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sold off more land than he had title to, and in 1745, petitioned the Maryland assembly to
grant him new lands to meet his obligations. To Digges, his request simply amounted to
a clarification of his holdings rather than a new land grant. In actuality, Digges’s request
amounted to a land grab for 3,679 acres in direct contradiction of the King’s edict. Yet
Maryland authorities approved the scheme anyway, and conflict quickly ensued. The
Penns sued the Calverts for a breach in the 1737-1738 agreements, Baltimore County
Sheriff Thomas Norris attempted to arrest several Pennsylvania claimants, and Lancaster
County Surveyor Thomas Cookson warned Maryland settlers that they were in violation
of the King’s edicts and thus subject to having their lands confiscated.31
Even after the Penns won their case against the Calverts in British courts in 1750,
backcountry skirmishes continued, with members on both sides destroying property and
further disrupting any hope for trade. The conflict came to a head in 1752 when a quarrel
between claimants led to the murder of Dudley Digges, John Digges’s son. A
Pennsylvania farmer, Martin Kitzmiller, was responsible for the shooting. Maryland
Governor Benjamin Tasker appealed to Pennsylvania Governor James Hamilton to move
the trial to a Maryland court, because, according to Tasker, the murder was committed
“within the Limits o f this Province [Maryland].” O f course, Pennsylvania officials
refused the request, and the trial was held in York where a Pennsylvania court deemed
the shooting accidental and acquitted Kitzmiller o f all charges. Thereafter, most
Marylanders lost interest in pursuing claims in the disputed area, and in 1763, the
proprietors finally agreed to a permanent solution. Two surveyors, Charles Mason and
Jeremiah Dixon, spent the next four years setting the border along the 1738 provisional

31 Cunz, The Maryland Germans, 54-56.
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line. They marked the “Mason-Dixon Line” at one-mile intervals with stone monuments
on which the Calvert coat-of-arms appeared on the Maryland side, and the Penn coat-ofarms appeared on the Pennsylvania side. These markers did not, however, always stay in
the same place. Settlers commonly used them as fence posts, and some even employed
the monuments as fireplace lintels.32
In addition to the disruptions caused by the border controversy, backcountry
settlements were periodically threatened by war against neighboring Indians. At the
same time that Samuel Blunston complained to the Pennsylvania Council about Thomas
Cresap's threat to backcountry settlers, he also related several acts of violence by Indians.
One gruesome incident had occurred on May 4, 1737 when two Indians entered Samuel
Bethel’s house and asked for something to drink. Blunston stated that Mrs. Bethel
persuaded the Indians to leave, but as soon as she locked the door behind them, the
Indians allegedly “Darted a Board thro’a Glass Window.” Two neighbors, Daniel
Southerland and John Judson, intervened to prevent the Indians from “doing further
Mischief, whereupon one of the Indians with a knife wounded Southerland in the Belly”
deep enough “so that his Bowels came out.” The Indian then turned to Judson “and
stabbed him in the Breast.” Incidents like the bloody one at the Bethels’ home were
committed by both settlers and Indians with relative frequency in the backcountry. The
limestone deposits in much of western Maryland and Pennsylvania made the area
extraordinarily fertile, and several tribes had contested for its control. American settlers,
whether from coastal Maryland or eastern Pennsylvania, were caught between the

32 Browne, et. al., Archives o f Maryland, XXVIII, 532; Nead, The Pennsylvania-German in the
Settlement o f Maryland, 140; and Susan Stranahan, Susquehanna, River o f Dreams (Baltimore:
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 43 n.5.
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Delaware to the east, the Piskataway, Patuxent, and Potomac to the south, the Shawnee
and Tuscarora to the west, and the Susquehannock and Seneca to the north. Officially,
Pennsylvania and Maryland enjoyed relatively peaceful relations with the neighboring
Indians, but depositions like Blunston’s reveals a much different reality for those living in
the backcountry.33
The Indians were not the worst threat to western settlements. Indeed, nothing
proved more disruptive than the frequent wars for imperial mastery between France and
Great Britain. Hostilities in the 1720s, 1740s, and 1750s caused many settlers to flee, and
thus parts o f the backcountry were in a continual state of fluctuation. Settlement had to
recommence at the close of each war, creating a process of expansion and contraction
that prevented settlers from developing anything more than a frontier exchange
economy— an export trade to the coast was a remote prospect. The worst of these
conflicts was the so-called French and Indian War of 1754-1763.34
In 1748, the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle officially ended the conflict between
France and Great Britain known to Americans as King George’s War, but the peace did
not settle the question of the two imperial powers’ overlapping claims on the Ohio River
Valley. Before the diplomats even convened, the French began planning to extend their
fortifications into the Ohio Valley. Under the Marquis Duquesne de Menneville, the new
33 Statement of Samuel Blunston (1737-38) in Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives, I, 547-49.
34 John Florin, The Advance o f Frontier Settlement in Pennsylvania, 1638-1850: A Geographic
Interpretation (University Park, PA: Penn State University, Department of Geography, #14, May
1977); Jack Sosin, The Revolutionary Frontier, 1763-1783 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and
Wilson, 1967), 82; Solomon Buck and Elizabeth Buck, The Planting o f Civilization in Western
Pennsylvania (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1939), 137, 204-205; Paul Doutrich,
‘The Evolution of an American Town: Yorktown, Pennsylvania, 1740-1790” (Ph.D., University
of Kentucky, 1985), 144; and Judith Ridner, “‘A Handsomely Improved Place’: Economic,
Social, and Gender-Role Development in a Backcountry Town, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, 17501810” (Ph.D., The CoUege ofWilliam and Mary, 1994), 89-90.
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Governor-General of Canada, these plans became fully realized with the construction of
forts at Presque Isle on Lake Erie in 1753, and another, Fort Duquesne, located at the
confluence o f the Ohio, Monogahela, and Allegheny Rivers. Virginia’s Governor Robert
Dinwiddie was the first colonial official to react to the new threat, sending 300 militia
under Colonel Joshua Fry and Lieutenant-Colonel George Washington to Fort Duquesne
in 1754 to oppose the French. After this expedition failed, the British dispatched an
expeditionary force under General Edward Braddock to lay siege to the wilderness
outpost in 1755. When the French and their Indian allies massacred Braddock’s forces,
panic swept the backcountry.35
As the war progressed, the rural population of western Maryland and western
Pennsylvania disappeared as settlers congregated into Carlisle, York, or Frederick, or
headed east to Philadelphia, Baltimore, or Annapolis. Reports flooded into the M aryland
Gazette that the houses of backcountry settlers were in flames, and the settlers were on
the move. Washington recorded in 1756 ‘T h a t the Maryland settlements are all
abandoned is certainly a fa c t. . . confirmed yesterday by Henry Brinker, who left
Monocacy the day before, and who also confirms that three hundred and fifty wagons
passed that place to avoid the enemy within the space of three days.” The situation in
Pennsylvania was just as bleak. Governor Robert Hunter Morris worried that so many
people “had quitted the County of Cumberland, one of the most firtile settlements in
North America,” that “great quantities of grain” now laid “at the Mercy of the Enemy.”
35 King George’s War was known in Europe as the War of the Austrian Succession. The French
fort at Presque Isle was located at the site of what became Erie, Pennsylvania, and Fort Duquesne
was located at the site of what became Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. For the origins of the French
and Indian War and the conflict’s early campaigns, see Fred Anderson, Crucible o f War: The
Seven Years’ War and the Fate o f Empire in British North America, 1754-1766 (New York:
Alfred Knopf, 2000), 11-134.
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By 1758, the backcountry was indeed controlled by the Indian allies of the French.
British General John Forbes reported that Indians “are scalping every day and have broke
up all the settlements.”36 With the backcountry in chaos until the war ended in 1763,
merchants in Baltimore Town could expect little produce to arrive for export abroad. As
the fate of the countryside went, so did the fortunes of an entrepot.

S ig n s

of

G row th

Despite the clarion of dismay surrounding the prospects over the backcountry,
Charles Carroll of Annapolis remained unbendingly optimistic about Baltimore Town
and western Maryland. He had reason to be. In the seven years following 1744, Carroll
sold off all but three of his twenty-seven lots in Baltimore Town, and by the early 1750s,
more than 90 percent of the town lots were under private ownership instead of Carroll’s
or the town commissioners. By the mid-1750s, prices for town lots rocketed from 0.2d
per square foot to more than 3d per square foot, an increase of 1,500 percent. The
Maryland assembly responded to the growth in interest in the town by authorizing
additions to Baltimore in 1747, 1750, and 1753 that expanded the size of the town by 75
acres. A struggling hamlet with only a few hundred inhabitants in 1750, Baltimore Town
surpassed Annapolis in population within a single generation, its population reaching
6,000 by the Revolution.37
36 Washington quoted in Cunz, The Maryland Germans, 81. Draft of a letter by Gov. Robert
Hunter Morris, (probably 1756), Gratz papers. Historical Society of Pennsylvania, case 15, box
18, quoted in Judith Ridner, ‘“ A Handsomely Improved Place’,” 86; and General John Forbes to
Abercromby, April 22, 1758, in Alfred Proctor James, ed.. Writings o f General John Forbes
(Menasha, WI: Collegiate Press, 1938), 69, quoted in Ridner, ‘“ A Handsomely Improved Place’,"
87.
37 Steffen, From Gentlemen to Townsmen, 141-46.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

54
The sudden rise of Baltimore Town after 1744 resulted from changes in the
Atlantic economy and the ability o f settlers in a limited area of the tow n’s hinterland to
respond to those changes despite backcountry hardships and frontier violence. By the
mid-eighteenth-century, Europe began experiencing sharp food shortages. Although
harsh winters or exceptionally hot summers caused short harvests in some areas, changes
in the weather were not the primary cause of the crisis. Indeed, advances in crop rotation
and other agricultural methods allowed both crop yields and grain production to increase
in the last half o f the eighteenth century by an average of 20 or 25 percent on the
continent, and more than 50 percent in England. Yet the impressive gains in production
were more than offset by the surge in population, and thus many nations faced recurrent
famines. In 1700, England produced 1,780,000 tons of grain and exported 35,000 tons;
in 1800, English production had risen to 2,670,000 tons, but the nation’s grain exports
disappeared completely. On the continent, where grain production had not increased as
quickly as in England, shortages were impossible to avoid. Many nations were being
pushed to the brink of a Malthusian crisis in which famines could only be averted by
grain imports from America. The lack of European grain surpluses also meant that
imperial powers found it impossible to provision the rapidly expanding populations of
their colonies in the West Indies. Shortfalls in the Caribbean also had to be made up by
increased food supplies from the North American colonies. The inevitable result, as seen
in Figure 1-1, was the steady inflation of wholesale prices on wheat and com. Wheat
prices doubled in the late 1740s, and surged again in the late 1750s, thereafter increasing
steadily until the Revolution. Com prices rose less dramatically, but nearly doubled from
approximately 2xh s per bushel to almost 4s per bushel by the early 1770s. Flour prices
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Figure 1-1

Five-Year Moving Averages on Mid-Atlantic Grain Prices, 1729-1772
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rose in the same period from less than Id per pound to more than 2d per pound.38
With the advent o f grain shortages in Europe, the mid-Atlantic region was poised
to become the breadbasket of the Atlantic world. However, the disruptions to
backcountry settlements caused by the Pennsylvania-Maryland border struggle and the
persistent conflict with Indians meant that not all mid-Atlantic farmers were poised to
take advantage o f the new economic realities. Initially, only those farmers in the
southeastern parts o f Frederick County, newly erected from Baltimore County in 1748, as
well as the remaining parts of Baltimore County itself were able to respond to the shifts
in the Atlantic economy. These settlers were somewhat insulated from the troubles
raging further north and west. Although the largely German-immigrant population in
Frederick and Baltimore counties did not adopt a monocrop culture, they were aware of
the increasing commercial value of their crops. The percentage of their farms engaged in
wheat and com production tripled between 1749 and 1775, and the activities of these
settlers did not go unnoticed by British authorities. In 1771, William Eddis commented
that “what chiefly tended to the advancement of settlements in this remote district, was
the arrival of many emigrants from the Palatinate, and other Germanic States.” He
believed that the progress made by these settlers “induced multitudes o f their enterprising
countrymen to abandon their native homes, to enjoy the plenteous harvest which
appeared to await their labours in the wild, uncultivated wastes of America.” Maryland’s
Governor Horatio Sharpe would have agreed. In a letter to Frederick Calvert, Sixth Lord
38 For shifts in European production of grains, see Rich and Wilson, The Cambridge Economic
History o f Europe, V, 74-89. For Baltimore’s response to the shifts in the Adantic economy, see
Clarence Gould, “The Economic Causes of the Rise of Baldmore,” in Essays in Colonial History
Presented to Charles McLean Andrews by His Students (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1931), 225-51. For wheat prices in colonial America, see Historical Statistics o f the United
States, II, 1197.
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Baltimore and Lord Proprietor o f Maryland, Sharpe indicated that the Germans who
resided in or near Baltimore Town had become “Masters of small Fortunes.”39
In addition to rising European demand, colonial actions also sped the transition
from tobacco to grain cultivation in parts of Maryland. In 1747, Governor Samuel Ogle
spearheaded the effort to pass a Tobacco Inspection Act. The new law established eighty
warehouses where inspection officers chosen by local vestrymen would approve quality
tobacco for export and destroy trash tobacco. Those who supported the Act hoped that it
would prevent fraud in the collection of customs and curtail officers’ fees. The aim of
the legislation was not to encourage farmers to abandon tobacco production, but those on
marginal lands who grew nothing but trash tobacco were nonetheless forced to make that
decision. The problem was especially acute on the Eastern Shore, where sandy soils
predominated along the chief waterways. Yet it was not just farmers on marginal soil
who switched to grain cultivation after 1747. As tobacco prices continued to stagnate
and grain prices steadily increased, farmers throughout the Eastern Shore participated in
the transition. Exports of tobacco from Eastern Shore plantations declined at both
Chestertown and Annapolis after 1750. Average annual totals for both ports amounted to
7.9 million pounds during the 1740s, only 6 million in the 1750s, and 4.7 million in the
1760s. Average annual wheat and com exports from Oxford and Chestertown increased
over the same period from 19,000 bushels to 121,000 bushels, and historian Paul
Clemens calculated that the total grain surplus in Talbot and Kent Counties ballooned
from 28,000 bushels in the 1730s to 832,000 bushels in the 1760s. Even slaveholders
39 William Eddis, Letters from America, Historical and Descriptive; Comprising Occurrences
from 1769 to 1777 Inclusive (London, 1792), 99; Governor Horatio Sharpe to Frederick Calvert,
Sixth Lord Baltimore and Lord Proprietor of Maryland, May 2, 1754, in Archives o f Maryland,
VI, 57; and Kessel, “Germans on the Maryland Frontier,” 153-62.
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made the switch to grain cultivation. During the 1740s, tobacco accounted for more than
50 percent o f the agricultural output from plantations with enslaved workers in Kent
County. In Talbot County, the number was closer to 75 percent. By the 1760s, wheat
and com accounted for approximately 67 percent of agricultural output in Talbot County,
and almost 90 percent in Kent County.40
The transition to grain cultivation on the Eastern Shore eventually contributed to
the growth of Baltimore as a port, but in the period before the Revolution, most of the
produce of the Eastern Shore went to the Philadelphia market. According to a report
made by Loyalist Robert Alexander in the 1770s, approximately 75 percent of the Eastern
Shore’s wheat had been shipped to Philadelphia in the years immediately preceding the
war. Alexander’s report was part of an American Loyalist effort to convince the British
authorities not to abandon the war in North America in the wake of the Franco-American
alliance, and was, in part, a propaganda effort to discredit an earlier report delivered by
British Major General Charles Grey in 1779 that stated the war in North America was
now hopeless. Yet Alexander’s report was also a startlingly objective statement on the
economic realities of the Eastern Shore, and it demonstrated that less than 20 percent of
Baltimore’s grain exports originated across the Bay.41
Farmers in western Pennsylvania were also unable to contribute significantly to
the growing prosperity of Baltimore Town in the colonial period. Unlike Frederick and

40 Paul Clemens, The Atlantic Economy and Colonial Maryland’s Eastern Shore: From Tobacco
to Grain (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980), 168-205, and Land, Colonial Maryland, 18081.
41 Edward Papenfuse, “Economic Analysis and Loyalist Strategy During the American
Revolution: Robert Alexander’s Remarks on the Economy of the Peninsula or the Eastern Shore
of Maryland,” Maryland Historical Magazine, 173-95.
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Baltimore Counties, much of western Pennsylvania remained a troubled area after the
conclusion o f the French and Indian War, and did not develop into a stable hinterland by
the Revolution. Indian raids along the river continued after the conclusion of the French
and Indian War, prompting a mob action by backcountry settlers in February 1764. At
least 200 settlers from Paxton Township in western Lancaster County, in what became
Dauphin County, marched on Philadelphia to demand action from the Quaker-dominated
government. A group of seven Philadelphia authorities led by Benjamin Franklin, Mayor
Thomas Willing, and Attorney General Benjamin Chew met the “Paxton Boys” at
Germantown on the outskirts of Philadelphia on February 6. Although the city officials
proved successful in convincing the marchers to seek formal legal redress for their
grievances, Indian raids against western Pennsylvania settlements continued until the
frontier conflict was finally ended by the Treaty of Fort Stanwix in 1768.42
Backcountry settlers in Pennsylvania also faced new land disputes after 1763 with
Virginia authorities in the far western reaches of the colony, and Connecticut settlers
along the North Branch of the Susquehanna River in northern Pennsylvania. These
disputes proved nearly as paralyzing as the earlier struggle between the Calverts and the
Penns over southern Pennsylvania. In 1773, Pennsylvania established Westmoreland
County, its first extension of political jurisdiction west of the Allegheny Mountains.
Virginians had not given up their claims on this land, however, and under the colony’s
*2 There were some entrepreneurs who managed to establish profitable commercial connections
between western Pennsylvania and Baltimore. One such exception was Ephraim Blaine of
Carlisle. Yet a mark of his unusually adventuresome spirit is that after the Revolution, Blaine
shifted his commercial interests to speculative ventures in the deerskin trade of New Orleans and
the lower Mississippi River Valley. See Ridner, ““A Handsomely Improved Place’,” 287-88. On
the fragmented condition of Paxton Township and the subsequent march of the Paxton Boys, see
George Franz, Paxton: A Study o f Community Structure and Mobility in the Colonial
Pennsylvania Backcountry (New York: Garland Publications, 1989).
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new governor, Lord Dunmore, the Virginia assembly countered Pennsylvania’s actions
by erecting the District of West Augusta in 1774 in what is today western Pennsylvania.
Despite the shift from the royalist government of Lord Dunmore to the patriot
governments o f Patrick Henry and Thomas Jefferson after 1776, Virginia’s policies
regarding western Pennsylvania did not change. In 1776, the Virginia assembly carved
three counties from the District of Augusta, and over the next four years, authorities from
both states competed for taxes and the loyalty of the backcountry residents in far western
Pennsylvania. Settlers faced intermittent violence, destruction of property, harassment by
officials from both governments, and a general inability to develop any significant
trade.43
The struggle for northern Pennsylvania between Connecticut settlers and
Pennsylvania claimants proved even more paralyzing than the challenge from Virginia in
the far western part of the state. The charter granted by King Charles II to Connecticut in
1662 specified the southern boundary as the sea, which referred to Long Island Sound,
and the western boundary as “the South Sea,” which colonists interpreted to be the
Mississippi River. This meant that Connecticut included land later granted to New York
in 1664 and William Penn in 1681. The potential for long-term conflict was lifted in
1731 when Connecticut and New York officials agreed on a border between the two
colonies. Officials in Pennsylvania believed that the deal ended all possible claims by
Connecticut on Pennsylvania, an assumption that proved accurate for almost two
decades. In May 1750, however, residents of Simsbury, Connecticut petitioned their
colonial assembly for a land grant in Pennsylvania. The Connecticut assembly rejected
43 R. Eugene Harper, The Transformation o f Western Pennsylvania, 1770-1800 (Pittsburgh:
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991), 8.
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the petition, as well as eleven more submitted between 1750 and 1753. Interested settlers
thus took matters into their own hands, establishing the Susquehanna Company in 1753,
and buying nearly 5 million acres from the Iroquois the following year.44
The French and Indian W ar postponed actual settlement in Pennsylvania’s
Wyoming Valley along the North Branch of the Susquehanna until May 1762. The First
settlers were wiped out by Indian raids, but settlers returned in force in 1769. Conflict
broke out almost immediately between the Connecticut claimants, or Yankees, and their
rival Pennsylvania claimants, or Pennamites, and conflict continued until the Yankees
forced a Pennamite surrender in July 1771. Pennsylvania Councilman Joseph Shippen
pledged that the colonial government would remove the “Nest of Villains, Murderers and
Banditti” from the Wyoming Valley, but authorities failed to act as decisively as
Shippen’s words. The Yankees’ population surged from a few hundred in 1771 to 2,000
in 1774, and approximately 3,000 by 1776. Emboldened by the Yankees’ successes, the
Connecticut assembly recognized their settlement in 1774 by creating them as the town
of Westmoreland attached to Litchfield County. Two years later, the assembly made
Westmoreland a separate county within the state o f Connecticut. Once again, the
Pennsylvania backcountry was plagued by violence and uncertainty.45
The continuous disruptions to settlement in rural western Pennsylvania sustained
the high rates o f out-migration common to the early eighteenth century, and kept the
badly fragmented communities from developing into a stable and reliable hinterland for
44 Paul Moyer, “Wild Yankees: Settlement, Conflict, & Localism Along Pennsylvania’s Northeast
Frontier, 1760-1820” (Ph.D., The College of William and Mary, 1999), 15-21.
45 Moyer, “Wild Yankees,” 21-49, and Joseph Shippen to Edward Shippen, August 21, 1771.
Robert Taylor, ed., The Susquehanna Company Papers (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1968),
IV, 251-52, quoted in Moyer, “Wild Yankees,” 27.
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Baltimore prior to the Revolution. Yet even if these disruptions had not existed, it was
unlikely that much of western Pennsylvania’s produce would have reached the Baltimore
market, because o f the lack of adequate transportation throughout the region. The easiest
way for farmers to have reached Baltimore would have been to simply float their goods
down the Susquehanna River to the Chesapeake Bay. Unfortunately for those interested
in such a strategy, the river was not suited to this. The Susquehanna is the longest nonnavigable river in North America. Flatboats descending from the North and West
Branches had to disembark at either Harris’s Ferry or W right’s Ferry, near the sites where
Harrisburg and Columbia were later founded. The river is approximately a mile in width
at this point, but it narrowed quickly. At Turkey Hill, just north of the Mason-Dixon
Line, the Susquehanna is just one-fifth of a mile wide. The resulting rapids made it
impossible for ships to descend the river any further without being dashed against the
craggy promontories and jagged rocks of the limestone-walled gorge beyond. The river
was just as impassable coming from the opposite direction. When Captain John Smith’s
expedition reached the head o f the Bay in 1608, he discovered that while “Canows may
goe a dayes journey or two up” the river, anything larger “could not get two myles up it”
before reaching the rocks. This happened near Little Octoraro Creek, close to the site
where Port Deposit, Maryland was later founded. From John Smith’s time to Charles
Carroll’s, the Susquehanna’s natural boundaries continued to frustrate those who hoped
the river could act as a conduit for trade.46
Overland transportation proved almost as difficult as negotiating the Susquehanna
46 Smith, The Generali Historie o f Virginia, New England & the Summer Isles, in The Travels o f
Captaine John Smith, 1,49. For the Susquehanna River’s natural impediments to navigation, see
Carl Carmer, The Susquehanna (New York: Rinehart, 1955), 445-51, and Stranahan,
Susquehanna, River o f Dreams. 33-37.
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River. Prior the Revolution, Maryland followed the typical colonial pattern of allowing
individual counties to direct road construction. This strategy proved deficient for three
reasons. First, local authorities did not employ modem roadbuilding techniques, usually
because the supervisors of road construction were farmers without any specialized
training in or knowledge of civil engineering. Common roads therefore deteriorated
easily. A surveyor judged the shortest distance using a magnetic compass, measured the
elevation using a level, and then measured distances using an instrument called Gunter’s
Chain.47 Road builders then removed boulders and trees, but left tree stumps up to a foot
high in the roadway. Rakes and hoes were employed to smooth the roadway, and the
road was then considered finished. No significant efforts were taken to insure that the
road was level, and the roadway was left unsurfaced. Thus as soon as it rained, the road
surface degenerated quickly, turning to mud and making the road nearly impassable.
Wagons that tried to push their way through the mud dug deep grooves into the wet earth.
When the rains stopped, these gouges dried into hardened ruts and furrows that jutted out
at odd angles. Rain also exposed tree roots and boulders, and raised the height of
exposed tree stumps. After a few rainy seasons, the road became useless as an avenue for
commerce even in good weather.48
Many o f the problems with the old colonial roads could have been avoided if local
officials had repaired the road surfaces. After all, no road is ever finished; once it is built,
a road must be maintained otherwise it will deteriorate. Yet regular appropriations for
47 Gunter’s chain, named for Englishman Edmund Gunter who invented it in 1620, was an iron
chain sixty-six feet long. Eighty chains equaled a mile, and ten square chains equaled an acre.
48 Donald Jackson, “Roads Most Traveled: Turnpikes in Southeastern Pennsylvania in the Early
Republic,” in Judith McGaw, ed., Early American Technology: Making & Doing Things from the
Colonial Era to 1850 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994), 202-06.
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the upkeep o f roads were not made. Most county officials followed the time-honored
English and colonial American practice of allowing farmers to “work o f f ’ their highway
taxes by helping to clear local roads after the harvest season. Few farmers believed road
work was an effective use o f their time and often did not show up for it. When local
officials did undertake road work, local routes took precedence over through ways. The
decentralized approach to road building sacrificed regional planning for the sake of
continued local control.
For decades, farmers in western Pennsylvania and western Maryland had sought
to compensate for the poor quality of the region’s glorified horse paths by building
wagons that could negotiate the gullies and furrows in the roads. The Conestoga wagon
was the solution. First constructed in the early eighteenth century by German settlers
along the Conestoga Creek in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania, from which the vehicle
took its name, the original Conestoga wagons resembled the heavy, box-like farm wagons
typical in the Rhineland, Low Countries, and southeastern Britain. As the eighteenth
century progressed, backcountry settlers made improvements to the basic European
designs. Wheels soon became angled outward from the hub, or “dished” to maximize the
strength and resilience o f the wagon as it bounded over deep ruts. The body also
changed, becoming concave in shape to push the contents of the wagon toward the
middle of the vehicle to keep goods from spilling over the sides or out the front or back
o f the vehicle during transit. The curve of the wagon also gave it a more boat-like
appearance than its boxy German and British ancestors. Like the dished wheels, the
concave body was designed with the gullies and furrows of backcountry roads in mind.49

49 For the European origins and precursors to the Conestogas, see J. Geraint Jenkins, The English
Farm Wagon: Origins and Structure (London: David & Charles, 1961), 22-58. For the evolution
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The various improvements made to the Conestoga wagon succeeded in reducing
transportation costs, but the effective range of commercial wheat farming from Baltimore
remained approximately fifty miles between 1750 and 1775. Beyond that distance, the
costs of transporting the grain exceeded 50 percent of the market value o f the crop, thus
making it unprofitable.30 As the Mason-Dixon Line is located approximately fifty miles
north of Baltimore, the town’s effective hinterland prior to the Revolution could not and
did not encompass much o f western Pennsylvania. As most o f the grain produced on the
Eastern Shore was shipped overland to Philadelphia prior to the Revolution, it was
therefore the largely German-immigrant settlers of Baltimore and Frederick Counties
who formed the core o f the Baltimore’s hinterland. Despite the limited area of
cultivation, annual grain exports from Baltimore amounted to at least 300,000 bushels
worth o f wheat, flour, and bread by the late 1760s. By the eve of independence, this
figure had ballooned to almost 800,000 bushels worth of wheat, or approximately 25
percent o f the total wheat and flour exports from British America. Even with a truncated
backcountry, Baltimore Town emerged as an important entrepot in the British Atlantic’s
mercantilist economy.51

of the Conestoga wagon in America, see Richard Dunlop, Wheels West, 1590-1900 (New York:
Rand McNally and Co., 1977), 29-32, and George Shumway, Edward Durell, and Howard Frey,
Conestoga Wagon, 1750-1850 (York, PA: George Shumway, 1964), L-26. For transportation
costs, see Jeremy Atack and Peter Passed, A New Economic View o f American History from
Colonial Times to 1940, 2d ed., (New York: W.W. Norton, 1994), 148.
50 For an annual breakdown of the maximum distance from a port for commercial wheat farming,
see Hoffman and Earle, “Staple Crops and Urban Development,” 77-78. Between 1750 and
1756, the maximum distance varied only slightly between 32.5 and 36.5 miles. Between 1757
and 1775, there was a much greater range, varying between 27.0 miles in 1757 and 89.5 miles in
1772. Overall, the average was approximately 50 miles.
51 According to Geoffrey Gilbert, the average annual volume of wheat exported directly from
Maryland between 1768 and 1772 was 216,848 bushels, and the average annual volume of flour
and bread was 46,772 barrels. Assuming a conversion ratio of 11.43 barrels per ton (each barrel
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As Baltimore expanded as a mid-Atlantic entrepot after 1750, the town’s local
economy grew and its social structure adapted to accommodate the increased commercial
activity. M ercantilist assumptions guided this development. From the British
perspective, it made very little sense to promote manufacturing enterprises in the
colonies. Charles Davenant repeated the standard argument on this point, that “it cannot
be the Publick good o f a Kingdom to furnish Colonies out of it, with People, when the
Product of such Colonyes is the same w ith the Kingdoms, and so Rivals the Kingdom
both in its Navigation and in its Product.”52 Greater colonial production of consumer
goods would divert economic resources, particularly labor, away from the production of
agricultural staples, and thus decrease the reliance of the colonies on importing British
goods. Such a situation would have upset the balance of trade most mercantilist thinkers
contained 196 pounds), the equivalent volume of combined flour and bread exports was
approximately 4,092 tons. According to David Klingaman, it took 51.4 bushels of wheat to
produce one ton of flour, thus the average annual volume of flour and bread exports was the
equivalent of 210,328 bushels of wheat. By adding this figure to the aggregate exports of bulk
w’heat, the total average annual volume of wheat, flour, and bread exports was the equivalent of
427,176 bushels of wheat. Assuming that Baltimore accounted for at least 70 percent of
Maryland’s direct grain exports, which is a very conservative estimate, the city would have
exported at least 300,000 bushels of wheat per year by the late 1760s. According to Robert
Alexander’s report, gross exports from Baltimore in 1774 included 120,000 barrels of flour (the
equivalent using the conversion method above of 539,632 bushels of wheat), and 250,000 bushels
of bulk wheat. Using the conversion method above, the total grain exports from the city in 1774
amounted to the equivalent of 789,632 bushels of wheat. This amounted to 25 percent of the total
for British America. According to Timothy Pitkin, total exports of bulk wheat from British
America in 1770 amounted to 851,240 bushels, and bread and flour exports amounted to 45,868
tons, or the equivalent of 2.4 million bushels of wheat. Thus total American exports were the
equivalent of 3.2 million bushels of wheat. See Geoffrey Gilbert, Baltimore’s Flour Trade to the
Caribbean, 1750-1815 (Baltimore: Garland Publishing, 1986), 36-37; David Klingaman, ‘The
Significance of Grain in the Development of the Tobacco Colonies,” Journal of Economic
History. 29 (1969): 272; Papenfuse, “The Economy of the Eastern Shore of Maryland,” 193; and
Timothy Pitkin, A Statistical View o f Commerce o f the United States (Woodbridge, CT: Research
Publications, 1980; orig. 1835), 21-23.
52 Charles Davenant, Discourses on the Publick Revenues, and on the Trade o f England. In Two
Parts (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1975; orig. 1698), II, 232.
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believed was critical to the wealth of nations. The British therefore favored limiting the
scale o f industry in British America to local workshops that serviced the immediate needs
of the local economy. Mercantilism thus fostered the development o f the household
economy in British America.
The term household economy is similar to mercantilism in that it is an interpretive
construct in need of definition.53 At its simplest, the household economy referred to the
web o f customs, privileges, social conventions, labor arrangements, and local exchange
networks practiced by both farm and handicraft households in early modem Europe.
Most artisans did not set their eyes on achieving great fortunes, and thus few envisioned
expanding their workshops to produce for anything more than the local market. No
matter what their particular trade, artisans, much like farmers, engaged in commerce to
achieve a “competency,” described by historian Daniel Vickers as “a degree of well
being that was both desirable and morally legitimate.” This ideal was necessarily
imprecise, because what constituted an acceptable income changed over the course of an
artisan’s life. The size of the family, the age of the producer, and the family’s access to
the burgeoning world of consumer goods all figured into the calculation. Yet most

53 My understanding of household production and non-market controls over economic life in
colonial America is based in part on Jackson Turner Main, The Social Structure o f Revolutionary
America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965); J.R.T. Hughes, Social Control in the
Colonial Economy (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1976); James Henretta,
“Families and Farms: Mentalite in Pre-Industrial America,” The William and Mary Quarterly, 3d
ser., 35 (1978): 3-32; Sung Bok Kim, Landlord and Tenant in Colonial New York: Manorial
Society, 1664-1775 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1978); John McCusker and
Russ Menard, The Economy o f British America, 1607-1789 (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1985), 236-57, 309-48; Lucy Simler, “Tenancy in Colonial Pennsylvania: The
Case of Chester County,” The William and Mary Quarterly, 3d ser., 43 (1986): 542-69; Sharon
Salinger, To Serve Well and Faithfully: Labor and Indentured Servants in Pennsylvania, 16821800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); and Daniel Vickers, “Competency and
Competition: Economic Culture in Early America,” The William and Mary Quarterly, 3d ser., 47
(1990): 3-29.
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artisans displayed advanced commercial sensibilities at some level. They were marketoriented without being profit-maximizers. Achieving a surplus was not the goal of
economic activity; if a surplus was achieved through hard work, so much the better—it
could be consumed for the immediate benefit of the family. However, few artisans
envisioned their surpluses as profits that could be re-invested as working capital. As
historian James Henretta pointed out, the family’s welfare was the preeminent
consideration because “the primary economic unit—the family— was also the main social
institution.” In the household economy, “family relationships could not be divorced from
economic considerations.”54
The centrality o f family as an organizing principle of the household economy
reinforced a gendered division of labor in which husbands and wives contributed in
discreet ways to both housework and artisanal production. Men and women did not share
the same work responsibilities, but there was likewise no sharp demarcation. There was
no separation in the household economy marking women’s work as unwaged labor that
occurred inside the household, and men’s work as waged labor that occurred outside the
household. Indeed, urban workshops were typically located inside the family’s home,
thoroughly blurring the lines between women’s and men’s work. In addition to doing
most of the laundering, cleaning, and sewing, wives also reduced the family’s need to
make cash expenditures by raising hogs and chickens, selling produce cultivated in
54 Vickers, “Competency and Competition,” 3, and Henretta, “Families and Farms.” 21. On the
emergence of the household economy in medieval Britain, see Barbara Hanawalt, The Ties that
Bound: Peasant Families in Medieval England (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986). An
excellent study of how a familial-oriented desire for “competency” in colonial America gave rise
to profit and fortune is Christine Daniels, “From Father to Son: Economic Roots of Craft
Dynasties in Eighteenth-Century Maryland,” in Howard Rock, Paul Gilje, and Robert Asher, eds.,
American Artisans: Crafting Social Identity, 1750-1850 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1995), 3-17. Also see Johanna Miller Lewis, Artisans in the North Carolina
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gardens, and producing a range of household goods like soap, candles, and clothing.
Middle-class wives oversaw the good behavior of servants, and many worked in their
husbands’ shops without wage compensation. Wives of laborers helped stave off the
family’s need for cash expenditures by ragpicking, scavenging for food, clothing, and
fuel, selling produce on the streets as hucksters, and in desperate circumstances, stealing.
Children, depending on their age, assisted their mothers with many of these household
tasks. Wives did most o f the cooking, but husbands were typically responsible for
hauling the wood, milling the grain, and butchering meat.ss
Wives and husbands both contributed to the care of children. Wives typically
looked after infants and younger children, but once the children were a little older,
eighteenth-century literature on child rearing emphasized the importance of the father’s
role in breaking, or at least bending, their children’s wills. Mothers still played a role, but
the instruction of older children, and particularly that of the boys, increasingly fell within
the broad scope of patriarchal authority. Eighteenth-century authors held that fathers
were better able to inculcate a lasting sense of duty, industry, submission, piety, and
deference in children. Mothers were admonished for indulging older children too much.
According to historian Philip Greven, an intense sense of affection combined with an
equally important sense of decorum to reduce the perceived need for discipline in genteel

Backcountry (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1995).
ss My understanding of the gendered division of labor in the household economy is based in part
on Mary Beth Norton, Liberty’s Daughters: The Revolutionary Experience o f American Women,
1750-1850 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980), 3-154; Ruth Schwartz Cowan, More Work
fo r Mother: The Ironies o f Household Technology from the Open Hearth to the Microwave (New
York: Basic Books, 1983), 16-68; Joan Jensen, Loosening the Bonds: Mid-Atlantic Farm Women,
1750-1850 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986); and Jeanne Boydston, Home and Work:
Housework, Wages, and the Ideology o f Labor in the Early Republic (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1990).
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families. These differences created subtle changes in the goals of child rearing. A sense
of reverence was emphasized above duty, which was taken for granted. Fear, which was
necessary to achieve a sense o f submission, was inconceivable. Thus obligation
superseded the importance o f submission. In all cases, however, piety and deference
remained the preeminent virtues, and patriarchal authority was a constant.56
Although the focus on family, local exchanges, and a gendered division of labor
were persistent themes in the household economy, there were variations between nations.
In France, the internal regulation of industry was almost as far-reaching as the
administration of foreign commerce. Beginning with Colbert’s ministry under King
Louis XIV, the government rested control over much of the nation’s trade from both
spiritual and temporal lords, as well as autonomous cities. Over the protests of those who
asserted traditional and customary privileges, Colbert and his King succeeded in
nationalizing the guilds and instituting a uniform and centralized system o f police
oversight over industrial laws, or reglements. A seemingly endless stream of ordinances
were closely maintained by a small army of inspecteurs, jug es des m anufactures, and
lieutenants generaux de police. The government also granted exclusive and extensive
privileges to specific tradesmen who were designated as m anufactures royales. Although
these businesses remained in private hands, they effectively became an extension of state
authority.57
In Britain, there was no equivalent to Colbert’s vast projection o f state power into

56 Philip Greven, The Protestant Temperament: Patterns o f Child-Rearing, Religious Expression,
and Self in Early America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), 21-61, 151-91, 265-96,
and Norton, Liberty’s Daughters, 93-100.
57 Heckscher, Mercantilism, I, 137-220.
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domestic economic affairs. Instead, British mercantilist regulations over internal
industries allowed the household economy to evolve from the model o f the medieval
family economy. Following the plagues of the fourteenth century, much of Europe
witnessed soaring wages resulting from the profound losses in population. In 1351,
Parliament passed a Statute of Labourers designed to control wages through a system of
assizes, or nationwide price-fixing. More important, the law also limited entrance into
craft trades by barring apprenticeship to anyone who had remained an agricultural worker
until age twelve. The purpose was to encourage generational stability in rural areas
depleted o f population. The effect of the law was to solidify the family as the primary
unit of production. Although targeted as rural workers, the 1351 Statute of Labourers did
not discriminate between urban and rural circumstances, applying equally to both.58
During Queen Elizabeth’s reign, regulation of the predominantly urban craft
trades was extended in the 1563 Labour Law, often referred to as the Statute of Artificers
and Apprentices. Until the law’s full repeal in 1814, the Statute of Artificers and
Apprentices served as one of the cornerstones of the household economy in Britain.
Apprenticeship was set as seven years, and recommended to commence no later than
eighteen years o f age, and end no sooner than twenty-one, and no later than twenty-four
years o f age. Restrictions were placed on admittance to some trades, but almost anyone
could become an apprentice to a less-skilled artisan. After the passage of the Poor Laws
o f 1597 and 1601, jurists interpreted the 1563 statute as prohibiting an apprentice from
being able to leave a master, and requiring that a master provide both spiritual and
occupational instruction to apprentices. Despite the focus on apprenticeship, the law was

58 25 Edward III c.1-7 in Statutes o f the Realm, and Heckscher, Mercantilism, 1,221-27.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

71
silent on the question of guilds. Instead o f nationalizing these institutions, as the French
had done, the British allowed for a considerable degree of local control over craft
organization. British artisans took full advantage of this in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries by creating craft societies that specified rules unique to particular
occupations. Ultimately these societies played an informal role in the regulation of
domestic trade by serving as the primary administrative agents over the apprentice
system. Yet a more important aspect of the decentralized system was that it strengthened
the sense o f community within the handicraft trades.59
In America, the household economy developed from the British model, but
mercantilist imperatives restricted its evolution. The dependence on imported British
goods helped limit the range of Baltimore’s handicraft trades to those necessary for either
subsistence or the facilitation of foreign commerce. Thus the household economy in
America was a stunted version of eighteenth-century British norms. In Baltimore,
artisanal production focused primarily on the needs of the grain trade, the maritime
economy, and the rapidly increasing population. In 1761, Joseph Ellicott and Hugh
Burgess moved from Pennsylvania to Maryland and built several mills on the Patapsco
River about ten miles west of Baltimore. The following year, William Moore relocated
to Baltimore from Pennsylvania and bought the mill Jonathon Hanson built in 1711.
Transportation o f the milled flour required the services of coopers and carters, and town
itself supported a growing number of bakeries. Shipbuilding also emerged as a central
industry in the town. By the Revolution, there were at least four active shipbuilders:
59 For the Poor Laws, see 39 Elizabeth c.3 and 43 Elizabeth c.2 in Statutes o f the Realm. On the
interpretation of the Statute of Artificers and Apprentices, see Heckscher, Mercantilism, I, 22733. The Statute of Artificers and Apprentices was repealed in two parts, by 53 George II c.40,
and 54 George m c.96.
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George Wells, James Morgan, Archibald Buchanan, and William McGachin. Ship
construction employed a range of artisans, including carpenters, riggers, caulkers, block
and pump makers, sailmakers, and various ironworkers and smiths. All o f these trades
flourished in the 1760s, and by the following decade, the town also supported two
ropewalks. The physical expansion of the town maintained a booming construction
industry, employing house carpenters, house joiners, plasterers, brick makers, brick
layers, and wharf builders. A large number of butchers, tanners, grocers, tailors, and
shopkeepers accommodated the needs of the city’s growing population, and taverns, inns,
and boarding houses served the needs of travelers.60
Compared to London, there were relatively few artisans engaged in luxury trades,
highly specialized crafts, or significant manufacturing enterprises. Except for the
ropewalks and the brickyards, Baltimore was a town of small, ordinary workshops. By
the 1770s there were a handful of cabinet makers, watchmakers, and silversmiths who
advertised in Baltimore newspapers, but the town otherwise lacked artisans who catered
to more affluent customers. There were no picture frame makers, piano forte makers, or
book binders until after the Revolution. Baltimoreans had to rely on imported goods, or
go to Annapolis or Philadelphia for these services. There was also little specialization
among Baltimore’s artisans. M ost needed to engage in a range o f business ventures to
achieve a competency, and thus artisans routinely engaged in farming, tavern keeping,
and land speculation. John Gordon, a saddler, also made chairs. Gerrard Hopkins, a

60 Charles Kuhlmann, The Development o f the Flour-Milling Industry in the United States
(Clifton, NJ: Augustus M. Kelley, 1973; orig. 1929), 28-30, and Tina Shelter, “Artisans and the
Evolution of Baltimore Town, 1765-1790” (Ph.D., University of Maryland, College Park, 1990),
37-43.
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cabinetmaker, also sold lumber.61
The stunted evolution of colonial artisan communities also produced a lack of
business organization compared to their British counterparts. British mercantilist policies
were geared towards maximizing the inflow o f silver into Great Britain. In the colonies,
this resulted in a general shortage of circulating specie that forced many assemblies into
printing paper money. Artisans grudgingly accepted colonial paper as a legitimate
alternative, but they preferred to deal in specie. To negotiate the demands of the cashpoor economy, artisans typically extended short-term credit to their customers, allowing
them to purchase goods and services on account. In many cases, this type of book debt
became a reciprocal arrangement where artisans purchased goods and services from their
customers on the same type o f short-term credit. The practice reduced the need for
frequent cash transactions, encouraged people to do business with those they knew and
trusted, and favored local exchanges over competition in a regional market. After a few
months, usually without any additional interest charges, accounts were settled in specie.
Although British artisans used the system of book debts too, the practice was increasingly
archaic as Londoners adopted double-entry bookkeeping instead. Baltimore’s artisans
sought to reproduce the metropolitan standards set by their London counterparts, but
mercantilist world in which the colonial household economy developed made it difficult.
The evolution of the household economy also shaped Americans’ sense o f social
deference and hierarchy. Degrees of social deference established themselves in colonial
America in a multitude of subtle ways.62 According to historian Rhys Isaac, “the

61 Sheller, “Artisans and the Evolution of Baltimore Town,” 37-43.
62 My understanding of eighteenth-century deference and the social order of colonial America is
based in part on Arthur Lovejoy, The Great Chain o f Being: A Study o f the History o f an Idea
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defining characteristics of gentility [in colonial America] are elusive. At first glance
being a gentleman resided in the fact itself - a claim made upon the world and accepted
by the world.” Despite the ambiguities, John Adams had no trouble believing that the
“regular and uniform Subordination of one Tribe to another down to the apparently
insignificant animalcules in pepper Water” represented the natural order of his society.
Adams gained this clarity over his world thanks in part to the connection between the
deferential social order and the traditional economic order based on household production
and non-market controls over labor. By the early eighteenth century, the bond between
the deferential social order and the household economy had been consolidated. Jonathan
Edwards commented how beautiful society had become when its members “have all their
appointed office, place and station, according to their several capacities and talents, and
everyone keeps his place, and continues in his proper business.”63
The profits gained from the export of agricultural products, which drew people to
the export economy and away from manufacturing activity, was usually sufficient to limit
the development of the domestic economy in colonial America. Few colonial assemblies
attempted to promote manufacturing, because lawmakers realized that the British Board
of Trade had the authority to review all colonial legislation and recommend that the laws
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1936), 200-07; Greven, The Protestant
Temperament, 194-98; A.G. Roeber, “Authority, Law, and Custom: The Rituals of Court Day in
Tidewater Virginia, 1720 to 1750,” The William and Mary Quarterly, 3d ser., 37 (1980): 29-52;
Rhys Isaac, The Transformation o f Virginia, 1740-1790 (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1982), 18-142; Richard Bushman, King and People in Provincial Massachusetts
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985); Timothy Breen, Tobacco Culture: The
Mentality o f the Great Tidewater Planters on the Eve o f the Revolution (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1985); and Gordon Wood, The Radicalism o f the American Revolution (New
York: Alfred Knopf, 1992), 11-94.
63 Isaac, Transformation o f Virginia, 131. Adams quoted in Wood, The Radicalism o f the
American Revolution, 20. Edwards quoted in Norman Fiering, Jonathan Edwards’s Moral
Thought and Its British Context (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981), 131.
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be nullified if deemed contrary to British interests or policies. It was not an idle threat.
Between 1696 and 1776, the Board’s examinations led to more than 400 different
colonial statutes being disallowed by the Privy Council. Occasionally, Parliament itself
adopted additional measures to stunt the development of American industry. One such
measure was the Hat Act of 1732, which prohibited the trade in hats between colonies
and restricted entry into the craft to those who served a formal apprenticeship. Although
the law did not set a limit on the number of hatters allowed in the colonies, it proved just
as effective in this regard by retarding the growth o f the industry. Sometimes,
mercantilist policies stimulated colonial manufacturing. In 1750, Parliament passed the
Iron Act as a means to promote Britain’s woolens trade. The goal was to create a
supplementary export trade for the American colonies to balance an increase in the
volume of British textile imports into the colonies. Baltimore benefited greatly from this
legislation. The red-stained clays that Captain Smith observed betrayed the existence of
substantial iron deposits close to Baltimore, and by 1776, there were at least six
ironworks established near Baltimore. All totaled, the British American colonies
produced one-seventh o f the world’s crude iron production on the eve of independence.
The Iron Act, however, proved the exception; it was more often the case that imperial
regulations limited colonial manufacturing.64
By the early 1770s, Baltimore was no longer a forgotten backwater of empire.
With its export trade flourishing, the town had become an integrated part of the Atlantic

64 For the Hat Act, see 5 George II c.22, and for the Iron Act, see 23 George II c.29, in Statutes of
the Realm. For growth of iron production in the Baltimore-area and the British American
colonies as a whole, see Shelter, “Artisans and the Evolution of Baltimore Town,” 166. On the
limitations to colonial manufacturing produced by British mercantilist policies, see Hughes,
Social Control in the Colonial Economy, 157-62.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

76
economy. The success o f the maritime economy had promoted the growth of a nascent
artisan community, and allowed the town to grow from a few hundred inhabitants to
more than 6,000 by the Revolution. The steady growth allowed Charles Carroll to sell
off the last o f his lots in 1763, earning him £591.4.1‘/2. Baltimore merchant William Lux
could scarcely believe the progress of the town, which seemed to have sprang from the
marshy shores of the Patapsco without warning and almost overnight. “It is so much
improved,” Lux told his aunt. “We have about 350 Houses in town and more adding
every day.” In the harbor, it was not uncommon that “70 or 80 Sail of Vessels Loaded
here yearly with Tobacco, Wheat, Flour, and Flaxseed.”65 The prospects for the midAtlantic entrepot appeared unlimited. The only conceivable threat to the town’s growth
seemed to be the drumbeats of war, and by the early 1770s, Baltimoreans could hear the
clamor all too easily.

65 Hoffman, Princes o f Ireland, Planters o f Maryland, 121-22, and William Lux to S. Lux, July
15, 1768, William Lux Letterbook, New York Historical Society, quoted in Sheller, “Artisans and
the Evolution of Baltimore Town,” 29.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE LIMITS OF REVOLUTION

On Tuesday, July 2, L776, the delegates to the Second Continental Congress in
Philadelphia voted unanimously in favor o f Richard Henry Lee’s resolution that “these
United Colonies are, and of right ought to be, free and independent States, that they are
absolved from all allegiance to the British Crown, and that all political connection
between them and the State o f Great Britain is, and ought to be totally dissolved.” Two
days later, the delegates trumpeted their decision to the world by adopting the Declaration
of Independence. Copies of the historic document soon circulated throughout the thirteen
newly independent states, and public readings occurred in nearly every town. General
George Washington even had the declaration read aloud to the Continental army. The
displays affirmed the gravity of the Congress’s action, and, not surprisingly, July 4
became a focal point o f patriotic celebration. The first anniversary o f the declaration was
greeted with pomp and circumstance, and in Boston and Philadelphia, the festivities
carried on all night long. A correspondent to the Pennsylvania Evening Post took great
satisfaction in his city’s commemorative celebration, expressing the hope that the
“glorious and memorable day, be celebrated through America, by the sons of freedom,
from age to age till time shall be no more.” 1 The parades and fireworks that still mark the
anniversary o f the historic date more than two centuries later would no doubt please the
correspondent to the Post.

1Chauncey Ford, ed., Journals o f the Continental Congress, 1774-1789, Editedfrom the Original
Records in the Library o f Congress, 34 vols. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1904-1937), V, 424, and Pennsylvania Evening Post, July 5, 1777, quoted in Len Travers,
Celebrating the Fourth: Independence Day and the Rites o f Nationalism in the Early Republic
(Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 1997), 24.
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Unlike the events of July 4, 1776, Congress’s resolution of April 6, 1776 is not
commemorated throughout the republic. Yet the decision reached on that date— to open
America’s ports to the commerce of every nation except Great Britain— held
revolutionary possibilities as far reaching as those in the Declaration of Independence.
The measure was primarily intended as a way to provide adequate provisions for the
army, yet it promised to turn the economy of the Atlantic world upside down. No longer
would American trade be controlled by the British navigation laws, limited by British
restrictions, or channeled by imperial dictates. The old mercantilist order would be swept
away and replaced by free trade. Just as the Declaration of Independence shattered the
monarchial government and confirmed the new nation’s political independence, the
opening of America’s ports promised to demolish British commercial dominance over
America and secure the republic’s economic independence.2
To many modem observers, a declaration of political independence and support
for a free trade policy may appear as two wholly different concerns. For the
Revolutionary generation, however, economic and political independence were linked,
albeit somewhat loosely. Better than anyone else, Thomas Paine, an emigre writer who
forcefully made the case for independence in his pamphlet, Common Sense, grasped how
the connection between economic and political freedom infused the American idea of
independence. Paine argued that any talk of reconciliation with Great Britain was utter
foolishness because continued “dependence on Great Britain, tends directly to involve

2For the importance of free trade in the American thinking about independence, see John
Crowley, This Sheba, Self: The Conceptualization o f Economic Life in Eighteenth-Century
America (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), 147-49, and Drew McCoy, The
Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1982), 76-77, 85-95.
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this continent [America] in European wars and quarrels.” Such conflicts did not benefit
Americans, for “whenever a war breaks out between England and any foreign power, the
trade of America goes to ruin, because o f her connection with Britain.” Political
dependence thus equated directly to economic dependence, and the only true way to
insure the nation’s prosperity was to end all political association with Great Britain.
Once political independence was achieved, according to Paine’s argument, free trade
represented the best way to insure the success of the new nation. Paine urged that “as we
have, without any good effect therefrom, withheld our trade to obtain a redress of our
grievances, let us now try the alternative, by independently redressing them ourselves,
and then offering to open our trade.” The latter would embrace all nations, for “as
Europe is our market for trade, we ought to form no partial connection with any part of
it.” The new republic’s role in the world would therefore be simple and easily defined:
“Our plan is commerce, and that, well attended to, will secure us the peace and friendship
of all Europe; because it is the interest of all Europe to have America a free p o r t”3
Paine’s arguments for free trade became a refrain that the Revolutionary
generation repeated over and over again. John Adams incorporated the doctrine later that
summer into the Model Treaty, which acted as the template on which all American
alliances were thereafter crafted. Adams stressed the importance of the republic’s
commercial connections to other nations instead of its political or military associations,

3Thomas Paine, “Common Sense,” in The Thomas Paine Reader, ed. Michael Foot and Isaac
Kramnick (New York: Penguin Books, 1987), 83, 110. In her study of the making of the
Declaration of Independence, Pauline Maier observed that “the promise of economic freedom and
expansion was never powerfully yoked to the cause of Independence,” but “the most commonly
mentioned benefits [of independence] were . . . economic advantages.” See Pauline Maier,
American Scripture: Making the Declaration o f Independence (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1997),
91-92.
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and thus embedded free trade as the benchmark principle of American foreign policy.
Thomas Jefferson also joined the chorus, writing in his Notes on the State o f Virginia that
“our interest will be to throw open the doors of commerce, and to knock off all its
shackles, giving perfect freedom to all persons.” He would later put it even more
succinctly: “Peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling
alliances with none.” In pinning their hopes to free trade during and after the war as the
way to insure economic security, Americans set the standard by which they measured
complete independence. Failure to realize this goal meant the greatest certainty of loss,
to both the prospects for American commerce and the likelihood that the republic would
even survive.4

T h e C o n t in e n t a l A s s o c ia t io n

O f all of America’s ports, Baltimore benefited the most from the confluence of
political and economic independence. In the span of just a few years, the city vaulted

4 Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State o f Virginia, ed. William Peden (New York: W.W. Norton,
1972), 174, and James Ritcheson, ed., A Compilation o f the Messages and Papers o f the
Presidents, 1789-1897 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1897-1900), I, 323.
Walter LaFeber pointed out that the exigencies of war made it necessary to amend the doctrine by
remodeling the Model Treaty in December 1776, and dispatching Benjamin Franklin to France,
John Adams to the Netherlands, and John Jay to Spain to obtain alliances. Nonetheless, the core
of the doctrine, that free trade ought to be the guiding principle of an independent United States
and the basis of any future alliance, survived these short-term complications. In practice,
commercial reciprocity became conditional most-favored-nation status. It was this principle that
was incorporated into the commercial treaties with France, Sweden, Prussia, and the Netherlands.
See Walter LaFeber, The American Age: United States Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad since
1750 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1989), 18-23, 28; Richard Morris, “The Durable Significance of
the Treaty of 1783,” in Peace and the Peacemakers: The Treaty o f 1783, ed. Ronald Hoffman and
Peter Albert (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1986), 233; Thomas Paterson, J. Garry
Clifford, and Kenneth Hagan, American Foreign Policy: A History to 1914 (Lexington, MA: D.C.
Heath & Co., 1988), 3d ed., 10-12, 33; and Robert Smith, “Keeping the Republic: Ideology and
the Diplomacy of John Adams, James Madison, and John Quincy Adams” (Ph.D., The College of
William and Mary, 1997), 43-123.
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from the rank o f a second-tier colonial entrepot within the British Empire to become one
o f the primary gateways for the new republic’s foreign trade. The city’s wartime
ascendance embodied the seemingly unlimited commercial opportunities created by
political independence and the revolutionary possibilities of free trade. A correspondent
to the Maryland Gazette could scarcely believe how much the town had transformed
during the war. “What a change— what a transition, in so short a time! Amazing
indeed!” Johann David Schoepf agreed. The chief surgeon with the troops from
Ansbach, Germany employed by the British as auxiliaries during the war, Schoepf
remained in America for a brief time after the Revolution, criss-crossing the American
countryside. He spent most of his time in Pennsylvania and Maryland, scribbling down
notes about the manners, customs, landscape, people, institutions, and prospects of the
mid-Atlantic region. He was most impressed with Baltimore. The quiet town on the
Patapsco River had blossomed into a first-tier port of entry for foreign commerce, and the
reason was obvious. “Nothing” Schoepf wrote, “was so favorable to the commerce of the
place as the last war.”s He sensed that with the coming of peace, Baltimore was poised to
become a primary gateway for the republic’s trade, possibly supplanting Philadelphia as
the chief entrepot for the mid-Atlantic region. A decade before Johann Schoepf s tour,
however, the chances that Baltimore would enjoy such a rarefied position and a
prosperous future were in serious question.
The American path of resistance to British policies between 1774 and 1776
threatened the foundation of British mercantilism, but did so in an altogether different

5 Maryland Gazette and Baltimore Advertiser. September 28, 1784, and Johann David Schoepf,
Travels in the Confederation, 1783-1784, trans. and ed. A J. Morrison (Philadelphia: W J.
Campbell, 1911), I.
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fashion than the ultimate direction taken by Congress on April 6, 1776. After Parliament
passed the Boston Port Acts in 1774 in reaction to the Boston Tea Party, delegates from
twelve colonies convened in Philadelphia in September 1774 for the First Continental
Congress. How best to remonstrate against the indignities suffered from British policies
headed the delegates’ agenda. Instead of adopting free trade to promote economic
independence from Great Britain, Congress pursued a proto-nationalist course by cutting
off American trade altogether from the Atlantic economy. On October 20, they agreed to
form the Continental Association, prohibiting imports from entering America after
December 1, 1774, and banning exports from America to Britain, Ireland, or the British
West Indies effective September 10, 1775. At the local level, Committees of Observation
were established to enforce the provisions of the Association, to ensure that the boycott
would have the desired political effect on the British. A similar strategy had worked
during the 1760s in winning the repeal o f the Townshend Acts, and Congress had every
confidence that the strategy would work again. The logic of Thomas Paine’s arguments
were as yet silent in the American mind.6
Unfortunately for moderates hoping for a reconciliation, Lord North, Great
Britain’s new Prime Minister, was unwilling to alter British policies. With Parliament
refusing to bend to American pressure, events quickly spiraled toward open rebellion. In
Annapolis, a mob had burned of the Peggy Stewart, a brig carrying more than 2,300
pounds o f tea. In Virginia, Governor Lord Dunmore had seized the gunpowder from the

6 Ford, Journals o f the Continental Congress, L, 76-77, and Jack Rakove, The Beginnings o f
National Politics: An Interpretive History o f the Continental Congress (New York: Alfred Knopf,
1979), 49-52. The Townshend Acts, or Townshend Duties, were named after Charles
Townshend, the Chancellor of the Exchequer under William Pitt [the Elder], who served as Great
Britain’s Prime Minister between 1766 and 1768.
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public magazine in Williamsburg. News o f the incident spread throughout the colony
“like sparks falling on dry brush” according to historian John Selby; volunteer companies
were prepared to march on Williamsburg, and would have done so if not for the efforts of
Edmund Pendleton, Richard Henry Lee, and Peyton Randolph, all of whom urged
caution. In Massachusetts, the British had attempted to seize the stores of munitions in
Concord had led to bloodshed on Lexington Green when Major John Pitcairn’s troops
exchanged fire with the colonial militia. Unlike Dunmore’s seizure o f the magazine in
Williamsburg, however, Pitcairn was denied his prize thanks to the heroic stand of the
militia at Concord Bridge.7
In the shadow of these milestones in the road to rebellion, the delegates
reconvened in May 1775 in Philadelphia for the Second Continental Congress. The
boycott of British trade had failed miserably in winning concessions from Parliament,
and Congress quickly resolved to adopt more drastic measures. On June 14, 1775, the
delegates agreed to create a Continental army of 15,000 troops— an ambitious goal given
that there was not enough specie in general circulation throughout all the colonies to pay
for an army o f that size. To pay the army’s expenses, Congress agreed on June 22 to
issue bills o f credit, a time-honored colonial method of financing military operations.
The new bills, called Continental Dollars, were not lawful money, meaning they were not
considered legal tender for all debts, public and private. Dollars could not be exchanged
7 For the burning of the Peggy Stewart, see Ronald Hoffman, A Spirit o f Dissension: Economics,
Politics, and the Revolution in Maryland (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973),
133-38. For the “gunpowder plot” in Virginia, see John Selby, The Revolution in Virginia, 17751783 (Williamsburg, VA: Colonial Williamsburg Foundation, 1988), 1-5,41-43. For the Battles
at Lexington and Concord, see Robert Gross, The Minutemen and Their World (New York: Hill
and Wang, 1976), 114-32. Frederick, Lord North, was a leading voice in British imperial affairs
during the 1760s, and served as Great Britain’s Prime Minister between 1770 and 1782. He
became a key member of the coalition government behind the Duke of Portland during the latter’s
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for specie at a Continental Bank, because Congress did not create such a bank.
Nonetheless, the delegates hoped that Americans would accept Continental Dollars as a
universal medium of exchange, and that individual states would assist in withdrawing
Dollars from circulation through taxation to prevent the bills from becoming too deflated
in value. Every colony had issued bills of credit during the eighteenth century, so there
were no illusions regarding the usefulness of Continental Dollars beyond their limited
purpose. At the same time, no colony had ever attempted to issue bills of credit on such a
massive scale: $2 million went into circulation immediately, the amount reaching $6
million by the end of 1775. Thereafter, in the words o f historian E. James Ferguson,
“Congress stuffed the maw of the Revolution with paper money,” emitting an additional
$19 million in 1776, $13 million in 1777, $63,500,300 in 1778, and $90,052,380 in
1779.8
The establishment o f the Continental Association and the adoption of the
Continental Dollar were primarily intended to serve short-term, specific political needs.
They were not linked programs, and they were not expected to act together like a
revolutionary national economic program. Yet by withholding trade, Congress created
the conditions whereby a new domestic market economy could take form. Cut off from
Atlantic commerce, America would have to be a self-sustaining nation o f farmers,
artisans, and manufacturers. To survive, this nascent national economy needed a medium
of exchange acceptable throughout the continent. The new Continental Dollars held the
brief tenure as Prime Minister in 1783.
8 E. James Ferguson, The Power o f the Purse: A History o f American Public Finance, 1776-1790
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1961), 8-35; Rakove, The Beginnings o f
National Politics, 202-11; and Curtis Nettels, The Emergence o f a National Economy, 1775-1815
(New York: Harper and Row, 1962), 23-24.
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promise o f fulfilling that need. In the early years o f the Revolution, Continental Dollars
circulated like real money, as Americans almost universally accepted them as payment
whether or not their individual state government had declared the Congressional bills as
legal tender.9
If Congress had continued to develop its proto-nationalist economic policies of
1774-1775, the colonies would have certainly shattered their economic dependence on
Great Britain. Yet this course would have likely spelled ruin for Baltimore. Although
Baltimoreans had embraced the revolutionary struggle since the Stamp Act crisis in the
m id-l760s, the city’s economy was ill-prepared in 1775 to embrace the Congress’s
autarkic policies. The restrictions on trade brought Baltimore’s economy to a standstill,
and threatened to undermine all the progress that town had made in the previous two
decades. The hardships caused several Baltimoreans to wobble on their support for
independence. John Smith, a leading merchant of the town, worried that his ‘T rade will
be much injured unless a Reconciliation Soon takes place.” George Woolsey shared
Smith’s worries. An Irish emigre who served on the Committee of Observation for
Baltimore Town, Woolsey believed “it is the wish of every well wisher to the Co[u]ntry
as we are Sensible we cannot at present exist without England.” A few weeks later,
Woolsey expressed solidarity with Patrick Henry’s fiery oratory, writing that “‘tis better
to die than be Slaves.” After the ban on exports took effect, however, he once again
became rather despondent. Writing in late October 1775 to his partner, George Salmon,
Woolsey complained that “If I find We Cannot do Enough [business], and trouble [is]
9 Individual states also adopted similar programs to promote domestic manufacturing as a way of
ending economic dependence on the British. Like Congress’s program, however, these efforts
sputtered after a year or two and then withered away. See Selby, The Revolution in Virginia, 16370.
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likely to continue long, I think to buy some land & Quit business.”10
With consumers cut off from imported goods, the city’s artisans theoretically
stood to gain from the Continental Association. Yet most artisans found it difficult to
accommodate the needs o f this ready supply o f new customers. First, many artisans had
relied too heavily on imported tools and semi-manufactured goods for their trades to be
able to suddenly dispense with them. Second, many potential laborers joined the ranks of
the privateers or the army, and the scarcity of labor caused wages to remain high
throughout the war. Third, the city’s household economy had developed around the
needs of the maritime economy, and conversion to large-scale domestic manufacturing
was not easy.11 If the Congress’s policies had continued, Johann Schoepf s narrative
would have likely been quite different than the one who actually produced. Instead of
commenting on how Baltimore was poised to overtake all other cities at the end o f the
war, Schoepf would have probably written about the city’s abandoned warehouses,
wharves fallen into disrepair, and empty workshops no longer busy supporting the city’s
mercantile pursuits.
A few scattered industries certainly prospered. Wartime demand created a ready
market for those employed in salt-petre works, gunpowder mills, iron forges, gunmaking,
cloth and leather production, and shipbuilding. Baltimore merchant George Keeports had

10 John Smith and Sons to Mildred and Roberts, September 26, 1775, Smith Letterbooks,
MS. 1152, MHS; Woolsey and Salmon to Robinson and Sandwith, April 10, 1774, Woolsey and
Salmon to George and John Wombwells, June 24, 1775, and George Woolsey to George Salmon,
October 28, 1775, Woolsey and Salmon Letterbook, Library of Congress. For the Baltimore
community’s political opposition to the British, see Paul Kent Walker, ‘The Baltimore
Community and the American Revolution: A Study in Urban Devleopment, 1763-1783” (Ph.D.,
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 1973), chapters 4-5.
11 Tina Sheller, “Artisans and the Evolution of Baltimore Town, 1765-1790” (PhD., University of
Maryland, College Park, 1990), 170-88.
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little trouble in 1779 purchasing £12,000 worth o f soldiers’ shirts made from roughlyhewn “country linen.” Commercial iron production collapsed after 1775, but Charles
Ridgely’s Northampton Furnace, Charles Carroll of Carrollton’s Baltimore Iron Works,
and Samuel and Daniel Hughes’s Antietam Furnace (near Hagerstown) successfully
produced a range o f munitions as well as pots and kettles for the army.12
Shipbuilders also prospered thanks to the proliferation of privateers as well as the
building needs o f the Maryland State Navy and the Continental Navy, both of which
required lightning-fast turn-around times for the completion of warships. When the
Baltimore Committee o f Safety purchased the ship Sidney from merchant John Smith and
refitted the vessel as the twenty-gun sloop-of-war Defence, the conversion should have
cost £3,710. Instead, the total expense of the refit came to a whopping £11 ,272.13 The
rapid pace o f the conversion, which spanned only four months (December 1775 to March
1776), was part o f the reason for the expense. Another was that labor and shipbuilding
supplies were at a premium because so many other building projects and refitting efforts
were underway at approximately the same time. At the beginning of December,
Congress sent Benjamin Harrison to Baltimore to purchase and refit vessels for the new
Continental Navy. Samuel Purviance and William Lux were subsequently employed to
refit the schooner Wasp and the sloop Hornet. Two Baltimore captains, William Hallock
and William Stone, were in command of the new warships when they joined Esek

12 Shetler, “Artisans and the Evolution of Baltimore Town,” 140-77.
13 For the cost of converting the Sidney, see Shelter, “Artisans of Baltimore Town,” 200 n.81.
Quoting British estimates for the cost of building warships, Thomas Paine estimated the cost of a
20-gun sloop-of-war at £3,710. However, the actual cost of conversion of the Sidney exceeded
Paine’s estimates for the cost of a 50-gun frigate, which he pegged at £10,606. See Paine,
“Common Sense,” in The Thomas Paine Reader, 96.
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Hopkins’s squadron in February. Purviance also oversaw the construction of the new
Continental Navy frigate Virginia. 14 In addition to merchants outfitting their own vessels
as privateers, the docks along Fell’s Point remained a focal point of activity throughout
the war, employing hundreds of the city’s carpenters, caulkers, block and pump makers,
ropemakers, riggers, joiners, and sailmakers.
By early 1776, Congress recognized the shortcomings of the Continental
Association. Although a limited number of individuals benefited from the policy, the
policy had failed to secure adequate provisions for the army, and it was no longer clear
whether or not the autarkic strategy would insure the nation’s economic independence. A
sure sign o f this failure was the depreciation in the value of the Continental Dollar.
Without imports, there was little for which the new paper money could be used to buy,
and not surprisingly, the exchange value of Continental Dollars for specie depreciated in
near-perfect correlation to the number of Dollars in circulation— a textbook example of
14 By the eighteenth century, navies rated warships primarily by the number of guns they carried.
A vessel’s rigging, size, and complement were of secondary concern, and the size of the vessel's
guns were of almost no concern at all. In the British Royal Navy, a warship carrying at least 64
guns was called a line-of-battle ship, or more simply, a ship-of-the-line. Warships carrying 24 to
64 guns were classified as frigates. British warships with fewer than 24 guns were classified as
sloops-of-war. (In the French Royal Navy, warships with less than 28 guns were called corvettes,
but Americans usually followed the British nomenclature.) Ships-of-the-line were always threemasted and square-rigged. Frigates could have either two or three masts, and could be rigged as a
ship or a brig, and on rare occasions, a bark or a snow. Rigging on sloops-of-war varied wildly,
underscoring the primacy of the number of guns carried in the classification. A sloop-of-war
could be rigged as a sloop, meaning a vessel with one mast rigged fore and aft, or it could be
rigged as a schooner, a brig, a bark, a snow, or even a ship. Thus sloops-of-war variably had one.
two, or three masts, and could be either square-rigged or rigged fore-and-aft. Most warships
carried a mix of guns ranging from smaller six and nine-pounders to the larger eighteen and
twenty-four-pound guns. American warships typically carried fewer heavy guns than their
British counterparts, but the classifications of the warships of both nations hinged simply on the
number of guns, not their size. See Howard Chapelle, The History o f the American Sailing Ships
(New York: W.W. Norton, 1935), 11-19, 51-57; Howard Chapelle, The History o f the American
Sailing Navy: The Ships and Their Development (New York: W.W. Norton, 1949), 9-51; and
N.A.M. Rodger, The Wooden World: An Anatomy o f the Georgian Navy (New York: W.W.
Norton, 1986), Appendix I.
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what happens when an increasing supply of money chases a static or declining supply of
goods.13 To gain adequate supplies o f war materials, a new course of action was needed,
and even before the Continental Association took full effect, Congress determined to
relax the impending restrictions. The entrance of non-British vessels into American ports
to trade war supplies for American produce was approved on July 15, 1775. A little over
a week after the ban on exports to the British Empire took effect, Congress empowered a
secret committee to nonetheless make contracts overseas for war supplies. Thanks to the
immediate successes o f these commercial connections and frustratingly slow
development of a domestic manufacturing capacity, Congress took the final step toward
ending its brief flirtation with developing a national economy. On April 6, 1776, they
embraced free trade by opening American ports to the commerce of every nation except
that of Great Britain— a merchants’ paradise was seemingly within reach.16

15The Pearson’s r was 0.93 for the correlation between the number of Continental Dollars in
circulation at the end of each year (1775-1779), and the exchange value of those Dollars in specie
at the end of each corresponding year. E. Janies Ferguson’s estimate for the number of Dollars in
circulation, and Curtis Nettels’s figures for the depreciation of the Dollar’s value were used in the
calculation of Pearson’s r. According to Ferguson, Congress issued $6 million in 1775, $19
million in 1776, $13 million in 1777, $63.5 million in 1778, and $90 million in 1779. According
to Nettels, $1.00 in specie equaled $1.00 in Continental Dollars in 1775. By December 1776, the
ratio between specie and paper fell to 1:1.5; by October 1777, the ratio was 1:3; by December
1778, the ratio was 1:6.84, and by December 1779, the ratio was 1:42.2. The method assumes
that none of the Continental Dollars issued subsequently left circulation during the period in
question—a safe assumption given that states avoided passing any tax law to retire Continental
Dollars from circulation. The method also ignores intra-year fluctuations in the exchange value
of the Continental Dollar, but this only happened once, in late 1778. The brief appreciation
followed a dip in the pace of Congressional emissions in 1777. Once the emissions of 1778 took
effect, the depreciation of the Dollar accelerated once again. See Ferguson, Power o f the Purse,
25-35, and Nettels, The Emergence o f a National Economy, 24-25.
16Ford, Journals o f the Continental Congress, IV, 257-59, and Nettels, Emergence o f a National
Economy, 2-6.
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Thanks to the vagaries of British military efforts, the revolutionary potential of
free trade was not universally realized during the war. One by one, every major
American port other than Baltimore, was occupied, blockaded, or destroyed. Baltimore
alone enjoyed the unique position of being the largest port not directly blockaded by the
Royal Navy at any point during the war. The city was likewise never occupied by the
British, nor was it ever seriously threatened. The New England towns did not prove so
lucky. After the British evacuated Boston in May 1776, they occupied Newport, Rhode
Island in December. From this strategic location in Naragansett Bay, the Royal Navy
subsequently interdicted the New England trade. When the French under General JeanBaptiste-Donatien de Vimeur, Comte de Rochambeau, occupied Newport in 1780, it
appeared that New England would finally see relief from British cruisers. Just three days
after the French occupied Newport, however, Rear Admiral Thomas Graves arrived in
New York with six ships-of-the-line, all with new copper bottoms. This squadron
reinforced the five ships-of-the-line under Vice Admiral Marriot Arbuthnot, and the
British naval presence was sufficient thereafter to maintain naval superiority in northern
waters for the rest of the w ar.17
In the Mid-Atlantic, the British were just as successful in limiting American
commerce as they proved in New England. After routing General Washington’s

17 Nathan Miller, Sea o f Glory: A Naval History o f the American Revolution (Annapolis: Naval
Institute Press, 1974), 345,451-52, and Richard Buel, In Irons: Britain's Naval Supremacy and
the American Revolutionary Economy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 113-19, 15354. Copper bottoms made warships faster, more maneuverable, and reduced damage to the hull
from barnacles. The Royal Navy started coppering its ships in 1778, and most of the fleet had
copper bottoms by 1782. See William Fowler, Rebels Under Sail: The American Navy during the
Revolution (New York: Scribners, 1976), 253-54.
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Continental Army in several engagements around New York in summer 1776, General
Sir William Howe occupied the city, and the British maintained a military stranglehold
over New York for the rest of the war. Although the British did not destroy the city, the
effect was just as complete on American commerce as if they had. The British also
threatened Philadelphia. By December 1776, General Lord Cornwallis’s vanguard had
forced the disintegrating Continental Army’s retreat south from New York through New
Jersey and across the Delaware River into Pennsylvania. At that point it appeared likely
that the British would occupy Philadelphia, and thus most of the city’s merchants
withdrew to the countryside. Their departure crippled Philadelphia’s commerce, which
was shut down completely the following year when the British finally occupied the city.
For much of the remainder o f the war, the Royal Navy maintained a stiff naval presence
off the Delaware Capes, frustrating the city’s commerce for the rest o f the war.18
Further south, the British frustration of American commerce was also effective.
On January I, 1776, several months prior to Congress’s declaration, Lord Dunmore, the
Royal Governor of Virginia, ordered Norfolk burned the city to the ground. American
Colonels William Woodford and Robert Howe actually had no objection to the British
burning Norfolk, having already proposed the action to the Committee of Safety to render
the port useless to the Royal Navy. Thus when Dunmore set fire to the town, the
American commanders took no action to stop it. The town was not rebuilt during the

18 Richard Buel argued that the British threat in 1776 and occupation of 1777-78 certainly
impaired Philadelphia’s commerce, but the British never succeeded in closing the port
completely. The city experienced a brief revival in trade in 1780-81 before the blockade of 1782
dealt a second crippling blow to the city’s commerce. See Buel, In Irons, 137-43, 173-85, 21722 .
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war, thus destroying Baltimore’s chief rival in the grain trade in the Chesapeake Bay.19
Charleston escaped the fires that engulfed Norfolk, and even withstood the initial British
siege o f June 1776. When the British invaded the deep South in 1779, however,
Savannah quickly fell, followed by Charleston the next year. Both cities were occupied
by the British for the remainder of the war.
Baltimore alone escaped the British. Johann David Schoepf believed that the
city’s good fortune was largely due to the natural advantages Baltimore possessed,
including “the situation o f the harbor,” which “assured it against the sudden attacks of
hostile craft; larger ships could not approach without circumspection and danger, and
smaller craft dared not venture alone as far as the end of so spacious a bay.” Yet a more
fundamental and more important reason was at the root of the city’s good fortune. To the
British, Baltimore was just another place on the map bearing a name with no particular
significance. Indeed, the Royal Navy never considered staging any significant military
actions in the upper Chesapeake Bay. In 1774, Vice Admiral Samuel Graves, Thomas
Graves’s uncle, estimated that he could successfully blockade the American coast with as
few as fifty ships, but his fleet in the Western Atlantic only numbered twenty-five ships.
He therefore decided to concentrate his naval power in the North, leaving the Chesapeake
Bay and the Carolinas largely free of British warships in 1775. Throughout the year,
Graves came under significant criticism from other British commanders and the Earl of
Sandwich, First Lord o f the Admiralty, for not doing more. Without an adequate fleet
there was little more that Graves could have done, but he was nonetheless relieved of

19 Selby, The Revolution in Virginia, 81-84,205-06.
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command at the end o f 1775.20
After Graves’s departure, the British fleet in the Western Atlantic was finally
reinforced and numbered fifty ships. Yet demands on warships to convoy British
merchant vessels as well as transport the army for the campaigns against Charleston, New
York, and Newport in 1776 continued to sap the fleet’s ability to effectively blockade
American ports, particularly those in the Chesapeake. Baltimore was briefly threatened
only once in 1776, when the British sloop-of-war Otter sailed into the upper Bay in
March. George Woolsey believed that after Lord Dunmore’s burning of Norfolk,
Baltimore would be next. The cruise o f the Otter appeared to be the prelude to such an
attack, but the newly refitted Defence turned back the British cruiser, ending the threat.
Tory activity, which was largely concentrated on the Eastern Shore, was suppressed in
summer 1776, and then crushed in early 1777. Although isolated Tory parties continued
to raid storehouses, the remaining Loyalists scattered to the wetlands or the islands in the
Bay, or fled Maryland altogether.21
The clearest example of the British lack of interest in the port occurred during
General Howe’s 1777 campaign against Philadelphia. Instead o f ferrying the British
army from New York through the Delaware Capes and then up the Delaware Bay,

20 Schoepf, Travels in the Confederation, I; Miller, Sea of Glory, 22-27, 37-39, and Buel. In
Irons, 37-43,287-88 n.25. Thomas Graves, Vice Admiral Samuel Graves’s nephew, rose quickly
through the ranks of the Royal Navy during the Revolution. He was a lieutenant commanding the
schooner Diana under his uncle’s command in 1775, and was promoted first to captain and then
to the admiralty within five years.
21 For Woolsey’s reaction to the destruction of Norfolk, see George Woolsey to George Salmon,
January 26, 1776, Woolsey and Salmon Letterbook, Library of Congress. For the engagement
between the Otter and the Defence, see Smith and Earle, 'The Maryland State Navy,” 216-23.
For Tory activities in the Chesapeake Bay, see Edwin Jameson, ‘Tory Operations on the Bay,” in
Chesapeake Bay in the American Revolution, ed. Ernest Eller (Centreville, MD: Tidewater
Publishers, 1981), 378-88.
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Admiral Richard Lord Howe, the general’s brother, transported the British army from
New York to the Virginia Capes, and then up the Chesapeake Bay to the Head of the Elk
River in northern Maryland. The fleet, which numbered more than two-hundred vessels,
entered the Bay on August 14, 1777. A week later, William Lux and Captain James
Nicholson could see the fleet from the steeple of the Baltimore Court House. Panic
engulfed the city as many believed the Howe brothers intended to seize or bum
Baltimore. Such an effort could have been rather easily accomplished, because the only
resistance Baltimore could have mustered were two under-manned galleys of the
Maryland State Navy. Instead, the British sailed by without detaching a single vessel;
Baltimore was simply unworthy of attention of any kind from His Majesty’s military
forces.22
In the absence of any direct military threat from the British, Baltimore’s
merchants were free to take advantage o f their commercial edge. Many of the city’s
merchants acted as agents for a range of political authorities. As early as the fall of 1775,
the Council o f Safety authorized merchants Samuel Purviance, William Smith, and David
Stewart to act as agents for the state and procure arms from Bermuda in exchange for
Maryland produce. John Smith and Samuel Purviance served as agents for Congress,
Jesse Hollinsworth served as an agent for Maryland, William Lux and Daniel Bowly
served as agents for Virginia, and William Smith served as an agent for the French Royal
Marine. The most lucrative posts were often those overseas, and this was especially true
for Abraham Van Bibber, who served as Maryland’s agent on the Dutch island of St.
Eustatius, and Richard Harrison, Maryland’s agent on the French island o f Martinique.
22 Myron Smith and John Earle, “The Maryland State Navy,” in Chesapeake Bay in the American
Revolution, 229-30.
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Van Bibber encouraged Baltimore merchants to focus their trade on St. Eustatius, and by
early 1776, Baltimore merchants John Smith, William Neill, William Spear, William
Lux, and Daniel Bowly were all exporting commodities to the West Indies in exchange
for arms. Until its capture by the British in February 1781, St. Eustatius acted like an off
shore entrepot for war supplies from Europe to America.23
Thanks to the wartime surge in prices on American produce, the profits from the
trade with St. Eustatius were enormous. Tobacco selling at 20 livres per quintal in 1774,
the equivalent of 15s/Ct (shillings per hundredweight), reached 125-150 livres per quintal
by 1776, or the equivalent of 95-115s/Ct.24 With prices on American leaf rocketing
upward, the French tobacco monopoly, or Farmers General, scurried to find alternative
sources of supply. The monopoly considered building up a domestic tobacco supply in
France, or importing new supplies from Cayenne, French Guiana, or Corsica. When
these efforts proved fruitless, the Farmers General decided to purchase tobacco from the
Spanish monopoly. Spain had opened Louisiana to speculation, and was eager for French
23 Paul Kent Walker, ‘The Baltimore Community and the American Revolution: A Study in
Urban Development, 1763-1783” (Ph.D., University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 1973), 199200; J. Franklin Jameson, “St. Eustatius in the American Revolution,” in The American
Revolution and the West Indies, ed. Charles Toth (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1975).
86-100; Ernest Eller, “Chesapeake Bay in the American Revolution," in Chesapeake Bay in the
American Revolution, 32; Todd Cooper, ‘Trial and Triumph: The Impact of the Revolutionary
War on the Baldmore Merchants,” in Chesapeake Bay in the American Revolution, 290-92.
24Jacob Price, France and the Chesapeake: A History o f the French Tobacco Monopoly, 16741791, and o f Its Relationship to the British and American Tobacco Trades (Ann Arbor
University of Michigan Press, 1973), II, 720-21. A quintal refers to 100 French pounds and a
hundredweight refers to 100 English pounds. The English and French measured a pound
differently, however, and thus a price per quintal needs to be discounted by 8 percent when
converting to a price per hundredweight. The currency also needs to be converted. In 1783,24
French livres could be exchanged for £1 Sterling, thus one French livre was worth approximately
10 pence, or 0.83 English shillings. Therefore a multiplier of 0.764 (0.92 x 0.83) should be used
to convert tobacco prices in the 1780s from livres per quintal into shillings per hundredweight
(s/Ct). To convert from s/Ct to livres per quintal, a multiplier of 1.309 (I / 0.764) should be used.
See Price. France and the Chesapeake, II, 753.
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investment there, but the Fanners General was only interested in Cuban or Venezuelan
leaf. The Spanish agreed to sell the French one million pounds of the latter in Seville in
1777, but when the Spanish raised their prices in 1778, the French ended the deal.
Thereafter, the Farmers General leaned heavily on tobacco growers in Russia, Ukraine,
Poland, Prussia, Hungary, the United Provinces, the Austrian Netherlands, and Flanders
to supply the French market. Tobacco production in these areas multiplied several times
over during the war. Russian and Ukrainian tobacco exports to western Europe increased
from 11,610 pounds in 1775 to more than 6 million pounds in 1777. However, French
consumers balked at the use o f non-American tobacco in the manufacture of snuff, and
were especially critical about the quality of Eastern European leaf. Consumers proved
willing to pay the higher prices for Maryland and Virginia leaf, and thus tobacco exports
from the Chesapeake Bay continued even though the average wartime price was 50 livres
per quintal— more than double its prewar levels.25 A similar inflation effected flour and
wheat prices, and Baltimore’s merchants were able to reap the benefits of windfall profits
from the wartime inflation.
Despite the city’s good fortune, the full potential of the Baltimore market was not
realized early in the war. Until 1778, Caron de Beaumarchais, the famed French author
o f The Barber o f Seville and The Marriage o f Figaro, supplied the Americans with
military equipment subsidized by the French government. The primary destination for

25The Fanners General paid 78,140,000 livres for tobacco purchases totaling just more than 157
million pounds between 1777 and 1782. Thus the Farmers General’s average wartime price was
50 livres per quintal. In Amsterdam, prices on Virginia tobacco increased steadily throughout the
war, and were 336 percent higher in 1782 compared to 1774. On the other hand, the price of
Dutch tobacco at Amsterdam increased 250 percent between 1774 and 1778, then declined 55
percent between 1778 and 1783 to near its 1774 level. See Price, France and the Chesapeake, II,
717-27, 852.
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Beaumarchais’s ships was Portsmouth, New Hampshire to supply the Continental Army
in the North. However, New England did not offer any commodities of interest for the
European market, so French captains typically sailed for Charleston in hopes o f taking on
tobacco or flour—the only two American commodities in demand in Europe.
Unfortunately, Charleston infrequently had either commodity, being at the heart of the
rice and indigo-growing regions of the colonies rather than the wheat and tobacco
regions. Beaumarchais overlooked the possibilities of a direct trade with Baltimore, and
thus his captains usually returned to France with empty hulls. If the French ships had
entered at Baltimore instead of Charleston, they could have easily procured flour and
tobacco. Baltimore was ignored as a possible destination for the same reasons that the
British did not bother occupying the city: it was a name on a map devoid of recognition
as a leading American entrepot. The oversight proved costly for Beaumarchais.
Although the French crown funneled nearly 3 million livres to his fictitious firm,
Rodrigue Hortalez & Company, his liabilities soared passed 10 million livres because his
captains failed to secure a return trade from the United States.26
Beaumarchais had little to fear from the Royal Navy in the Chesapeake Bay, so
his failure to trade in Baltimore can not be blamed on the fear of British resistance. The
Royal N avy’s blockade of the Chesapeake Bay in 1777 never involved more than a few
frigates. The British initially deployed the 50-gun ship Preston and the 20-gun sloop-of26 Georges Lemaitre, Beaumarchais (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1949), 220, and Frederic Grendel.
Beaumarchais: The Man Who Was Figaro, trans. Roger Greaves (New York: Thomas Y.
Crowell, 1977), 175, 190-92. The French crown’s connection to Beaumarchais had to be covert
because France was not yet at war with Great Britain in 1776-1777. For French aid to America
prior to the alliance of 1778, see Claude Van Tyne, “French Aid Before the Alliance of 1778,”
American Historical Review, 31 (1925): 34-40; Gaston Martin, “Commercial Relations between
Nantes and the American Colonies during the War of Independence,” Journal o f Economic and
Business History, 4 (1932): 812-29; and Thomas Abernathy, “Commercial Activities of Silas
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w ar Brune off the Virginia Capes in January, but these ships were relieved by the frigates
Phoenix and Emerald the following month. Additional warships joined the squadron in
August, but Admiral Howe had to withdraw most of them in September to maintain
supply lines through the Delaware Bay to British-occupied Philadelphia. Beaumarchais’s
vessels, most of which were heavily armed, could have easily matched the British
warships. The Fier Roderique, a converted East Indiaman, carried 54 guns. The
Beaumont, which was designed as a 64-gun ship-of-the-line, carried 40 guns.27
As the war progressed, the Royal Navy’s grip over the Chesapeake Bay gradually
tightened. In 1778, several ships-of-the-line joining the frigates normally patrolling the
Virginia Capes, and on May 8, 1779, the blockade became nearly impassable with the
arrival of Commodore Sir George Collier’s flotilla of 28 warships led by the 64-gun
Raisonable.28 Yet Baltimore itself was never directly blockaded, and the city’s
merchants discovered ways to circumvent the British naval presence off Hampton Roads.
From the Patapsco, produce could be ferried in shallops across the Bay to Tangier or
Pocomoke Sounds. Because the Eastern Shore was largely cleared of Tory agitation by
1777, the produce could then be safely carted across the peninsula to a number of small
inlets in either Chincoteague or Sinepuxent Bay. Produce could then be loaded onto
vessels anchored off Assateague Island, and war supplies off-loaded to be carted back
across the peninsula and then ferried across the Chesapeake Bay to Baltimore. George
Woolsey employed the strategy as early as 1776 to minimize the risk of the British
Deane in France,” American Historical Review, 39 (1934): 477-85.
27 Eller, “Chesapeake Bay in the American Revolution,” in Chesapeake Bay in the American
Revolution, 30-31, and Buel, In Irons, 54, 295-96 n.4.
28 Selby, The Revolution in Virginia, 204.
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seizing his goods, but the practice became widespread after 1778 as the chances of
running the British blockade diminished. The strategy was much more expensive then
having an ocean-going vessel clear the Virginia Capes, but it proved highly effective in
evading the Royal Navy’s blockade. When Tory agitation swelled up again in 1780,
Tangier and Pocomoke Sounds became primary theatres of operation for Tory privateers
and the barges of the Maryland and Virginia navies that opposed them.29
The surge in Baltimore’s flour trade had mixed results in wartime procurement for
the army. The trade through St. Eustatius was a vital link in keeping the Continental
Army supplied with arms, but the export of wheat and flour to pay for those war supplies
contributed to severe shortages in the supply of food to the army. Another problem with
procurement was that so many farmers were enlisted in the militia and the army that the
supply of grain was lower than it would have been in peacetime. General Henry Knox
estimated that mobilization likely reduced the normal farm surplus by at least 50 percent,
and in some years wiped it out completely. Others in the army were not convinced.
General Horatio Gates wrote to Washington in 1779 that “I cannot persuade myself there
has been any Natural Scarcity.” Rather, “Avarice and Monopoly, must have caused the
emptiness of our Magazines of Bread.” To address this problem, Congress determined to
ban the export of wheat, flour, and bread in 1778 to insure an adequate domestic supply.
When the ban took effect, however, farmers began forestalling their crops to wait for

29 The action between Tory privateers and the Maryland barges culminated in November 1782 in
the Battle of Cager’s Strait, or the “Battle of the Barges,” the bloodiest naval engagement of the
war in the Chesapeake Bay. See Smith and Earle, “The Maryland State Navy,” in Chesapeake
Bay in the American Revolution, 234-46, and Jameson, ‘Tory Operations,” in Chesapeake Bay in
the American Revolution, 378-402.
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better prices, and thus the supply of food to the army failed to improve.30
After the Treaty of Alliance with France was signed in 1778, procurement
problems for the Continental Army worsened further. When French forces began
arriving in America, beginning with the Comte D ’Estaing’s fleet in summer 1778, they
too needed provisions and looked to their American allies to provide them. Unlike agents
for the Continental Congress, who offered depreciated Continental Dollars as payment
for goods, or agents for Maryland, who offered depreciated state currency, William Smith
could offer French bills o f exchange and specie as an agent for the French Royal Marine.
Thus James Calhoun as an agent for Maryland found it nearly impossible to fulfill his
quotas for grain, while Smith proved so successful that the state’s commissioners accused
him of hoarding. They temporarily seized 5,000 bushels of wheat, and several thousand
barrels of flour from Smith’s Baltimore warehouses. The Chevalier de !a Luzerne,
minister plenipotentiary to the United States, complained to Congress about Maryland’s
actions. Although Congress had no power to compel a state government, the Maryland
authorities were urged to reconsider their actions, and Smith’s produce on consignment to
the French was subsequently returned to him. Despite some minor ripples, the French
connection proved enormously profitable for Baltimore, siphoning more specie into the
city than had been in circulation at any point during the colonial period. When the
Maryland Assembly asked the city’s merchants for £200,000 Sterling in May 1780 to
send Maryland troops south for the Yorktown campaign, Baltimore raised £100,845

30 Buel, In Irons, 5-25,47-52, 113. Harold Pinkett is somewhat more forgiving of Baltimore’s
role in supplying the army and the republic with food, but his evidence supports Buel’s more
subdued conclusions regarding the city’s role. See Harold Pinkett, “Maryland as a Source of
Food Supplies During the American Revolution,” Maryland Historical Magazine, 46 (1951):
157-72. Horatio Gates quoted in Buel, In Irons, 7.
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immediately, with a promise for another £30,000-£40,000 to follow in a few days.31
The substantial British military activities in the Chesapeake in late 1780 and 1781
leading up to the climactic battle at Yorktown created temporary problems for Baltimore,
but the allied victory over Lord Cornwallis’s army in October ultimately made the
presence o f foreign armies in the Chesapeake just as profitable to Baltimore’s economy
as the procurement trade. French General Francois Jean de Beauvoir, Chevalier de
Chasteilux, estimated that by 1782, wartime spending by British troops had placed more
than £10 million Sterling into circulation in the United States, and that spending by
French troops added another 35 million livres, or the equivalent of nearly £ l '/2 million
Sterling to the total. These totals did not include spending by the two nation’s fleets.
Even though much of the spending occurred outside Baltimore, the city’s merchants were
often the ultimate beneficiaries of the inflow of foreign specie. As Richard Buel pointed
out, “the absence o f an indigenous mercantile elite” in Virginia meant “that French
money distributed in Virginia flowed to Baltimore and Philadelphia, having only a slight
effect on the Virginia economy.”32
Much o f French spending did occur in Baltimore, the point of embarkment in
September 1781 for the more than 5,000 French troops under General Comte de
Rochambeau destined for the battlefield at Yorktown. After helping to defeat the British
army under General Lord Cornwallis, the French army returned to Baltimore in July 1782
and spent several weeks in the city. Most of the regiments marched north in late August,
31 Pinkett, “Maryland as a Source of Food Supplies,” 157-72; Buel, In Irons, 159-63; and Walker.
“The Baltimore Community,” 275-81, 287-89.
32 Buel, In Irons, 210, and Francois Jean de Beauvoir, Chevalier de Chasteilux, Travels in North
America in the Years 1780-1871-1782, trans. Howard Rice (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1963), n, 572.
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but 500 troops under the command of Brigadier General Chevalier de La Valette
remained in Baltimore for the duration of the war. Rochambeau also left a small
squadron of French warships at Baltimore under Admiral Chevalier de la Villebrune,
making the city a base of operations for the French fleet in North America as well as the
chief port of entry for French trade between 1781 and 1783. The French presence
boosted the city’s economy by saturating it even further with specie, and when the French
finally left Baltimore at the end of the war, the city’s merchants were sorry to see them
33

ga

in Baltimore, the sense of optimism at the end of the war was palpable. Thanks to
the city’s wartime trade, Baltimore was thus uniquely positioned to take advantage of the
pending transformation of the Atlantic economy, and merchants on both sides of the
Atlantic knew it. Beginning in early 1783, dozens of merchants descended upon
Baltimore to seek their fortunes. In the late summer or early fall, Henry Johnson arrived
from Massachusetts to establish a branch of his Boston firm, Johnson, Johonnot &
Company.34 Johnson hoped to position the firm to better take advantage of Baltimore’s
proximity to the W est Indies, where a free trade with the Dutch, Danish, Spanish and
French possessions promised to greatly expand the already profitable connections with
the British colonies in the Caribbean. To James Demie in Cape Francois, Santo
Domingo, Johnson wrote that “I am confident Baltim ore] will have its share of your
33 J. Thomas Scharf, The Chronicles o f Baltimore: Being a Complete History o f “Baltimore
Town " and Baltimore Cityfrom the Earliest Period to the Present Time (Baltimore: Turnbull
Brothers, 1874), 195-96, 199-203,206-07.
34The firm’s three members included George and Francis (Frank) Johonnot, who were brothers,
and Henry Johnson, their half-brother. They were likely third generation descendants of
Huguenot merchants. See Rhoda Dorsey, “The Conduct of Business in Baltimore, 1783-1785: as
seen in the Letterbook of Johnson, Johonnot, & Co.,” Maryland Historical Magazine, 55 (I960):
230.
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trade as we are growing very fast here.”35
Baltimore’s prospects even attracted merchants from Europe. Robert Oliver was
among them. Without any capital though filled with boundless energy and ambition,
Oliver arrived from Belfast, Ireland aboard the brig Friendship in May 1783. Likely
encouraged by Irish merchants to migrate to Maryland’s growing port, he established a
partnership with a Baltimore merchant named Simm, and the new firm quickly set about
selling the cargo o f dry goods and provisions from the Friendship.36 From Germany
came John Jacob Astor. Just past his twentieth birthday, Astor sailed for Baltimore in
summer 1783 carrying a few hundred dollars worth of musical instruments that he
planned to sell on commission.37
Even men who had never engaged in commerce felt the pull of the entrepreneurial
excitement in America’s fastest growing city. Among those so enthralled was Joshua
Barney, a young naval commander who captured the British sloop-of-war General Monk
in 1782. Although it was this victory which placed Barney on the road to his fortune, he
had already earned fame before the celebrated engagement in the Delaware Bay.
35 Henry Johnson to James Demie, November 8, 1783, in Johnson, Johonnot & Co. Letterbook,
MS.498, MHS.
36The exact date of Robert Oliver’s arrival in Baltimore is unknown, thus it is not entirely certain
he arrived aboard the Friendship. Yet Stuart Bruchey has demonstrated based on the evidence
surrounding Oliver’s arrival in Baltimore that this interpretation must be the correct one. See
Stuart Bruchey, Robert Oliver, Merchant o f Baltimore, 1783-1819 (Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1956), 52-54, esp. 53 n.8.
37 Scharf lists 17 American merchants (including Henry Johnson) and 33 European merchants
(including Robert Oliver) who established houses in Baltimore at the conclusion of the war. See
Scharf, The Chronicles o f Baltimore, 209. Astor does not appear on Scharf s list because he did
not establish a house in Baltimore. On the advise of a fellow passenger aboard the ship to
America, Astor quickly relocated to New York where he exchanged his musical instruments for
furs. He subsequently settled in New York rather than Baltimore. At the time of his death,
Astor’s fortune, which surpassed $20 million, was the largest in America. See Scharf, The
Chronicles o f Baltimore, 221-22.
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Commissioned as a lieutenant in the Continental Navy before his seventeenth birthday,
he escaped from the notorious Old Mill Prison in Plymouth, England after being taken
prisoner by the British. Four days after his much-publicized return to America, the
Pennsylvania Navy offered him command of the Hyder-Ally. Barney accepted, and
barely a month later, captured the General Monk. Awarded command o f his prize, now
refitted and renamed the General Washington, Barney soon captured the sloops Sally and
Boreas, and the schooner Happy Return. At the end of the war, he used the money from
these prizes to underwrite a business partnership with his brother-in-law, John Strieker.
Together they cultivated business connections in Havana and Hispaniola, as well as
Spain, France, England, and the Netherlands.38
Perhaps the clearest sign of Baltimore’s increasing prominence was the interest
shown in the port by Robert Morris, whose business savvy Congress had relied on to
finance much o f the Revolutionary War effort. Like so many others, Morris formed a
partnership in the wake o f the war with a Baltimore merchant— in this case Tench
Tilghman, a former Colonel of the Maryland Line who served as an Aide-de-Camp to
General George Washington. The articles o f incorporation between Tilghman and Morris
for the new firm, Tench Tilghman and Company, took effect January 1, 1784, but the two
merchants had been transacting business months before the official date. Tilghman soon
won over his Philadelphia partner’s complete trust. In April, Morris wrote to Tilghman
that “I shall relax entirely the Article [of incorporation] requiring consultation whenever
you think proper. You have my entire confidence, use your own discretion and good

38 Louis Arthur Norton, Joshua Barney: Hero o f the Revolution and 1812 (Annapolis: Naval
Institute Press, 2000), 54-101, and Huibert Footner, Sailor o f Fortune: Life and Adventures o f
Commodore Barney U.S.N. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1998; orig. 1940), 102-16.
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Sense.” A grandiose speculator in his own right, Morris was likely attracted to the
extraordinary ambition exemplified by the scope of Tilghman’s correspondence in late
1783 and early 1784. The Baltimore merchant clearly hoped to do business with almost
every part of European continent, sending a flurry o f letters to merchants in an enormous
crest of cities that stretched from Hamburg on the North Sea to Lisbon on the Atlantic,
around Gibraltar to Genoa on the Mediterranean.39 Tilghman’s correspondence, and that
of the dozens o f other merchants who descended on the city in 1783, announced to the
world that Baltimore was to be a center of the Atlantic world’s pending transformation.

P o s t w a r O p t im is m

and

F r u s t r a t io n

With news of the peace treaty believed imminent in early 1783, attention on both
sides o f the Atlantic turned, once again, to a consideration of the new republic’s
commercial prospects. Few wished a return to the nationalist policies that the Congress
had embraced in 1775. Robert Morris had fought hard during the waning years of the
war for a nationalist agenda of currency reform and economic interdependence, but he
keenly desired retirement from public life in 1783. James Madison, another nationalist
who ultimately served as one of the chief architects of the Federal Constitution, retired
from the Continental Congress in 1783, and returned to Virginia to serve in the state’s
39 Robert Morris to Tench Tilghman, April 10, 1784, in The Papers o f Robert Morris, 1781-1784,
ed. Elizabeth Nuxoll and Mary Gallagher (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1995-1999),
IX, 247. For Morris’s official announcement of the new firm, see Robert Morris to Jonathan
Williams, Jr., January 1, 1784, in The Papers o f Robert Morris, IX, 3. For transactions between
Morris and Tilghman prior to January 1, 1784, see The Papers o f Robert Morris, VIII, 797 n.l,
888. The ports that most interested Tilghman included the German port of Hamburg on the North
Sea, London, Falmouth, Bristol, and Liverpool in England, Cork in Ireland, Nantes, Bordeaux,
and Bayonne on France’s Atlantic coast, Coruna on the northwest Atlantic coast of Spain, Cadiz
on the southwest Atlantic coast of Spain, Lisbon, Gibraltar, and the Mediterranean ports of
Barcelona, Marseilles, and Genoa. See Tench Tilghman Papers, MS. 1445, MHS. For
Tilghman’s background, see Scharf, The Chronicles o f Baltimore. 244.
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assembly. The making o f a national domestic economy was therefore postponed, as
Americans considered how the new republic would maintain its economic independence,
and how the political independence of the United States would change the patterns of
commerce in the Atlantic economy. What place would there be for the trade of an
independent republic in an imperial world? In America, the answers to both questions
were simple and linked: from Savannah to the Kennebec River, Americans wanted full,
fair, and free trade with every nation.40
The basic principles o f free trade had guided the Congress since April 1776, when
the delegates agreed to open American ports to the commerce of every nation except
Great Britain. Somewhat surprisingly, however, the leaders of the world’s foremost
mercantilist powers also lent their support to free trade in the wake of America’s victory
over the Britain. In France, Charles Gravier, Comte de Vergennes, who served as both
Foreign Minister and Principal Minister to King Louis XVI, desired to keep French ports
open to American ships after the war. Vergennes was not really an ideological proponent
of free trade like Quesnay and the physiocrats. A perspicacious career diplomat,
Vergennes was instead determined to preserve and extend the close relationship he
helped forge with the United States during the war. He also hoped that an extensive
postwar trade with the United States might ease the enormous burdens on the French
treasury. By 1781, France faced deficits of more than 150 million livres per year even

40 For the abortive efforts of nationalists at the end of the war, see Lance Banning, “James
Madison and the Nationalists, 1780-1783,” The William and Mary Quarterly, 3d ser., 40 (1983):
227-55; Ferguson, The Power o f the Purse, 109-78; and Rakove, The Beginnings o f National
Politics, 297-330. For Madison’s return to the Virginia House of Delegates, and his new focus on
state-oriented solutions to economic problems, see Drew McCoy, “The Port Bill of 1784,” The
Virginia Magazine o f History and Biography, 83 (1975): 288-303, and Richard Chew, “A New
Hope for the Republic” (M.A., The College of William and Mary, 1992).
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though half the French royal budget was marked for interest payments on the national
debt. Vergennes believed, as did others, that the liberalization of French trade policies
with the United States would expand the French government’s revenues from commerce,
and in turn, help relieve the increasingly perilous fiscal predicament.41
In Britain, an unimpeded trade with America was also a preeminent concern of
the new prime minister, William Petty Fitzmaurice, Earl of Shelburne. Given the new
political context, no one in Britain could be entirely certain whether or not the Americans
would welcome British trade. For Shelburne, a liberalization of mercantilist policies
provided the means to insure the American trade. Unlike Vergennes, Shelburne was also
ideologically predisposed to free trade. On February 17, 1783, he proclaimed to
Parliament that “situated as we [Britain] are between the old world and the new, and
between the southern and northern Europe, all that we ought to covet upon the earth is
free trade.” To further this aim, Shelburne’s ministry promoted the American Intercourse
Act, which would have provided the United States with the same trade privileges that
existed for the American colonies prior to the war.42

41 On Quesnay and the French physiocrats, see Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, The Origins o f
Physiocracy: Economic Revolution and Social Order in Eighteenth-Century France (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1976). Vergennes had served as France’s Foreign Minister since 1774,
becoming the Principal Minister to King Louis XVI after Jean-Frederic Phelypeaux, Comte de
Maurepas, died in 1781. Thereafter, Vergennes was in a position to exert enormous influence
over a bewildering array of affairs, including France’s national debt. See Samuel Flagg Bemis.
The Diplomacy o f the American Revolution (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1957), lb23, 237-48; Jacob Price, France and the Chesapeake, II, 740; Jonathan Dull, A Diplomatic
History o f the American Revolution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), 38-39; Gregg
Lint, “Preparing for Peace: The Objectives of the United States, France, and Spain in the War of
the American Revolution,” in Peace and the Peacemakers, 35-38; and Jonathan Dull,
“Vergennes, Rayvenal, and the Diplomacy of Trust,” in Peace and the Peacemakers, 110-12.
42 Cobbett's Parliamentary History o f England: From the Norman Conquest in 1066 to the Year
1803 (London: T.C. Hansard, 1806-1820), XXIII, cols. 409-410. Shelburne hoped that the
American Intercourse Bill would lay the groundwork for long-term economic cooperation
between the United States and Great Britain, and eventually lead to political reunification
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With both the French and the British seemingly ready to embrace the ideal of free
trade, merchants from Boston to Savannah were supremely confident that new avenues of
commerce would soon open throughout the Caribbean, the Atlantic, and the
Mediterranean. Extricated from the web of mercantile restraints, colonial patterns of
trade would be left behind. No longer would Britain alone act as the entrepot for
American goods in Europe, and correspondence from Europe strengthened this view.
From Nantes, the locus for so much of the American trade with France during the war,
Mark Lynch assured James Madison that “every article necessary in America, can be
procured and shipped. . . on reasonable terms, which I dare say you will experience
hereafter.” Bolstered by such bold declarations, Madison confidently reported to
Congress prior to his departure for Virginia, that taxes on imports would aptly serve for
“paying the debts o f the Revolution,” because “an unbounded freedom has accrued to
commerce.”43 From the vantage of either the nation’s wharves or the halls o f Congress,
the republic’s commercial horizons seemed unlimited.
The rising tide o f support for free trade generated increasing uneasiness for
British merchants. A particular fear was that British efforts to regain their prewar
between the British and the newly independent Americans. See Bemis, The Diplomacy o f the
American Revolution, 236; Charles Ritcheson, The Aftermath o f Revolution: British Policy
Toward the United States, 1783-1795 (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1969), 5-19;
Charles Ritcheson, “The Earl of Shelburne and Peace with America, 1782-1783: Vision and
Reality.” International History Review, 5 (1983): 322-45; and Esmond Wright, “British
Objectives, 1780-83: “If Not Dominion Then Trade’,” in Peace and the Peacemakers, 18, 22, 2728.
43 Mark Lynch to James Madison, February 15, 1783, and “Report on Address to the States by
Congress,” April 26, 1783, in The Papers o f James Madison, ed. William Hutchinson and
William Rachal (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962-), VI, 243,489. Mark Lynch was a
merchant with close ties to Philip Mazzei, Virginia’s wartime agent in Tuscany. The committee
on which Madison served also included Alexander Hamilton and Oliver Ellsworth. Congress
appointed them to deliver an address to the states concerning the recent adoption of a plan to
restore public credit.
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domination over the Chesapeake trade could be thwarted by the French. Planters in
Maryland and Virginia owed enormous prewar debts to British merchants, and
Shelburne’s ministry sought to insure repayment in the preliminary peace agreement.
Article IV stated that “Creditors on either side, shall meet with no lawful Impediment to
the Recovery o f the full value in Sterling Money of all bona fide Debts heretofore
contracted.”44 Yet if Marylanders and Virginians chose to bypass the British trade in
favor o f selling tobacco and other staples directly to the French, the mechanism for
repayment would have been lost. Without the American trade, it would have been nearly
impossible for the British to collect on the prewar debts. Recapturing the commerce of
their former colonies was therefore a paramount concern, and to encourage its renewal in
Spring 1783, many British firms began offering Americans deep discounts up to 25
percent below London prices on manufactured goods, as well as six-month’s credit to pay
for them.45 The campaign to win back the Americans to the commercial nexus of the
British Empire had begun.
It soon became very clear that the British merchants had nothing to fear. By the
end of the war, Americans were flush with specie and had a burning desire to spend it on
British goods. In Charleston, John Banks, a Virginia merchant contracted to buy
provisions for General Nathanael Greene’s army, purchased large quantities of British
goods prior to the British evacuation. In Virginia, John Randolph complained that
“several British vessels have arrived in our rivers: some o f which affect to entitle

44 “Preliminary Terms of the Peace between Britain and The United States, November 30, 1782,”
Article IV, in Dull, A Diplomatic History, 172.
45 Louis Maganzin, “Economic Depression in Maryland and Virginia, 1783-1787” (Ph.D.,
Georgetown University, 1967), 19-22.
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themselves to an entry by distress.” Once the formal peace arrived, however, the rage for
imports swelled into a torrent of spending. Never before during the colonial period had
so much specie been in circulation, and in conjunction with deep discounts and liberal
credit terms offered by the British merchants, the availability of money touched off a
frenzy of speculative spending that quickly spread throughout America. Between 1783
and 1785, Americans imported almost £7 million Sterling in goods from Britain, of
which nearly £2 million Sterling went to Maryland and Virginia.46 Although it is not
known what percentage of imports went directly to the port of Baltimore, the city
undoubtedly received a considerable portion of this trade. Ships jammed the city’s
waterfront by summer 1783, and the massive number of seamen crowding the wharves
caught the attention of Johann Schoepf. He claimed that on an autumn day in 1783, fifty
ships thronged the wharves at Fells Point, creating a forest of masts where pennants
fluttered in the breeze like leaves on so many trees. Henry Johnson reported that as many
as seventy ships and smaller vessels crowded into the port on one day the following
Spring.47
In Baltimore, the city’s shopkeepers and merchants were caught up in the
46 American exports during the same period amounted to just over £1.8 million Sterling, of which
£800,000 Sterling came from Maryland and Virginia, thus leaving staggering trade deficits for
both the Chesapeake as a region and the nation as a whole. See U.S. Department of Commerce,
Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics o f the United States: Colonial Times to 1970
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), II, 1176. A 1786 British report made
by William Eden, a member of Parliament, estimated that between Christmas 1783 and Christmas
1784, British imports to America amounted to £4,281,174 Sterling, of which £2,009,782 Sterling
went to Virginia and Maryland. Eden estimated British exports for the same period at £677,368
Sterling, of which £352,792 Sterling went to Maryland and Virginia. See Ritcheson, Aftermath of
Revolution, Appendix D, 368.
47 Schoepf, Travels in the Confederation, 1783-1784,1, 328; Henry Johnson to Stephen
Higginson, March 25, 1784, in Johnson, Johonnot & Co. Letterbook. MHS; The Papers o f James
Madison, V, 287 n.19 and VI, 46 n .ll; and Edmund Randolph to James Madison, May 9, 1783,
in The Papers o f James Madison, VO, 33.
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delirium as well. During the last six months of 1783, the firm o f Woolsey and Salmon
ordered more than £2,000 in linens from the British firm o f Cunningham and Campbell, a
variety of manufactures from their English supplier, George Moore, as well as silks,
satins and other luxury items from numerous French merchants— yet they still
complained that they could not get enough merchandise to satisfy demand. BrigadierGeneral Mordecai Gist, who commanded the second division o f the Maryland Line at the
Battle of Yorktown, returned to his mercantile pursuits after the war. Throughout 1784,
he steadily imported every variety of luxury goods, including velvets, silver utensils, silk
cloth, and china.48 Christian Keener, who took over his father’s mercantile business at
the end of the war, also participated in the speculation. In 1785, he increased his
commodity purchases by 300 percent over their total the previous year, with flour
purchases alone amounting to at least £1,374 over two years.49
The speculative fervor was so intense that despite the availability of specie and
deep discounts, many Baltimore firms still went into debt to pay for the torrent of
manufactures streaming into the port. A foreign observer noted that the flush of
prosperity generated by the postwar speculation would not last, and that the mounting
debts would doom the city and the state to ruin unless new sources of gold and silver
48 Woolsey and Salmon to Waddel Cunningham and Campbell, September 30, 1783, Woolsey
and Salmon to George Moore, September 30, 1783, and Woolsey and Salmon to Gauge and
Dupree, October 20, 1783, in Woolsey and Salmon Letterbook, 1774-1784, Library of Congress:
quoted in Maganzin, "Economic Depression,” 20, 22, 28-29. For Gist’s role in the Revolution,
see Scharf, The Chronicles o f Baltimore, 214-16, 219-21, and for his business activities after the
war see Maganzin, “Economic Depression in Maryland and Virginia,” 30.
49 Keener Account Book, MS.514, MHS. Exact figures for Keener’s commodity purchases are
impossible to calculate because only 201 of the 397 entries in the account book list both the type
of good purchased and its value. The 201 entries for which type and value are known account for
£4,776 Sterling in goods, and include seventeen transactions in 1784 for commodities worth
£494, and twenty transactions in 1785 for commodities worth £1,647. Keener had six
transactions in 1784 for flour worth £249, and seven transactions in 1785 for flour worth £1,125.
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emerged. The Maryland Assembly agreed. As early as November 1783, legislators
feared the consequences of “improvident citizens who too frequently indulge themselves
in the pernicious practice o f involving themselves in [further] debt.”50
The Assembly had reason to be concerned about Marylanders’ indebtedness.
Prewar debts to foreign merchants amounted to £1 million Maryland currency in 1783,
and the debts contracted during the speculative period following the war had added
another £667,000 to that total in just eighteen months. Marylanders also held domestic
debts, especially for wartime confiscations of loyalist property, as well as tax in arrears
owed to the state and private debts owed to other Americans. Together, these debts
added another £ l '/2 million to the total. In Baltimore, most of the domestic debt was held
by merchants and lawyers. The Assembly had allowed purchasers of confiscated loyalist
property to post bonds rather than pay in cash, and in Baltimore, twenty-four individuals,
almost all o f them merchants, posted bonds to purchase £36,673 in property confiscated
from nine loyalists. All totaled, Marylanders’ total indebtedness likely surpassed £3
million Maryland currency by early 1784— or an average debt of more than £50 per
family.51

50 Schoepf, Travels in the Confederation, II, 61, and Votes and Proceedings o f the Maryland
Senate, November Session, 1783, 16.
51 Exact figures for Marylanders’ indebtedness a year after the war are difficult to calculate. A
report by the Maryland House of Delegates in January 1787 stated that Marylanders’ total
indebtedness amounted to £2,489,586 Maryland currency. The exact figure for the value of
confiscated loyalist estates was £650,991 195 10Vid. Of this £275,600 2s Id remained unpaid, but
nearly the full amount would have still been outstanding in 1784. The Report estimated that pre
war debts to British merchants equaled £1,000,000 Maryland currency, post-war debts added
£666,667, and private debts added £350,000. Taxes in arrears amounted to £197,319 in 1787.
This figure included post-1784 taxes in arrears but excluded pre-1784 taxes in arrears that had
been paid off by 1787. Taxes in arrears in 1784 were therefore at least £200,000, and were likely
much higher. Overall, Marylanders’ total indebtedness in 1784 was at least £2,866,667 Maryland
currency, and almost certainly surpassed £3 million. See General Assembly o f the State o f
Maryland, November Session 1786, House of Delegates, January 16, 1787, and Philip Crowl,
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Despite the overwhelming debt burden, Baltimore’s merchants were supremely
confident that their debts, both new and old, would be quickly retired from the profits of a
renewed commerce gained through free trade. Imports would be paid for by the
republic’s exports to all the world. Unfortunately these projections proved false when
Great Britain and France did not adopt free trade measures. Although Shelburne and
Vergennes initially demonstrated enthusiasm for free trade with America, the mercantile
communities of both nations feared that the newly independent United States would soon
engross the West Indies trade. Not surprisingly, both the French and British governments
reversed course and designed mercantilist policies to frustrate American commercial
traffic in favor of each nation’s own merchants.
In March 1783, Parliament’s debate over the American Intercourse Act finally
began. Unfortunately for proponents of free trade, the bill’s prospects of passing had
largely vanished after Lord Shelburne’s ministry collapsed on February 24. The new
ruling coalition, an odd coupling o f the staunchly conservative Lord North and the
normally liberal Charles James Fox, opposed the measure. William Eden and John Baker
Holroyd, Earl of Sheffield, carried the argument in the House of Commons for the new
ministry. They condemned the act as a wholesale repeal of the Navigation Law and a
threat to the supremacy of the British Empire. A much-publicized pamphlet written by
Sheffield claimed that Canada could adequately provision the British W est Indies, and
that Britain would recapture 75 percent of the American trade without any special
dispensations to the former colonies. Voices normally sympathetic to America and free
trade remained largely silent during the debate and the measure was easily defeated. An
Maryland During and After the Revolution: A Political and Economic Study (Baltimore: The
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1943), 64-110.
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alternative bill, which provided the King in Council with the power to arbitrarily set
commercial policy regarding the United States, easily passed in its place. Subsequent
Orders in Council of July 2, September 5, and December 26, 1783 excluded American
ships from trading directly with the British West Indies; Americans could still transact
business with Caribbean planters, but the trade itself, and thus the terms on which that
trade was to be conducted, was reserved to British merchants and British ships alone.52
In France, the struggle over trade policy began as early as January 1783 when the
French government reverted back to their prewar trade policies, at least on a temporary
basis. American flour could not enter France in American ships, American ships would
not admitted unless flying the French flag, and exports to America would be limited to
molasses and rum. In the West Indies, only two ports, Port-de-Carenage in St. Lucia and
Mole Saint-Nicholas in Santo Domingo, would be open to American ships.53 Yet on both
sides of the Atlantic, supporters of free trade mobilized to fight for reform. Among the
most important was the Chevalier d ’Annemours, the French consul in Baltimore, who
penned a fifteen-page treatise arguing that the reversion to France’s prewar policies
would harm both French and American interests. He urged the French government to
instead open French ports to American ships. Vergennes was thoroughly impressed with
the pamphlet and asked D ’Annemours to prepare a further analysis on M aryland’s
52 John Baker Holroyd, First Earl of Sheffield, Observations on the Commerce o f the American
States with Europe and the West Indies (London, 1783). The lack of a concerted effort in support
of the bill was mostly political, owing to the downfall of Shelburne’s government and Fox’s
opposition to the measure. However, another important reason was that an enforceable
commercial treaty with the United States appeared unlikely. The American Congress under the
Articles of Confederation did not have the power to impose a binding treaty on all the states, and
thus many members of Parliament worried that vital issues could not be adequately addressed in
such a treaty. See Ritcheson, The Aftermath o f Revolution, 5-19, 39-45.
53 These stipulations were based on a French decree issued in L767. See Frederick Nussbaum,
“The French Colonial Arret of 1784,” South Atlantic Quarterly, 27 (1928): 63-64.
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trade.54 At the same time, however, Vergennes was also feeling intense political pressure
from the agricultural interests in Bordeaux and much of the French mercantile
community who wished that the mercantilist regime be perpetuated.
The Marquis de Lafayette understood Vergennes’s dilemma, but found the
situation very frustrating. Just after Christmas 1783, he complained to Robert Morris that
‘T h e Ideas Upon Commerce that Are Met With in this Country [France] are far from
being always Right. To persuade people into their own interest is Sometimes as difficult
a Matter as it Would be to obtain a Sacrifice.” Gouvemeur Morris o f Pennsylvania was
equally perplexed by French intransigence. In June 1784 he wrote to the now-Marquis de
Chastellux that “English Commerce is strong enough to overthrow the Government; the
Government of France can annihilate its Commerce . . . have the courage to give a liberal
extension to your Commerce.”55
In America, merchants adjusted as best they could to the lags and delays in
achieving the long-expected liberal policies regarding trade. Even when European
decrees, proclamations and laws seemingly dashed the hopes for free trade, many
remained optimistic that in the end, American aspirations would be fulfilled. From

5-1For d’Annemours’s views, see Kathryn Sullivan, Maryland and France, 1774-1789
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1936), 137-43. For Vergeness’s position, see
Comte de Vergennes to Chevalier de La Luzerne, February 15, L784, in Lafayette in the Age of
the American Revolution: Selected Letters and Papers, 1776-1790, ed. Stanley Idzerda (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1977-1983), V, 226. In America, the call for free trade was echoed by
the Chevalier de La Luzerne. In France, the Marquis de Lafayette, and General Chevalier de
Chastellux, and Francois Barbe-Marbois, the Consul General, joined the clarion pressing
Vergennes to act. See The Papers o f Robert Morris, VUE, 687-94. On the French reversion to
prewar trade practices and the efforts for and against free trade, see The Papers o f Robert Morris,
Vm, 510-511, 681-87, and Nussbaum, “The French Colonial Arret of 1784,” 62-68.
55 Marquis de Lafayette to Robert Morris, December 26, 1783, in The Papers o f Robert Morris,
Vm, 843, and Gouvemeur Morris to Marquis de Chastellux, June 17, 1784, in The Papers of
Robert Morris, IX, 405.
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Baltimore, Henry Johnson busily scribbled dozens of letters to his business contacts in
the French West Indies trying to shore up his firm’s interests by suggesting contingencies
for the American trade. He assured James Demie, a merchant in Cape Francois, Santo
Domingo, that “Should your port be shut against the Americans, you will have an
opportunity of doing something clever here under the French flag.” To Marie and
Company in Port-au-Prince he wrote that “whether we [Americans] have permission to
enter your p o r t . . . seems doubtful,” but “Should your trade be carried to the Mole of St.
Nicholas . . . vessels under the French Flag will bring the produce of your Island to this
Continent much easier than the Americans.” Johnson remained hopeful, however,
writing to his half-brother Francis Johonnot that “You know enough o f Baltimore to see
that every advantage ought to be taken that can be.” Johnson even clung to the faint hope
as late as February 1784, more than six months after the Orders in Council were issued,
that he expected “to see a free trade to the English West Indies.” Yet he did worry that
without a free trade to the West Indies, “we shall not know what to do this year coming
as our crops o f wheat are like[ly] to be abundant.”56
Relief finally arrived in the form of two Arrets issued by the French Council of
State in May and August 1784, but the decrees greatly disappointed advocates for free
trade. The French opened the ports of L ’Orient, Bayonne, Dunkirk, and Marseilles to
American ships, compelled the Farmers General to show preference for American
tobacco, increased the number of free ports in the French West Indies from two to seven,
established Isle de France [Mauritius] as an entrepot for American trade in the Far East,
56 Henry Johnson to James Demie, November 8, 1783; Henry Johnson to Messrs. Marie & Co.,
November 8, 1783; Johnson, Johonnot & Co. [Henry Johnson] to Frank [Francis Johonnot],
January 23, 1784; and Johnson, Johonnot & Co. [Henry Johnson] to Noah Parker, February 21,
1784, in Johnson, Johonnot and Company Letterbook, MHS.
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and greatly expanded the list of items that might be imported or exported. However, the
arrets also limited American trade in the W est Indies to timber, dye-woods, coal,
livestock, salt beef, salt fish, rice, legumes, hides, and pitch. Wheat, flour, and com were
prohibited. The only exports allowed were rum and molasses; sugar and coffee were
prohibited. Salt fish entering the French W est Indies from America was taxed and
rendered uncompetitive for the West Indies market, and worst o f all, only ships of more
than 60 tons were to be admitted to the free ports, which eliminated most of the sloops
and schooners Americans employed for the W est Indies trade.57
For Baltimore, the terms of the commercial settlement were potentially
catastrophic. France’s exclusion of American flour exports to the French W est Indies,
coupled with Britain’s restrictions on American trade with the British West Indies,
threatened the profitability of the city’s most important export. Prospects for tobacco
were no better. Although the Farmers General were instructed to show preference for
trading directly with American merchants, they continued to import most o f the
American crop through Britain, because Order in Council of December 26, 1783 allowed
American tobacco destined for reexport to be admitted and warehoused in Great Britain
duty free.58

37 The seven West Indian ports included Port-du-Carenage in St. Lucia, St. Pierre on Martinique,
Pointe-a-Pitre on Guadeloupe, and Scarborough on Tobago. On Santo Domingo, Cape Mole St.
Nicholas was closed, and Cape Francois, Port-au-Prince, and Aux Cayes were opened to
American ships. By 1787, a series of further French actions eroded most of the concessions made
in the Arrets of 1784. The exception was American trade with French colonies in the Far East.
In 1787, Charles Alexander de Caionne, the French controller-general, extended American
trading privileges to all French ports in the vicinity of Mauritius. See Nussbaum, ‘The French
Colonial Arret of 1784,” 69-70; The Papers o f Robert Morris, VTII, 510-511, 681-685; Sullivan.
Maryland and France, 1774-1789, 137-143; Henry See, “Commerce between France and the
United States,” American Historical Review, 31 (1926): 734-35; and Ritcheson, Aftermath o f
Revolution, 23.
58 David Ross and other Virginia merchants to Thomas Jefferson, October 18, 1785, in The
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Vergennes defended the French policies as the best that could be hoped for,
arguing that they granted Americans a freer trade than they enjoyed anywhere else. This,
of course, was not true, and the fact that Vergennes made these arguments in February
1783 to in a letter to the Chevalier de La Luzerne, the minister plenipotentiary to the
United States, three months before the Arrets were actually declared, is a good indication
that he knew the Americans would be disappointed. Charles Eugene Gabriel de La
Croix, Marquis de Castries and the minister of marine, more readily admitted the hard
truth to the Marquis de Lafayette. Like Eden and Lord Sheffield across the Channel, de
Castries saw the United States as a potential commercial threat, and sought to block
American access to his empire’s colonial ports. He was thus an unwavering adversary of
free trade, and likely expressed a degree of masked satisfaction when he informed
Lafayette that “it will not be possible for us to give the degree o f [commercial] freedom
you desire” for America.59 Although Lafayette and others continued the struggle for
further trade liberalization, the minister’s words spelled out the situation clearly: the
revolutionary possibility that free trade would remake the Atlantic economy was over,
and the measure o f American independence was now in doubt.

Papers o f Thomas Jefferson, ed. Julian Boyd (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950-), VIII.
650-51; Lewis Gray, History o f Agriculture in the Southern United States to 1860 (Washington:
The Carnegie Institute, 1933), II, 600; and Price, France and the Chesapeake, II, 732. London,
Bristol, Cowes, Liverpool, Whitehaven, and Greenock were opened to the American tobacco
trade by Orders in Council of November 5, 1783. Subsequent Orders in Council opened Port
Glasgow on November 19, 1783, Falmouth and Portsmouth on April 16, 1784, Hull on July 30,
1784, and Lancaster on November 24, 1784.
59 Vergennes to La Luzerne, February 15, 1784, in Lafayette in the Age o f the American
Revolution, V, 226. Castries quoted in The Papers o f Robert Morris, VIII, 697 n.26.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE NEOMERCANTILIST ECONOMY

As hopes for winning free trade concessions in Europe faded during late 1784 and
early 1785, a commercial depression began to grip the republic. British firms that had
offered long-term credit to Americans for the purchase o f imports in the months
immediately following the war began asking for payment. To satisfy their British
creditors, American merchants who had been caught up in the speculative frenzy tried to
collect on debts owed to them by farmers, shopkeepers, and artisans. However, the
profligate spending on British goods had exhausted the supply of specie pumped into the
economy during the war, and there were no profits from the export trade to make up for
the loss. As Americans realized that the mind-numbing weight o f their debts could easily
crush all initiative, consumer spending evaporated. British imports into the United States
declined from £3.5 million Sterling in 1784 to just £1.4 million in 1786— a decline of 60
percent in two years.1
All over the country, the earlier jubilation over American prospects was replaced
by the darkest predictions of the future. Many commentators fixed the blame for the
downturn on the postwar spending rage. In the Maryland Journal, “Mentor” railed
against the short-sighted and wasteful indulgence of his neighbors who “embarked in
every expense, extravagance, and luxury that folly, fashion, or vice could suggest.” In a
petition to the Congress, Baltimore’s artisans and tradesmen also blamed the city’s
commercial troubles on those who “prodigally expended in the purchase o f . . . articles
from foreigners.” Other commentators blamed the collapse of free trade and the
1U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics o f the United States:
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subsequent restoration of European mercantilist policies as the root cause of the
American crisis. Governor Benjamin Harrison of Virginia condemned the British
merchants as “locusts that are crouding us here as so many emissaries” of the British
government, “sent to sound out [our] inclinations” and lure and trick Americans into
further debt. Arthur Campbell went even further, believing that a conspiracy had existed
since the Paris peace treaty to thrust the country back into the arms of King George HI.
In October 1783 he confided in James Madison that “If my intelligence from a distant
Correspondent, is right,” British policy since the king’s acknowledgement of American
independence had aimed at the new nation’s destruction by “introducing luxury, draining
our money, impairing public credit, and destroying public spirit.”2
Those who blamed Europe for America’s commercial problems clearly believed
that free trade would have made a difference. Yet it is worth questioning whether or not
the United States would have realized a greater measure of economic independence if the
hopes o f free trade advocates had been realized during the 1780s. How truly
revolutionary was the American view of free trade? When historian John Crowley
addressed this question, he anticipated writing a study about how Adam Smith’s views on
free trade and Smith’s philosophy in general influenced the thinking of the Revolutionary
generation. Crowley soon discovered that such a book “would be very short,” because
American thinking on free trade was distinctly different from the views expressed in
Colonial Times to 1970 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), n, 1176.
2 Maryland Journal, August 3, 1786; ‘To the President and Congress of the United States, the
Petition of the Tradesmen, Mechanics, and Others, of the Town of Baltimore, April 11, 1789,”
quoted in Louis Maganzin, “Economic Depression in Maryland and Virginia. 1783-1787” (Ph.D..
Georgetown University, 1967), 42-43; Benjamin Harrison to the Virginia Delegates in Congress,
September 26, 1783, and Arthur Campbell to James Madison, October 28, 1783, in The Papers o f
James Madison, ed. William Hutchinson and William Rachal (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1962-), VH, 35 9 ,3 8 3 .
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Smith’s An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes o f the Wealth o f Nations. This should not
be surprising given that the treatise was first published in 1776 at the beginning of the
Revolutionary War, and few Americans had read the manuscript by even the m id-1780s.3
Smith used the metaphor of the “invisible hand” to guide his argument that
investment in and development of domestic industries would produce as much wealth and
social benefit as investment in overseas trade. He believed that an exclusive focus on
trade “tends to diminish, or, at least, to keep down” industry, and thus acts like “a dead
weight upon the action of one of the great springs which puts into motion a great part of
the business of mankind.” Smith does not deny that the manufactures of Great Britain
had vastly increased since the inception of the Navigation Act, the genesis of the
mercantilist system, but he maintains that the advance “has not been by means of the
monopoly o f . . . [colonial] trade, but in spite of that monopoly.” Restrictions and
prohibitions, “like all the other mean and malignant expedients of the mercantile system,
depresses the industry . . . of the country in whose favour it is established.” Smith thus
supported free trade primarily as a method to foster society’s evolution away from the
mercantile system and towards investments of capital in domestic pursuits. Free trade
was a means to an end, not an end unto itself.4
In the United States, the Revolutionary generation adopted a different approach to
free trade; relative to Smith’s thinking on the subject, the American application of his
principles was incomplete. Most of the leading revolutionaries rejected a strong

3 John Crowley, The Privileges of Independence: Neomercantilism and the American Revolution
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), xi.
4 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes o f the Wealth o f Nations, ed. R.H.
Campbell and Andrew Skinner (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1981), II, 592,610-11.
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government role in the regulation of agriculture, maritime commerce, and handicraft
production, and therefore should not be considered mercantilists. Such a role for
government contradicted the most fundamental precepts of eighteenth-century
republicanism.5 However, most Americans could be considered neomercantilists. The
revolutionaries rejected the primacy of government action in guiding foreign trade, but
few forsook the primacy of foreign trade itself in the creation o f the wealth of the nation.
Instead of investing in domestic production as Smith’s analysis suggested, most
Americans continued to fix their gaze across the Atlantic at markets over the ocean’s
horizon. Thomas Jefferson feared that such would be the case. In his Notes on the State
o f Virginia, Jefferson hoped that after the war, Americans might “abandon the ocean
altogether,” and “leave to others to bring what we [Americans] shall want, and to carry
what we can spare.” He then recognized that “the actual habits of our countrymen attach
them to commerce,” and “they will exercise it for themselves.”6 Most Americans of the

s Maryland provided no protection at all against foreign imports. Virginia restricted trade to a
number of enumerated ports, but did so in an effort to promote competition rather than restrict it.
Most states followed a similar path. Massachusetts and Pennsylvania proved the exceptions, the
former by establishing a parallel mercantilist regime to the British Orders in Council, and the
latter by enacting a series of high tariff walls. See Drew McCoy, “The Virginia Port Bill of
1784,” Virginia Magazine o f History and Biography, 83 (1975): 288-303, and Richard Chew, “A
New Hope for the Republic” (M.A., The College of William and Mary, 1992).
6 Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, ed. William Peden (New York: W.W. Norton,
1972), 174-75. Lawrence Peskin defines neomercantilism as an interest in “a positive balance of
trade; an active state to direct the economy; a balanced, self-sufficient national economy; and a
concern for the general good over individual interests.” He thus identifies the position advocated
Coxe, Hamilton, and Gallatin as neomercantilist. See Lawrence Peskin, 'T o 'Encourage and
Protect’ American Manufactures: The Intellectual Origins of Industrialization, 1763-1830”
(Ph.D., University of Maryland, College Park, 1998), 105. Other historians share Peskin’s
definition of neomercantilism, but it seems to me that the definition is almost interchangeable
with the commonly accepted definition of mercantilism. The only difference seems to be the
relative power accorded to government: mercantilists advocated a strong hand for government in
regulating trade and neomercantilists advocated a not-quite-so-strong hand for government in
regulating trade. The definition for American neomercantilism offered here differs from that
offered by Peskin.
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Confederation period had not yet absorbed the primary lesson of Smith’s work: free trade
opens up opportunities for investments in domestic industries, and these are just as
profitable and beneficial to the nation as investments in foreign commerce. Instead,
Americans embraced free trade as an end unto itself, making it a tactic within the
framework of traditional mercantilist thinking. As long as the neomercantilist mentalite
remained preeminent in the American mind, merchants would continue to focus on
Atlantic commerce instead of the domestic market.7
Baltimore merchant George Woolsey epitomized the American neomercantilist
mentalite. During the trying days of the Continental Association, Woolsey complained to
his partner, George Salmon, that if business did not improve, he would quit the overseas
trade and buy land. He was almost certainly being facetious, but it is interesting that for
Woolsey, the alternative to foreign commerce was agriculture, not domestic commerce.
He did not consider, at least not in his griping to George Salmon and others, the idea of
quitting overseas trade and investing his available capital in a manufacturing enterprise.
For some Americans there were lingering fears after the Revolution about the corrosive
effects of industrialization on public virtue. Sir James Steuart, a Scottish political
economist, had established this standard axiom of eighteenth-century thought, stating that
“when foreign demand begins to fail, so as not to be recalled, either industry must
decline, or domestic luxury must begin.”8 Yet few revolutionaries held so firm to this
thinking as to exclude all attempts to develop a domestic market— least of all George
Woolsey. Instead of a blind faith in republican abstractions, it was Woolsey’s single7 Crowley, The Privileges o f Independence, 75-83.
8 Sir James Steuart, An Inquiry into the Principles o f Political Oeconomy, ed. Andrew Skinner
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), II, 237.
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minded belief in the neomercantilist perspective that limited his imagination and kept him
from recognizing domestic commerce as a viable alternative to foreign trade.
That a neomercantilist mentalite like Woolsey’s persisted in the Confederation
period is bewildering. First, Americans, more so than any people in Europe, were in a
position to take actuate Smith’s philosophy and build a domestic economy. In the peace
settlement of 1782, Great Britain ceded most o f its territory in North America south of
the St. Lawrence River and east of the Mississippi River to the newly independent United
States. With the stroke of a pen, a thin line of loosely-confederated colonies hugging the
Atlantic coast were transformed into a truly continental nation. A few intrepid pioneers
like Daniel Boone had already settled beyond the mountains in the western frontier of the
new republic, and enough had done so by the early 1790s for Kentucky to enter the union
as the new nation’s fifteenth state. By building connections to the growing backcountry,
Americans could have shaken loose the manacles o f British commercial dominance
regardless o f European mercantilist restrictions. Yet such dreams eluded Woolsey.
When Americans looked to the West during the 1780s and 1790s, they typically
perceived it in the same way as they had done so during the colonial period—as a source
o f land speculation rather than a place in which to develop new markets.9 The
commercial focus of most Baltimoreans, like most Americans, remained strongly set on
overseas trade thanks to the neomercantilist assumptions embedded within the American
9 Andrew Cayton sees a direct progression from colonial to post-colonial thinking about the west.
He argued that "the proto-Federalist western policy that emerged by the end of the L780s was
largely an elaborate refinement of old ideas, a continuation of speculative schemes for a
coordinated development of the trans-Appalachian region whose implementation had been
interrupted by the American Revolution.” See Andrew Cayton, “Radicals in the ‘Western
World’: The Federalist Conquest of Trans-Appalachian North America,” in Federalists
Reconsidered, ed. Doron Ben-Atar and Barbara Oberg (Charlottesville: University Press of
Virginia, 1998), 79.
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concept of free trade. This situation would not have changed even if European
governments had not adopted restrictive trade policies. Rather than providing a real
measure of independence, neomercantilism helped shape the limits of the Revolution by
promoting dependence on overseas trade and stunting the process of market development
in the backcountry.

T h e C on fed era tio n ’s E co no m ic T ro ubles
A few modem historians have suggested that the commercial frustrations of the
1780s were largely limited to the northern ports and New England, but this was not the
case. As early as April 1784, Henry Johnson was already out of patience with his
Baltimore customers, complaining to his half-brother that it is “impossible to collect Cash
from the [city’s] retailers after we have trusted them . . . If we had not two or three
friends we should be obliged to hang ourselves.” By 1785, a pall shrouded Baltimore’s
mercantile houses, and one by one, many of them quietly dissolved— including several of
the city’s most successful firms. Clement Biddle & Company, whom George
Washington himself had relied on, went bankrupt. Samuel and Robert Purviance, who
played such leading roles in the Revolution, soon joined Biddle. Dozens of other houses
hovered on the brink of failure, and struggled mightily to stay afloat.10
British imports into Maryland and Virginia plunged from £1,010,000 in 1784 to
£857,000 in 1785, and kept declining until bottoming out at £657,000 in 1788. Although
a smaller decline than the nation as a whole, the 35 percent decline over four years
amounted to a precipitous state o f affairs. Marylanders also continued to owe more than
10Henry Johnson to Francis Johonnot, April 27, 1784, in Johnson, Johonnot & Co. Letterbook,
MS.498, MHS.
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£3 million in various debts throughout the 1780s, and had no way to remit them.
Throughout the state, insolvencies mounted, and legal actions against debtors multiplied.
As the number of suits doubled and then tripled as the decade wore on, Maryland courts
became hopelessly clogged with cases. Baltimore Town was not yet independent of the
county, thus suits brought against debtors in the city had to be heard in the county court,
further delaying matters. Most of the debts owed were small, amounting to under £50,
but several debtors owed money for claims on confiscations of loyalist property as well
as tax in arrears. In these cases, debts could run into thousands of pounds.11
If the United States had enjoyed an active export trade, many of the commercial
embarrassments of the Confederation period could have easily been avoided. Debts
could have been remitted to British creditors, and insolvencies could have been avoided.
It is therefore tempting to point to the collapse of free trade as the source of the nation’s
commercial frustrations. Yet such an explanation is untenable. Despite the restoration of
European mercantilist policies, American ships continued to trade freely throughout the
West Indies. The Dutch, Danish, and Swedish islands remained open to American ships,
and more than a year after the British Orders in Council, the French arrets, and the
Spanish restrictions were issued, American ships were able to gain entry to many British,

11 Historical Statistics o f the United States, II, 1176; Philip Crowl, Maryland During and After
the Revolution: A Political and Economic Study (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press,
1943), 83-110; and Maganzin, “Economic Depression in Maryland and Virginia,” 177-202.
Samuel Chase was among those who owed large sums, and he led the cause for debtor relief in
the Maryland House of Delegates. Unfortunately for Chase, the more conservative Senate, which
was filled with creditors anxious to be repaid, rejected all the House’s efforts. Chase had been a
resident of Annapolis during the Revolution, but in February 1786, Colonel John Eager Howard
offered Chase land at the comer of Eutaw and Lexington Streets in downtown Baltimore as an
incentive to get him the move to the city. The planned worked, and Chase built a three-and-a-half
story brick townhouse on the spot. See James Haw, Francis Beime, Rosamond Beime, and R.
Samuel Jett, Stormy Patriot: The Life o f Samuel Chase (Baltimore: Maryland Historical Society,
1980), 144-45.
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French, and even Spanish islands as well. The ease with which American captains gained
entry to the British islands was thanks in large part to the actions of the islanders
themselves. During the debate over the American Intercourse Bill in 1783, merchants
and planters in the West Indies flooded Parliament with petitions imploring the members
to support the bill or risk starvation and the collapse of trade in the Caribbean. After the
Orders in Council were issued, the freeholders of Antigua complained that their
provisions would not last two months without an unlimited trade with the United States.
The Baltimore community kept a close watch on the growing dissatisfaction throughout
the region.12
When the hurricane seasons of 1784, 1785, and 1786 brought additional hardships
to the islands, many colonial governors in the West Indies used their discretionary powers
to open up their islands to American ships. Although special concessions such as these
were only supposed to be made under extraordinary circumstances, at least one British
island was open to American ships every year following the Revolution except 1787.
Jamaica proved the most consistent in relaxing British restrictions in the years
immediately following the war. Lieutenant-Governor Alured Clark opened the island to
American ships in October and November 1783, and again from July 1784 until January
21,1785. Over the next two years, devastating storms continued to sweep the island,
compelling the governor to periodically reopen Kingston, Montego Bay, and other
Jamaican ports to any ships carrying provisions— including those coming from the
12Edmund Bumett, “Observations of London Merchants on American Trade, 1783,” American
Historical Review, 18 (1913): 769-73, and Alice Keith, “Relaxations in the British Restrictions on
the American Trade with the British West Indies, 1783-1802,” The Journal o f Modem History,
20 (1948): 1-2. The complaints of the freeholders on Antigua appeared in the Bahama Gazette
for October 6, 1783, and the story was reprinted in the Maryland Gazette (Annapolis) for
December 18,1783.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

128
United States. The volume o f American trade to Jamaica during these years was
immense. Between October 1, 1785 and October 1, 1786, 249 American vessels totaling
more than 20,000 tons legally entered the island.13
Jamaica was not the only island in the West Indies to open its ports. Governor
William Brown opened Bermuda to American trade in 1783, Governor John Maxwell
opened several ports in the Bahamas in 1784, and Governor John Orde kept Dominica
open throughout all of 1784. Between October 1, 1784 and October I, 1785, 88
American ships totaling 6,891 tons entered at Barbados thanks to the concession granted
by Governor David Parry. Lieutenant-Governor Henry Hamilton opened Bermuda to
provisions in March 1789, and Parliament itself allowed Americans to load salt at Turk
Island in the Bahamas in 1788. Even Thomas Shirley, the Governor of the Leeward
Islands who lodged furious complaints with the British Foreign Secretary in the early
1780s about the questionable decisions of West Indian governors and the collusive
practices of American merchants to smuggle goods into the British islands, agreed to
open St. Kitts to imports of lumber. After 1787, Nevis and St. Kitts in the Leewards
became the islands most frequently open to American ships. In the early 1790s, Santo
Domingo, Grenada, the Grenadines, Jamaica, and Bermuda were each open at some point
for several months.14
When colonial governors did not allow entry to American ships, American
captains presented forged papers to claim French, Spanish, or British registry as needed.

13 Keith, “Relaxations in the British Restrictions,” 2-3,6-7.
14 Keith, “Relaxations in the British Restrictions,” 5,7-9, and Lowell Ragatz, “‘Upon Every
Principle of True Policy’: The West Indies in the Second Empire,” in The American Revolution
and the West Indies, ed. Charles Toth (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1975), 183-95.
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Customs officials in the W est Indies regularly accepted the fraudulent papers for an
appropriate bribe. The practice was so widespread and successful that Baltimore
merchant Henry Johnson proposed this course of action to his half-brother Frank. In
February 1784, Henry wrote “You will not forget the proposition I made respecting the
vessel under British colours. I do believe there is an opening there.” It was evidently
rather easy to forge the papers, because Henry was confident that “If it [the voyage] could
be done this quarter I would soon have a set of British papers.” If conditions changed, he
was equally sure that they could “put the vessel again under American colours” without a
problem.15
Failing all other options, ship captains simply smuggled cargoes ashore, and the
Royal Navy usually did nothing to stop it because Admiral Sir Richard Hughes
prohibited his captains from interdicting against the American trade. Hughes believed he
had no authority to act because neither the Parliament nor the Admiralty had not given
him a direct order to do so. The situation disgusted a young Horatio Nelson, recently
arrived in the Caribbean as captain of the Boreas. Nelson and his fellow captains were at
last able to convince Hughes in December 1784 that the clear intent of the Orders in
Council gave him more than enough authority to act. Yet Hughes’s subsequent orders
still prohibited naval officers from interfering with an American ship when a colonial
British governor deemed it proper to give it entry. The admiral’s orders effectively
handcuffed Nelson and allowed the American trade to continue unharassed. The young,
headstrong Nelson finally took matters into his own hands on May 2, 1785 and seized the
American schooner Eclipse. In the legal action that followed, Nelson prevailed and
15Johnson, Johonnot & Co. [Henry Johnson] to Frank [Francis Johonnot], February 21, 1784, in
Johnson, Johonnot & Co. Letterbook, MHS.
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established the precedent for other British captains to interdict against the American
trade. Yet the victory proved short-lived. To avoid further seizures, American merchants
thereafter avoided a direct trade with the British and French islands in favor of an indirect
trade through the Danish and Dutch colonies. American captains would thus consign
their cargoes to a merchant in one of the Dutch, Danish, French, or Swedish West Indies.
The cargo could then be re-exported legally to the British islands. The most popular
islands for this indirect American trade with the British islands were the Dutch islands of
St. Eustatius and Curasao, the Danish island of St. Croix, the French islands of
Guadeloupe and Martinique, and St. Bartholomew’s, which the French crown had leased
to the Swedish government. The Royal Navy could do little to stop the practice, and the
British Committee of Trade struggled to find an effective solution to the problem.16
Despite the prohibitions against American ships, captains clearly had little trouble
entering allegedly closed ports, thus allowing American merchants to carry on a massive
trade with the West Indies in the years following the Revolution. The clearances and
tonnage for American ships thus steadily rose throughout the 1780s, leading a few
historians to the conclusion that the republic did not face any real economic troubles
during the Confederation period. An American ship captain would have found such a
conclusion absurd. From a captain’s perspective, mercantilist restrictions could be
circumvented, but there was no escape from the laws of supply and demand. The real
16 Charles Ritcheson, The Aftermath o f Revolution: British Policy Toward the United States,
1783-1795 (Dallas: Southern Methodist University, 1969), 212-27. In 1787, Parliament sought a
compromise by allowing single-decked American vessels of no more than 70 tons burden to enter
in Jamaica at Kingston, Savanna-Ia-Mar, Montego Bay, and St. Lucea, St. George in Grenada,
Roseau in Dominica, and Nassau in the Bahamas. However, the vessels were sdll not allowed to
carry tobacco or grains, only cotton, indigo, livestock, timber products of various types, furs, and
the produce of European colonies. See Keith, “Relaxations in the British Restrictions,” 2, and
Ragatz, “‘Upon Every Principle of True Policy’,” 191, 194.
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problems for Americans began after a ship had entered a West Indian port and the captain
tried to find buyers for the cargo. Thanks to an international glut in flour and wheat that
choked off demand and caused prices to plummet, captains were frequently unable to find
buyers. Most merchants expected that a fall in commodity prices would follow the
cessation of hostilities and the ending of the Royal Navy’s blockade, but the deflation
that actually resulted was much greater than most Americans anticipated. Tobacco prices
also suffered from oversupply as well as a series of price-fixing schemes that drained
profitability out of the trade as neatly as the crop itself drained nutrients out of the soil.
Market conditions throughout the Atlantic— a classic question of supply and
demand rather than a problem arising from European restrictions on trade— were thus the
real cause o f the city’s and the nation’s economic troubles in the 1780s. No matter where
they turned, American captains discovered that the prices they asked consistently
exceeded what the market would bear. Precious little demand existed for grains, and
where there was a demand, there was almost certainly a plethora of merchant ship
captains from every part of the Atlantic world competing for the same business. When
unable to find buyers, captains either had to return home with unsold cargoes, or consign
their cargoes to a local agent to wait for prices to improve. Either way, American
merchants typically experienced a loss, either from the eventual sale o f their cargoes at
clearance or auction prices, or the wholesale loss of their cargoes because they could not
be sold or even consigned. The efforts of even the craftiest captains were confounded by
this miserable state of affairs.
The worldwide oversupply of wheat and flour developed as a result o f the
Revolution. Largely cut off from American supplies during the war, European merchants
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scrambled to find alternative sources for American grains in Europe. Many of the
subsequent efforts to expand wheat cultivation and flour manufacture in Europe met with
great success. When Portugal’s harvest failed in 1785, the nation’s merchants were able
to import wheat from Sicily rather than M aryland to relieve the shortfall. The Lisbon
firm o f Hudson and Harrison reported to Baltimore merchant Tench Tilghman that “we
are abundantly supplied with every kind of grain . . . that should a further quantity arrive,
prices must diminish very considerably.” The Portuguese also developed a domestic
flour milling capacity, eliminating the need to import refined flour from America. After
1786, the market at Lisbon was closed entirely to American flour imports. Long harvests
in the early 1780s in the Baltics, England, and France meant that the Portuguese could
have turned to these markets as well before having to rely on American imports.
Baltimoreans contributed the problem o f oversupply too by increasing the volume of
flour exports from 50,700 barrels in 1784 to more than 130,000 barrels in 1788. At the
same time, flour prices fell from $6.47 to $4.61 per barrel, marking a twenty-year low for
the commodity.17
In Baltimore, Tench Tilghman received the same bad news from merchants in
almost every port in Europe. From London, Charles Herries informed Tilghman that “at
the prices you quote for your Produce there [is] no Encouragement for speculation.”
James Bum, also of London, concurred that American “prices are much too high for the
markets in Europe— and there must be great alterations before anything can be
17 Hudson and Harrison to Tench Tilghman & Co., July 27, 1785, in Tench Tilghman Papers,
MS. 1445, MHS, and Geoffrey Gilbert, Baltimore’s Flour Trade to the Caribbean, 1750-1815
(New York: Garland Publishing, 1986), 66-67, and Appendix D. Gilbert derived his figures for
flour prices based on the price lists in Anne Bezanson, Robert Gray, and Miriam Hussey,
Wholesale Prices in Philadelphia, 1784-1861 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
1936-1937), H, 80.
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undertaken.” From Falmouth, George Fox claimed that “Prices being so low in Europe &
high with you, nothing but evident loss must attend to it.” From Coruna on the northwest
coast of Spain, Teronimo Hixosa complained that “the price of Indian Com was so high
last season that it cou’d not turn to acc[oun]t.” From Cadiz on the southwest coast of
Spain, James Duff wrote that “prices of wheat in Spain are & mist continue high for some
time.” D uff also cautioned that “we have also reason to expect our receiving supply of
soft wheat as well from the Baltick as from England to say nothing of your Quarter.”
This left no room at all for American produce at the Spanish market. Livingston &
Turnbull o f Gibraltar and De Larrard and Company of Barcelona confirmed that while
grain prices in southern Spain had been high briefly in late 1784, supplies from England.
France, the Levant, and the Barbary Coast had driven prices down in 1785.18
Merchants also experienced severe problems in the tobacco trade after the war,
though the reasons were somewhat different from the problems associated with wheat.
Supplies o f American tobacco were limited during the war, and thus prices were greatly
inflated. With the cessation of hostilities, the Farmers General expected prices to fall as
low as 25 livres per quintal, or just above their prewar levels. In the Chesapeake,
however, costs for tobacco production remained very high because of the destruction
from the war. Particularly damaging had been the raids conducted by Major General
Edward Mathew and Commodore Sir George Collier in May 1779, which pillaged the
shipyard at Portsmouth, burned the town of Suffolk, removed 518 formerly enslaved
18Charles Herries & Co. to Tench Tilghman & Co., August 3, 1785; James Bum to Tench
Tilghman & Co., July 9 1784; Teronimo Hixosa to Tench Tilghman & Co., April 27, 1785;
George E. Fox & Sons to Tench Tilghman & Co., June 8, 1785; James Duff to Tench Tilghman
& Co., August 2,1784 and September 20,1785; De Larrard & Co. to Tench Tilghman & Co.,
December 11, 1784 and October 22, 1785; and Livingston & Turnbull to Tench Tilghman & Co.,
October 10, 1785, in Tench Tilghman Papers, MHS.
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African Americans from the state, demolished 137 vessels, and destroyed tobacco and
other goods valued at more than £2 million. Collier also detached the pesky sloop-of-war
Otter, which returned once again to the upper Bay to raid plantations on Maryland’s
Eastern Shore and the Virginia coast. In late 1780 and early 1781, Benedict Arnold, then
a Brigadier General in the British army following his treason against the United States,
extended the raiding up the James River as far as Richmond.19
Although not as brutal as the Collier-Mathew invasion, Arnold’s actions helped
prevent a recovery in the tobacco-growing regions of the lower Chesapeake Bay. After a
brief plunge in tobacco prices in 1783, the continued high costs of production kept prices
high over the following eighteen months. As seen in Figure 3-1, prices on Maryland
tobacco rose from 30.s/Ct Maryland currency in November 1783, or the equivalent of
23Vi livres per quintal, to 38s/Ct Maryland currency in May 1785, or the equivalent of 30
livres per quintal. Given the costs of freight, commissions, and duties, Maryland leaf had
to be resold in Europe for at least

livres per quintal in November 1783, and 38-

40 livres per quintal by May 1785 for a merchant to break-even. Unfortunately, the
Farmers General were only willing to offer 35 livres per quintal because new tobacco
plantations in the Carolinas and Georgia had enabled the overall supply of American leaf
to match prewar levels despite nagging problems of postwar recovery in the
Chesapeake.20
19 John Selby, The Revolution in Virginia, 1775-1783 (Williamsburg, VA: The Colonial
Williamsburg Foundation, 1988), 204-08, 221-25.
20 Jacob Price, France and the Chesapeake: A History o f the French Tobacco Monopoly, 16741791, and o f Its Relationship to the British and American Tobacco Trades (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 1973), II, 728-31,752-54. To convert shillings per hundredweight
Maryland currency (s/Ct Md) to livres per quintal, the price needs to be converted to Sterling
using a multiplier of 0.6 (at par, £100 Sterling equaled £166 2/3 Maryland currency). In May
1785, Maryland leaf sold for 38 s/Ct Md, or 22s 1Q</ Sterling. The multiplier of 1.309 may then
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Figure 3-1

Prices on Maryland Tobacco between November 1783 and May 1786
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Source : Jacob Price, France and the Chesapeake: A History o f the French Tobacco
Monopoly, 1674-1791, and o f Its Relationship to the British and American Tobacco
Trades (An Arbor: University o f Michigan Press, 1973), II, 754.
Note: The dotted line indicates where missing data has been extrapolated.
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Faced with such dismal prospects, Baltimore merchant Matthew Ridley conspired
with merchants in the free French port of L ’Orient as early as April 1783 to fix the price
of tobacco at 42 livres per quintal. Ridley guaranteed the procurement of 10,000 to
13,000 hogsheads o f tobacco per year if the French would guarantee the price. If the plan
had succeeded, Maryland leaf would have become immediately profitable. The Comte de
Vergennes, who was interested in insuring a commercial connection with the newly
independent United States, liked the idea, though was unsure about the people involved.
Ridley had served as Maryland's purchasing agent in France, but Vergennes did not
know him personally. The French minister thus sought the advice of Benjamin Franklin,
who served as an American envoy in Paris throughout most of the war and had won the
universal respect and admiration of the French court. Franklin suggested that any such
plan be carried forward by the firm of Morris and Willing in Philadelphia. Although
Robert Morris was initially interested, he soon backed out, and thus Franklin directed
Vergennes to consider his grandnephew, Jonathan Williams, whose father-in-law,
William Alexander, had been the Farmers General’s purchasing agent in Scotland. Such
blatant nepotism did not give Vergennes cause for concern because such arrangements
were common in monarchial governments. Vergennes thus approached Williams and
Alexander, who proposed to supply the Farmers General with 15,000 hogsheads per year
at just 30 livres per quintal. Unlike Ridley’s proposal, the price set by Williams and
Alexander was even lower than what the Farmers General had been offering, and just
slightly higher than the prewar price for tobacco. The plan seemingly doomed American
planters to a less-than-favorable arrangement, and not surprisingly, Vergennes leapt on
be used to convert the price in Sterling to livres per quintal (see footnote 23, this chapter). Thus.
22s 10d Sterling equals 29.8452 livres, or a price of approximately 30 livres per quintal.
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the deal, approving it October 3, 1783.21
Williams and Alexander did not believe that they had sold out their American
suppliers. After all, if the arrangement remained unprofitable, there was no way to
coerce the sale o f tobacco. Williams and Alexander made the arrangements because they
fully expected the price of tobacco to plummet to near its prewar levels very soon. By
pegging the commodity’s price at 30 livres per quintal, both they and their American
suppliers would achieve windfall profits. It was a high-risk strategy, but in March 1784,
Robert Morris sensed that Williams and Alexander might be right. Morris thus joined the
firm as a silent partner with a one-third interest in the company. When the long-expected
decline failed to materialize, however, Alexander was only able to buy 1 million pounds
of tobacco, o f which just 738,760 pounds, or approximately 740 of the 15,000 promised
hogsheads, were shipped to France. Despite the setback, Morris was still convinced that
a fall in prices was coming, and he offered a new contract to the Farmers General in 1784
guaranteeing delivery o f an astounding 20,000 hogsheads of tobacco at a price of 36
livres per quintal. By this point, the Farmers General had boosted their prices to nearly
45 livres per quintal, thus the Morris contract seemingly promised to manipulate the
market to the detriment of Chesapeake merchants and planters. Thomas Jefferson, who
was serving as the new U.S. minister to the French court, was livid about the
arrangements, and complained vociferously to Vergennes. Nonetheless, the deal was
struck. When prices in the Chesapeake once again failed to decline significantly in 1785,
Morris was only able to procure 5,808 hogsheads of tobacco. When tobacco prices
finally declined in 1786 to the long-anticipated levels, however, Morris was able to

21 Price, France and the Chesapeake, II, 741-43.
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deliver more than the 20,000 hogsheads promised in the agreement.22
Jefferson was convinced that Morris had benefited from the price-fixing scheme
on the backs o f Chesapeake planters. He was partially right. Although M orris’s contract
did not directly cause a fall in tobacco prices, his schemes did raise French expectations
of an impending fall in American prices, and this had the effect of retarding rather than
encouraging trade. From Bayonne, David Alexander wrote to Tench Tilghman that
“prices o f Tob[acc]o have been so high in Y[ou]r Continent, no speculations could be
made.” From Paris, William Short, the American Charge d ’Affaires, concluded that “the
experience of seven years has suffered to show” that trade between France and America
was not profitable. Between 1784 and 1788, not a single “French house having
undertaken that Commerce” did so “without losing by it” according to Short. Others
echoed the observation. From Bordeaux, French and Nephew stated that American
exports were “rated so amazingly high for our European markets, in short there has been
no possibility of our speculating or transacting any business whatever with America but
with the greatest certainty of loss.”23

22 Price, France and the Chesapeake, II, 747-73.
23 David Alexander to Tench Tilghman & Co., October 4, 1785, and French & Nephew to Tench
Tilghman & Co., November 12, 1785, in Tench Tilghman Papers, MHS, and American State
Papers, “Extract of a Letter from William Short, Charge des Affaires of the United States at the
Court of France,” October 21, 1790, Foreign Relations, Class I, vol. I, 120-121, quoted in
Maganzin, “Economic Depression in Virginia and Maryland,” 94-95.
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Despite the overwhelming evidence that profitable markets were few and far
between, rumors nonetheless continued to circulate in the 1780s of places in need of
American supplies. Following their neomercantilist inclinations, merchants paid more
attention to rumor than reality and continued to send cargoes to either the West Indies or
Europe in hopes of gaining an advantageous trade. The voyages ended almost invariably
with disappointing if not ruinous results. Paul Bentalou, who established a new
mercantile house in Baltimore after the war, suffered through several misadventures
based on such rumors. Bom in Montauban, France in 1755, Bentalou joined the Royal
French Dragoons at the age o f 15. Like several other young French idealists his age,
Bentalou left his native land for the United States in 1776 to join the American crusade
for independence. He received a commission as a lieutenant of cavalry, and at the Battle
of Brandywine, had the opportunity to meet Count Pulaski, the famed Polish cavalry hero
of the Revolution. Pulaski was impressed with the young Frenchman, and had Bentalou
transferred under his command as a captain of cavalry. Bentalou spent the next two years
of the war at the Count’s side, and at the disastrous Battle of Savannah in 1779, it was
Bentalou who carried the mortally wounded Pulaski from the field.24
Paroled by the British, Bentalou spent the rest of the war in Baltimore as a
recruiting officer. It was there that he met and fell in love with Katharine Keeports,
daughter o f Baltimore merchant Jacob Keeports. The couple were married before
Christmas 1780, and remained in Baltimore. After the war, Bentalou started a mercantile

u Bentalou File in Dielman-Hayward File, MHS. The file draws on newspaper reprints of
Bentalou’s life in The Baltimorean, January 22, 1881, and Baltimore American, November 10,
1903.
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partnership with John Dumeste, the husband of Elizabeth Keeports, Katharine’s sister.
The firm began auspiciously. In July 1784, Bentalou purchased a three-eighths interest in
the General Washington, the same ship that Joshua Barney had recaptured from the
British and then commanded with great success. Unfortunately for Bentalou and
Dumeste, the purchase of this fine vessel turned out to be the firm’s only encouraging
event for several years.25
Bentalou retained Richard Stevens as the captain of the General Washington, and
borrowed nearly £2,700 from fellow Baltimore merchants Richard Curson and Adrian
Valck to purchase dry goods to supplement the ship’s cargo of flour. In September 1784,
Stevens set out for the Caribbean, but the voyage did not go well. He landed first at St.
Thomas in the British Virgin Islands, and later at the Dutch island of Curasao, where,
according to Bentalou, Stevens had “by a most unaccountable stupidity, disposed of his
flour below Baltimore prices, whilst he well knew.” Stevens had encountered the classic
problem that ship captains faced after the Revolution, an inability to find buyers because
of glutted markets. Hoping to salvage the expedition, he crossed the Atlantic to Spain in
search of a market. His luck was no better in Europe than in the Caribbean, and he
returned to Jamaica and Cuba to try once more, unsuccessfully, to sell his cargo.
Bentalou suffered a loss o f £695 13s on the voyage in addition to the debt owed Curson

25 “Paul Bentalou,” in Dielman-Hayward File, MHS, and entry for July 1784, Paul Bentalou
Journal, MS.12S, MHS. Francis Casenave and Thomas Burling held shares of three-eighths and a
one-quarter in the General Washington, respectively. For the earlier history of the General
Washington, see chapter two. Bentalou referred to the ship he purchased from Congress as the
George Washington, but it was the General Washington that Congress sold at auction and
Bentalou bought in July 1784. The Continental navy had a 32-gun frigate named the Washington
that was destroyed in 1777, but there was no Continental warship ever named the George
Washington. See Louis Arthur Norton, Joshua Barney: Hero o f the Revolution and 1812
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2000), 98-99, and Nathan Miller, Sea o f Glory: A Naval
History o f the American Revolution (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1974), 528-29.
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and Valck.26 He blamed the failure of the voyage on Stevens, and never used the captain
again for any of the firm’s dealings. As time would prove, however, Stevens had taken
the prudent course in minimizing the voyage’s losses, and his venture for Bentalou
ultimately proved one of the least disastrous of the firm’s dealings in the 1780s.
When rumors swirled in Fall 1784 that flour was in short supply on Hispaniola,
Bentalou’s associate, Francis Casenave, sailed for Port-au-Prince in December 1784 with
a hold full o f flour in the sloop Flying Fish. Dumeste followed in the General
Washington with more flour, as well as the unsold dry goods from Stevens’s voyage.
Casenave entered at Port-au-Prince, but when he was unable to find any buyers, he had to
consign the cargo to a local merchant. Dumeste was denied entrance at Port-au-Prince
and entered instead at Kingston, Jamaica. Like Casenave, he was unable to sell his cargo,
and consigned it to a local merchant, Alexander Linde. In each place, the agents for the
consigned cargoes waited in vain for market conditions to improve, and ultimately sold
the flour at below cost before it rotted. In Port-au-Prince, Casenave’s agent allegedly
sold the cargo, which cost more than £2,500, for just £1,150. Casenave refused to give
the agent’s name, however, and Bentalou was sure that he had been swindled. According
to Bentalou, the two men “mutually agreed to refer the settlement of the whole to
arbitrators officially appointed by the French consul.” Unfortunately for Bentalou, the
arbitrators concluded that the low prices quoted by Casenave in his ledger were the result
of bad judgement rather than fraud. In addition, Casenave claimed losses against
Bentalou for his interest in Dumeste’s consignment to Linde, and the arbitrators agreed.
Bentalou ultimately suffered losses on these voyages o f £1,321 for Casenave’s cargo, and

26 August to September 1784, and January 1786, Paul Bentalou Journal, MHS.
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approximately £2,046 for Dumeste’s consignment in Jamaica. To make matters worse,
Dumeste also wrecked the General Washington on the return voyage to Baltimore in
April 1785, bringing a tragic and unfortunate ending to the celebrated vessel.27
Rumors once again circulated in August 1785 that Hispaniola needed flour.
Bentalou quickly outfitted two brigs, the Debonair and Prospect, as well as the sloop
Polly to carry flour to the island. When the ships arrived in September, their captains
discovered that French vessels carrying flour from Bordeaux had already crowded into
the port, and as Bentalou later related, “a ruinous depression on the prices of that article
then followed.” Dumeste, who commanded the Debonair, consigned the cargoes to a
local agent, Cottineau, Chottard, & Company. Bentalou remained ignorant as to the fate
o f the cargoes until September 16, 1788, nearly three years later. On that day, he
received a letter from Henry Marchand, a Port-au-Prince merchant who had taken over
the accounts o f Cottineau, Chottard, and Company, and much to Bentalou’s
consternation, the 1785 voyage had ended in the same way as all the others. Bentalou
wrote that he “had the mortification to find, that, far from being in our debt, as I had
flattered myself, they, on the contrary, brought against us a balance” of more than
£13,000.28
Bentalou was not alone in his troubles. Joshua Barney and John Strieker sent
their first consignment of goods to Havana in late 1784, but the profits were squandered

27 December 1784 to April 1785, [early] 1788, and April 1789, Paul Bentalou Journal, MHS.
Linde provided a note to Bentalou in 1789 showing losses on Dumeste’s consignment of $4,261.
the equivalent of approximately £1,600. In addition, the arbitrators in the case between Bentalou
and Casenave awarded the latter £448 2s 4d for his interest in Dumeste’s consignment, thus
bringing Bentalou’s total losses on the voyage to approximately £2,046.
28 August to September 1785, and September 1788, Paul Bentalou Journal, MHS.
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by the local agent. Another of the firm’s cargoes spoiled when they could find no buyers,
and as business continued to flounder in 1785, Barney slowly disengaged from the firm’s
activities.29 Henry Johnson met with similar frustrations, and he was very pleased when
his half-brother, George Johonnot, took over the Baltimore branch of their firm in May
1784. Johonnot struggled mightily to scurry up any business. None o f his half-brother’s
letters had succeeded in establishing new commercial ties either in Europe or the West
Indies, and thus Johonnot had to rely on the firm’s meager coastal trade with New
England and its unprofitable connections to trading partners in Havana. By July, his
frustration concerning the embarrassed situation of the city’s commerce boiled over.
Writing to Henry, he complained that “Business is excessive d u l l . . . and such a quantity
of Havanna Sugars we have had stor’d as to break the main beam of the second floor” of
the warehouse. Not surprisingly, Johonnot soon rejoined the rest of his family back in
Boston. After a flurry of speculation in flour in 1784 and 1785, merchant Christian
Keener also faced rough times. In 1786, his purchases of commodities fell from £1,647
the previous year to £483 in 1786, and continued falling to just £256 by 1788. By that
time he had largely abandoned large flour purchases, and was no longer even speculating
in rum. The largest part of his business came from 99 barrels of shad and herring worth
just over £50.30
Even Robert Oliver, who eventually retired a millionaire, struggled mightily

29 Norton, Joshua Barney, 101-02.
30 George Johonnot to Henry Johnson, July 13, 1784, in Johnson, Johonnot & Co. Letterbook,
MHS, and [Christian] Keener Account Book, MS.514, MHS. Rhoda Dorsey is sure that all three
brothers in the firm Johnson, Johonnot, and Co. returned to Boston, but she is unsure when. See
Rhoda Dorsey, “The Conduct of Business in Baltimore, 1783-1785: As Seen in the Letterbook of
Johnson, Johonnot, & Co.,” Maryland Historical Magazine, 55 (I960): 242.
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through these years. His partnership with Simm ended by February 1785 with little
fanfare. The firm had imported goods from L ’Orient and Cadiz in the previous year and
likely made little profit as Oliver was only able to invest £1,000 Maryland currency in
May 1785 into his new partnership with Hugh Thompson. The new firm focused on the
tobacco and flour trade with the free French ports, where they sent 27 of their 84 ships
over the next three years. The value of the firm’s trade with L’Orient reached £19,000 by
1788, but Oliver and Thompson realized a net loss on of £12 on this trade. Similar
results plagued the firm’s other export accounts too. The value of the firm’s total exports
for 1785-1789 was £46,875, but Oliver and Thompson barely managed to cover their
costs on this trade. The firm’s balance sheet as of March 3, 1789 showed net earnings of
£8,625 for the previous four years, but net earnings from exports totaled just £232— a
profit margin of less than one-half of one percent. Oliver was able to increase his initial
investment in the firm from £1,000 to £3,336 by early 1789, and Thompson increased his
net worth from £2,300 to £6,553 thanks to commissions earned for transactions
completed for other merchants, and strategic investments in ship ownership and
insurance.31
That other merchants faced miseries was not a source of comfort to Bentalou. By
January 1786, the French emigre had reached a crossroads in his life. Almost £20,000 in
debt and facing possible legal action by his creditors, he knew that his next voyage had to
31 Stuart Bruchey, Robert Oliver, Merchant o f Baltimore, 1783-1819 (Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1956), 52-73. Bruchey points out that many of these export accounts
were still open on March 3, 1789. The closed accounts that showed net losses were L’Orient,
Bordeaux, Liverpool, the West Indies, Boston, and Petersburg. Only Teneriffe, St. Croix, and
Newry showed moderate gains. The accounts for Dublin, Belfast, Cork, Amsterdam, Marseilles.
Nantes, Jamaica, and St. Thomas were still open. The final outcome of these ventures is
unknown due to a gap in the firm’s extant records, but Bruchey suggests that when closed, it is
likely that the firm may have actually shown a net loss.
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be a success. Otherwise, it appeared that he and Dumeste would share the same fate as so
many other Baltimore firms in the mid to late 1780s. With “such a load of difficulties so
frightfully accumulated,” he thus “determined to have Dumeste at home and to try [his]
own luck abroad.” To secure a cargo of flour and tobacco, he had to post two bonds, one
for £350 with the Baltimore firm Usher and Donaldson, and a second for £687 I Os with
the Baltimore firm Wilson and Stumps. In M ay 1786, Bentalou departed for Bayonne
with his wife aboard the Heartwigh. Throughout “a most disagreeable, long & tedious
passage,” his firm ’s survival weighed heavily upon his mind.32
Arriving in Bayonne in August 1786, Bentalou found no buyers for his cargo and
was forced to store it. Fortunately, Frederick Folger, whom Bentalou knew as Baltimore
merchant John Sterret’s favorite ship captain, sent a letter asking Bentalou about
procuring a cargo in Bordeaux suitable for the market in Charleston, South Carolina. The
plan was to exchange the French goods for rice, and return to Bordeaux in time for Lent.
Folger offered Bentalou up to a half-interest in the cargo, but Bentalou did not have that
kind o f capital. Using his unsold tobacco as collateral, Bentalou was able to convince
Pierre Changeur, and old family friend, to loan him more than 30,000 livres (the
equivalent of approximately £1,250) to finance a share in the venture. Once again, the
firm was on the line, and once again, disappointment followed. After departing for
Charleston in fall 1786, Folger did not return to Bordeaux until July 1787, months after
Lent had ended. It turned out that the normally reliable Folger had altered course to St.
Eustatius, where he exchanged the French goods for rum and gin. Folger then proceeded
to Charleston, where he consigned the cargo to Robert Hazlehurst for a smaller supply of
32 Bruchey, Robert Oliver, 62, and January to May 1786, and September 1786, Paul Bentalou
Journal, MHS.
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rice and tobacco than anticipated by the investors back in France. Upon his return to
Bordeaux, Bentalou’s entire share of the Charleston cargo was turned over to Changeur
to repay the loan. Once again, the venture had failed, and by November, Bentalou had
reached the end o f his tether. Returning to Baltimore, he lamented that “Such was the
truly disturbing situation in which I found our affairs . . . and so puzzled was I in that
cruel dilemma, that having almost given myself up to despair, I could discover no way
how to extricate myself, or how to continue going on.”33
One last chance at commercial redemption was afforded to Bentalou thanks to the
intervention of Dumeste’s brother. A planter with significant estates and commercial
interests in the Mascarene Islands, located north and east of Madagascar, Dumeste’s
brother desired to initiate a trade with America and looked to his family in Baltimore to
facilitate it.34 In November 1787, Bentalou was able to convince his friend and fellow
merchant, William Vanwyck, to lend him $700 to gain a one-twelfth interest in the small
100-ton brig Traveller owned by Baltimore merchant James Clark and commanded by
Captain Daniel Howland. The investment was embarrassingly small, but Bentalou
considered himself fortunate to have received credit from anyone. Dumeste soon

33 August 1786 to November 1787, Paul Bentalou Journal, MHS.
34The Mascarene Islands include lie de France and lie de Bourbon. The former was settled by
the Dutch in 1638, who introduced sugarcane as a cash crop. The French seized the island in
1721, introducing enslaved African labor, and changing the name of the island to De de France.
The British seized the island in 1810, changing its name to Mauritius and replacing the enslaved
African population with Indian Hindu workers. Direct British rule continued until 1968, and the
new Republic of Mauritius severed all remaining connections to the British crown in 1992. The
island had a population of more than one million in 2000 with Hindus making up a slight majority
over Christians and Muslims. The other island in the Mascarenes, De de Bourbon, is better
known today as Reunion. It was occupied by the French in 1665 and thereafter remained a
French colony. With a population of almost 725,000 in 2000, Reunion is France’s most populous
overseas possession today. The island elects five deputies and three senators to the French
Parliament.
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departed on the Traveller for the Cape of Good Hope and the French islands beyond,
leaving Bentalou behind to await word of the voyage’s fortunes and the firm’s ultimate
fate.35

Bounded M arkets

in t h e

B ackcountry

Given the wretched state of overseas trade in the mid-1780s and the enormous
potential for developing markets in the backcountry, it is surprising that a greater interest
in the city’s hinterlands did not finally emerge by the end of the decade. Throughout the
warm, humid summer months of 1788, Paul Bentalou could do little except wait to hear
o f Dumeste’s return, and mull over his options if the commercial venture to the
Mascarene Islands turned out to be a failure. Unlike George Woolsey, Bentalou never
openly considered the life o f a farmer, not even in jest. Returning to France was a
possibility, but not a very palatable one because the country’s economy was in a worse
condition than that of the United States. Faced with a colossal national debt far greater
than America’s, and racked by growing discontent in both the countryside and the cities,
it was apparent from even 5,000 miles away that the ancien regime was about to topple.
Cornered by the failure of overseas trade and the dangerous state of affairs in his
ancestral home, the idea o f developing a return trade to the backcountry must have
crossed Bentalou’s mind and that of many other merchants in the suffering town. When
the city’s commercial frustrations forced merchants to undertake enormously risky
ventures to the Mascarene Islands and beyond, someone must have considered
alternatives.

35 November 1787, Paul Bentalou Journal, MHS.
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The neomercantilist mentalite was pervasive, and certainly contributed to the lack
of imagination regarding opportunities. However, the woeful prospects for development
in many areas o f the backcountry played just as important a role in discouraging any
schemes to build market connections to the hinterland. In the lower Potomac River
valley to the south o f the city, there was evidence that the area would never evolve
beyond an agricultural hinterland. The valley encompassed St. Marys, Charles, Calvert,
Prince George’s, and Montgomery counties in southern Maryland, as well as most of
northern Virginia extending westward to the Shenandoah River. The Tidewater areas
included some o f the wealthiest tobacco-growing lands in the colonial period, and the
valley as a whole was the closest area to Baltimore for market expansion. Most of the
region, including the Potomac River itself, lay within Maryland’s borders, and thus
Baltimoreans enjoyed a political advantage over merchants in the growing city of
Alexandria, Virginia, as well as those in the new federal city of Washington.
Competition from merchants in Annapolis also promised to be weak. With tobacco
prices steadily in decline after the Revolution, however, indebtedness swept across the
region. The number o f judgements in lawsuits against debtors rocketed from just 41 in
1783 to well over 200 by 1788 in Prince Georges County, and from 47 in 1783 to 208 in
1787 in Ann Arundel County.36 Few were left untormented by their creditors. Even
worse, the declining fortunes and growing indebtedness among tobacco planters caused
population to stagnate and then decline in many areas, leading to the erosion of local
economies and the disintegration of the social order throughout the region. For Baltimore
merchants and artisans, the large investments of capital needed for developing greater
36 Maganzin, “Economic Depression in Maryland and Virginia,” 265-66. Also see Frances Robb,
“Industry in the Potomac River Valley, 1790-1860” (Ph.D., West Virginia University, 1991).
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commercial connections to the area were not justified.
The troubled condition o f planters in Charles County during the 1780s and 1790s
typified the limitations of the region for market expansion. Situated neatly between the
Potomac and Patuxent Rivers, Charles County had been one of the most prosperous
places in the Chesapeake prior to the war. Following the Revolution, the tobacco trade
collapsed, and even the county’s leading citizens felt the sting of ill fortune. Colonel
Francis Ware was among them. Easily elected Sheriff in 1785, Ware was in the top ten
percent of the county’s property owners. Just two years later, however, he faced
conviction by the General Court o f Maryland for debts of more than £14,000 owed to the
state. Parts of his plantation, as well as his enslaved workers, livestock, and furniture
were auctioned off, his book debts were turned over to his creditors, and trustees assumed
control over the remainder o f his lands. Ware became a tenant on his former property,
and by 1800 was poverty-stricken. He was not alone. Other prominent planters,
including Thomas Howe Ridgate and Gerald B. Causin also faced the ignominy of
insolvency and having their estates confiscated and auctioned away by the courts.
Unable to maintain significant numbers of enslaved workers, many planters sold them off
as quickly as possible. Sellers extended as much as two years’ credit to buyers, revealing
the desperation many slaveholders faced to their reduce costs immediately. The hard
times produced an astonishing out-migration after 1790 which drained the county of its
population and its economic life.37
The experience of planters in Charles County served as a warning to Baltimore
merchants. Although the port never lost its claim as Maryland’s leading tobacco entrepot
37 Jean B. Lee, The Price o f Nationhood: The American Revolution in Charles County (New
York: W.W. Norton, 1994), 222-62.
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after the war, the city’s merchants steadily divested their interests in the tobacco trade.
Tobacco exports from the naval district at Baltimore equaled 15,958 hogsheads in 1784,
and thereafter declined steadily to just 8,184 hogsheads by 1790. Baltimore accounted
for more than 60 percent of M aryland’s tobacco exports as late as 1785, and just 33
percent five years later. Most of the tobacco purchased was o f inferior quality as well, or
“trash” tobacco. Tench Tilghman, acting on behalf of Robert Morris, bought up over
3,000 hogsheads of inferior grades between 1784 and 1786. The trade in higher grade
tobacco simply did not interest most Baltimore merchants. The Annapolis firm o f
Wallace, Johnson, and Muir, which specialized in the latter trade, had only one Baltimore
purchasing agent in 1785, John Sterrett. The other twelve agents were located along the
Patuxent and Potomac Rivers or in Virginia, and there was one on Tred Haven Creek in
Talbot County on Maryland’s Eastern Shore. Baltimore’s mercantile community feared
that no profit could arise from the trade, and financial ruin would be the inevitable
consequence. They proved right. Between 1785 and 1786, Wallace, Johnson, and Muir
contracted a whopping debt of more than £67,000. The partners then struggled for three
years to find a way to repay their London creditors before ultimately dissolving the firm
on January 1, 1790.38
Many planters in southern Maryland recognized the limitations of the tobacco
trade, and began switching to wheat cultivation after the war. With the abolition of the
French tobacco monopoly in 1791, the number of farmers making the switch rocketed
into the thousands. The rush to wheat production had a ruinous effect on the region’s
ecology. In an attempt to recoup losses and debts dating back to the Revolution,
38 Edward Papenfiise, In Pursuit o f Profit: The Annapolis Merchants in the Era o f the American
Revolution, 1763-1805 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), 169-215.
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slaveholders plowed up as many acres as possible to raise wheat, often without leaving
any fields fallow or using any type of fertilizer to replenish the soil. When marginal
lands were overplowed, rain washed valuable topsoil into the rivers, ending the chances
for planters to revert back to tobacco cultivation if prices rebounded. The zealousness
with which the conversion to wheat took place insured the long-term decline of the
tobacco trade; exports dwindled from their postwar high in 1790 o f 118,000 hogsheads
and failed to reach that level again until 1840.
Baltimore merchants engrossed both the wheat trade and what was left of the
tobacco trade in southern Maryland in the 1790s. In 1791, the city’s exports amounted to
$1.5 million, or 70 percent of the state’s overseas trade. By 1795, Baltimore’s exports
surpassed $5.5 million, and accounted for over 95 percent of the state’s overseas trade.
Annapolis stagnated as a result, and in the words of Edward Papenfuse, “settled into the
sleepy routine o f a quiet market town” at the turn of the century.39 Yet supplanting
Annapolis as the chief entrepot for all of Maryland strengthened the neomercantilist
reliance on foreign trade, and did nothing to promote the development of a return trade to
the backcountry. Furthermore, the Baltimore merchant community’s penetration of
southern M aryland’s export markets certainly did not help the region regain its lost
economic strength. Indeed, the activities o f Baltimore’s merchants likely undermined the
region’s economy. The commercial connections between the city and southern Maryland
supported an expanding number of bay pilots, and initially helped a tiny number of local

39 Papenfuse, In Pursuit o f Profit. 225. For the consequences of the conversion from tobacco to
wheat cultivation, see Lorena Walsh, “Rural African Americans in the Constitutional Era in
Maryland, 1776-1810,” Maryland Historical Magazine, 84 (1989): 337. For the decline in the
tobacco trade, see Historical Statistics o f the United States, II. 899. For Baltimore’s increasing
domination of Maryland’s trade, see Gilbert, Baltimore’s Flour Trade in the Caribbean, 123.
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millers and merchants. At the same time, however, the farming population declined and
the possibilities for industrialization were stunted. In St. M ary’s County, where farmers
accounted for more than ninety percent of the population in 1790, the number of people
pursuing agriculture declined by ten to fifteen percent in the following decade. Together,
the population of Anne Arundel, Calvert, Charles, Prince Georges, and St. M ary’s
counties declined by more than four percent during the 1790s, and remained stagnant
between 1800 and 1820.40
In the Susquehanna River valley to the north of the city, the prospects for market
development were far better than along the old Tobacco Coast. In the two decades after
the American Revolution, western Pennsylvania witnessed a surge in population growth,
and on the surface, a vibrant trade appeared to flourish between Baltimore and the
region’s farmers.41 Hundreds of wagons rumbled southward along muddy, heavily rutted

40 Robb, “Industry in the Potomac River Valley,” 279-80; Bayly Ellen Marks. “Rural Response to
Urban Penetration: Baltimore and St. Mary’s County, Maryland, 1790-1840,” Journal o f
Historical Geography, 8 (1982): 113-27; and Arthur Eli Karinen, “Numerical and Distributional
Aspects of Maryland Population, 1631-1840” (Ph.D., University of Maryland, College Park,
1958), 208. The combined population of these counties in 1790 was 88,761. This figure dropped
to 84,976 in 1800, and fell to 84,928 in 1820.
41 For the classic statement on the growth of post-Revolutionary Western Pennsylvania, see
Solomon Buck and Elizabeth Buck, The Planting o f Civilization in Western Pennsylvania
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1939). The literature on the growth of postRevolutionary western Pennsylvania has since grown quite extensive. See especially James
Livingood, The Philadelphia-Baltimore Trade Rivalry (Harrisburg: Pennsylvania Museum
Commission, 1947); Jane Garrett, “Philadelphia and Baltimore, 1790-1840: A Study of IntraRegional Unity, Maryland Historical Magazine, 55 (1960): 1-13; Homer Rosenberger,
“Migrations of the Pennsylvania Germans to Western Pennsylvania,” The Western Pennsylvania
Historical Magazine, 53 (1970): 319-335 and 54 (1971): 58-76; Paul Doutrich, “The Evolution of
an American Town: Yorktown, Pennsylvania, 1740-1790” (Ph.D., University of Kentucky,
1985), Peter Mancall, Valley o f Opportunity: Economic Culture along the Upper Susquehanna,
1700-1800 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991); R. Eugene Harper, The Transformation o f
Western Pennsylvania, 1770-1800 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991); Jo N. Hays,
“Overlapping Hinterlands: York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore, 1800-1850,” The Pennsylvania
Magazine o f History and Biography, 116 (1992): 295-323; Judith Ridner, “‘A Handsomely
Improved Place’: Economic, Social, and Gender-Role Development in a Backcountry Town,
Carlisle, Pennsylvania, 1750-1810” (Ph.D., The College of William and Mary, 1994); and Paul
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roads to reach the streets o f Baltimore and the docks along the city’s waterfront. The
sight of so many wagons heading south from the Pennsylvania backcountry unnerved
Philadelphia’s mercantile community. In 1787, Thomas Paine wrote that “the commerce
and traffic of the Back Country members and the parts they represent goes to Baltim ore..
. . If one part of the state is thus to go on in opposing the other, no great good can come to
either.” The editor of Philadelphia’s Independent Gazette agreed with Paine’s concerns,
adding that the commercial unity of the state could not be achieved until the diversion of
trade from western Pennsylvania to Baltimore ceased. “Happy would it be for
Pennsylvania,” he continued, if the state’s “boundaries were comprised by the
Susquehanah; we should then be more compact and more united.”42
The correspondents to the Independent Gazette need not have worried too much.
Although the quantity of wheat, flour, and whiskey arriving at Baltimore from north of
the Mason-Dixon line in the 1780s and 1790s easily surpassed the city’s totals for the
colonial period, Philadelphia still received the bulk of the Pennsylvania backcountry
trade, and held a near-monopoly over the return trade in dry goods. In 1789, Benjamin
Rush estimated that “in the months between September and October it is not uncommon
to meet in one day from fifty to an hundred . . . wagons on their way to Philadelphia.” In
1790, Pennsylvania’s Society for the Improvement of Roads and Internal Navigation
estimated that the upper Susquehanna valley’s down-river trade amounted to 150,000
bushels per year, and that the grain typically traveled to Middletown and then to
Philadelphia. The report did not predict Philadelphia’s impending doom at the hands of
Moyer, “Wild Yankees: Settlement, Conflict, & Localism Along Pennsylvania’s Northeast
Frontier, 1760-1820” (Ph.D., The College of William and Mary, 1999).
42 The Independent Gazette, March 7, 1787 and March 12, 1787.
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engrossing Baltimoreans, and no alarms raised over the possibility that Baltimore
merchants and artisans would develop a return trade to the backcountry. Wagons arrived
in Baltimore by the dozens stuffed to the brim with farm produce, but most of them
returned to the backcountry with relatively light cargoes. Salt, salted fish, sugar, tea, and
coffee might be loaded for the return trip, but in the decade-and-a-half following the war,
few wagons carried significant quantities o f manufactured goods into the backcountry
from Baltimore. In York, Carlisle, Harrisburg, and elsewhere in western Pennsylvania,
few advertisements listed the arrival o f dry goods and luxury items from Baltimore, and
only a handful o f Baltimore firms decided to advertise in backcountry newspapers before
1800.43
Even when the potential for a return trade to western Pennsylvania appeared
promising, Baltimore’s merchants and artisans typically demonstrated no interest in
developing the connection. Jacob Stofft, who owned an inn on King Street in Lancaster,
Pennsylvania, purchased 30 cases of Rhenish wine, a total of 828 bottles, from the
Baltimore firm of Valck, Burger, and Schouten. The transactions occurred between
March 24 and July 8, 1786; if the trade had continued throughout the year at the same
pace, Stofft would have imported over 3,000 bottles from the Baltimore firm. Instead,
Stofft’s interests thereafter turned primarily to the Philadelphia market. On June 5, 1792,
he became one of the original subscribers to the Philadelphia-Lancaster Turnpike

43 Benjamin Rush, An Account o f the Manners o f the German Inhabitants o f Pennsylvania
(Lancaster, PA: Pennsylvania-German Society, 1910), quoted in George Shumway, Edward
Durell, and Howard Frey, Conestoga Wagon, 1750-1850 (York, PA: George Shumway, 1964),
21. The report of the Society for the Improvement of Roads and Internal Navigation is quoted in
Mancall, Valley o f Opportunity, 176-77.
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Company.44 A similar trend characterized the business dealings of York merchant
Conrad Leatherman. His account books listed 452 purchases in Philadelphia between
1790 and 1800, and only 38 purchases made in Baltimore. Closer inspection reveals that
most o f the Baltimore purchases occurred in summer and autumn 1793 during an
outbreak o f Yellow Fever in Philadelphia. Leatherman acquired kettles, shoemaking
wares, hinges, ink powder, knives, and a menagerie o f cloths from velvet and silk to
calico from twelve different Baltimore merchants, usually at the same prices that he
received from Philadelphia merchants. Baltimore’s merchants could have met the needs
of this backcountry merchant, and might have been able to maintain at least part of their
return trade to the York merchant. Like Stofft, however, Leatherman turned decisively
back toward the Philadelphia market. Most of his remaining purchases from Baltimore
consisted o f pitch tar and s a lt45
The lack o f effective inland transportation helped deflate the ambitions of
Baltimore merchants and artisans to pursue a regular return trade with western
Pennsylvanians like Stofft and Leatherman. No major improvements were made to
navigation along the lower Susquehanna River prior to 1790, thus the dangerous currents
and exposed rocks below Turkey Hill continued to act as a natural boundary to those
wishing to reach the Chesapeake Bay and the Baltimore market beyond. At the other end
of the rapids, the same ancient boulders that blocked the progress o f Captain John
Smith’s expedition in 1608 also blocked the development o f a return trade from

44 Hubley Collection, MG. 2, box 1, The Lancaster County Historical Society, and Historical
Papers and Addresses o f the Lancaster County Historical Society, 22 (1918): 95.
45 Conrad Leatherman Account Book, BR-11, Historical Society of York County, and Hays,
“Overlapping Hinterlands,’’ 311.
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Baltimore to the backcountry. Johann David Schoepf, the chief surgeon with the
Ansbach regiment who remained for a brief time in the United States during the 1780s,
highlighted the difficulties the river presented. He reported that following the end of the
Revolutionary War, “a few bravos . . . made the voyage in two boats from here [Sunbury]
to Baltimore and back,” but the effort had been framed “out of vanity.” Since that feat,
“the difficulties and dangers have kept them and others from any further attempt.”46 To
make matters even worse, the Susquehanna valley was plagued by major floods during
the 1780s. Ice flows destroyed homes and farms on both branches of the river in March
1784, and another flood struck the North Branch in October 1786. The latter became
known as the “Great Pumpkin Flood,” because “heavy pumpkins came tumbling
downstream like great orange cannonballs and had much the same effect when houses or
men stood in the way,” according to one observer 47
Navigation along the Susquehanna River did improve somewhat in the 1790s
thanks to the introduction of arks— flat bottomed vessels designed to negotiate the
craggy, rock-strewn Susquehanna. Unlike the small flatboats typically used on the upper
reaches of the river, arks were large, boxy freighters, typically 75 feet long and 16 feet
wide. Their awkward shape made the vessels almost impossible to steer, requiring their
crews to use enormous 30 foot-long pine sweeps to conduct the boats downstream.

Yet

46 Sunbury is located in central Pennsylvania where the West Branch and North Branch of the
Susquehanna River meet. See Johann David Schoepf, Travels in the Confederation [1783-1784],
trans. and ed. Alfred Morrison (Philadelphia: William J. Campbell, 1911), I, 178; Carl Carmer.
The Susquehanna (New York: Rinehart & Co., 1955), 446-50; and Susan Stranahan.
Susquehanna, River o f Dreams (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 33-37.
47 Quoted in Stranahan, Susquehanna, 119.
48 The name “ark” was given to the large river freighters by backcountry residents, although the
reasons for the adoption of this particular name remain obscure. The ambitiousness of the
scheme to conquer the waters of the Susquehanna might have recalled Noah’s efforts to conquer
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these ungainly vessels made the difference in opening up the down-river trade to
Baltimore. On April 20, 1792, Baltimore newspapers reported with “pleasure . . . that
Mr. Michael Kryder arrived here on Monday with 104 barrels of flour, which he brought
from his mill above the standing stone, on the Juniata [River], down the river to the
Susquehanna” in an ark. He reshipped his flour at Havre-de-Grace, completing the
journey in five days. Kryder’s trip proved that “navigation of the Susquehanna,
heretofore thought impracticable for boats of burden,” could now be achieved. By 1800,
arks were traversing down the West and North Branches of the Susquehanna as well, and
the sound of the boat horns could be heard throughout the valley. Ark traffic ballooned
over the next thirty years. Between April and July 1817, 343 arks and almost 1,000
smaller craft descended the river below Columbia. In 1822, $ 1,337,925 in goods reached
Port Deposit, Maryland, from which most were reshipped to Baltimore. By the 1820s,
Baltimore flour inspections averaged 524,636 barrels per year against the 341,818 barrels
per year at Philadelphia. Even with the introduction of the arks, however, the
Susquehanna remained a one-way river. Once the large freight vessels reached Port
Deposit or Havre-de-Grace, they were doomed. Unable to make a return trip upstream,
they were usually broken apart and the timber used in their construction was resold.49
Arks therefore aided the further development of Baltimore as an entrepot, and did little to
assist in the development of a return trade to the backcountry.
Overland transportation in the mid-Atlantic remained just as unpromising as it
the flood, or the shape of the boat itself might have inspired the name.
49 Pennsylvania Herald and York General Advertiser, May 2, 1792; Carmer, The Susquehanna.
285-88; George Lightner, Susquehanna Register o f Arks, Rafts, etc.. Arriving at Port Deposit, in
the Year 1822, (Baltimore, 1823), Maryland Room, Enoch Pratt Public Library, Baltimore; and
Livingood, Trade Rivalry, 26, 37,55.
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had been during the colonial period. In Maryland, local authorities still directed road
construction after the Revolution, and thus most through ways continued in a wretched
state of disrepair. It is not immediately obvious, however, why the abysmal state of the
region’s roadways necessarily retarded the development of a return trade. Compared to
bulky commodities like wheat, flour, and whiskey, which suffered from very low value to
weight ratios, most manufactured goods could be shipped, in theory, over much greater
distances at far less cost. Based on the nominal costs of transportation, it should have
been more profitable for Baltimore merchants and artisans to send manufactured goods to
the backcountry than it was for western Pennsylvania farmers and shopkeepers to send
farm produce to the city. However, nominal transportation costs based on value to
weight ratios assume that the goods in question will actually arrive at their destination in
one piece. This presents a problem in making a direct comparison between farm produce
and manufactured items; wheat and flour did not shatter, china did. Merchants and
artisans faced the risk of a cargo being smashed when a wagon wheel caught the edge of
a rut in the road at the wrong angle; this created additional opportunity costs that helped
stunt the development o f a return trade from Baltimore due to the wretched state of the
roadways.
Settlers in western Pennsylvania realized that better vehicles could neutralize the
opportunity costs o f shipping a broad range of manufactured goods. By the late
eighteenth century, backcountry settlers had refined the traditional Conestoga wagon
from its rough-hewn colonial ancestors to meet the challenge o f mid-Atlantic roads.
With yards o f white canvas soaring above the red-painted upper wood panelling of the
wagons and their blue-painted undercarriages, the Conestogas o f the post-Revolutionary
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period were an imposing sight then, and would be today. By 1800, a typical Conestoga
was able to haul several tons o f produce, and measured up to twenty-four feet in length.
With a team o f four or six horses harnessed to it, the entire rig could reach a length of
sixty feet, o r the size of a modem eighteen-wheel tractor-trailer. Even more imposing
were the wheels, which typically measured three to four feet in diameter in the front,
while the larger back wheels towered four or five feet above the road. The massive
canopied wagon top stretched up to eleven feet above the road. It was supported by up to
thirteen large hoops and covered the dramatically swept body of the wagon. No longer a
simple farm wagon, the Conestoga had evolved into a rugged, long-distance hauler, ready
to act as the vanguard of western expansion and commerce.50
Yet even the specially-built Conestogas often proved no match for American
roads. Few other experiences fired the pens of foreign writers like travel on American
roads, especially those in the mid-Atlantic. In February 1796, one harried traveler was
astonished at the wreckage of dozens of overturned carriages, wagons, and stages on the
road from Baltimore to Philadelphia road. Conditions were little better going south from
Baltimore to Alexandria and Washington. Robert Hunter never forgot the experience he
had on this road in November 1785. A young merchant from London, he had traveled
over land from Quebec down through New York to Philadelphia and Baltimore, yet the
road to Alexandria was in his mind “the w orst . . . I have been [on] yet— nothing but deep
gullies and step hills.” Hunter marveled how “we were not all killed. But fortunately we
had a most capital driver.” Along such abysmal roads, the driver could indeed make all
the difference. On a trip from Elkton, Maryland to a ferry on the Susquehanna, Isaac
50 Richard Dunlop, Wheels West, 1590-1900 (New York: Rand McNally and Co., 1977), 29-32,
and Shumway, Durell, and Frey, Conestoga Wagon, 1-26. Also see the discussion in chapter one.
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W eld described how “the driver frequently called to the passengers in the stage to lean
out of the carriage first at one side, then at the other, to prevent it from oversetting in the
deep ruts.” Jacques Pierre Brissot de Warville, a French aristocrat, took the road from the
ferry back to Baltimore in 1788. He did not find the experience pleasing, as “the roads
were almost all terrible, clayey and full o f deep ruts. We traveled all the way through the
woods and were often forced to clear the way for the stage around trees.” Warville
believed American carriages and wagons to be far superior to their French counterparts,
yet “these French carriages, which travel over the finest roads, do a league an hour. Oh!
If Americans had such roads,” he exclaimed, “with what speed they would travel!” Until
then, commerce would be difficult. Moreau de Saint-Mery agreed. A French
revolutionary and political ally of the Marquis de Lafayette, Moreau was forced to flee
Paris in 1793. He subsequently traveled throughout the United States during the mid1790s, and concluded that trade between Philadelphia and Baltimore “would be too
costly if carried by land.”51
The lack of adequate inland transportation was not lost upon legislators on either

51 James Callender, The American annual register, or, historical memoirs o f the United States for
the Year 1796 (Philadelphia: Bioren and Madan, 1797), 34; Robert Hunter, Quebec to Carolina in
1785-1786, Being a Travel Diary and Observations o f Robert Hunter, Jr., a Young Merchant o f
London, ed. Louis Wright and Marion Tirling (San Marino, CA: The Huntington Library, 1943),
187; Isaac Weld, Travels Through the States o f North America, & the provinces o f Upper and
Lower Canada, during the Years 1795, 1796, and 1797 (London: J. Stockdale, 1800); Jacques
Pierre Brissot de Warville, New Travels in the United States, ed. Durand Escheverria, trans. Mara
Soceanuvanos and Durand Escheverria (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1964), 339,
153; and Mederic Louis Elie Moreau de St. Mery, Moreau de St. Mery's American Journey
[1793-1798], trans. and ed. Kenneth Roberts and Anna Roberts (Garden City, NJ: Doubleday and
Co., 1947), 82. Moreau was bom in Martinique, and studied law in Paris where he attained the
rank of avocat au parlement. He returned to the West Indies where he became a member of the
conseil superieur of Cap Francois in San Domingo. After 1789, he became a leading
revolutionary, serving as Vice President of the Paris Commune. With the rise of Robespierre,
however, Moreau was forced to flee Paris to Normandy and then to the United States. He
boarded a vessel at Le Havre on November 9, 1793, just ahead of an order arrived for his arrest.
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side of the Mason-Dixon Line. As early as September 1783, the Pennsylvania legislature
began to search for ways to improve the roads between Philadelphia and the lower
Susquehanna Valley, and explored the possibility of building a canal linking the
Schuykill and Susquehanna Rivers. Farmers in Lancaster County had always sent their
produce to Philadelphia, but improved roads and a new canal would have greatly
expanded Philadelphia’s reach into the backcountry, providing the needed first step in
building an integrated regional market with Philadelphia as the hub. The Maryland
assembly responded to the challenge in November by incorporating the Proprietors of the
Susquehanna Canal. Baltimore-area merchants and planters with a stake in the city’s
commercial connections to the north pledged £18,500 of the needed £20,000 in
subscriptions.52 For the moment, it appeared that the mid-Atlantic region might roar of
its neomercantilist shell and embrace a full-blown market revolution. This was not to be
the case.
After a series o f political twists, the efforts of transportation enthusiasts ultimately
and ironically reinforced the neomercantilist mentalite to ignore the backcountry.
Planters and merchants in southern Maryland were jealous of Baltimore’s special
treatment, and in 1784, they supported the efforts of George Washington and other
northern Virginia planters who wished to improve navigation along sixty miles of the
Potomac River between Georgetown to Harpers Ferry. Washington welcomed the
assistance of the southern Maryland planters. As a member of the House o f Burgesses in
52J. Lee Hartman, “Pennsylvania’s Grand Plan of Post-Revolutionary Internal Improvement,”
Pennsylvania Magazine o f History and Biography, 65 (1941): 445-54; Paul Kent Walker, “The
Baltimore Community and the American Revolution: A Study in Urban Development, 17631783” (Ph.D. Diss., University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 1975), 351; and William Arthur
O’Brien, “Challenge to Consensus: Social, Political and Economic Implications of Maryland
Sectionalism, 1776-1789” (Ph.D., University of Wisconsin, 1979), 131.
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1772, Washington had supported efforts to improve navigation on the Potomac, but the
efforts had floundered in the Maryland Assembly thanks to the opposition of Baltimore
merchants. The new coalition proved powerful enough to overcome the opposition of the
mercantile interest, and on March 20, 1785, Thomas Johnson, Thomas Stone, Samuel
Chase, and Daniel of St. Thomas Jennifer met with a group of Virginia delegates at
Alexandria. The resulting agreement, known as the Mount Vemon Compact, called for
the M aryland assembly to incorporate the Potomac Company with George Washington as
its president, and appropriate £3,000 for the construction of a road from the upper
Potomac to the Cheat River. Within five months, the Potomac Company raised £40,000,
mostly from merchants and planters in Winchester, Georgetown, Alexandria, Frederick,
and Annapolis.53
To head off what appeared to be the beginning of a regional competition for
government and private resources in the construction of transportation improvements, the
Pennsylvania assembly called for a tri-state convention in 1785 where delegates from
Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Delaware could discuss commercial development
throughout the region. The powerful coalition of southern Maryland and northern
Virginia planters and merchants opposed the tri-state meeting, however, demanding that
Virginia be included in any such discussions. At the same time, politicians concerned
about foreign trade issues and British mercantilist policies were clamoring for a multi
state convention to discuss the possibility o f allowing Congress to regulate both foreign
53 Corra Bacon-Foster, Early Chapters in the Development o f the Potomac Route to the West
(Washington, DC: Columbia Historical Society, 1912), 33-60; O’Brien, “Challenge to
Consensus,” 134-36; Ronald Shaw, Canals fo r a Nation: The Canal Era in the United States,
1790-1860 (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1990), 7-8; and Tina Sheller, “Artisans and
the Evolution of Baltimore Town, 1765-1790” (Ph.D., University of Maryland, College Park,
1990), 283-86.
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and interstate commerce. The two movements were quickly conflated, and thus what
began as an effort to address concerns over westward expansion became lost in the
deliberations over foreign trade. The subsequent meeting in Annapolis in September
1786 was so poorly attended that the delegates assembled decided to adjourn the meeting
and call for an even larger convention to convene the following May in Philadelphia.
The proposed convention promised to expand the discussion to include a myriad of
political and economic problems associated with the Articles of Confederation. With
political interest building for a constitutional convention, concern for improving
transportation connections on the Potomac and Susquehanna valleys largely dissipated.54
Even if adequate transportation to the backcountry had been built, there was no
guarantee that a significant return trade would have developed in the decade-and-a-half
after the Revolution. Philadelphia merchants jealously guarded their return trade with the
lower Susquehanna valley, especially on the east side of the river. When Samuel and D.
Byrnes of Baltimore advertised “French and Nova Scotia Plaister of Paris” in the
Lancaster Journal, Philadelphia firms quickly besieged the newspaper with
advertisements. Although Byrnes’s ad appeared only once, Daniel Drinker of
Philadelphia continued advertising “Plaister of Paris” for several months. He added that
his product could even be “manufactured by the ton.” Lancaster’s German-language
newspapers printed stories about events in Baltimore two to four weeks late while similar
stories about Philadelphia appeared in the pages of the Lancaster Zeitung in one or two
days— even news from Boston and New York City was seldom a week old. More

54 O’Brien, “Challenge to Consensus,” 142-46, and Lance Banning, The Sacred Fire o f Liberty:
James Madison & the Founding o f the Federal Republic (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995),
69-75.
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importantly, German-language newspapers listed Philadelphia commodity prices, a
strong indication that Philadelphia provided the primary market for their wheat and
flour.55
In neighboring Dauphin County, Baltimoreans did not fare much better. Before
1800, there is no evidence of any trade between the area and the Maryland port. On the
other hand, Philadelphia’s business community involved themselves directly in the
economy o f Harrisburg, the county’s leading town.56 No Baltimore merchants advertised
in Harrisburg newspapers, nor did any Harrisburg shopkeepers announce the arrival of
merchandise from Baltimore. However, two Philadelphia firms, Edmund Milne and
Company of No. 84 Arch Street and Miller and Hossinger of No. 176 Market Street,
appealed directly to the shopkeepers in the growing town. Milne guaranteed “that
storekeepers and others may be supplied . . . on the shortest notice and most reasonable
terms.” M iller and Hossinger made similar claims. A Harrisburg shopkeeper boasted
that he could dispose of merchandize “as low as . . . in Philadelphia, excepting the
portage only,” and at least one Harrisburg merchant entered into a partnership with a
Philadelphian to exploit the wheat trade. Harrisburg merchant Thomas Elder, who
remained active in the backcountry trade in whiskey, iron, and cattle during the 1780s
and 1790s, always favored the Philadelphia market.57

55 Lancaster Journal [English-language], January 8, and March 17-April 28, 1798, and Lancaster
Zeitung [German-language], July 23, 1788.
56 Harrisburg numbered only 87S people in 1790. Incorporated as a borough on April 13, 1791,
the town grew steadily. In 1800, it boasted a population of 1,472, and by 1810 reached a
population of 2,287. As with most communities in America, its growth slowed during the next
decade, but it still managed to reach 2,990 inhabitants by 1820. See Luther Reily Ketkner,
History o f Dauphin County, Pennsylvania (New York: Lewis Publishing Company, 1907), II,
514.
37 Elder Family Papers, MG.70, FF-6, Dauphin County Historical Society, and The Oracle of
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West of the river, Philadelphia’s influence was less dominating. Farmers and
shopkeepers in York County divided their loyalties between the two cities by selling a
considerable portion of their produce to Baltimore while buying retail goods from
Philadelphia. Unlike German-language newspapers in Lancaster County across the river,
the York Gazette listed Baltimore commodity prices for “Superfein Flour, Flour,
Schinfen, and Butter.” However, advertisements for retail goods demonstrate the bias
toward the Philadelphia market for the return trade.58 Advertisements for land sales in
The Pennsylvania Herald, an English-language York newspaper, also reveal a concern by
English-speaking farmers for proximity to the Baltimore market. In 1788, D. Grier
advertised 269 acres, “its situation very convenient to market, being about four miles
from York, four miles from the river Susquehanna, fifty-seven miles from Baltimore and
eighty-five miles from Philadelphia.” Many others did not bother to mention
Philadelphia, and included only the farm’s distance to the Maryland port. William
McCreary advertised land “all well situated, and in good repair, convenient to a number
of merchant mills, and 55 miles from Baltimore market.” Baltimore merchants Thomas
and Samuel Hollingsworth also tried to sell a mill in Frederick County, Maryland through
the York newspaper. In terms of the return trade to the backcountry, though, The
Pennsylvania Herald showed the same pattern as the York Gazette. In the eleven years
before 1800 for which there is a complete run, three Baltimore ads and three Philadelphia

Dauphin and Harrisburg Advertiser, September 9, 1793, August 3 and December 7, 1795, and
September 19,1796.
58 York Gazette [German-language], September 30 and October 21, 1796. Baltimore pricecurrents appeared weekly in 1796-1797. Several scholars have identified this process of farmers
“selling in Baltimore” and “buying in Philadelphia.” See Hays, “Overlapping Hinterlands,” 295323; Ridner, ‘“A Handsomely Improved Place’,” 297-303; and Livingood, Trade Rivalry, 18.
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ads appeared. Samuel Smith advertised “fine and coarse s a lt. . . near head of Market
S tree t. . . lower than it is sold at any other store Baltimore.” A Baltimore dentist made
known the availability o f his services on Gay Street in Baltimore, and George
Eichelberger proclaimed the opening of his tobacco manufactory on W ater Street. None
of these early Baltimore advertisements catered to the dry goods trade. Philadelphia’s
ads offered brass, cutlery, ironmongery, German goods, and books, demonstrating that
York County farmers and shopkeepers continued to trade in commodities at Baltimore,
and for dry goods from Philadelphia before 1800.59
Farmers and shopkeepers in Cumberland County conformed to the same pattern
seen in York County. Carlisle newspapers printed Philadelphia commodity prices,
indicating that farmers and shopkeepers divided the backcountry trade between the two
eastern cities. In the seven months from June to December 1789, an unidentified Carlisle
merchant sent 126 barrels of flour to John Holmes in Baltimore and purchased 212'/2
bushels of coarse and fine salt, three barrels of herring and one barrel of mackerel. In this
same period, he sent only 43 barrels of flour to Philadelphia, yet Philadelphia remained
the primary market for his dry goods. In July 1789, he spent £180 9s on sundries
purchased from seven different Philadelphia merchants. Another unidentified Carlisle
merchant received over £200 in dry goods from Philadelphia in September 1792. Tailors
in the growing cloth trade of Cumberland County flaunted their acquaintance with
European and Philadelphia fashions in Carlisle newspapers. Philadelphia connections
also helped Carlisle merchants John and Samuel Postlethwaite develop commercial

59 Pennsylvania Herald and York General Advertiser [English-language], December 31, 1788,
November 4, 1789, September 15, 1790, December 14, 1791, November 20, 1792, September 18,
1793, December 4, 1793, July 19, 1797, and June 13, 1798.
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connections to Kentucky, and allowed William Irvine, another Carlisle merchant, to
speculate in trade in Louisiana and Florida.60
In Pennsylvania’s western frontier, settlement had not yet advanced to any
significant degree at the end of the Revolution. On a journey from Carlisle to the Ohio
River, Johann David Schoepf passed through much of the upper Juniata River valley,
through the mountains, and then into western Pennsylvania. Soon after departing from
Carlisle, he observed how settlement quickly gave way to nature. Shippensburg had “a
good number o f houses,” but it was the population of wild turkeys, rather than people,
that increased dramatically in number the further west they traveled. He commented that
“we had hitherto seen [turkeys] only here or there, and singly,” in the eastern parts of the
state. Yet “today we came upon sundry large flocks . . . running on the road.” As the
journey continued into the mountains, Schoepf became increasingly agitated. Upon his
arrival at Bedford, he commented that it was “a little town, but a little town in a great
wilderness may easily please without beauty.” Not even half-way from Carlisle to
Pittsburgh, he concluded that the people around Bedford “do not yet produce what is
necessary to pay for their wants. Hunting must supply the rest; skins and furs, which
their guns bring in, are all they have to send to market.” The trade of the area was carried
on by peddlers, who “go about the country in little wagons, selling and swapping.” He
speculated that perhaps in the future, “the Juniata may contribute somewhat to a better
trade.” Yet little had changed seven years later. Samuel Maclay, a judge from
Northumberland county dispatched by the Pennsylvania government in 1790 to make a

60 Ridner, “‘A Much Improved Place’,” 167-169, 289-92,298, and Carlisle Gazette, September 7,
1785, October 19, 1785, April 19,1786, and April 22, 1795. Ridner believes that the unidentified
merchant was Joseph Givin, who operated in Carlisle between 1788 and 1791.
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survey of the western branch o f the Susquehanna, reached the same conclusions as
Schoepf did after the Revolution.61
In addition to inadequate transportation, the return trade to the backcountry was
also frustrated by the financial burdens under which western Pennsylvania farmers
groaned. The indebtedness in the region had been created in large part by the
Pennsylvania government’s decision to withdraw the state’s paper money after the war.
Due to a lack of specie in the backcountry, farmers were thereafter unable to pay their
debts or their taxes, and the number of foreclosures in western Pennsylvania skyrocketed.
Between 1782 and 1792, courts seized more than 6,000 farms in Westmoreland County,
effecting more than 40 percent of all the families in the county. Matters worsened further
when Congress passed the excise tax on distilled liquor in 1791. Western Pennsylvanians
bristled at the inequity; a land tax would have shifted the burden of taxation onto the
landholding eastern elites, but the so-called Whiskey Tax shifted the tax burden onto the
already indebted western farmers. Not surprisingly, backcountry residents refused to pay
the tax, and moved to close down sheriff sales. State officials who tried to enforce the
laws were routinely threatened, and on July 15, 1794, western Pennsylvania erupted into
open rebellion after a skirmish in Allegheny county between a mob and a state supervisor
of collections led to the death o f several people. In October, President George
Washington authorized the introduction of approximately 12,000 federal troops into the
backcountry to crush the Whiskey Rebellion. Although the army left as quickly as it had
arrived, the commercial frustrations of western Pennsylvania’s farmers continued through

61 Schoepf, Travels in the Confederation, I, 218-19, 222,227-29, and Samuel Maclay, Journal o f
Samuel Maclay, while Surveying the West Branch o f the Susquehanna, the Sinnemahoning and
the Allegheny Rivers in 1790 (Williamsport, PA: Gazette and Bulletin Printing House, 1887).
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the end o f the century, eclipsing any chance that Baltimore’s merchants and artisans
could extend their commercial relationship with the area.62
In Pennsylvania’s northern frontier, along the North Branch of the Susquehanna,
the ongoing conflict between Pennsylvania and Connecticut claimants over lands in the
Wyoming Valley continued to frustrate market development throughout the region. By
the early 1780s, the area had not yet recovered from the destruction of the Revolutionary
War. On a visit to Wilkes Barre in 1783, Johann David Schoepf commented that the
settlement “lies in an extraordinarily fertile valley,” but the settlers “are pauper-poor. . .
They live in miserable block-houses, are badly clothed, farm carelessly, and love easeful
days.” The people faced a daily struggle to eke out a subsistence, having sent most of
“their com and wheat over the mountains” the previous winter to be made into “cyder
and brandy.” In the spring, “they had neither seed-corn nor bread; they lived meanwhile
on milk and blackberries, or by hunting.” Although Schoepf painted a bleak picture of
the settlers’ lives, conditions actually worsened after his departure.63
In early 1783, at the time of Schoepf s visit, the Pennsylvania government was
seeking to resolve the land disputes in the Wyoming Valley. A federal tribunal in
Trenton had already issued a decree on December 30, 1782 awarding the territory to the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, but the decree did not resolve the sticky issue of
overlapping land claims between Pennamites and Yankees themselves. When
62 Terry Bouton, “‘No wonder the times were troublesome’: The Origins of Fries’ Rebellion,”
Pennsylvania History, 67 (2000): 24-31, 33-36, and Jeffrey Davis, “Guarding the Republican
Interest: The Western Pennsylvania Democratic Societies and the Excise Tax,” Pennsylvania
History, 67 (2000): 43-50. For the Whiskey Rebellion in Pennsylvania, see Thomas Slaughter,
The Whiskey Rebellion: Frontier Epilogue to the American Revolution (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1986).
63 Schoepf, Travels in the Confederation, I, 170,173-74.
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Pennsylvania state officials attempted to intervene after the war, they further exacerbated
the situation by showing favoritism to Pennamites, and garrisoning troops from
neighboring Northampton and Northumberland counties in the fort at Wilkes Barre.
Enraged by what they perceived to be unfair treatment, the Connecticut Yankees
assaulted Pennsylvania officials, igniting the Second Yankee-Pennamite War.
Skirmishes over land, crops, and resources further aggravated the conflict which
continued until the winter of 1784. Pennamite resistance was substantially broken at that
point, and last of the Pennsylvania claimants withdrew to the south by the summer of
1785.64
Emboldened by their victory, the Connecticut Yankees decided to reassert the
Susquehannah Company claims and solidify their control over the region. A company
meeting on July 13, 1785 created 600 new claims, amounting to 360,000 acres of
Pennsylvania land, as well as 400 new half-shares of 300 acres each. The former were
bought up by speculators, particularly New Yorkers from the border region between the
Hudson River and Massachusetts. These grandees had sympathies for Ethan Allen’s
Vermont separatists, and likely supported a separatist agenda for the Wyoming country as
well. Ethan Allen himself became a member of a four-person executive committee set up
to decide land disputes between Connecticut claimants. The 400 half-shares were
available to young men, or Wild Yankees, who were willing to submit to the orders of
company agents. In the words of Timothy Pickering, who became a leading Federalist in
Pennsylvania, the W ild Yankees were “the instruments of all the outrages” committed on
Pennsylvania’s northern frontier in the late 1780s. The Connecticut Courant described

w Moyer, “Wild Yankees,” 50-88.
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them as “a dangerous combination of villains, composed of runaway debtors, criminals,
and adherents to Shays.”65 Frontier violence continued until 1788, when the W ild
Yankees kidnapped Timothy Pickering and held him prisoner for twenty days. Believing
that the New York speculators had abandoned them, they let Pickering go, and resistance
on the frontier subsided for the first time since the end of the war. Although farmers
continued to raise crops in the valley throughout the protracted conflict, the region did
not contribute much to the down-river trade, and was not a viable area for market
development in terms of a return trade.66
With land prices as low at 8 cents per acre in northern Pennsylvania in the early
1790s, and federal lands in the new Northwest Territory pegged at $2 per acre, thousands
of migrants flooded into northern Pennsylvania. The Connecticut Yankees encouraged
the settlement of New Englanders, and gradually gained a stranglehold over local
Pennsylvania politics. John Franklin, the leader of the Yankee resistance, served as
Sheriff of Luzerne County between 1792 and 1796, Lieutenant Colonel of the county
militia after 1793, and representative to the Pennsylvania assembly in 1795-1796, 1799,
and 1800-1803. The state continued the struggle for control over the region and to gain
compensation for displaced Pennamites, but the campaign against the Connecticut
Yankees was largely carried forward through legal and legislative means. The Wyoming
Valley finally achieved a degree of economic and political stability by the mid- 1790s that
had been missing. Wheat began descending the North Branch o f the Susquehanna on
arks, and much o f the produce reached the market at Baltimore. Yet it was not until after
65 Timothy Pickering to John Pickering, August 4, 1788, and Connecticut Courant, September 10,
1787, both quoted in Moyer, “Wild Yankees,” 105,106-07.
“ Moyer, “Wild Yankees,” 89-164.
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1800 that a return trade would develop, and the region would became more fully
integrated into the Atlantic economy.67

T he R evival

of

O verseas T rade

The obstacles to developing markets in the backcountry were certainly steep, but
they were not insurmountable. For even the most stubborn merchants like Paul Bentalou,
who steadfastly clung to the smallest sliver of hope that his fortune would be made by
trade on the seas, failure and insolvency would have been powerful inducements in
forcing a change in his neomercantilist mentalite. For Bentalou, all his remaining hopes
hinged on the success of the Traveller, the ship that his partner and brother-in-law, John
Dumeste, had taken to the Mascarene Islands in a desperate last gamble to save the firm.
Failure would have represented a life-altering event. Yet when the Traveller finally
arrived in Baltimore in November 1788, Bentalou’s faith in overseas trade was restored
in full. The venture turned out to be a tremendous success—the first truly good news for
his struggling firm in more than four years. Bentalou’s modest one-sixteenth share in the
venture yielded a substantial profit, and proved more than enough to satisfy his creditors
in the short-run. He had managed to buy needed time to slowly climb out of the abyss of
his debts. John Clark, the merchant who had helped finance Bentalou’s share in the
voyage, was so impressed the success of the voyage that he outfitted the Traveller and the
ship Betsy to return to the French islands at once with tobacco and other goods “thought
best to answer that market.” Dumeste’s brother supplied a substantial loan to Dumeste
and Bentalou, enabling the firm to receive a three-sixteenths share in the Betsy. In

67 Moyer, “Wild Yankees,” 165-202, and Mancall, Valley o f Opportunity, 195-213.
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February 1789, Clark’s two vessels departed from Baltimore with Dumeste on board.
Once again, Bentalou was forced to wait.68
Pending his partner’s return, Bentalou decided “to live as economically as
possible,” and thus retired with his wife “to a garden we then had . . . and accommodated
ourselves as well as . . . we could in a very small house.” Over the next two years,
Bentalou was mightily harassed by his creditors, but in May 1791, the Betsy finally
returned. The Traveller had been sold, along with its cargo at Mozambique, and
Dumeste had remained in lie de France in the Mascarenes. The voyage was not a failure,
but its success fell “far short of our expectations” according to Bentalou, and the Betsy
had arrived in very poor condition. Yet Clark remained impressed with the commercial
possibilities on the French islands, and outfitted the ship Sally for a return voyage.
Despite Bentalou’s own complaints, the profits from his interest in the Betsy were enough
to finance a one-fourth interest in the Sally. With a proven commercial connection now
established with the French colonies in the Indian Ocean, Bentalou’s fortunes and
prospects improved over the next few years. Saved from insolvency, any thoughts that he
might have entertained about developing the backcountry faded away.69
Bentalou’s successes in the Indian Ocean trade were repeated in the East Indies
and China by other merchants. As early as December 1783, Boston merchants financed
an ambitious scheme to send the tiny 40-ton sloop Harriet to Canton by way of the Cape
of Good Hope. Not much bigger than a yacht, the Harriet nonetheless left Hingham,
Massachusetts for China with a cargo o f ginseng. Ultimately, Captain Hallet, the

68 November 1787 to February 1788, Paul Bentalou Journal, MHS.
69 February 1788 to May 1791, Paul Bentalou Journal, MHS.
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commander o f the Harriet, did not allow hubris to cloud his own good sense, and he
decided against making the hazardous journey around the Cape. Outside of Cape Town,
the Harriet encountered a huge British East Indiaman carrying a cargo of black tea.
Hallet exchanged his ginseng for the tea and returned home. The venture yielded more
than $30,000, or a 30 percent profit for the ship’s backers, but the Harriet did not become
the first American ship to reach China. That distinction fell upon the Empress o f China, a
large 368-ton ship built in Massachusetts and far better-suited for the journey around the
Cape. Loaded with brandy, wine, and ginseng, the ship left New York on February 22,
1784 and arrived on August 28 at Canton’s Whampoa anchorage, fourteen miles south of
the city. The American vessel remained in port four months, disposing of its cargo and
taking on 328,000 pounds of black tea, 75,000 pounds of green tea, 130,000 pounds of
chinaware, 3,200 pounds of nankeen, 2,800 pounds of cassia, and several hundred pieces
of silk for the return trip. Thomas Randall, who represented the interests of the
mercantile houses in the voyage, also chartered a second ship, the Pallas, to carry
$50,000 in black tea and several hundred pieces of porcelain. The Empress o f China
arrived safely in New York on May 10, 1785, while the Pallas was directed to Baltimore.
The American trade to the Indian Ocean, the East Indies, and China grew quickly, and by
1800, more than a hundred American vessels cleared Canton for American ports.70
The trade around the Cape of Good Hope represented a bright spot for the
republic in an otherwise dreary period, but the commerce there was not significant
70 John Scofield, Hail, Columbia: Robert Gray, John Kendrick and the Pacific Fur Trade
(Portland, OR: Oregon Historical Society, 1993), 28-32, and Arrell Morgan Gibson and John
Whitehead, Yankees in Paradise: The Pacific Basin Frontier (Albuquerque: University of New
Mexico Press, 1993), 94-101, 172-73. Nankeen is a coarse cotton cloth, while cassia is an
inferior form of cinnamon. A person who represented the interests of the mercantile houses in the
voyage was known as the supercargo.
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enough to make up for the dismal state o f Atlantic trade as well. By the late 1780s,
however, commerce with Europe and the West Indies began to revive. A number of short
harvests, especially in France in 1789, ended the postwar glut in the international grain
market, creating an increased demand for American produce. Few places faced the
danger of scarcity because American supplies were able to make up the shortfalls on the
continent, thus prices continued to stagnate. Nevertheless, the number of barrels of flour
exported from Baltimore increased from 72,000 in 1785 to 200,000 in 1792, allowing the
value of the city’s flour exports to rise steadily. After bottoming out in 1787 at $245,000,
the value of Baltimore’s flour trade to the West Indies climbed to $626,000 in 1792, and
the combined value of the city’s flour exports to the W est Indies and Europe topped $1
million for the first time in 1790. Imports from England to the Chesapeake continued to
decline, reaching a postwar low of £656,000 in 1788. However, the resurgence in the
export trade enabled Marylanders to begin paying off their debts, and this permitted
imports to rebound in 1789. Imports from England to the Chesapeake topped £1.2
million in 1790, and surpassed £1.4 million in 1791. Robert Oliver certainly prospered
during the early years of the commercial revival. By mid-1793, his capital in the firm
Thompson and Oliver had increased from £3,336 in March 1789 to £8,741. Unlike the
mid-1780s, when most of his profits derived from the commission business and shop
ownership, Oliver built his fortune on exports. The pattern of his overseas ventures had
not changed; the firm continued trading in Tobago, St. Croix, Martinique, and Jamaica in
the West Indies, and L ’Orient, Marseilles and Cadiz in Europe. What had changed was
the market conditions in the Atlantic economy, which now favored American produce for
the first time since the end o f the Revolutionary War.71
71 Gilbert, Baltimore's Flour Trade to the Caribbean, 66, 86-87, 126-27; Historical Statistics o f
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The prospects for American commerce brightened still further with the onset of
the W ars o f the French Revolution. Since the storming of the Bastille on July 14, 1789,
the French National Assembly had moved quickly to curb the power o f the Church by
subordinating the clergy to the state. This led to a series of increasingly apoplectic
condemnations by Pope Pius VI against the French Revolution, and growing agitation
among European princes to restore absolute monarchy. In France, both the people and
the politicians believed the country was surrounded by jealous enemies, and the clamor
for war reached deafening proportions. On April 21, 1792, King Louis XVI responded to
the popular will by issuing, with the unanimous consent o f the assembly, a declaration of
war against Austria. Louis XVI hoped to avoid war with the German states, but Prussia
honored its treaty with Emperor Francis II of Austria. The Comte de Rochambeau, who
had been in overall command of French forces in North America during the American
Revolution, commanded the French invasion of the Austrian Netherlands. Rochambeau’s
initial campaign went poorly, but French armies proved victorious at Valmy in
September against the Prussians under Duke o f Brunswick. The engagement was largely
confined to a long, drawn-out artillery duel in which the advantages possessed by the
disciplined Prussian army regulars over the French citizen-soldiers were neutralized.
Goethe, who witnessed the historic battle, concluded that a new era of world history
began when the eminent Prussian army retreated in defeat. The National Assembly
agreed. Emboldened by victory, France declared w ar against Great Britain and the
Netherlands in February 1793, and against Spain the following month. By summer,
the United States, II, 1176; and Bruchey, Robert Oliver, 74-76. For the United States as a whole,
the low-point for both imports from and exports to England came in 1786. Imports increased
from £1.4 million in 1786 to more than £4 million in 1791, while exports increased from
£743,000 in 1786 to more than £1 million in 1791.
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France was at war with every major European country except Russia.72
The expansion o f the war in Europe was good news for American prospects in the
Atlantic trade. The French National Convention realized that the commerce of the
French Empire would be immediately imperiled by the war with Great Britain, and in
February 1793, the Convention reversed the arrets o f the 1780s. All French ports in the
West Indies, the East Indies, and the Mascarene Islands were thereby opened to
American ships. Although the British Parliament did not take similar action, colonial
governors in the British West Indies issued special concessions to American ships on an
almost continual basis after 1793, effectively nullifying the Orders in Council of the
1780s. The one remaining threat to American trade was seizure by French and British
warships, because both imperial powers adopted measures to interdict against neutral
vessels carrying goods destined for the ports of the other empire. On May 9, the National
Convention authorized the seizure of neutrals carrying provisions to any British port.
The decree violated the terms of France’s 1778 treaty with the United States, however,
and the Convention decided to issue an exemption on May 23 for American ships. The
exemption was repealed on May 28, re-instated on July 1, and repealed for the second
and last time on July 27. Thereafter, American ships bound for British ports were liable
to seizure under French law. The British Parliament was not similarly plagued by
indecision. Orders in Council of June 8 and November 6, 1793 authorized the seizure of
all neutral ships carrying provisions to France, and the seizure o f any neutral ship
carrying goods from a French colony. In the months that followed, the Royal Navy
seized 600 ships, including 250 American vessels, of which 150 were condemned by
72 Owen Connelly, French Revolution, Napoleonic Era (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
1979), 96-101, 114-18, 124-26, 131.
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British Vice Admiralty Courts. The foul treatment of American ships earned censure
from the U.S. government, and on January 8, 1794, the Orders in Council were revised to
allow only for the seizure of neutral ships carrying goods from the French West Indies
directly to Europe, or carrying French property from the French colonies to any port.
American property carried in American ships to French ports were no longer liable to
seizure.73
When the British revised the Orders in Council in 1794, the decision created the
opportunity for American merchants to engage in a re-export trade using the concept of a
“broken voyage.” When a vessel arrived from the West Indies, merchants attempted to
sell as much o f the cargo in America. When the market for the product in America
became exhausted, the produce could then be legally re-exported to Europe as American,
rather than French property. This enabled merchants to circumvent both the British and
French restrictions on neutral vessels, and allowed American trade to grow immensely.
Chief among American re-exports were sugar and coffee, the two most important cash
crops in the W est Indies. After 1783, coffee exports from the West Indies had rocketed,
with Santo Domingo accounting for half of all French coffee imports by the end of the
decade. By the latter 1780s, the trade encompassed colonies throughout the western
hemisphere, including Brazil, Venezuela, and Curasao, a small Dutch possession off the
South American coast. Yet Americans were slow to realize the opportunities presented
by the thriving coffee trade, importing only 4 million pounds in 1791. This situation
changed with the opening of the re-export market.74

73 Anna Clauder, American Commerce As Affected by the Wars o f the French Revolution and
Napoleon, 1793-1812 (Clifton, NJ: Augustus M. Kelley, 1972), 9, 11, 27-34.
74 Fernand Braudel, The Structures o f Everyday Life: The Limits o f the Possible, trans. Sian
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With coffee prices high and profits at least 30 to 40 percent greater than on sugar,
merchants seized on the trend with a furor. American coffee imports escalated to 34
million pounds in 1793, and 61 million pounds in 1796, an amount that exceeded the
gross weight of sugar imported that year. Although the legal concept of a “broken
voyage” dictated that a reasonable period of time needed to elapse before American
merchants could lawfully re-export products to Europe, coffee prices in Europe, rather
than the letter of the law, usually dictated the timing for re-export. A period of four to six
months would often pass before a merchant decided to load unsold cargo onto a ship for
an Atlantic crossing. Most o f this product was re-exported to Europe, but the United
States also provided a burgeoning market. Thanks in large part to the coffee and sugar
trade from the West Indies, the value of re-exports from the United States surged from
less than $1 million in 1791 to $26 million in 1796.75
Direct exports also remained important for American trade, and particularly for
Baltimore. With most of the continent at war, demand for American wheat, flour, and
Reynolds (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1992), 256-60, and Historical Statistics o f
the United States, n, 902. Coffee beans fust reached European markets from Arabia around 1615
and became a sensation in France during the 1670s. Coffee remained largely unknown to
colonial British Americans until planters introduced the coffee shrub to the West Indies during
the 1720s. Production began first on the islands of Cayenne, Santo Domingo, Martinique, and
Jamaica, and coffeehouses soon began appearing in the mainland British colonies by mid-century.
Merchants found the new establishments convenient places to exchange valuable commercial
information, adding to the growing trade in the bean. Yet the popularity of coffee in the British
American colonies can be easily overstated; tea remained the preferred beverage through the
Revolutionary period.
75 Historical Statistics o f the United States, II, 886, 902, and Bruchey, Robert Oliver, 237-38.
The relative profitability of coffee and sugar imports are difficult to determine because of a lack
of sources. However, there is some anecdotal evidence. In June 1797, Robert Oliver expected to
make a profit of $23,662 if his ship Harmony carried only sugar, and a profit of $33,600 if the
ship carried an equal amount of only coffee. He anticipated paying three to four cents a pound
for the sugar, and eight to nine cents a pound for coffee, however, which suggests that the actual
market price for coffee may have been 75 to 125 percent greater than for sugar. Oliver decided to
import sugar anyway, and was disappointed with the results. See Bruchey, Robert Oliver, 178-
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com increased once again. Yet the conflict also made it increasingly difficult to
provision the European markets or the British and French W est Indies. Flour exports
from Baltimore to Europe fell from 115,000 barrels in 1793 to just 23,000 barrels in
1796, and flour exports from Baltimore to the British and French W est Indies declined
from 109,000 barrels in 1792 to 79,000 barrels in 1796. Although flour exports to the
Dutch, Danish, Spanish and Swedish islands doubled from 15,000 to 31,000 barrels
between 1792 and 1796, the increased supply to these islands was not enough to make up
for the shortfall. Overall flour exports from Baltimore declined from 220,000 barrels in
1793 to just 133,000 in 1796. Yet the decline in the volume of exports was not
detrimental to the city’s commerce. With short harvests in France and the American
trade impeded, Europe faced food scarcities. As seen in Figure 3-2, commodity prices
appreciated for the first time since the end of the Revolutionary War. In Maryland, the
price of com rose from 36'/2 cents to 80 cents per bushel between 1791 and 1796, and the
price of wheat rose from 80 cents to $1.60 per bushel over the same period. American
wholesale prices doubled on farm produce, and increased by more than 50 percent for all
goods. As seen in Figure 3-3, the number of barrels of flour exported from Baltimore
declined, but the inflation in prices allowed the value of city’s flour trade to surpass $1
million in 1792, and reach almost $1.7 million in 1796. For the United States as a whole,
the value of direct exports increased from $19 million to $32 million between 1791 and
1796.76

79.
76 Donald Adams, Jr., “Prices and Wages in Maryland, 1750-1850,” Journal o f Economic History,
46 (1986): 644; Gilbert, Baltimore's Flour Trade to the Caribbean, 127; and Historical Statistics
o f the United States, I, 202, 205, and II. 886.
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Figure 3-2

Mid-Atlantic Grain Prices, 1784-1796
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Economic History, 46 (1986): 644.
Note: Missing data on wheat prices was extrapolated using George Warren and Frank
Pearson's wholesale price index and Anne Bezanson's wholesale price index in U.S.
Department o f Commerce, Bureau o f the Census, Historical Statistics o f the United
States: Colonial Times to 1970 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1972), I, 202, 205.
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Figure 3-3

Value of Flour Exported from Baltimore, 1783-1796
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Source: Geoffrey Gilbert, Baltimore's Flour Trade to the Caribbean, 1750-1815 (New
York: Garland Publishing, 1986), 127.
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The Wars of the French Revolution also enabled American merchants to recapture
the nation’s carrying trade. In 1791, Lord Hawkesbury of Britain’s Committee of Trade
issued a report stating that by the late 1780s, 75 percent of the foreign clearances from
Charleston, 80 percent of the foreign entrances to Philadelphia, 98 percent of the foreign
tonnage in New York, including 40 percent of all the tonnage for the port, was carried in
British bottoms. Indeed, foreign ships accounted for approximately 40 percent of all the
tonnage in the American trade. By 1796, however, the tonnage for American ships
nearly doubled to 700,000, while the tonnage for foreign ships plummeted from more
than 300,000 to less than 50,000. Thanks to the increased demand for American produce
in Europe, rising prices on grain and almost every other commodity, and increased
American control over the carrying trade, overall U.S. exports, including direct exports
and re-exports, more than tripled between 1791 and 1796 from $19 million to $59
million.77
The wartime boom was good news for Baltimore merchant Robert Oliver, who
prospered like never before. Opportunities were so great that his firm actually refused to
engage in the commission business, sinking all available time, capital, and energy into the
export trade. The decision paid off. Between mid-1793 and January 28, 1795, Oliver
and Thompson realized profits of £111,898, allowing Oliver to increase his capital in the
firm from £8,741 to over £67,000. Even when the firm faced problems they made

77 Ritcheson, Aftermath o f Revolution, 31-32; Clauder, American Commerce, 25; and Historical
Statistics o f the United States, II, 886. Douglass North’s estimates for exports during this period
were higher than those of the Department of Commerce. North states that re-exports amounted to
$500,000 in 1791 and increased to $26 million by 1796, while direct exports expanded from
$I8!6 million in 1791 to $41 million in 1796. Thus total exports more than tripled between 1791
and 1796, from $19 million to $67 million. See Douglass North, The Economic Growth o f the
United States, 1790-1860 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1966), 221.
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money. On January 28, 1795, Oliver reported losses of £32,000 on goods seized by the
British, and this number swelled to £60,000 by 1799. However, these were book losses.
Once a cargo was condemned, the British sold off the goods at what Oliver considered
below market price, though usually not at prices below cost. Oliver’s accounts for
January 28, 1795 thus showed net revenues on his seized cargoes amounting to £17,000.
Furthermore, Oliver eventually received the market price for most of his seized goods
when British courts began reversing the decisions of the Vice Admiralty courts. In one
case o f the brig Bacchus, the firm actually received compensation in excess of the
claimed losses of £8,000. The court found in favor of Oliver and Thompson, and
awarded them £5,881 in addition to the £2,125 they had already been paid— a total
compensation of £8,006. Oliver observed that “instead of plundering us,’’ the British had
ultimately plundered “their own nation.”78
With the export trade booming, the neomercantilist assumptions that had guided
American thinking about the nation’s economy were preserved. There was little reason
to invest in anything other than overseas trade, and thus most of the major schemes
unhatched in the mid-1780s to improve inland transportation languished during the 1790s
for lack o f capital. After completing just 15 miles of the canal between the Schuykill and
Susquehanna Rivers at a cost of $440,000, work was suspended on the project in 1795.
The construction turnpike between Philadelphia and Lancaster was completed by 1794,
but this transportation improvement fell short of reaching the Susquehanna River and
western Pennsylvania beyond. In Maryland and Virginia, land speculation along the

78 Robert Oliver to Timothy Pickering, April 29, 1799, quoted in Bruchey, Robert Oliver, 91. For
Oliver and Thompson’s success in the export trade in the mid-1790s, see Bruchey, Robert Oliver,
80-96.
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Potomac and unpaid stock subscriptions helped delay improvements on the Potomac
river. By the turn o f the century, the Potomac company had not opened its first locks,
and work on the canal linking the Chesapeake to the Susquehanna River had not even
commenced.79 As long as commerce continued to flourish, the neomercantilist mentalite
could continue indefinitely. The full implementation of Adam Smith’s theories of
political economy would have to wait.

79 Shaw, Canals fo r a Nation, 4-9. The Potomac Company opened its first lock in 1802, and
work on the Chesapeake-Susquehanna canal finally began in 1801.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE PERSISTENCE OF TRADITIONAL SOCIETY

No one in the republic planned to welcome the new Federal Constitution in a
more stately fashion than Captain Joshua Barney. The Revolutionary war hero proposed
the construction of a miniature ship to lead a parade through the city’s streets to mark
Maryland’s ratification of the new national plan of government. Baltimore’s shipwrights
leapt on the idea and built the Federalist, a fifteen-foot-long, fully-rigged ship mounted
on four wheels and drawn by four horses. Barney became the unofficial grand marshal of
Baltimore’s celebration, commanding the Federalist and its crew, which consisted of the
city’s leading ship captains. To the delight of the crowd, which reportedly numbered four
thousand, Barney and his crew went through the motions of sailing the miniature ship as
it was drawn through the city’s streets. The procession passed through Fells Point to Old
Town, then across Jones Falls into Baltimore Town. Barney Finally dropped anchor on
the high banks southwest o f the Basin—a place that Baltimoreans have known ever since
as Federal Hill in honor of the constitutional fete. A bonfire and fireworks followed the
parade, and the celebration was capped off by the launching o f the Federalist into the
harbor. Barney navigated the miniature vessel down the Patapsco to the Chesapeake
Bay, then up the Potomac River to Mount Vernon, where he presented the ship on behalf
of the proud citizens o f Baltimore to George Washington, the presumptive first President
of the United States. Washington was greatly pleased by the gesture, calling the vessel a
“beautiful curiosity,” and expressing the hope that M aryland’s actions would not “be
without its due efficacy on the minds of their neighbors.” The celebrated event indeed
caught the imagination o f others around the republic. W hen New York ratified the
183
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constitution in July, New Yorkers copied Baltimore’s pageantry by building their own
miniature ship and parading it down Broadway.1
Although the Federalist was the most spectacular part o f the Baltimore parade,
other aspects o f the celebration revealed more about the social and economic structure of
Baltimore at the end of the 1780s. Trailing behind Barney’s miniature ship were the
city’s artisans, organized by occupation. They carried banners representing their
individual trades and trumpeting their support for the new federal constitution. The
theatrical display recalled a well-worn custom of traditional society. Throughout the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, British artisans emblazoned the symbols of their
trades onto furniture, buildings, and clothing, and carried banners with those symbols
during civic festivities like the annual procession on the Lord M ayor’s Day in London.
In the colonies though, artisans sought to reproduce the metropolitan standards set by
their London counterparts, but the craft trades were never sufficiently organized to
produce a spectacle like the procession on the Lord M ayor’s Day.2 Thus the banners
streaming through Baltimore’s streets in 1788 represented a powerful symbol of how
many of the institutions and rhythms of colonial life had passed through the Revolution

1John Thomas Scharf, The Chronicles o f Baltimore; Being a Complete History o f “Baltimore
Town” and Baltimore City from the Earliest Period to the Present Time (Baltimore: Turnbull
Brothers, 1874), 249-50, and George Washington to William Smith and others, of Baltimore,
June 8, 1788, quoted in Scharf, The Chronicles o f Baltimore, 250-51. In familiar fashion for New
York, its ship, the Hamilton, was larger than Baltimore’s miniature. An exact copy of a 32-gun
frigate, it was twenty-seven feet long, fully rigged, and drawn by ten horses.
2 Howard Rock, “‘All Her Sons Join as One Social Band’: New York City’s Artisanal Societies in
the Early Republic,” American Artisans: Crafting Social Identity, 1750-1850, ed. Howard Rock,
Paul Gilje, and Robert Asher (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 156-60.
For the origins and development of artisanal participation in civic festivities in London, see also
William Kahl, The Development o f the London Livery Companies (Cambridge, MA: Baker
Library, 1960), and George Unwin, Gilds and Companies o f London (London: Methuen & Co.,
1908).
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unscathed. Instead of moving away from the English standard in the wake o f the
Revolution, American artisans had actually edged closer to it. Despite the attack on the
symbolic familial authority of the King over the colonies, the actual familial authority of
artisans over workers remained very firmly intact. The persistence of traditional society
was apparent elsewhere too, in the continued dominance o f husbands over wives and
slaveholders over the enslaved.
In an age of republicanism, the continuation of traditional patterns o f social and
economic control is quite surprising. The Revolutionary generation condemned
economic dependence, denounced social deference, and censured arbitrary power, yet it
was these three core values that sustained apprenticeship, patriarchy, and slavery. Instead
of abolishing them, the Revolutionary generation defended apprenticeship, slavery and
patriarchy, and in some ways even strengthened them after the Revolution. The
persistence o f these traditional institutions represents the most profound contradiction of
post-Revolutionary America. Having reached a consensus that “all men are created
equal, and that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights,” the
Founding Fathers then refused to recognize the universality of these universal principles.
The central features of American life remained at odds with the primary ideological
precepts of the American Revolution— a hypocrisy which was not lost upon apprentices,
women, or the enslaved.3

3 The literature on the radicalization of apprentices, women, and the enslaved during the
Revolutionary period is vast. See especially W. J. Rorabaugh, “ T Thought I Should Liberate
Myself from the Thraldom of Others’: Apprentices, Masters, and the Revolution,” in Beyond the
American Revolution: Explorations in the History o f American Radicalism, ed. Alfred Young
(DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 1993), 185-217; Mary Beth Norton. Liberty’s
Daughters: The Revolutionary Experience o f American Women, 1750-1800 (Boston: Little,
Brown, & Co., 1980); Linda Kerber, Women o f the Republic: Intellect and Ideology in
Revolutionary America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980); Sylvia Frey,
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To justify oppression in its many forms, distinctions had to be drawn between
people to account for the exclusion of some part of the public from full participation in
the polity. In this charged political environment, those who defended the continuation of
apprenticeship, patriarchy, and slavery invoked spiritual, intellectual, cultural, and even
biological arguments to rationalize the institutions. One of the most persuasive
arguments, however, was a fundamentally economic one that revealed the degree to
which the traditional social order relied on the persistence of the household economy. In
1801, a frustrated husband and father, writing under the name Hyperion, provided the
essence of this argument in a letter to the Mercury and New-England Palladium. He
complained “nothing was more dangerous to the rights of man,” than when the rights of
women and children “took possession in the home department.”4 The vitality of society
rested on the mutual acceptance of universal obligations and duties within the household,
not the extension of universal rights to all people. When apprentices, wives, or the
enslaved refused to recognize their prescribed responsibilities within the household, all
suffered. Hyperion’s defense of the traditional social structure drew a sharp distinction
between the rights of property owning free white men and those o f all others. As

Waterfrom the Rock: Black Resistance in a Revolutionary Age (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1991); and Gerald Mullin, Flight and Rebellion: Slave Resistance in Eighteenth-Century
Virginia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972).
* “Hyperion,” Mercury and New-England Palladium, August 18, 1801, quoted in Rosemarie
Zagarri, ‘The Rights of Man and Woman in Post-Revolutionary America,” The William and
Mary Quarterly, 3d ser., 55 (1998): 219. The literature on the limits of Revolutionary ideology is
extensive. In addition to Zagarri, see especially Christopher Tomlins, Law, Labor, and Ideology
in the Early American Republic (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 223-97; Joan
Hoff Wilson, ‘The Illusion of Change: Women and the American Revolution,” in The American
Revolution: Explorations in the History o f American Radicalism, 383-445; and Elaine Forman
Crane, “Dependence in the Era of Independence: The Role of Women in a Republican Society,”
in The American Revolution: Its Character and Limits, ed. Jack Greene (New York: New York
University Press, 1987), 253-75.
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historian Rosemarie Zagarri has argued, white men used this distinction “to expand their
political rights and challenge social privilege,” while at the same time, “legitimate current
social arrangements.”5 Contemporary critics found this argument difficult to overcome.
Even Mary Wollstonecraft, who favored a revolution in female manners to expand the
economic opportunities of single women and widows, ultimately retreated into the
sanctity of the household economy regarding the education of wives and mothers.
According to Wollstonecraft, better education for women would produce better
companions for men and better nurturers for children, not a new class of female
professionals.
The strength of the household economy was thus an important key, and perhaps
the most important key to the persistence of traditional society, and three legacies of the
colonial and Revolutionary periods helped sustain and strengthen the household economy
in the early republic. First, few artisans faced the extreme financial hardships endured by
many of the city’s merchants and shopkeepers during the Confederation. Many
discovered that their workshops were somewhat insulated from the commercial troubles
of the 1780s. Industries that had benefited the most from the wartime economy were
forced to make peacetime adjustments, but political independence created unexpected
economic opportunities for much of the artisan community. During the colonial period,
British mercantilist policies dictated what Americans could and could not produce, based
upon the needs of the British Empire rather than economic potential of the colonies.
After the break with Great Britain, artisans were free to produce a broad range of articles
previously forbidden under British law. Although indebtedness to British merchants and

5 Zagarri, “The Rights of Man and Woman,” 223.
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the decline in consumer spending in the mid-1780s were certainly problems, freedom
from Britain’s imperial mandates enabled many artisans to weather the hard times of the
1780s, and then prosper as never before during the 1790s.
A second legacy of the Revolution was the rise of organized political activity
among artisans. During the 1760s and 1770s, resistance to British authority helped
galvanize the artisan community to become more politically active. In the years
following the Revolution, trade associations, much like those organized by artisans across
the Atlantic, emerged throughout America. During the 1780s, these associations enabled
artisans to pursue a range of political and economic objectives, all of which were
designed to strengthen the household economy and the traditional social order. The
activities of these associations proved especially important in stabilizing the household
economy for those industries facing economic hardship during the Confederation. By the
1790s, trade associations enabled artisans to form a powerful political interest within
Baltimore that played a significant role in shaping the city’s political future.
The emergence o f a strong, independent artisan faction could have upset the
neomercantilist balance between the maritime and household economies. However, a
third legacy of the Revolution was that artisans and merchants had worked together to
overthrow British rule. In the wake of the war, merchants and artisans shared the same
neomercantilist outlook. The two groups tussled over many political issues during the
1780s and 1790s, and at times the quarrels between them were quite embittered. Yet
most o f the debates were over details and not direction. Both groups had a vested interest
in maintaining the prevailing social and economic order. Although tedious at times, the
coalition of interests between merchants and artisans continued in the post-war years,
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helping prop up the traditional social order.

T h e P o s t -W a r H o u s e h o l d E c o n o m y

As much as any other occupational group within the city, artisans benefited from
the infusion o f foreign specie into the port during the war, and the subsequent buying
spree which immediately followed the cessation of hostilities. Business revived, and
many laborers who would have normally joined the ranks of the privateers decided to
remain within the city to take advantage of high wages. Despite the euphoria, however,
industries which profited from the wartime economy still confronted the problem of post
war readjustment. The shipbuilding trades were among those affected. The formal
adoption o f the Treaty of Paris ended legal privateering, and neither the Congress nor
Maryland’s new state government were prepared to subsidize naval establishments during
peacetime. Robert Morris, Congress’s Agent of Marine, decided to sell all the remaining
ships in the Continental navy except the 32-gun frigate Alliance, the fleet’s only copperbottomed vessel. Some members in Congress hoped to retain the ship as a reminder of
the navy’s role in securing the nation’s independence. When hard times struck the
republic, however, the vessel’s fate was sealed. On August 1, 178S, the Alliance was
auctioned off for $26,000 at Merchants’ Coffee House in Philadelphia, ending the federal
government’s support for the naval establishment.6 With the loss of these two sources of
revenue, the demand for new ship construction collapsed and shipwrights could no longer
expect to make the enormous profits possible during wartime.

6 Nathan Miller, Sea o f Glory: A Naval History o f the American Revolution (Annapolis: Naval
Institute Press, 1974), 521, and Richard Buel, In Irons: Britain’s Naval Supremacy and the
American Revolutionary Economy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 94.
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Shipbuilding continued to decline in the 1780s thanks to the revival of European
mercantilist restrictions on trade, but the city’s shipyards did not close down. As long as
traffic continued to enter and clear from the port, there were ships in need of repair and
refit. Thanks to the growing importance of the coastal trade as well as ventures like
Bentalou’s and Dumeste’s the Indian Ocean and beyond, the total number of entrances to
and clearances from Baltimore continued to climb throughout the decade. The city’s
shipyards were therefore never at a loss for business. David Stodder, a shipbuilder who
had removed from Virginia to Baltimore during the Revolution, was the most adept at
shifting the focus of his yard from construction to maintenance of the existing merchant
marine, and his yard expanded enormously during the Confederation years.7 To the
city's carpenters, caulkers, riggers, sailmakers, and ropemakers working on Baltimore’s
docks and wharves, it did not matter if the ships entering the port were of foreign registry,
or if their voyages had been profitable for the owners. As long as ships sailed into port in
need of service, these workers enjoyed steady employment. Not every shipwright had the
foresight to make the change, enough did so that the shipbuilding trades as a whole were
not injured by the reversals of fortune in the Atlantic trade. The disparity between
mercantile and artisanal prospects was not lost on the city’s merchants. George Johonnot
bristled at the wages earned by the city’s ship carpenters. He complained that Baltimore
could not boast of a single talented ship carpenter, all “those here [being] mere botchers,”

7 Rhoda Dorsey, “The Pattern of Baltimore Commerce during the Confederation Period,”
Maryland Historical Magazine, 62 (1967): 119-34. To the extent that household size and the
number of enslaved workers is an indication of economic expansion, Stodder’s yard nearly
tripled. In 1783, his household consisted of 19 individuals, including 12 enslaved workers. By
1790, his household numbered 52, including 25 enslaved workers. See Tina Sheller, “Artisans
and the Evolution of Baltimore Town, 1765-1790” (Ph.D., University of Maryland, College Park,
1990), 224-25.
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and he marveled at how those producing such poor quality work nevertheless earned
“such wages as raises their fortunes in a few years.” Henry Johnson, Johonnot’s partner,
concluded that the ship carpenters were “so extravagant in their demands” that the high
cost of labor made it “impossible for them [shipwrights] to attempt to build” new ships.
Although their analysis o f the lack of new ship construction may have been faulty,
Johnson’s and Johonnot’s observations do reveal the prosperous circumstances of those
working on the wharves and docks during the Confederation.8
Artisans engaged in the preparation of commodities for export also prospered
during the 1780s thanks to the neomercantilist reliance on trade. As long as merchants
kept sinking capital into foreign commerce, whether or not the voyages proved profitable,
wheat had to be milled into flour, flour had to be packed into barrels, and barrels had to
be carted to the docks. The need for these services meant steady employment for the
city’s millers, bakers, coopers, and carters. Other trades also overcame the problems of
post-war readjustment. The expansion of British textile and iron production in the last
two decades o f the eighteenth century effectively eliminated the nascent American
industries that had developed during the war. Like the shipbuilding trades, however, the
textile trades were able to expand and prosper by shifting the focus of the industry from
production to service. Baltimore had few cloth producers, but the city supported a
growing population of hatters, seamstresses, and tailors. Hatters reaped an additional
economic advantage from political independence because they were no longer bound by

8 George Johonnot to Noah Parker, May 29, 1784, and Johnson, Johonnot, and Co. [Henry
Johnson] to Noah Parker, February 21, 1784, both in Johnson, Johonnot, and Co. Letterbook,
MS.499, MHS.
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the terms o f Britain’s 1732 Hat Act.9
In the metal forging trades, capital also shifted from a production-oriented to a
more service-oriented economy. The eclipse of the 1750 Iron Act hurt American
production o f pig iron because the commodity was no longer admitted duty-free in
London.10 In the 1780s, Maryland’s iron production declined to just 33 percent of its pre
war levels. Only two o f Baltimore’s five ironworks in operation in 1776 were still in
business by 1786, and o f these, Charles Carroll’s Baltimore Company Ironworks had
ceased its operations. The iron-rich deposits in the area of the Patapsco went largely
untapped, and thus it is accurate to conclude that the Revolution retarded the domestic
iron industry in terms of the production of pig iron and steel. Yet the city’s blacksmiths,
nailmakers, and tinsmiths prospered during the Confederation as production of basic
tools, nails, and tinware increased. By 1789, Christopher and Robert Johnston, Andrew
Van Bibber, Richardson Stuart, Adam Fonerden, and John Dorsey had invested in four
new nail manufactories located either in Baltimore or in the city’s immediate area.11
If the commercial frustrations of the 1780s had persisted, artisans would have
eventually faced declining fortunes along with the merchants. As long as Baltimore
remained primarily an entrepot, the household economy would have been irreparably hurt
in the long-term by the stagnation of the maritime economy. Yet commerce did revive by
the late 1780s, and with the onset of the Wars of the French Revolution in the 1790s,
Baltimore’s artisans grew in both numbers and wealth. Even industries like construction

9 5 George Q c.22 in Statutes o f the Realm. See the discussion in chapter one.
10 23 George II c.29 in Statutes o f the Realm. See the discussion in chapter one.
11 Shelter, “Artisans and the Evolution of Baltimore Town,” 228-39.
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that were fully depressed experienced an economic revival. After the post-war building
frenzy collapsed in 1785, brickmakers, carpenters, joiners, plasterers, and painters
struggled through the middle part of the decade. By the late 1780s, however, these
artisans witnessed a renewed building boom needed to accommodate the city’s surging
population. In the 1790s, Baltimore’s population nearly doubled from 13,503 to 26,514.
The city’s average annual increase of 1,301 people was almost twice the city’s rate of
population growth during the previous decade, and was greater than either Boston’s or
Philadelphia’s rate of growth during the 1790s. New York C ity’s rate of population
growth surpassed Baltimore in absolute terms, but not in percentage terms.12
To accommodate the swelling population, builders and landowners favored
construction of brick rowhouses, and it was during the late 1780s and early 1790s that
brick rowhouses with washed, white marble steps began to dominate Baltimore’s
residential neighborhoods. Although a common feature in most other Atlantic coast
cities, the rowhouse became a particular symbol of Baltimore’s growth, and the white
marble steps became a cultural trademark of the city well into the twentieth century.
Builders preferred rowhouses because they were less costly to build. Landowners
favored rowhouses because it maximized the number of people who had to pay them
ground rents.13 As early as 1793, James Kent, a New Yorker visiting Baltimore,
commented that the city “is built chiefly of brick. Its Houses are 3-story—join[ed]
12First Census of the United States: Population, Maryland, 1790 (hereafter referred to 1790
Maryland Census), and Second Census of the United States: Population, Maryland, 1800
(hereafter referred to 1800 Maryland Census), both at National Archives.
13The collection of ground rents was an old English custom, and thus another hold-over of
traditional society. When landowners sold off a rowhouse for a profit, they still retained the
rights to the ground on which the structure was located. This entitled them to a small, but regular,
annual rent. See Robert Alexander, “Baltimore Row Houses of the Early Nineteenth Century,”
American Studies, 16 (1975): 68.
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together—are wide, & the Town appears to be better and more handsomely built than
Philadelphia.” The 1798 Direct Tax validated Kent’s observations, showing that 64
percent o f the buildings in the downtown area o f the city were brick, and most of them
were rowhouses. O f the 3,508 buildings assessed throughout the city, including 653
outbuildings, almost half were made of brick. The enormous increase in the number of
buildings was matched only by swelling numbers of those engaged in the construction
trades. The 1800 city directory listed 235 carpenters, the largest artisanal occupational
group in the city, including 52 people who identified themselves specifically as house
carpenters. The city also supported 15 brickmakers, more than 60 painters, plasterers,
and joiners, as well as hundreds of day laborers and bricklayers not listed in the city
directory.14
The luxury trades also benefited from the booming, commerce-driven economy of
the 1790s. During the Confederation, the number of Baltimore artisans employed in
luxury trades had grown only slightly. These artisans had survived by catering to a broad
range of services instead of specializing in one craft. Goldsmiths doubled as jewelers,
and welcomed work in silver, copper, and, at times, even brass. The city was simply not
yet able to support a large group of luxury craftsmen. After the revival of overseas trade,
the boom times o f the 1790s created many new opportunities. By 1798, more than two
dozen Baltimoreans owned at least $10,000 in property, and more than one-hundred
owned at least $2,000 in property. This nascent class of wealthy, urban elites sustained
14James Kent, “A New Yorker in Maryland: 1793 and 1821,” Maryland Historical Magazine, 47
(1952): 139; Richard Bernard, “A Portrait of Baltimore in 1800: Economic and Occupational
Patterns in an Early American City,” Maryland Historical Magazine, 69 (1974): 345-47; Federal
Direct Tax of 1798, Baltimore City, MS.806, MHS (hereafter referred to 1798 Baltimore Federal
Direct Tax); and The New Baltimore Directory and Annual Register; fo r 1800 and 1801
(Baltimore: Warner and Hanna, 1800), hereafter referred to as 1800 Baltimore City Directory.
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the growing number of specialized artisans in the luxury trades. By the end of the
century, Baltimore had a piano forte maker, 2 picture frame makers, 4 engravers,
including one who specialized in glass engraving, 4 confectioners, 4 jewelers, 5
upholsterers, 7 goldsmiths, 11 silversmiths, 10 china and glassware shops, 14 booksellers
and stationers, 24 watch and clockmakers, 34 cabinet makers, and 15 chair makers,
including one who specialized in making Windsor chairs.15
Those in the shipbuilding trades benefited most from the revival of Atlantic trade.
With American ships carrying a greater percentage of the Atlantic trade, the demand for
new ship construction rocketed in the United States and Baltimore’s shipbuilding
industry expanded enormously. The 1800 city directory recorded 5 shipbuilders, 3
shipwrights, 5 boat builders, and 41 ship carpenters. Several of the ship carpenters,
including William Parsons, Joseph Despeaux, and William Price, were really shipwrights
who operated their own yards. Thus Baltimore had more than a dozen active shipbuilders
by the turn o f the century, many of them enormously wealthy. David Stodder, William
Price, Dixon Brown, Joseph Biays, and Benjamin Baker were each in the top 10 percent
of the city’s property owners in 1798, while four other shipbuilders, Thomas Cole, John
Steele, Isaac Sutton, and Nathaniel Thompson, were in the top 20 percent. The prosperity
of the shipbuilders meant employment for other artisans and workers in the shipbuilding
trades, and the number of people employed within the industry swelled into the hundreds.
The 1800 city directory listed 16 sailmakers, 11 block and pump makers, 10 ship joiners,
9 ship chandlers, and 4 ropemakers, as well as dozens of riggers, caulkers, seamen,

15 1798 Baltimore Federal Direct Tax, and 1800 Baltimore City Directory.
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mariners, pilots, and sea captains.16
The economic vitality of the city’s workshops required artisans to invest heavily
in labor. Apprenticeship had been a cornerstone of the household economy, and
demographics encouraged artisans to continue investing in this institution; white boys
under the age o f sixteen comprised 40 percent of the city’s white male population in
1790, and thus represented the largest pool of potential workers for Baltimore’s
workshops. Not surprisingly, employers took advantage of the massive number of
potential laborers to work out apprentice contracts under informal circumstances.
Although small tears in the fabric of the old social order had appeared thanks to rifts
between artisans and workers over customary rights, these struggles would not have
brought about the collapse of the household economy. Decades could have passed before
such tussles significantly eroded the traditional household economy. Apprentices
ultimately had little reason to run away during the hard times o f the 1780s, and
delinquency was not a serious problem. What most interested M aryland lawmakers
regarding the apprentice system was the increasing lack of communal oversight and the
city’s growing number of displaced orphans becoming caught up in the system. It
appeared that the institution, which had never been well-organized in the colonial period,
was becoming unmanageable by the late 1780s. To preserve the stability of the
household economy, the Maryland Assembly took action to formalize apprenticeship.17
16 1800 Maryland Census; 1798 Baltimore Federal Direct Tax; and 1800 Baltimore City
Directory.
17 1790 Maryland Census. The first census differentiated between free white males sixteen years
and over, free white males under sixteen years old, free white females, all other free persons, and
slaves. Thus a percentage of the total population below the age of sixteen is impossible to
determine. For a different perspective on why Maryland chose to reform its apprentice laws, see
Rorabaugh, ‘“ I Thought I Should Liberate Myself from the Thraldom of Others’,” 202-04.
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Instead of adopting a revolutionary approach to controlling labor and wages, the
Assembly followed legal precedents stretching back to Elizabethan England. Maryland’s
new law streamlined the system, but its specific measures, which took effect in 1794,
upheld customary practices in defense of the traditional social order. Masters were
required to register apprentices in the Baltimore County Orphans Court; failure to do so
resulted in a £3 fine. The law also empowered city officials to submit homeless orphans
to the supervision of the Orphans Court, and four times a year, the court apprenticed
these children to interested families. Once bound to a household, apprentices had to
remain single, celibate, pious, dutiful to their masters, and respectful of private property.
Masters provided the traditional requisites for apprentices, including food, shelter,
spiritual guidance, and occupational instruction, as well as specified “freedom dues”
owed at the end o f the contract period. The law did not require, as did others around the
republic, that masters teach their apprentices how to read and write. The new system
worked in very much the way it was intended during the mid-1790s. On average, the
Court bound out approximately 150 apprentices per year, mostly to artisans. Although
the construction and textile trades and the shoemakers accounted for the largest shares of
apprentices, every handicraft trade invested in apprenticed labor.18
Artisans also substantially increased the number o f enslaved and free African
American laborers in the city’s workshops during the 1780s and 1790s. The city’s
enslaved population jum ped from a few dozen at the beginning o f the Revolution to

18 “An Act for the better regulation of apprentices,” November 1793 session, in William Kitty,
ed., Laws o f Maryland (Annapolis: Frederick Green, 1800), chapter 45; Jonathan R.T. Hughes,
Social Control in the Colonial Economy (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1976), 9698; and Charles Steffen, The Mechanics o f Baltimore: Workers and Politics in the Age o f
Revolution, 1763-1812 (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1984), 28-32.
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1,255 in 1790, and more than doubled again to 2,843 in 1800. The increase in the
number o f free African Americans was even more startling. Essentially a non-existent
community in 1776, there were just 323 free African Americans in Baltimore in 1790.
Over the course o f the following decade, however, the free African-American population
ballooned to 2,771. The overall number of African Americans within the city thus
increased by more than 5,000 after the Declaration of Independence, accounting for
approximately 25 percent of the city’s total population expansion. In percentage terms,
African Americans represented the fastest growing segment of the city. In 1776,
Baltimore was more than 90 percent white. By 1790, African Americans accounted for
almost 12 percent o f the population. By 1800, more than 21 percent o f Baltimore’s
population was African American, either free or enslaved. Merchants, shopkeepers, and
professionals all contributed substantially to the net increase in the num ber of enslaved
laborers, but enslaved workers also labored in artisan workshops too. Indeed, slavery
proved just as universal to the handicraft trades as apprenticeship. It is also likely that as
many as half of the city’s enslaved workers labored in the city’s workshops, because
many merchants and professionals acquired enslaved workers in order to hire them out to
the city’s handicraft producers.19
The extensive practice of delayed manumission, or term slavery, led to a massive
19 For the growth of the Free Black and enslaved population in Baltimore, see “Census of
Deptford Hundred, or Fell’s Point, 1776,” Maryland Historical Magazine, 25 (1930): 271-75;
Maryland Tax Lists, Baltimore Town, 1783, MHS; 1790 Maryland Census; and 1800 Maryland
Census. For the reasons why slaveholding expanded, see Shane White, Somewhat More
Independent: The End o f Slavery in New York City, 1770-1810 (Athens, GA: University Press of
Georgia, 1991), 144-45; T. Stephen Whitman, Ihe Price o f Freedom: Slavery and Manumission
in Baltimore and Early National Maryland (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1997), 1012; and Steffen, The Mechanics o f Baltimore, 36-40. For a different perspective on the reasons
for the increase in Baltimore’s enslaved population, see Christopher Phillips, Freedom's Port:
The African American Community o f Baltimore, 1790-1860 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press,
1997), 16-20.
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increase in the number of both enslaved and free African Americans in Baltimore during
the 1790s. When an enslaved person was sold, instead of being condemned at that point
to a lifetime of enslavement with a new master, an increasing percentage of such
transactions specified a set date for the enslaved person’s manumission. The delayed
manumission therefore provided a term of years in which the worker would remain
enslaved. The practice did not arise from humanitarian impulses for the abolition of
slavery, or economic concerns over the institution’s profitability. Unlike New York
City’s 1799 Gradual Manumission Law, term slavery was brought about by private
initiative rather than legislative action. It was not a strategy used by employers to lure
free laborers to the city, nor was it a sign that the supply of enslaved laborers exceeded
demand. For Baltimore’s slaveholders, delayed manumission was a tactic designed to
extend slavery’s viability within the urban economy. In a growing city, it was simply too
easy for enslaved workers to disappear into the throng of several thousand free African
Americans. The promise of manumission, even when delayed by several years, helped
reduce the risk of runaways. The limitation on the period of enslavement also reduced
the price to less than half the normal cost of acquiring a worker enslaved-for-life. This
reduced the capital necessary to acquire enslaved labor, and enabled the institution to
expand and prosper side-by-side the growing free African American community.20

20 New York’s 1799 Gradual Manumission Law specified that all children bom to enslaved
parents after July 4, 1799 would be enslaved until their middle twenties, and thereafter be free.
See White, Somewhat More Independent, 46-47. On the practice of delayed manumission and
term slavery, see Whitman, The Price o f Freedom, 12-24, 93-118; Christopher Phillips, “The
Roots of Quasi-Freedom: Manumission and Term Slavery in Early National Baltimore,” Southern
Studies, 4 (1993): 39-66; and Phillips, Freedom’s Port, 30-56. For the prevalence of runaways in
cities, see Richard Wade, Slavery in the Cities: The South, 1820-1860 (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1964), 214-25; Barbara Jeanne Fields, Slavery and Freedom on the Middle
Ground: Maryland During the Nineteenth Century (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985),
40-62; and Phillips, Freedom’s Port, 66-70.
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Beyond the expansion of slavery and apprenticeship in the city’s workshops,
households also continued to rely on traditional structures of order, in this case the
gendered division of labor. When Hyperion wrote to the New England Palladium, his
primary concern was not directed towards the city’s workshops, but the “home
department.” The language here is telling— Hyperion clearly believed that without
patriarchy, the household economy could not be sustained. Households were not separate
from workshops, and in the years after the Revolution the vitality o f the artisanal
economy provided a powerful reinforcement to many of the existing gender divisions.
Patriarchy did not disappear with the Declaration of Independence, and the Revolution
brought about only subtle alterations in its practice. Parents continued to cajole their
children into proper marital choices, but there was an unmistakably greater degree of
latitude extended even to daughters in the selection of spouses. Matrimony continued to
be a hierarchical model enshrining male dominance and female subordination, but many
couples nevertheless embraced a heightened sense o f reciprocity in the marriage.21
Most important of all were the changes in child-rearing practices. The
Revolutionary generation believed that a successful republic required virtuous citizens.
Benjamin Rush, who at times seemed as naturally predisposed to heroic language as he
was to “heroic medicine,” proclaimed that “Virtue [and] Virtue alone” could preserve the
republic. Yet even before the cannons had ceased roaring, many republicans believed
that Americans’ sense of virtue was quickly eroding. As early as 1780, James Warren
observed that the public behavior o f Bostonians better resembled the “ridiculous manners
o f Asiatic society” than “the hardy and sober manners o f a New-England republic.” In

21 Norton, Liberty’s Daughters, 228-35.
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Virginia, Edmund Randolph brooded in the waning days of the war that Americans were
engaged in a mad rush to fritter away every sense of public virtue through their “hunger
and thirst after cheese and porter.” He feared that “in the opinion of those people” across
the Atlantic “have admired our self-denial,” the new republic’s reputation would be
irreparably tarnished.22 Immediate action was needed to restrain unhealthy and excessive
appetites, and in an attempt to save the republic from the people, many republican
theorists encouraged women to take a more active role in guarding and nurturing public
and private virtue. Mothers were thus encouraged to employ reason rather than parental
decree as a means o f advancing republican virtues in their children. Women were
believed better able to inculcate a sense of temperance, thrift, devotion to public service,
and patriotic fervor in their sons. Thus for the first time, mothers assumed a greater role
in the instruction o f older children, including boys. The idea of republican motherhood
was bom.23
The extension of the mother’s role in the instruction of children bolstered the idea
that men were not intellectually superior to women, and helped bring about the
advancement of female education in the young republic. For the daughters of the
Revolutionary generation, this provided the groundwork for greater inclusion in the polity

“ For Rush’s comment, see “Excerpts from the Papers of Dr. Benjamin Rush,” Pennsylvania
Magazine o f History and Biography, 29 (1905): 21. Warren quoted in Philip Greven, The
Protestant Temperament: Patterns o f Child-Rearing, Religious Experience, and the Self in Early
America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), 358. For Randolph’s comment, see
Edmund Randolph to James Madison, May 24, 1783, in The Papers o f James Madison, ed.
William Hutchinson and William Rachal (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962-), VII, 73.
23 Norton, Liberty’s Daughters, 235-38, 242-50; Kerber, Women o f the Republic, 11-12, 199-200;
Carroll Smith-Rosenberg, “Domesticating ‘Virtue’: Coquettes and Revolutionaries in Young
America,” in Literature and the Body, ed. Elaine Scarry (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1988), 160-84. For an alternative view see Rosemarie Zagarri, “Morals,
Manners, and the Republican Mother,” American Quarterly, 44 (1992): 192-215.
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in the long-term. Yet for the women of the Revolutionary generation itself, republican
motherhood actually reinforced existing gender divisions. Prior to the Revolution, the
greatest drain on a woman’s time was child rearing. The increase in maternal
responsibilities after the Revolution expanded the demands of child rearing even further,
and there were just as many children being bom after the Revolution as during the
colonial period. There was certainly little generational change within the Keener family.
Melchior Keener, a merchant, had migrated from Switzerland to York County,
Pennsylvania by way of Rotterdam in 1739. He later removed from Pennsylvania to
Baltimore in 1761 with his wife, Margaret. At the time, the couple had two children,
Christian and Catherine. Before the end of the decade, Margaret gave birth to five more
children, all of whom survived. The couple’s eldest son, Christian, married Susannah
Swope, the daughter of Reverend Benedict Swope of Baltimore’s German Reformed
Church. Susannah’s subsequent life bore a striking resemblance to Margaret Keener’s.
In the twenty years after Susannah’s marriage, she gave birth to thirteen children., and
only one, John Joseph, died before reaching the age of eighteen. Susannah’s experience
was very common. At regular, two-year intervals between 1786 and 1798, Mary Biays,
wife o f shipbuilder James Biays, gave birth to seven children. Mary Carr Grundy, wife
of merchant George Grundy, gave birth to eight children between her marriage in 1780
and her death in 1797 at the age o f thirty-four. For these women, the patterns o f life
remained remarkably similar to the experience of their mothers and grandmothers.24
Some of the prevailing sensibilities regarding women may have changed, but
24 Grundy-Gibson Papers, MS. 1294, MHS; Keener Family File, in Dielman-Hayward File, MHS;
and Kathryn Allamong Jacob, “The Woman’s Lot in Baltimore Town: 1729-1797,” Maryland
Historical Magazine, 71 (1976): 287. John Joseph Keener, tenth child of Christian and Susannah
Keener, was bom 1794, and died two years later in 1796.
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throughout the city, most women of the Revolutionary generation continued to face all
the tedious household responsibilities familiar to their colonial forbearers. Greater
freedom in marital choices and a greater sense of reciprocity between partners may have
provided greater happiness in marriage, but through the 1790s, women’s lives continued
to be largely circumscribed by marriage, family, and housework. As a poem in the
M aryland G azette counseled women: “Reserved the decrees of fate, Do everything— but
get a mate.”25 Patriarchy, much like apprenticeship and slavery, had survived into the
early republic.
The vitality of the household economy in the 1780s and 1790s enabled artisans to
strengthen their ranks even further through associational activity and political
involvement. During the colonial period, artisans were not well organized. The first
trade association in the city, the Mechanical Company, was a product of resistance to
British rule. The company was, at first, largely dominated by the city’s merchants.
Melchior Keener held the first meeting in 1763 at his dry goods store, and was elected the
company’s president, an office he retained for ten years. When the Sons of Liberty
organized a few years later, much its membership was drawn from the Mechanical
Company. By 1773, artisans began playing a much larger role in the struggle for
independence. With no end in sight to the troubles with Parliament and crown, it was an
especially dangerous time to be in a position of leadership in either Baltimore or
Maryland and not be identified with the province’s or the city’s leading revolutionaries.
In Annapolis, Charles Carroll of Carrollton had gathered about him a “popular party,” in
which he was allied with William Paca, Thomas Johnson, and Samuel Chase against the
25 Maryland Gazette and Baltimore Daily Advertiser, July 3, 1775, quoted in Jacob, “The
Woman’s Lot in Baltimore Town,” 284.
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royal governor, Robert Eden. The galvanizing issue in the capitol was Eden’s decision to
arbitrarily set proprietary officials’ fees. In Baltimore, a minor incident between customs
collector W illiam Moreton and merchant Samuel Purviance led to a riot. James Gaddes,
who had allegedly told Moreton that Purviance’s ship carried contraband goods, was
seized by the mob, tarred and feathered, and then taken to the gallows where he was
forced to plead for his life. In this increasingly radical atmosphere, Melchior Keener’s
tenure as president of the Mechanical Company was on shaky grounds. Many
Baltimoreans regarded Keener’s rather moderate political views as a mask for loyalist
sentiments, and forced the merchant to step down. Thereafter, three consecutive artisans
were elected as president of the company: Gerard Hopkins, who was a cabinet maker,
Adam Fonerden, a wool card maker, and David Shields, a hatter.26
Artisan organization stepped up even further after the Continental Congress
adopted the Continental Association in October 1774. Baltimore’s leading
revolutionaries quickly called for elections to a Committee of Observation, and began
raising militia companies to enforce the congressional mandate. The committee itself
was largely dominated by merchants, but the militia was dominated by artisans. This was
especially true after 1775, when the provincial convention revised the militia law to allow
companies to elect their own officers. Inspired by the new law, artisans organized the
Baltimore Mechanical Volunteer Company in December 1775, and thereafter were
26 Keener Family File in Dielman-Hayward File, MHS; William McCreary, The Ancient and
Honorable Mechanical Company o f Baltimore (Baltimore, 1901), esp. 1-15; “Extract of a Letter
from Mr. Robert Moreton,” and “Deposition of James Gaddes," in Archives o f Maryland, ed.
William Browne, et. al. (Baltimore: Maryland Historical Society, 1883-1972), LXm, 427-29,
435. For the rise of the “popular party” in Annapolis and the continuing struggle between
Governor Eden and Charles Carroll of Carrollton, see Ronald Hoffman, A Spirit o f Dissension:
Economics, Politics, and the Revolution in Maryland (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1973), 60-151.
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deeply involved in securing financial contributions for the war effort, and rooting out and
censoring loyalists. When British troop strength on the continent expanded in 1776,
many o f the militia companies were called to duty. The W hig Club, in essence an extralegal extension of the Committee of Observation, stepped into the void. Although its
membership was more heavily slanted towards merchants than the militia had been, it too
served as a means by which artisans became better organized and more politically
involved. Much to the dismay of provincial leaders in Annapolis, the Whig Club proved
extraordinarily zealous in its efforts to suppress suspected loyalists.27
The experience of artisans in the defiance of Great Britain helped prepare
tradesmen to organize in the post-war years. There seemed to be little need for political
agitation during the speculator fervor of 1783-1784, and membership in the old
Mechanical Company vanished. When increasing indebtedness led to the collapse of
Atlantic trade, however, artisans took action. Craftsmen began organizing themselves by
individual trades, and created an umbrella society called the Association of Tradesmen
and Manufacturers to pursue collective goals. Following the lead of Boston artisans, the
Association began clamoring almost immediately for a protective tariff to bolster
domestic production. The following year, the Association promoted the candidacy of
physician James McHenry for the state assembly. Although the numerous petitions for
the tariff failed time and again to win support in Annapolis, and James McHenry was
defeated for the assembly seat, the efforts themselves were important signs of the

27 David Curtis Skaggs, Roots o f Maryland Democracy, 1753-1776 (Westport, CT: Greenwood
Press, 1973); Paul Kent Walker, “The Baltimore Community and the American Revolution: A
Study in Urban Development, 1763-1783” (Ph.D., University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill,
1973), 243-68; Steffen, The Mechanics o f Baltimore, 61-78; and Shelter, “Artisans and the
Evolution of Baltimore Town,” 90-111.
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persistence, and even the maturation of traditional society. By the 1790s, the basic
structures of the household economy were increasingly solidified by the addition of
dozens o f formal trade associations, including the Carpenters’ Society o f Baltimore, the
Association of Master Hatters, and the United M aster Tailors. Unlike the Mechanical
Association, the new trade associations embraced regulation within individual trades of
prices, wages, working conditions, the terms of apprenticeship, and the status of
journeymen— all along traditional lines.28
More so than ever before, the household economy in Baltimore came to resemble
that of London in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Francois Auguste Rene de
Chateaubriand reached precisely that conclusion soon after his arrival in the new
republic. The younger son of a French aristocrat, Chateaubriand had followed a typical
path for someone of his rank and position by joining the army. After the Fall of the
Bastille, however, an being officer in a royalist regiment was no longer a safe position for
an aristocrat, much less a profitable one. Thus Chateaubriand traveled to America with
the declared purpose o f finding a Northwest Passage. More likely, he wished to evade
the increasingly intolerant regime in Paris, and many members of his family who
remained in France soon found their heads at the bottom of baskets.29
Upon reaching Baltimore, Chateaubriand was amazed at what he discovered. He
explained that as “a man landing as I did in the United States, full of enthusiasm for the
ancients, a Cato seeking everywhere for the rigidity of the early Roman manners,” he was

28 Steffen, The Mechanics o f Baltimore, 81-120, and Shelter, “Artisans and the Evolution of
Baltimore Town,” 286-96.
29 Francois Auguste Rene de Chateaubriand, Chateaubriand’s Travels in America, trans. Richard
Switzer (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1969), xi-xiii.
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shocked to find almost no difference between European and American culture. To the
young aristocrat, “the United States gives rather the idea of a colony than a nation; there
one finds customs, not mores.” Indeed, Chateaubriand continued, “At Philadelphia, I
could have thought myself in an English town: nothing proclaimed that I had passed from
a monarchy to a republic.” The use of the term proclaim ed is the important part of the
quotation. As Chateaubriand spent more time in the United States and conversed with
Americans, he discerned differences in the political sensibilities of the people. Yet his
first impressions, those of the bustle in the streets, the patterns of deference in the shops
and homes, and the overall sense o f social order in the cities, all proclaim ed to him the
persistence of traditional society.30

C hallenges

to

T r a d it io n a l S o c ie t y

Two crises during the 1790s threatened to unbalance the traditional social order.
In both cases, however, the reaction of the Baltimore community typified the underlying
corporatism of the city’s social order, and Baltimoreans’ continued adherence to
traditional social and political structures. The first challenge arrived in Baltimore harbor
on July 9, 1793, when ships carrying refugees from San Domingo began arriving. The
refugees had fled their island on June 23 after revolutionaries burned the town of Le CapFrangois. More than 5,000 people fled on board more than 130 French merchant vessels.
By the afternoon of July 10, twenty-two of those vessels had crowded the harbor off
Fell’s Point. Eventually, 53 ships arrived in Baltimore, carrying more than 1,000 white
and 500 black refugees into a city. At the time, Baltimore’s population was

30 Chateaubriand, Chateaubriand's Travels in America, 15.
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approximately 17,000, thus the refugees amounted to 9 percent o f the city’s population.
An equivalent crisis at the dawn o f the twenty-first century would involve more than
50,000 refugees arriving in Baltimore at one time. A committee of the city’s leading
merchants immediately formed to procure temporary housing and relief for the refugees.
Samuel Hollingsworth took a leading role in these efforts, and the committee secured
over $12,000 in donations within two days. Within a month, over four-hundred French
refugees found shelter in private homes within the city. Not every Baltimorean reacted
with the same sense o f communal obligation. On July 15, the Baltim ore Daily Advertiser
reported that a local farmer took advantage of “a poor Frenchman” from Cap-Fran$ois by
demanding “a dollar per dozen” for eggs. The refugee believed the price too high, but
being “uncertain o f the usual price of our markets, at length procured a dozen fo r three
quarters o f a dollar.”31 Notwithstanding other minor incidents o f abuse which
undoubtedly occurred, the general response of the community emphasized the sense that
Baltimore’s residents comprised a single organic entity guided by deference to a
traditional hierarchical order.
Many o f the white refugees quickly established themselves at the center of city
life. Paul Aime-Fleury opened a school on the Upper Falls, and Madame Lacombe began
a boarding school for girls on South Street in 1795. Berquin-Duvallon, an accomplished
lawyer in Le Cap-Fran^ois, became a well-respected attorney in Baltimore. J. Pinaud, a
renowned fencing instructor in both Paris and London, proclaimed a “fencing assault” at
31 Maryland Journal and Baltimore Daily Advertiser, July 15 and July 26, 1793, and Scharf, The
Chronicles o f Baltimore, 578-79. The committee which sought to procure temporary housing for
the refugees included Robert Gilmor, George Pressman, Philip Rogers, Jeremiah Yellott, James
Carey, James McHenry, Robert Smith, Zebulon Hollingsworth, Thomas McElderry, Stephen
Wilson, John O’Donnell, Adam Fonerden, Thomas Coulson, David Plunkett, Samuel Sterrett,
Paul Bentalou, and Colonel Daniel Smith.
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the Sign of Indian Queen. Doctor Pierre Chatard, a graduate of the College of Toulouse,
also settled in Baltimore and helped the city combat its yellow fever epidemics in 1797
and 1800. Edme Ducatel became a successful druggist on Baltimore Street, and Jean
Charles-Marie-Louis Pascault, Marquis de Poleon, established one o f largest mercantile
houses in the city.32
Many of the black refugees did not fare as well as their white counterparts.
Displaced, propertyless, French-speaking plantation workers from a Catholic island in the
West Indies, they were suddenly thrust into a mostly English-speaking, largely Protestant,
intensely urban setting in North America. Adjustment promised to be difficult, for both
the refugees and those living in Baltimore at the time. Explaining the situation in the
city, Robert Brent claimed that the black refugees “appear to be completely inert and
careless and helpless, spending their time singing, [and] living hand to mouth.” Although
city officials had done an admirable job finding temporary lodging upon the refugees’
arrival, it seemed to Brent that “the officials of the city do not know where to turn to seek
and obtain relief.” He did not see the Domingans as a benign presence, complaining that
some of the black refugees “even appear hostile,” and that “shops are subject to pillage
and houses are nightly being looted.” For Brent, the refugee crisis had placed “the city . .
. under a cloud. Every one is uneasy as if awaiting some sinister event.” One solution
seemed quite palatable for Brent: ‘T o return then whence they came seems to be the
answer which is on the lips of a goodly number of [my] neighbors.” The corporatism
underlying the city was clearly fraying, and Baltimore seemed poised for a

32 Walter Hartridge, ‘The Refugees from the Island of St. Domingo in Maryland,” Maryland
Historical Magazine, 38 (1943): 110-18.
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conflagration.33
Fortunately for all concerned, a group of French emigre priests of the Society of
St. Sulpice took up the cause of helping the black Domingans adapt to their new
surroundings. The Sulpicians shared three things in common with the refugees: they
spoke French, they were Catholic, and they were also refugees o f a revolution— in this
case the revolution in France rather than the revolution in Haiti. The Sulpicians had been
condemned by the regime in Paris, and being no longer able to maintain their schools in
France, many decided in 1791 to emigrate. The plight of the Sulpicians caught the
attention o f Bishop John Carroll across the Atlantic. Carroll had struggled in the years
after the Revolution to build the legitimacy and expand the membership of the Roman
Catholic Church in America, and invited the Sulpicians to settle in Baltimore. He hoped
that they would establish a seminary, and help train a native clergy in the United States.
In April 1791, four members of the society and five seminarians boarded a ship at SaintMalo bound for Baltimore. It happened to be the same vessel that Fran^ois-Rene de
Chateaubriand took to reach America, and the Frenchman recalled that for several of the
Sulpicians, the voyage almost proved more treacherous than the authorities back in
France. When the ship reached the seas off Maryland’s Eastern Shore, the winds died
and the heat became so oppressive that several passengers decided to take a swim in the
ocean. Unfortunately, for the swimmers, the current carried the ship away. When sharks
were sighted in the water, the crew frantically began firing into the water, and made a

33 Robert Brent to John Curry, April 2, 1794, quoted in William Fletcher, ‘The Contribution of
the Faculty of Saint Mary’s Seminary to the Solution of Baltimore’s San Domingan Negro
Problem, 1793-1852,” (M.A., The Johns Hopkins University, 1951), 28-29. Earlier warnings and
complaints about the presence of the black Domingans in Baltimore appeared in the Maryland
Gazette on July 16 and August 30,1793.
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furious attempt to launch a boat to save the hapless swimmers. Before matters worsened,
however, the incident was resolved by what Chateaubriand called “the greatest stroke of
luck.” A “barely perceptible breeze came up,” and the ship was able to close the distance
to reach the swimmers. The remainder of the voyage up the Chesapeake Bay proved
uneventful, and the ship entered Baltimore on July 10, 1791.34
On July 18, 1791, the Sulpicians moved into a house one mile north of the town,
and on October 3 opened the doors to St. Mary’s Seminary of Saint Sulpice. Within the
next eighteen months, the faculty was bolstered by the arrival of eight more priests,
including Father William duBourg who had been bom in Le Cap Francois, St. Domingo.
He had emigrated to France at the age of two to live with his grandparents, trained at the
College de Guyenne where he received Orders in 1788. In 1792 he joined the Sulpicians
in Baltimore, and the following year, encouraged his fellow priests to set up classes for
the black Domingans, find work for those who were able, and even purchase several of
the refugees who were still enslaved to white Domingans. Many of Baltimore’s leading
merchants and artisans, including many Protestants, employed refugees. Bishop Carroll
appointed Father duBourg to become the president of Georgetown College in 1796, but
the seminary maintained their aid to the black Domingans after his departure.
Throughout the nineteenth century, Baltimore’s black Catholic Haitians maintained a

34 Chateaubriand, Chateaubriand’s Travels in America, 8-13. The four members of the society on
board were Francis Nagot, Anthony Gamier, John Tessier, and Michael Levadoux. The five
seminarians included John Floyd, Edward Cantwell, Francis Tulloh, and John de Mondesir,
Joseph Perinault. See Charles Herbermann, The Sulpicians in the United States (New York:
Encyclopedia Press, 1916), 1-23, and Joseph Ruane, The Beginnings o f the Society o f St. Sulpice
in the United States, 1791-1829 (Washington, DC: The Catholic University Press, 1935). For
Bishop John Carroll’s post-Revolutionary struggles, see Thomas Spalding, The Premier See: A
History o f the Archdiocese o f Baltimore, 1789-1989 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1989), and John Gilmay Shea, A History o f the Catholic Church Within the Limits o f the
United States (New York: Amo Press, 1978; orig. 1886-1892).
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sense of community, and what had seemed a potential threat to the traditional order of
society in fact became a lasting testament to its persistence.35
The other major crisis of the decade, and in many ways the defining political issue
in Baltimore after the Revolution, was the struggle to obtain a city charter. In the years
immediately preceding the war, few people believed that it was necessary to divide the
town from Baltimore county. Despite the growth of Baltimore in the 1760s and early
1770s, the population of the town was still far smaller than that of the surrounding
countryside, and most Marylanders believed that the county’s officials and the town’s
various civic agencies were still able to properly administer the affairs of the town. With
Baltimore’s rising prosperity during the war, however, the city’s poorly paved streets,
increasing lawlessness, and lack of regulation in the its markets appeared beyond the
capacity of the constituted authorities. A resident of Baltimore County griped in 1782
that “there are no streets in any town whatever more [of] a disgrace to its inhabitants”
than those of Baltimore. The deteriorating situation finally prompted Baltimoreans to
propose a city charter in April 1782 to establish greater autonomy over local
government.36
Objections raised by laboring people doomed the 1782 charter proposal, which
never reached the assembly. Yet the desire for incorporation still burned within the city,
and two years later, a group of merchants and professionals proposed another charter.
35 Herbermann, The Sulpicians in the United States, 170-80, and Fletcher, “The Contribution of
the Faculty of Saint Mary’s Seminary,” 34-45. The persistence of Baltimore’s Black, Catholic
Haitian community became the subject of a magazine article in 1878, and newspaper article as
late as 1929. See Eugene Didier, “The Coloured Creoles of Baltimore,” Lippincott’s Magazine,
July 1878, and ‘The Baltimoreans from San Domingo,” The Baltimore Sun, September 1, 1929,
cited in Fletcher, ‘The Contribution of the Faculty of Saint Mary’s Seminary.”
36 Maryland Journal, April 30, 1782, and Scharf, The Chronicles o f Baltimore, 196.
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Once again, arguments over its terms led to the collapse of the movement, and the
assembly in Annapolis never had the opportunity to consider this measure. Hoping to
avoid a repeat o f past quarrels, charter proponents side-stepped public debate in
Baltimore altogether in 1786 by making a proposal directly to the state assembly. This
charter was staunchly anti-democratic, with steep property qualifications for office. The
plot backfired, however, when merchant Richard Lemmon seized a copy and returned
with it to Baltimore. The M aryland Journal published the proposed plan of government,
and when controversy erupted, all hopes for its passage vanished immediately. No
further attempts were made to secure a charter during the decade.37
Opponents of the 1782, 1784, and 1786 charter proposals did not object to the
idea of Baltimoreans gaining greater control over local government. There was nearuniversal agreement that the efforts of county officials and Baltimore’s various civic
agencies were no longer adequate to meet the needs o f the city. What artisans feared the
most was the potential range o f powers that would be granted to a municipal corporation.
A legal creation o f medieval society, the primary function of a municipal corporation in
England had been

separate urban iradesmen and merchants from the influence o f the

surrounding landed aristocrats, and to provide regulation of commerce and trade within
the city. Instead o f promoting economic growth, the regulations adopted by most
incorporated towns were meant to promote social order and eliminate dearth and disease.
The government could limit the number o f tradesmen allowed in a particular craft, set
wages, hold down prices, or establish monopolies. Artisans feared that these powers

37 Walker, “The Baltimore Community and the American Revolution,” 345-46; Steffen, The
Mechanics o f Baltimore, 123-27; and Shelter, “Artisans and the Evolution of Baltimore Town,”
345-54.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

214
could easily used retard the growth of Baltimore and thus hurt the household economy.
Various trade associations had just recently begun to practice regulatory activity within
their individual crafts, and they were not willing to surrender the ability to control the
terms under which their workshops operated to a merchant-led municipal corporation. In
essence, artisans feared that an ill-conceived charter would upset the balance between the
mercantile and household economies.38
In 1793, a new charter proposal sought to accommodate artisan concerns over the
powers o f a municipal corporation. Under its terms, the bicameral city council would be
prohibited from laying taxes on artisan tools, inventories, raw materials used in
manufacturing goods, or on property in the city’s western precincts where a significant
percentage o f the city’s artisans resided. The council would also be prohibited from
restraining anybody from participation in any profession or trade.39 Despite these efforts,
artisans still objected to the property qualifications for public office. Political
representation by ward would be enumerated on the basis of taxable residents, and while
there were no additional property qualifications to be elected to the city council, a
minimum of $1,000 in property was needed to be considered for the council of electors.
This body had the responsibility of electing the mayor, the members o f the upper
chamber of the council, and approving all mayoral appointments. To many
Baltimoreans, the 1793 charter appeared just as anti-democratic as its predecessors. A
number of trade associations thus joined together to form the United Committees in
38 Shelter, “Artisans and the Evolution of Baltimore Town,’’ 337-41. For the origins and
evolution of the municipal corporation, see Jon Teaford, The Municipal Revolution in America:
Origins o f Modem Urban Government, 1650-1825 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975).
39An Actfo r Incorporating Baltimore-Town, in Baltimore-County, into a City by the Name o f the
City o f Baltimore (Baltimore: Philip Edwards, 1794).
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January 1794 to oppose the proposed charter.40
As the 1794 assembly elections approached, the United Committees published a
highly democratic alternative to the charter proposed in 1793. A single Board of
Commissioners with both legislative and executive power, elected annually by the people
without respect to property, race, or age, replaced the bicameral model.41 On October 3,
1794, a few days to the election, the United Committees chose to support lawyer James
Winchester and merchant Alexander McKim to champion their cause in the assembly.
The stark contrast in the two plans of government generated much impassioned debate
over the next two years, but in the end, the Maryland House of Delegates approved a
charter for Baltimore in December 1796 that largely ignored both the 1793 and 1794
proposals. When the Maryland Senate approved the legislation in January 1797,
Baltimore formally became an incorporated city. Artisans grumbled over the resolution
of the charter struggle, and many vowed that they would fight for reform. Yet most
Baltimoreans grudgingly accepted the resolution. Despite the initial howls of protest,
political debate quickly swung away from the charter controversy and onto new topics.
The 1798 Congressional election between James W inchester and Samuel Smith centered
on the candidates’ views regarding the Quasi-War with France and the notorious XYZ
Affair, not W inchester’s involvement in the charter struggle. “
One historian concluded that Baltimoreans acquiesced to the 1797 charter because
40 Scharf, The Chronicles o f Baltimore, 196, 267; Steffen, The Mechanics o f Baltimore, 127-31;
and Sheller, “Artisans and the Evolution of Baltimore Town,” 356-67. The United Committees
also included the Republican Society, a newly formed maverick group of merchants dedicated to
what they perceived to be the principles of the French Revolution.
41 Baltimore Daily Intelligencer, September 12 and 30, 1794.
42 Steffen, The Mechanics o f Baltimore, 131-40, and Sheller, “Artisans and the Evolution of
Baltimore Town,” 367-94.
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“the townspeople must have reached a point of exhaustion where any charter seemed
desirable if it could settle the fourteen-year controversy.”43 Although this may have been
true, there was a more likely reason. The primary objections to the charters of the 1780s
had centered around the potentially damaging powers of a municipal corporation.
Although the 1793 and 1794 proposals embraced very different plans o f government,
they were in substantial agreement regarding what government should be able to do.
There were minor differences, of course. The 1793 proposal stated that government
should regulate public amusements, while the 1794 proposal stated that government
should regulate and restrain them. The 1793 proposal stated that the government should
attend to the prevention of disease and the maintenance of public health within the limits
of Baltimore; the 1794 proposal embraced the same ideals, but extended the
government’s jurisdiction on these matters into the western precincts as well.44 Yet these
were quibbles over details, not arguments over direction. By the late 1790s, it was clear
that for most people, the fear over the possible abuse of municipal power had subsided,
and the only major disagreements left were over how frequently elections should be held,
and what the qualifications should be for the highest offices. In the end, these were not
good reasons to hold up a resolution of the charter struggle, even a less-than-perfect one.
With the threat to the balance between the maritime and household economies no longer
at issue, few censured Winchester’s decision in 1797 to go along with the assembly’s
plan of government.

43 Steffen, The Mechanics o f Baltimore, 140.
44An Actfo r Incorporating Baltimore-Town, and Baltimore Daily Intelligencer, September 30,
1794.
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T he D aw n

o f the

M anufacturers

Not everyone was committed to maintaining the household economy and
sustaining what amounted to a colonial framework for American life. After the
Revolution, a few handicraft producers and political leaders encouraged the development
o f a native class o f manufacturers to promote American economic independence from
Great Britain. These prophets of industrialization, including Tench Coxe and Alexander
Hamilton, rejected both the mercantilist world of colonial restrictions, and the American
neomercantilist m entalite that evolved after the war. They believed that a balance needed
to be struck between commerce, agriculture, and domestic production, and in the context
of the post-colonial American economy, this required a significant push towards
developing American manufacturing. Unlike the wartime advocates for American selfsufficiency who relied on a litany of republican appeals calling for boycotts, selfsacrifice, and moral fortitude in defense of public virtue, the post-war manufacturing
advocates recognized that the best way to break the American passion for British
manufactures was to replace the British imports with American-made goods.45
Embedded in the pro-manufacturing strategy was an implicit attack on the model
o f the artisanal workshop. In his “Report on Manufactures” in 1791, Alexander Hamilton
drew a sharp contrast between the two types of production, and strongly favored
government support for manufactories: “Except the simple and ordinary kinds of
household Manufactures, or those for which there are very commanding local
advantages, pecuniary bounties are in most cases indispensable to the introduction of a
new branch.” The “simple and ordinary” types o f household manufactures to which
45 Jacob Cooke, 'Tench Coxe, Alexander Hamilton, and the Encouragement of American
Manufactures,” The William and Mary Quarterly, 3d. ser., 32 (1975): 369-92.
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Hamilton referred, which were not slated for replacement by the new type o f production,
were articles produced in the home itself. The “new branch” of production were those
establishments which embraced the division of labor, mechanization, and did not limit the
potential pool of laborers to apprentices, journeymen, and the enslaved. Under
Hamilton’s plan, these establishments were to be protected from foreign competition
using tariffs and other regulations on trade.46 The potential rise of a native manufacturing
class thus represented a fundamental challenge to both the neomercantilist assumptions of
the post-war maritime economy as well as the vitality of the household economy.
In drawing a distinction between workshops and manufactories, Hamilton
contributed to the growing distinction between artisan workshops and manufactories.
The word m anufacturer derives from the Latin phrase manu facere, meaning “to make by
hand,” and was commonly used to describe both laborers and employers during the first
half o f the eighteenth century. It was largely interchangeable with the more established
terms artificer, artisan, craftsman, handicraftsman, and mechanic. As late as 1755, the
eminent Samuel Johnson found very little variation between these words, defining each
of the terms by the others in his much-prized dictionary. Indeed, the word manufacturer
appeared as part o f the definition in each of the other terms 47 Manufactures and

46 “Alexander Hamilton’s Final Version of the Report on the Subject of Manufactures,”
December 5, 1791, in The Papers o f Alexander Hamilton, ed. Harold Syrett (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1966), X, 249, 284, 301.
47 Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary o f the English Language, 2 vols. (London: W. Strahan, 1755).
Johnson defined a manufacturer was “a workman; an artificer.” He defined an artificer as “an
artist; a manufacturer; one by whom any thing is made.” A mechanick was “a manufacturer, a
low workman.” A craftsman was “an artificer, a manufacturer, a mechanick,” and a
handicraftsman was “a manufacturer, one employed in manual occupation.” Johnson defined the
term artisan a little differently. Derived from a French word based on the Latin root artifex, an
artisan was an “artist; professor of art.” Nevertheless, the secondary definition for an artisan was
a “manufacturer; low tradesman.” According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the words maker,
craftsman, and artificer first entered the English language in the fourteenth century; the nouns
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manufactories were indistinguishable from artisans and workshops— they were
synonymous within the model of household production that dominated both Hanoverian
Britain and colonial America.
The meaning of the word m anufacturer began to change after the Seven Years’
War. In this great contest of empires, British armies fought against the French in Europe,
India, and North America, and the Royal navy confronted French men-of-war in the
Caribbean, Atlantic, and Indian Oceans. To carry on this conflict and ultimately defeat
the French, Great Britain spent approximately £160 million, the vast majority of which
was financed through long-term bonds. Saddled with such a huge war debt, Parliament
introduced new taxes in the colonies, and actively promoted domestic production to boost
trade. Both of these measures were meant to raise government revenues for the purpose
o f retiring the empire’s enormous financial burden.48 To help promote domestic
production, the London Society for the Encouragement of Arts, Manufacture, and
Commerce began offering a long list of premiums, or prizes, for inventions deemed
useful to the commerce o f the nation. Textile production benefited almost immediately
from a series of technological advances.49 In particular, James Hargreaves’s spinning
jenny (1764), Richard Arkwright’s water frame (1768), Samuel Crompton’s spinning

artisan, mechanick, handicraftsman, and the verb manufact appeared between 1S38 and 1551.
The first cited use of the noun manufactor appeared in 1649, and the first cited use of the noun
manufacturer appeared in 1719 (although both words were likely in use before those dates).
48 Nancy Koehn estimated that the £160 million price tag for the conflict represented twice Great
Britain’s total Gross National Product in 1760. This would be analogous to the United States
waging a war at the beginning of the twenty-fust century that cost $19 trillion, or approximately
three-and-a-half times the total U.S. national debt in 2001. See Nancy Koehn, The Power o f
Commerce: Economy and Governance in the First British Empire (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1994), 5.
49 Koehn, The Power o f Commerce, 16-60.
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mule (1779), and Edmund Cartwright’s power loom (1785) placed British textile
manufacturing securely at the forefront of the industrial age.
As new woolen manufactories began dotting the English and Scottish countryside,
the meaning of the word m anufacturer began to change. Although technological
improvements were important to the growth of the new manufactories, the substitution of
mechanical devices for laborers was neither a focus of early industrialization, nor an
important difference between manufacturers and artisans. Despite the increase in
gadgetry, nearly all members o f both groups still fell squarely into the category of
handicraft production. In essence, the emerging difference between manufacturers and
artisans came down to the size of their respective establishments. Late eighteenthcentury political economists recognized this as the emerging difference between the two
groups. Instead of focusing on technology, they centered their analysis on the division of
labor. The new manufactories employed dozens of workers in an attempt to improve
productivity through economies of scale, whereas the artisan’s workshop employed at
most a few apprentices and a journeyman or two. Thus manufacturers were increasingly
seen as supervisors o f people, whereas artisans continued to be identified as producers of
goods.50
Across the Atlantic, Americans eagerly participated in the evolution o f
manufacturing enterprises from household to industrial production. By 1776, the British
American colonies produced one-seventh of the world’s crude iron in dozens of forges
scattered from Virginia to New England. Baltimore contributed handsomely to this total.
The rich deposits of iron ore discovered in the Patapsco River Valley during the early
50 Francois Crouzet, The First Industrialists: The Problem o f Origins (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1985), 2.
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eighteenth century were the initial reason for the more intense settlement o f the area in
the 1720s. The crisis with Parliament and crown during the 1760s and early 1770s
provided an additional spur to American interest in domestic production. During the
Revolutionary War, the Continental Congress encouraged mechanization in the
manufacture of war materials, especially saltpeter (potassium nitrate), a vital ingredient in
making gunpowder that Americans had previously imported. Although Baltimore did not
figure prominently in this industry, the city did have a gunpowder mill, and the Principio
Works in nearby Cecil County became a leading producer of arms and ammunition
throughout the war.51
Renewed British competition after the war led to the collapse several of
Baltimore’s budding manufacturing enterprises. Yet interest in technological innovation
and the establishment of large-scale production continued in other trades. Thanks to
Oliver Evans, Baltimore and its environs remained at the forefront of American
manufacturing in the wake of the Revolution. In 1783, Evans invented the means by
which water-powered machinery could move grain through a mill and carry away the
flour. As historian George Terry Sharrer explained, Evans’s method “arranged several
noncontinuous operations into a continuing sequence,” and eliminated the need for much
o f the human labor previously involved in the milling process.52 Evans worked in Talbot
County on Maryland’s Eastern Shore while developing his process. Although his process
did not substantially increase the amount of flour milled per hour compared to other

51 John Kasson, Civilizing the Machine: Technology and Republican Values in America, 17761900 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1976), 8-14.
52 George Terry Sharrer, “Flour Milling and the Growth of Baltimore, 1783-1830” (Ph.D..
University of Maryland, College Park, 1975), 72.
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methods, it did reduce the number of workers needed at a mill. Evans estimated that a
mill producing forty barrels o f flour per day needed four men and a boy using traditional
methods. Using his automated method, only one or two men would be needed. Thus
savings in labor costs, rather than faster production, made Evans’s process more lucrative
than other techniques.53
In 1785, two o f Evans’s brothers placed the automated system into commercial
use for the first time in a mill erected near Wilmington, Delaware. By 1787, Evans
secured a Maryland patent for the machinery, and two years later, granted permission to
Josiah Pennington of Baltimore County to use the automated process. An announcement
in the Maryland Journal and Baltimore Advertiser publicized the agreement with
Pennington. Evans hoped that the demonstration would prove the utility o f his invention,
and convince other millers to pay him royalties due for the use of his automated process.
The plan worked. In August 1790, the Ellicott brothers, arguably Baltimore’s most
important millers, certified that they had “erected Oliver Evans’s new invented mode of
elevating, conveying, and cooling meal, &c.” They further assured the public that
Evans’s process was “well worthy of attention of any person concerned in merchant, or
even extensive country mills, who wishes to lessen the labour and expense of
manufacturing wheat into flour.”54 Thanks to Evans, automated grain milling emerged as
an important symbol o f both American industrialization and the emerging class of
manufacturers.
53 Sharrer, “Hour Milling,” 65-89.
54 Maryland Journal and Baltimore Advertiser, May 14, 1787. Testimonial of John, Jonathan,
George, and Nathaniel Ellicott of Ellicott’s Mills, Baltimore County, Maryland, August 4, 1790,
quoted in Oliver Evans, Young Mill-wright and Miller’s Guide (Philadelphia: Oliver Evans,
1795), HI, 122.
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Although Wilmington and the millers along the Brandywine Creek benefited first
from Evans’s process, Baltimore quickly became the leading center for automated grain
milling in the United States. Elisha Tyson, Isaac McPherson, and Thomas and John
Hollingsworth all adopted the process for their mills, and by 1800, Baltimore had at least
fifty automated grain mills within eighteen miles of the city along the Jones’ and
Gwynn’s Falls, and the Patapsco and Little Gunpowder Rivers. Hoping to further profit
from his invention, Evans applied for and received the third patent issued by the United
States on December 1 8 ,1790.55
Evans was not the only millwright in the mid-Atlantic region who achieved an
impressive degree of mechanization. In 1797, the Duke de La Rochefoucault-Liancourt,
a French aristocrat travelling in the United States, described the automated mill belonging
to the Ellicott family as having “six pair of millstones, and constructed as well as any of
the mills of Brandywine, of which it possesses all the perfections.” The Duke believed
that in the area of grain milling, the Ellicotts’ mill represented the most advanced
engineering in the world, rivalling mills in operation near “London Bridge in England
and those the brothers Perrier have constructed at Paris near Gros-caillou.” Within a few
years, the Ellicotts operated numerous automated mills, including three located
consecutively on Gwynn’s Falls. These mills alone processed almost half-a-million
bushels of grain per year, and produced more flour than all twelve mills along the
Brandywine Creek in Delaware.56

55 Greville Bathe and Dorothy Bathe, Oliver Evans: A Chronicle o f Early American Engineering
(Philadelphia: Historical Society of Pennsylvania, 1935), 323, and John Mullin, The Baltimore
Directory for 1799 (Baltimore: Warner and Hanna, 1799), 126.
56 Fran;ois-Alexandre, Duke de La Rochefoucauld Liancourt, Travels Through the United States
o f North America (London: R. Phillips, 1799), HI, 493, and Robert Sutcliff, Travels in Some
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The impressive achievements of the region’s miller-merchants can easily cloud
the real extent of industrialization prior to 1800. Americans accounted for many
impressive inventions during the late eighteenth century, but the British proved the
leaders in developing new technologies in the First Industrial Revolution.
Notwithstanding Eli Whitney’s cotton “gin” (1793), Britain’s technical edge proved
especially true in the textile industry.57 British patents for cotton and woolen
manufacturing outnumbered American patents 96 to 86 between 1790 and 1812.
Although the margin may seem relatively small, the numbers do not take into account
that British patents cost at least £70 and took between six weeks and three months to
process. Given that a cotton factory overseer’s typical income amounted to just £50 per
year in England in 1800, the British patent system proved exclusionary. In the United
States, the patent process was far more democratic. A patent cost only $30, or the
equivalent o f £6 15s, and after the new law of 1800, could be accomplished by swearing
to an affidavit. Given the limitations of the British system, the relatively small margin is

Parts o f North America in the Years 1804, 1805 and 1806 (York, England: W. Alexander, 1815),
80.
57 A few historians dispute Britain’s claim to technological supremacy, arguing that the American
“jack-of-all-trades” was actually superior to a skilled British factory worker, and American know
how equaled the British by the 1780s. See Eugene Ferguson, “The American-ness of American
Technology,” Technology and Culture, 20 (1979): 3-24; Thomas Cochran, Frontiers o f Change:
Early Industrialization in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981); and John
McCusker and Russell Menard, The Economy o f British America, 1607-1789 (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1985), 281. Doron Ben-Atar refused to engage in this debate,
and argued instead that “the extent of the foreign espionage effort” in Britain demonstrated the
degree that Americans envied British expertise. For Ben-Atar’s study, it did not matter whether
or not British technology was superior, only that Alexander Hamilton, Tench Coxe, and others
“believed it to be so.” See Doron Ben-Atar, “Alexander Hamilton’s Alternative: Technology
Piracy and the Report on Manufactures,” The William and Mary Quarterly, 3d ser., 52 (1995):
397 n.44.
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therefore quite significant.58
Unfortunately for American entrepreneurs, the British government vigilantly
guarded British technological secrets from foreign eyes. After the American Revolution,
Parliament prohibited skilled artisans from freely leaving Britain or Ireland for any
country outside the British Empire. Additional legislation forbade anyone from enticing
manufacturers to emigrate or export machinery for the production of textiles, clocks,
paper, glass, and many other manufactured goods. Although both European and
American governments officially recognized the British restrictions, authorities on both
sides of the Atlantic actively promoted industrial espionage in Britain. As Secretary of
the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton also encouraged the emigration of skilled British
workers to the United States, and promoted the idea of granting patents to Americans for
minor innovations on British designs. These various efforts sometimes met with success.
The most spectacular American prize arrived in 1789, when Samuel Slater brought the
design for Arkwright’s “water frame” from Britain in his head. For the most part,
however, the British government proved adept at keeping the nation’s technological
secrets from foreign eyes, using at least six government agencies to enforce the
Parliament’s restrictive laws.S9

58 David Jeremy, “Invention in American textile technology during the early nineteenth century,
1790-1830,” in Artisans, Entrepreneurs, and Machines (Brookfield: Ashgate, 1998), VO, 1-42.
Although it is true that Thomas Jefferson frowned on issuing patents, believing monopolies were
harmful to a republic, his influence over the granting of patents extended only to 1793 when he
ceased to be Secretary of State.
59 David Jeremy, “Damning the Flood: British Government Efforts to Check the Outflow of
Technicians and Machinery, 1780-1843,” Business History Review, 51 (1977): 1-34; David
Jeremy, Transatlantic Industrial Revolution: The Diffusion o f Textile Technologies Between
Britain and America, I790-I830s (Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press, 1981), 240-51; John Harris,
“Industrial Espionage in the Eighteenth Century,” Industrial Archaeology Review. 7 (1985): 12738; and David Jeremy, ‘Transatlantic Industrial Espionage in the Early Nineteenth Century:
Barriers and Penetrations,” Textile History, 26 (1995): 95-122. For Hamilton’s role in the
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Like their British counterparts, American inventors also jealously guarded their
secrets from the public. Evans’s revolutionary process was an important symbol of
industrialization in the mid-Atlantic, and its fame undoubtedly contributed to the
continuing shift in meaning of the word manufacturer away from its traditional
synonyms. Yet the details of his automated process remained largely hidden from the
public until the publication o f his 1795 book, The Young M illwright and M iller's Guide.
The publication o f his process may have proved Evans’s biggest mistake. Although the
U.S. patent protected Evans throughout the nation against millers using his machinery
without a license, his book so completely described the automated process that almost
anyone could reproduce the technology. After 1800, this potential pitfall blossomed into
a real problem for Evans as millwrights throughout the mid-Atlantic mechanized along
the lines described in the book. During the 1780s and 1790s, however, few producers
benefited from Evans’s designs, and newer technologies in general, because of restricted
access to them.
Despite the best efforts of pro-manufacturing advocates like Hamilton and Coxe
to secure government support for American industrialization, competition from British
imports and the secrecy which surrounded technological innovations helped retard the
development of manufactories in the late 1780s and 1790s. Yet the most significant
threat to the extension of what Hamilton called the “new branch” of production was the
diffusion of Bridsh technology, see Ben-Atar, “Alexander Hamilton’s Alternative,” 389-414;
Edward Walterscheid, ‘T o the Editor”; and Doron Ben-Atar, “Doron Ben-Atar replies,” The
William and Mary Quarterly, 3d series, 53 (1996): 425-30. It should be noted that Hamilton was
not alone in taking a cavalier attitude toward foreign intellectual property rights. Over ten percent
of the British patents granted between 1790 and 1830 were for minor innovations on foreign
designs, most of them American. For Samuel Slater and his influence on the early American
textile industry the best treatment is Barbara Tucker, Samuel Slater and the Origins o f the
American Textile Industry, 1790-1860 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984).
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coalition o f interests between merchants and artisans in America’s seaports. From the
merchants’ perspective, a few types of manufactories, like ropewalks and nail
manufactories, were necessary to the functioning of the domestic economy. The further
extension of manufactories into most areas of production, on the other hand, represented
a potential threat to the dominance of the import-export trade. The maintenance of a
robust household economy promised to limit the development o f large-scale
manufacturing in the city. Johann David Schoepf observed that “the object of the
merchants of Baltimore, as o f American merchants generally, is exports and imports.
They neither intend nor desire to be manufacturers, and do not care to see such among
them or very much to encourage them.’’ Schoepf believed that the merchants’ disdain
arose as much from materialist rather than idealist reasons, “for the more wares are
fabricated in the country itself, so much the less would the merchant have to bring in.”60
As in the colonial period, overseas trade reinforced a domestic economy based on
household production.
As late as 1798, manufacturers were nearly an invisible group within Baltimore.
A few intrepid entrepreneurs had begun using the term manufacturer to describe their
operations, but they amounted to only three percent of the city’s handicraft producers.
Most artisans continued to use traditional designations. Manufacturers represented such a
tiny percentage o f the occupational structure that they were even outnumbered in the city
by the number o f landed gentlemen. In the Federal Direct Tax o f 1798 for Baltimore
City, very little separated the assessments of manufacturers from those o f traditional
artisans. The manufacturers’ average assessment was marginally above the city’s overall
60 Johann David Schoepf, Travels in the Confederation [1783-1784], trans. and ed. Alfred
Morrison (Philadelphia: William J. Campbell, 1911), I, 330.
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mean, while the traditional artisans’ average assessment was nearly equal to the city’s
mean. Both groups were therefore in the middling part of society. Clearly the division of
labor that manufacturers relied upon to create wealth had not yet produced significant
returns by the turn of the nineteenth century. Manufacturers accounted for only four
percent o f the total assessed property of the handicraft producers. Baltimore’s economy
remained squarely centered on household production dominated by traditional artisans.61
Through the post-war economic adjustments to a peacetime economy, the trials of
the charter controversy, the challenge of the Haitian refugee crisis, and the beginnings of
a manufacturing revolution in America, the basic structures o f traditional society
persisted into the late 1790s. The resiliency of the household economy and the vitality of
the nation’s overseas trade helped sustain many of the institutions of colonial America
beyond the Revolution. As long as the port remained busy, there seemed little reason for
anyone to suspect that the patterns of life in Baltimore and its hinterlands would change
to any great extent at the turn of the nineteenth century.

61 1798 Baltimore Direct Tax and 1800 Baltimore City Directory. The figure of four percent for
the manufacturers’ percentage of the handicraft producers’ total assessed property, was calculated
using several steps. First, the number of artisans and manufacturers in the 1800 Baltimore City
Directory was multiplied by their average assessed property in the 1798 Baltimore Direct Tax.
Those numbers were then added to calculate the total assessed property for all handicraft
producers. Finally, the manufacturers’ total assessed property was divided by the handicraft
producers’ total assessed property to produce the manufacturers’ percentage of the handicraft
producers’ total assessed wealth.
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CHAPTER FIVE
HARD TIMES

Samuel Brooke faced a serious problem. After enjoying several years of brisk
trade at his shop in Baltimore, sales plummeted sharply in early 1797. The sudden
downturn caught him quite by surprise. Like so many young men of his generation,
Brooke had spent considerable time during the 1790s scouting the Atlantic coast for the
best place to locate a business. During those travels he was suitably impressed by the
bustling shores o f Manhattan, writing his sister that he found the city “to be a place of
considerable business . . . and far from being divested of the fashionable follies and vices
of the age.” He concluded that “I think it rather has the lead of any place,” but he did not
see “anything so very interesting or entertaining” in New York to encourage a permanent
relocation there.1 Although larger than Baltimore, New York did not compare favorably
with the city at the head of the Patapsco, which, in Brooke’s estimation, held the best
commercial prospects anywhere in America. His decision to relocate to Baltimore
initially proved a good one— at least until early 1797 when his customers abandoned him.
The slump muffled trade during the normally busy spring season, and the dearth
o f shoppers continued into the lazier summer months. By fall 1797, there seemed to be
no end in sight to the hard times. In a letter to his mother, Brooke admitted that whether
economic conditions “will remain so or get better or worse I cannot tell.” He despaired
that business “remained exceedingly dull,” and that “some days [I] do little or nothing at
all.” Distraught by his predicament, Brooke did not know how to handle the situation,
and the reverses at his shop quickly soured his judgment of the city. His friends assured
1Samuel Brooke to sister [Hannah], February 15,1795, Brooke-Hopkins Letterbook, MS. 150,
229
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him “not to be discouraged for they are in the same way, having little or nothing to do but
to sit at their store’s door and wish for better times.” Brooke found some solace in this,
believing that things would have to turn around soon, “as the people . . . must buy
necessaries.”2 As October came and went with few customers, however, all hope of a
quick recovery dwindled away. What people deemed necessary had evidently changed
during that dreadful year. By winter, it was clear that the steady and impressive growth
o f Baltimore, the most dynamic city o f the new republic, had come to a shuddering halt—
and no one knew when things might change.
The immediate cause of the city’s troubles occurred several thousands o f miles
away in the boardroom o f the Bank of England. With the reluctant blessing of William
Pitt, Great Britain’s conservative Prime Minister, the Bank’s directors suspended specie
payments on February 27, 1797, triggering the Panic of 1797.3 The Bank’s decision
disrupted access to the British gold and silver reserves that American merchants had
relied on to finance the delicate web o f Atlantic credit on which their fortunes rested.
Mercantile difficulties soon rippled throughout the Atlantic world, and the effects of the
Panic quickly reached the United States. Merchants were not alone in facing hard times.
Shopkeepers and grocers who relied on the rising fortunes of the city’s overseas trade to
stock their shelves and sell their wares found that fewer customers patronized their stores.
Even artisans, whose success was intimately tied to the prosperity of the city as a whole,
ultimately suffered economic setbacks.
MHS.
2 Samuel Brooke to Mother [Mrs. Brooke], March 25, 1797, Brooke-Hopkins Letterbook, MHS.
3 Wilfred Marston Acres, The Bank o f England From Within, 1694-1900 (London: Oxford
University Press, 1931), 1,277.
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The Panic o f 1797 represented the republic’s most severe economic crisis since
the end o f the American Revolution. Curiously though, most accounts of the early
republic ignore the panic. There are reasons for the oversight. In America, the events of
1797 displayed few hallmarks of what normally constituted a “panic,” at least in the way
economists and historians have traditionally defined the term.4 The Panic of 1797 was
not like the later Panics of 1819 or 1837 where thousands of individual fortunes
evaporated overnight with the collapse of the nation’s banking system. Instead, the Panic
of 1797 began overseas and affected the mercantile sector of the economy first. The
financial turmoil it created took several more months to unsettle the broader economy.
Another obvious difference from other panics is that there were no “bank runs” in 1797.
Indeed, Baltimore had only three banks, the last of which opened its doors for the first
time on January 2, 1797, only a month before the British government began restricting
specie payments.5 Finally, the economic downturn that followed the Panic of 1797 was
neither as severe nor as long-lived as later depressions in the nineteenth century. If
panics must result from structural, or at least internal problems within the nation’s
business cycle, and lead to a banking collapse and a prolonged depression, then the
economic crisis of 1797 does not qualify as a “panic.”
Despite the differences between the economic crisis of 1797 and those of 1819
and 1837, there were some interesting parallels. When the Bank of England suspended
specie payments, the effect was much the same as when American banks suspended
4 For a discussion of what makes an economic crisis a “panic,” see Charles Kindleberger, Manias.
Panics, and Crashes: A History o f Financial Crises (New York: Basic Books, 1978).
5 The Bank of Maryland, the city’s branch of the Bank of the United States, and the newlychartered Bank of Baltimore. See Denwood Kelly, Armand Shank, Jr., and Thomas Gordon,
Money &. Banking in Maryland (Baltimore: Maryland Historical Society, 1996), II, 116.
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payments in 1819 and 1837: commodity prices fell sharply, trade was disrupted,
businesses failed, and a period of economic uncertainty followed. In 1797, the Bank of
England acted almost like a surrogate national bank for the American economy thanks to
the nation’s neomercantilist dependence on foreign trade. There were other similarities.
The later panics led to prolonged depressions, and for Baltimore, the commercial
frustrations that began with the Panic lasted until the W ar of 1812. Hard times spurred
the creation of new markets, a revolution in the use of newspapers, the construction of
internal improvements, the rise o f a new manufacturing class, and most important, a
transformation of the city’s traditional social order. Thus whether or not one refers to the
economic crisis of 1797 as a true panic, it acted like one, and its long-term consequences
led to sweeping cultural changes. The hard times of the 1790s proved just as critical to
the development of Jeffersonian America as the Panic of 1819 and its subsequent
depression were for Jacksonian America.6

T h e P a n ic

of

1797

The origins o f the Bank of England’s troubles may be traced to January 1795,
when the armies of revolutionary France under the command of General Pichegru
marched into the United Provinces. British observers in the Netherlands commented on
6 For the Panic of 1819 and its importance to Jacksonian America, see Samuel Reznick. “The
Depression of 1819-1822: A Social History,” American Historical Review, 39 (1933): 28-47;
Murray Rothbard, The Panic o f 1819: Reactions and Policies (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1962); Gary Browne, “Baltimore and the Panic of 1819,” in Aubrey Land, ed., Law,
Society, and Politics in Early Maryland (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977),
212-227; Andrew Cayton, “The Fragmentation of ‘A Great Family’: The Panic of 1819 and the
Rise of a Middling Interest in Boston, 1818-1822,” Journal o f the Early Republic, 2 (1982): 144167; David Lehman, “Explaining Hard Times: Political Economy and the Panic of 1819 in
Philadelphia” (Ph.D., University of California, Los Angeles, 1992); and Sarah Kidd, “‘To be
harassed by my Creditors is worse than Death’: Cultural Implications of the Panic of 1819,”
Maryland Historical Magazine, 95 (2000): 161-189.
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the invasion’s camival-like atmosphere, and marveled afterwards that Dutch society
seemingly maintained a sense o f order despite the turmoil of conquest. The so-called
orderly affairs o f the low countries proved short-lived, however, as the conquering
French imposed many hardships on the Batavian Republic— the revolutionary regime’s
new name for the United Provinces. The Dutch lost Flanders, Venlo, Roermond, and
Maastricht to annexation. The French also demanded an indemnity of 100 million
guilders, extorted Dutch bankers to make a large loan to the French government, and
required the dismantling of all frontier defenses in the Netherlands. The results were
devastating. Within months, political factions warred over the nature of the new
republic’s sovereignty while the nation’s commerce laid paralyzed. Gin distilleries and
prostitution quickly became the only booming industries in the country. The frequently
exorbitant demands and requisitions made by French commanders in Dutch cities
angered a populace already strapped by imposed hardships. When the maritime trade
languished, widespread resentment of the French followed.7
The collapse o f the Dutch economy did not by itself prove catastrophic to British
commodity and financial markets. This was fortunate for Baltimore, because the city’s
mercantile community relied on access to British credit to conduct overseas trade. The
city thus enjoyed continued prosperity in 1795 and 1796.8 However, the strategic threat

7 Jonathan Israel, The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall, 1477-1806 (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1995), 1119-30. Also see I. Leonard Leeb, The Ideological Origins o f the
Batavian Republic: History and Politics in the Dutch Republic, 1747-1800 (The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1973), 220-61; Simon Schama, Patriots and Liberators: Revolution in the Netherlands,
1780-1813 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1977), 138-245; and Owen Connelly, French
Revolution, Napoleonic Era (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1979), 153.
8 The lack of any real impact on Atlantic trade from the collapse of the Dutch economy should
not be surprising. During most of the eighteenth century, the United Provinces weathered a
profound decline in its fortunes, diminishing its importance within the Atlantic world. Except for
the small triangle of cities formed by Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and The Hague, where population
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to Britain posed by the French conquest of the United Provinces did imperil British
prosperity. The fall o f an independent Dutch state removed a traditional check on French
ambitions in Europe, and after 1795, the British government began borrowing heavily
from the Bank o f England to meet new wartime needs. As British depositors also
withdrew large sums in advance of a possible invasion from the continent, the strain on
the Bank of England’s reserves quickly became intolerable. By the end of February
1797, gold and silver specie at the Bank had been reduced to only £1,100,000. With
British reserves steadily deteriorating, the collapse of the Dutch economy suddenly
became crucial. When coupled together, the financial troubles in London and
Amsterdam placed enormous strain on the Atlantic economy, and commodity prices
subsequently dropped sharply and unexpectedly in London in early 1797.9
The sudden downturn promised a gloomy period for Baltimore’s export-driven
economy, but the city’s merchants and artisans expected the vagaries of international
trade to occasionally cloud their prosperity. Few people in Baltimore consequently
panicked about either the Bank o f England’s troubles or the collapse o f commodity prices
in London. Baltimore newspapers simply noted the events overseas and moved on to
other matters. The financial unrest of early 1797 proved far more disastrous, however,
than anyone on either side of the Atlantic could have predicted. The Bank of England’s
stagnated for much of the eighteenth century, most other Dutch cities experienced significant de
urbanization after 1720. Leiden declined from a population of 70,000 in 1688 to only 31,000 in
1795, and Haarlem declined from a population of 50,000 to 21,000 in the same period. The
withering of the textile industry in Leiden and Haarlem, coupled with the diminishing number of
breweries and the decay of the maritime economy, had reduced the United Provinces to a shadow
of its former glory. Jonathan I. Israel remarked that the “shrinkage, and deterioration, of the cities
in the United Provinces is all the more dramatic when looked at against the background of the
general trend in eighteenth-century Europe towards urbanization.” See Israel, The Dutch
Republic, 1011, 1006-18, and Schama, Patriots and Liberators, 24-45.
9 Acres, The Bank o f England From Within, I, 269-75.
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directors feared that another run against the Bank’s reserves would render it insolvent.
To prevent this dire scenario, the directors sent a deputation to W illiam Pitt, the Prime
Minister, asking “how far the Bank might venture to go on paying cash and when he
thought it would be necessary to interfere.” Pitt agreed to bring a resolution before
Parliament calling for a restriction on the issuing of specie, but waited as long as possible
before taking action. The Prime Minister recognized the danger of insolvency, but
worried about the economic and political consequences o f restricting specie payments.
He changed his mind after the London Gazette Extraordinary reported on February 25
that a small group o f French troops had apparently landed at Fishguard in Wales.
Whether o r not the story proved accurate, Pitt realized that the news might cause a
general panic and provoke a disastrous run on the Bank. Having waited as long as
possible before taking such radical action, Pitt finally acceded to the directors’ wishes.10
For Baltimore’s business community, the Bank of England’s restrictions
transformed a merely bothersome turn o f events into a genuine economic emergency. By
suspending specie payments, the Bank caused a severe contraction in available credit
throughout the Atlantic world. At first it appeared that the crisis might be short-lived. In
October 1797, the Bank of England’s directors resolved that “the affairs of the Bank are
in such a state that it can safely resume its accustomed functions.” Hopes ran high in
Baltimore that this improved situation might lead to a relaxation of the crippling
restrictions, but Pitt’s administration proved steadfast. Fiscal conservatism was the order
o f the day, as the British government was hunkering down for what they anticipated
would be a long, expensive war against Napoleon. The interest rate on British public

10 Acres, The Bank o f England From Within, 1,275-77.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

236
securities subsequently doubled to 6 percent in 1798, the highest annual level recorded
during the entire eighteenth century. Bankers on the continent reacted quickly. Dutch
interest rates, usually the lowest in Europe, spiked to 10 percent, while French rentes
rocketed to 34 percent.11
In Baltimore and throughout the United States, the financial troubles across the
Atlantic wreaked havoc with commodity prices. Wholesale wheat prices in Maryland fell
by almost 17 percent in 1797, and the value of the city’s flour exports to the West Indies
dropped from $1,379,000 in 1796 to only $1,038,000 in 1798. Flour exports to Europe
experienced even worse results, plummeting from $288,000 in 1796 to $89,000 in 1797,
and just $19,000 by 1799.12 As seen in Figure 5-1, the initially sharp drop in prices
during the Panic was followed by a period of violent fluctuations that lasted until the War
of 1812. Commodities primarily destined for overseas export suffered greater volatility
than those typically traded on domestic markets. As seen in Figure 5-2, wholesale wheat
prices in Maryland became highly erratic after 1797, while wholesale com prices

11 Bank of England’s directors’ resolution quoted in Acres, The Bank o f England From Within, I,
282-83. For the changes in interest rates following the panic, see David Hackett Fischer, The
Great Wave: Price Revolutions and the Rhythm o f History (New York: Oxford University Press,
1996), 129-30.
12For the value of Baltimore’s flour exports see Geoffrey Gilbert, Baltimore's Flour Trade to the
Caribbean, 1750-1815 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 126-27. For
wheat and com prices in Maryland, see Donald Adams, Jr., “Prices and Wages in Maryland,
1750-1850,” Maryland Historical Magazine, 46 (1986): 625-645. Beyond Baltimore, American
exports suffered generally after the Panic of 1797. According to the Commerce Department,
from a total of $59 million in 1796, U.S. exports fell to $51 million in 1797, and reached only $61
million in 1798. The export figures reported by Adam Seybert in 1818 vary from the Commerce
Department’s figures, but the trend is the same. According to Seybert, U.S. exports equaled $67
million in 17% and dropped to $56.8 million in 1797. Trade rebounded somewhat in 1798, rising
to $61.5 million. See U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics
o f the United States: Colonial Times to 1970 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1975), II, 886, and Adam Seybert, Statistical Annals o f the United States o f America (New York:
Augustus M. Kelley, 1970; orig. 1818), 93.
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Figure 5-1
Indices o f Wholesale Prices in America, 1791-1812
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Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau o f the Census, Historical Statistics o f the
United States: Colonial Times to 1970 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1972), I, 202, 205.
Note: The Commerce Department figures are based on two older works: George Warren
and Frank Pearson, Wholesale Commodity Prices in the United States fo r 213 Years,
1720-1932 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1932), and Anne Bezanson, Wholesale
Prices in Philadelphia, 1784-1861 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
1936).
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Figure 5-2
Mid-Atlantic Grain Prices, 1791-1812
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Sources: Donald Adams, Jr., "Prices and Wages in Maryland, 1750-1850," Journal o f
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DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), I, 209.
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remained relatively steady.13
Baltimore’s post-colonial dependence on foreign markets made its economy
acutely vulnerable to the price volatility following the Panic, and those directly involved
in maritime pursuits were the first to face the repercussions. M any wealthier mercantile
firms, like Robert Oliver & Sons, were able to ride out temporary set-backs by relying
upon a complex tangle of debt-financing schemes to survive. To pay for the importation
of sugar from the West Indies, for example, the Olivers’ agents in St. Croix drew bills
worth £6,000 sterling on John and Thomas Kirwan of London. Unfortunately, the
Olivers had sold most of their cargo on two and four months’ credit, which meant that
they could not reimburse the Kirwans in a timely fashion through the sale of their sugar.
Robert Gilmor, another of Baltimore’s affluent merchants, suggested that the Olivers
borrow from the Amsterdam firm of Wilhelm and Jan Willinks to pay back the Kirwans.
However, the Dutch proved averse to advancing any credit. The difficulties arising from
the French conquest of the United Provinces were thus keenly felt in the Olivers’
counting house.14
To secure the loan from the Willinks, the Olivers lied. Robert told the Willinks
that he did not know how much the Kirwans “have occasion for,” which was truthful, but
he elaborated that they “will not require much if any immediate advances from you, as
the Bills drawn on them for our account cannot fall due for some time.’’ This was not
13 Baltimore did export com, but the value of the trade in this commodity amounted to a fraction
of the city’s exports of tobacco, wheat, and flour. In 1791, Baltimore com exports amounted to
227,520 bushels valued at $82,084.73. This amounted to 26 percent of the value of the city’s
tobacco exports, and less than 8 percent of the value of the city’s wheat and flour exports.
Overall, com accounted for less than 5 percent of the city’s total exports. See Maryland Journal,
March 2, 1792.
14 Stuart Bruchey, Robert Oliver, Merchant o f Baltimore, 1783-1819 (Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1956), 181-186.
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completely honest, for on the same day, the Olivers assured the Kirwans of advancing
them “two thirds of the value of this property immy [immediately].” The ploy worked
and the Olivers were able to weather the panic. Despite such creative financial measures,
the firm did not avoid severe indebtedness. By the end of 1797, the Olivers’ obligations
exceeded their claims by more than $48,000. Nevertheless, they were still in business.15
The experiences of Robert Oliver & Sons were not representative for most of
Baltimore’s mercantile community. Although the depression following the Panic lasted
only a few years, the commercial difficulties generated by the crisis continued to plague
all but a few individuals engaged in overseas trade. American exports rebounded
between 1800 and 1807, but only merchants with significant capital benefited from the
revival of trade.16 Those with limited capital continued to face a deteriorating situation
due to the wild fluctuations in commodity prices. Unable to draw on the types of
reserves available to wealthier individuals, most Baltimore merchants struggled to meet
their obligations to creditors when prices dropped suddenly. Despite the volatility, many
smaller firms might have survived if the general trend in wheat prices had remained
positive. Unfortunately, as seen in Figure 5-3, the three-year moving average for

15 Robert and John Oliver to John and Thomas Kirwan, May 18,1797, and Robert and John
Oliver to Wilhelm and Jan Willinks, May 18, 1797, both in Oliver Record Books, volume 3,
MS.626.1, MHS. Stuart Bruchey, Robert Oliver’s most important biographer, is somewhat
ambiguous, if not apologetic, about Oliver’s business ethics on this and many other issues.
Bruchey submits that Baltimore's mercantile culture “formed for Oliver a criterion of business
right and business wrong which he, concerned as he was for the reputation of his house, could
hardly ignore and did not.” Lying to a foreign creditor evidently fell within the boundaries of
acceptable business behavior. From Robert Oliver’s perspective, his statements to the Willinks
artfully deceived them without undermining his firm’s credibility. See Bruchey, Robert Oliver,
367.
16 See for example, Thomas and Samuel Hollingsworth to Levi Hollingsworth, August 18, 1803,
Hollingsworth Family Papers, Historical Society of Pennsylvania, and Alexander Brown & Sons
to William Cumming, October 12, 1803, Alexander Brown & Sons Papers, Library of Congress.
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Figure 5-3
Three-Year Moving Avgs. on Mid-Atlantic Grain Prices, 1791-1812
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wholesale wheat prices in Maryland declined and then leveled off at a deflated level in
the fifteen years after the Panic. Even savvy merchants found it difficult to manage in
these circumstances without access to significant capital reserves.17
Thanks to the insolvency o f so many marginal firms between 1797 and 1812, an
increasingly smaller number of wealthy individuals were able to control an ever-greater
percentage of the Baltimore’s trade. As seen in Figure 5-4, the percentage o f merchants
in the poorest 40 percent of Baltimore property owners surged from 13 to 37 percent in
this period, while the percentage of merchants among the top 10 percent of Baltimore
property owners plummeted from 48 to 22 percent. Overall, merchants remained one of
the most affluent occupational groups in the city, but this seeming prosperity obscured a
growing inequality within their ranks. The wealthiest 10 percent of the city’s merchants
owned more than half o f all the merchants’ assessed property by 1812, compared to just
over one-third in 1798. Baltimore’s and the nation’s seemingly improving trade figures
for 1800-1807 are therefore quite deceptive. For those on the margins of the mercantile
community, prosperity proved elusive after the Panic of 1797.

17 Adams, “Prices and Wages in Maryland, 1750-1850,” 625-647. Although there is, not
surprisingly, some variadon from the Maryland numbers, wholesale commodity price indexes for
Philadelphia, Charleston, and the United States reveal the same basic pattern seen for Maryland
wheat: prices became very erratic after 1797 with the long-term trend being slightly deflationary
in the decade-and-a-half following the Panic. See Donald Adams, Jr., “Wage Rates in the Early
National Period: Philadelphia, 1785-1830,” Economic History Review, 27 (1968): 404-426, and
Historical Statistics o f the United States, I, 201-202, 204-205, 209. The Census Bureau’s
numbers are based in part on three older studies: George Rogers Taylor, “Wholesale Commodity
Prices at Charleston, 1796-1801,” Journal o f Economic History, 4 (1922): 848-867; G.F. Warren
and F.A. Pearson, Wholesale Commodity Prices in the United States fo r 213 Years, 1720-1932
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1932); and Anne Bezanson, Wholesale Prices in Philadelphia,
1784-1861 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1936).
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Figure 5-4

Property Distribution for Baltimore Merchants, 1798 and 1812
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T h e Q u a s i -W a r

As if the financial distress caused by the Bank of England’s restrictions were not
enough to disrupt foreign trade, the Quasi-War with France further depressed the
economy of an already beleaguered city. After the U.S. Senate ratified Jay’s Treaty in
1795, the revolutionary regime in France grew increasingly belligerent toward the United
States. Diplomatic hostility turned into an undeclared war after July 2, 1796, when a
decree issued by the French Directory annulled the neutral shipping rights guaranteed by
the Franco-American commercial treaty of 1778. The new law allowed French ships to
seize any vessel carrying British goods, and to declare any American ship a lawful prize
if the captain could not produce a properly ordered role d ’equipage.

1R

American shipping

losses mounted as French corsairs swarmed off U.S. coasts in search of prizes. By early
1797, the raids had become quite violent. In one instance, a French commander used
thumbscrews to torture the captain of the Cincinnatus, a Baltimore ship, into declaring
that his cargo was o f English origin. The American captain refused to yield, but even his
valiant resistance to such barbarism was insufficient to keep the French from plundering
his ship anyway.19
Atrocities like those aboard the Cincinnatus convinced President John Adams to
dispatch John Marshall, Elbridge Gerry, and Thomas Pinckney to Paris seek a redress of
American grievances. Meanwhile, having no fleet to repel the molesting corsairs, the

18 A list of all crew and passengers.
19 Alexander DeConde, The Quasi-War: The Politics and Diplomacy o f the Undeclared War with
France, 1797-1801 (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1966), 9, 17; Jerald Combs, The Jay
Treaty: Political Battleground o f the Founding Fathers (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1970), 186-88; and Albert Hall Bowman, Struggle for Neutrality: Franco-American Diplomacy
During the Federalist Era (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1974), 237-44.
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government remained powerless to stop the French depredations. As a result, insurance
rates on American shipping climbed steadily.20 The Baltimore Insurance Company
assessed an average rate of about 4 percent of the cargo’s value for direct voyages, and 8
percent for voyages involving multiple ports in 1796. Average rates for the West Indian
trade were marginally higher than for the trans-Atlantic or U.S. coastal trades, but the
differences were very small. Higher rates were assessed for voyages to and from riskier
locations, such as the Leeward and Windward Islands, but the biggest premium for any
direct voyage in 1796 was only 1216 percent, and just 15 percent for voyages involving
multiple ports. Robert Oliver believed that sharp-built schooners received better rates
from insurers than other vessels, the Baltimore Insurance Company’s policies
demonstrated no bias toward a particular ship type or the person insured. Premiums
were, of course, linked to the value of the ship's cargo, but insurance rates varied almost
entirely upon the number of ports included in the policy, and where the ship would be
sailing. Although Oliver may have been aware of some minor variations, the differences
he perceived must have been very small.21
Premiums with the Baltimore Insurance Company increased dramatically in 1797.
20 Congress approved the building of six frigates in 1794, but construction ceased in 1795 after
the Washington administration reached a peace accord with the Barbary pirates. A
supplementary act in 1796 authorized the completion of the three most advanced vessels,
including the thirty-six gun Constellation under construction in Baltimore. Although Congress
entrusted the construction of the Constellation to David Stodderd, a Baltimore ship builder, much
of the credit for the ship’s advanced progress belonged to Captain Thomas Truxton. a former
privateer during the Revolution and the designated commander of the Constellation.
Unfortunately, the Navy would not receive the first of these new frigates until Summer 1798. See
Howard Chapelle, The History o f the American Sailing Navy: The Ships and their Development
(New York: W.W. Norton, 1949), 118-32; Kenneth Hagan, This People's Navy: The Making o f
American Sea Power (New York: The Free Press, 1991), 29-43; and Michael Crawford and
Christine Hughes, The Reestablishment o f the Navy, 1787-1801 (Washington, DC: Naval
Historical Center, Department of the Navy, 1995), 6-7.
21 Baltimore Insurance Company Account Book, MS.77, MHS, and Bruchey, Robert Oliver, 106.
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The threat of French seizures doubled average rates overall to Sl/ z percent for direct
voyages, and nearly 16 percent for voyages to multiple ports. The inflation of insurance
premiums suggests that the Quasi-War had a chilling effect on the city’s commerce, but
the increases were very uneven depending on where a ship was headed. With the main
elements of the French battle fleet either sailing in the Mediterranean, or bottled up by the
British Home Fleet in the eastern Atlantic, the French concentrated their efforts against
Americans in the West Indies. French corsairs thus proved most effective against only a
fraction of American commerce, and Americans trading in the West Indies suffered the
m ost."
The troubled tale o f Edward Hall, a Baltimore merchant in aux Cayes, St.
Domingo, illustrates the extraordinary measures often required to prosecute trade in the
West Indies during the Quasi-War. In August 1798, Hall wrote that aux Cayes “is almost
deserted since the arrangements taken in America relative to France. Provision[s] & Dry
Goods [are] very scarce,” causing prices to rise, while those for “produce [are] falling.”
Conditions deteriorated even further by early 1799. In a letter to William Wise, a ship
captain, Hall groused that “our situation becomes daily more disagreeable—since the
intercourse with America has been stoped [sic.], everything has become extremely scarce
& dear.” Hall lamented that the island’s economy was reduced to a subsistence level as
“every person waits the return . . . o f the Americans.” He was sure that until then, locals
would continue to “only buy from hand to mouth.”23

" Baltimore Insurance Company Account Book, MHS.
23 Edward Hall to Phillips & Corsen, August 22,1798, Edward Hall to Captain William Wise,
March 10, 1799, and Edward Hall to Duncan & McIntosh, May 31, 1799, in Edward Hall Papers,
MS. 1300, MHS.
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Signs o f relief seemed to appear in June 1799. Hall confided to John Johnson, a
ship captain, that he had received a letter from David Stewart of Baltimore that claimed
“communication would without doubt be soon opened between America & St.
Domingo.” Stewart evidently requested that Hall “invest all my fund in produce.” At the
time, Hall was an agent for a business association between Stewart, Stewart’s son, and
James Williams, another Baltimore merchant. Acting on the hopeful letter, the ambitious
agent acquired 199 hogsheads of sugar, 120,000 pounds o f Coffee, 35,000 pounds of
cotton, and 630 barrels of flour “under the speculative idea that the intercourse would
shortly take place.” He confided to Johnson that “should it prove otherwise, I shall be
ruined, unless some mode can be adopted to get the produce out o f the country.” This
was no exaggeration. In order to purchase the massive cargo, Hall withdrew thirteen bills
of exchange against David Stewart & Sons amounting to more than $24,000. Unless he
could sell the cargo quickly, he would have no way of remitting the balances due.24
When the promised opening to America failed to materialize by late July, Hall
began to panic. In a letter to David Stewart, Hall asserted that he “was firmly persuaded
by the tenor o f your [Stewart’s] Letters & those of others, from the prevailing opinion &
from a variety of concurring circumstances, that he trade would have been opened long
ere this.” If he had known otherwise, he “would not have drawn on you [David Stewart
& Sons] for such an amount without a certainty of placing sufficient funds in your hands
to reimburse you.”25
The dram a dragged on for months without resolution until Hall developed an
24 David Hall to Captain John Johnson, June 30, 1799, and Edward Hall to David Stewart & Sons,
July 26, 1799, in Edward Hall Papers, MHS.
25 Edward Hall to David Stewart & Sons, July 26, 1799, Edward Hall Papers, MHS.
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elaborate intrigue to funnel the slowly rotting produce to the Dutch island o f Curasao.
Realizing that an American cargo would likely be seized and condemned, Hall conspired
with several others to mask both the cargo’s ownership and the identity of the party to
whom it was consigned. First, he placed the 630 barrels of flour (valued at almost
$16,000) and 848 bags of coffee (valued at more than $15,000) on the Danish schooner
Holstein. As a neutral vessel, the Holstein was less likely to be subject to seizure by the
French. Next, the ship’s accounts of January 18, 1800 showed that the cargo was being
shipped to Curasao for Patrick Wood, a British merchant in St. Thomas, on consignment
to the Dutch firm o f Philips & Cursor. In reality, Hall had consigned the cargo to Wood
for sale to Philips & Cursor. This subterfuge masked the ultimate ownership of the
cargo, but it also meant that Hall, and by extension, his business partners in Baltimore,
were now liable to Wood. From Jacquemel, James Williams wrote Hall that the plan was
acceptable, but warned Hall that on or about January I, 1800, David Stewart & Sons had
gone out o f business, and thus not to place any further cargoes on either his or the
Stewarts’ accounts.26
Hall’s intricate scheme quickly unraveled. When the Holstein reached Curasao,
Philips & Cursor only purchased 485 bags of coffee. The Dutch merchants complained
that “a considerable quantity [of coffee].. . is much damaged and we fear totally
spoiled.” This meant that Wood would be short nearly $5,000 for the coffee, and that
Williams and the Stewarts would ultimately be responsible to Wood to make up for the

26 Complaint of Williams & Hillen against Edward Hall, David Stewart, and David C. Stewart in
Baltimore County Court, July 15, 1809; Holstein account of January 18, 1800 (Document No. 7);
and Affidavit of David Stewart to Lords Commissioners (Documents, pgs. 48-50), all in Williams
vs. Hall Record Book, MS.910, MHS. The exact value of the flour was $15,796.70, and the exact
value of the coffee, which amounted to 117,578 pounds, was $15,221.16.
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shortfall. Disregarding W illiams’s letter, Hall agreed to allow Woods to consign almost
$2,500 in rum, salt, wine and other goods aboard the Holstein to him on Stewart’s
account. Hall clearly hoped that a profitable return on that cargo might balance the
account with Woods. The remaining coffee, as well as $1,500 in specie, was loaded onto
a separate ship, the Penelope, and both vessels sailed for St. Thomas. Although the
Holstein arrived safely in St. Thomas, the Penelope was seized by a British frigate,
appropriately named the Surprize, and diverted to Jamaica where she was condemned by
the British Vice Admiralty Court.27
Williams did not discover the unfortunate outcome of the affair for another year.
He had removed from Jacquemel to Cuba and from there to Baltimore. Finding the
Yellow Fever ravaging the population, he remained in the countryside until 1801. When
he finally returned to the city, he received Hall’s letter of August 6, 1800 asking him for
payment for all balances due to Patrick Woods. Williams was incensed. In his opinion,
Hall had no right to undertake the second voyage, and he refused to accept Hall’s
accounting. Hall shot back that he could not “suppose that you were either serious in
your proper senses,” and that “on a mature consideration o f the subject you will totally
disavow the sentiment.” Instead of resolving the matter privately, both parties agreed to
institute reciprocal suits against the other in Baltimore County Court. The case dragged
on for several years, but in 1808, the county court decided in Hall’s favor. Williams and
Stewart were ordered to pay $12,500 to Hall. The decision was partially reversed in

27 Complaint of Williams & Hillen against Edward Hall, David Stewart, and David C. Stewart in
Baltimore County Court, July 15, 1809; Holstein accounts, March 22, 1800 (Documents Nos. 9
and 12); John Cursor to Patrick Wood, July 27, 1800 (Document No. 10); and Affidavit of David
Stewart to Lords Commissioners (Documents, pgs. 48-50), all in Williams vs. Hall Record Book,
MHS.
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Chancery Court in 1816, when Judge William Kitty ordered Hall to pay back $7,359.55
to Williams.28
Although the story of Edward Hall’s intrigue and its painful outcome make a
compelling case study of the Quasi-War’s impact on American trade, such troubled tales
proved the exception rather than the rule for Baltimore trade overall. As seen in Figure
5-5, the threat o f French seizures tripled average rates for direct voyages to and from the
West Indies to 12 percent. Yet the average rates on direct voyages across the Atlantic
had only doubled by the end of 1797, and the effect on the U.S. coastal trade was
negligible.29 The possible French menace in the Atlantic did succeed in making
American merchants nervous, but this only discouraged the practice of insuring both legs
o f a trans-Atlantic voyage at once. Almost 40 percent of the Baltimore Insurance
Company’s policies on trans-Atlantic voyages in 1796 covered the vessel’s return trip;
this percentage fell to just 13 percent in 1797. Yet the total number of policies for transAtlantic commerce doubled, suggesting that anxiety over seizures did not lead to a
diminution of trade, only a change in tactics. Although merchants hedged their risks,

28 Complaint of Williams & Hillen against Edward Hall, David Stewart, and David C. Stewart to
Baltimore County Court, July 15,1809; Verdict of the Honorable William Kitty in the case
Williams & Hillen against Edward Hall, David Stewart, and David C. Stewart, Maryland High
Court of Chancery, February 29, 1816; Edward Hall to James Williams, August 6, 1800
(Document No. 17); and Edward Hall to James Williams, May 18, 1802, all in Williams vs. Hall
Record Book, MHS.
29 Baltimore Insurance Company Account Book, MHS. In 1797, the Baltimore Insurance
Company’s rates exceeded 20 percent for voyages to and from the Windward Islands, and
climbed as high as one-third of the cargo’s value for a few voyages to the West Indies. In 1798,
insurance rates reportedly climbed as high as 30 percent on trans-Atlantic voyages and 40 percent
for the West Indies. During the worst days of the Quasi-War, rates may have occasionally gone
even higher. See the chart on insurance notes in Nathan Sargeant, “The Quasi-War with France,”
The United Service, 9 (1883): 11; John Forbes, Israel Thorndike, Federalist Financier (New
York: Beverly Historical Society by Exposition Press, 1953), 45; DeConde, The Quasi-War, 12425; and Bruchey, Robert Oliver, 243.
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Figure 5-5

Three-Month Moving Avgs. on Insurance Rates by Destination
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they still plunged full ahead with their planned voyages. For the U.S. coastal trade, the
threat of seizures resulted in greater volatility, but rates remained essentially the same in
1797 as in 1796.30
The importance of the Quasi-W ar to the hard times of the late 1790s can be easily
exaggerated. Unlike the financial troubles associated with the Panic that effected every
part of society, the limited war primarily tormented merchants whose interests were tied
to the W est Indies. Merchants engaged in the trans-Atlantic trade did not suffer the same
hardships as those trading in the West Indies. The limited French naval forces in the
western Atlantic concentrated their efforts in the West Indies, and were largely
inconsequential to the rest of American commerce.
Baltimore merchants undertook relatively few voyages in 1798, but it would be a
mistake to conclude that seizures and higher insurance premiums resulting from the
Quasi-W ar accounted for the decline in commercial activity. The threat of seizure did
not unnerve them. Merchants in the late eighteenth century demonstrated an eagerness to
undertake bold initiatives in trade, and if they had possessed available funds, many would
have surely continued to brave the troubles on the high seas. Herein lied the real
problem. The crushing debts incurred after the Panic of 1797 bludgeoned the city’s
vigorous spirit o f enterprise, forcing many otherwise intrepid individuals to reconsider
their risks. The Olivers were in debt by almost $50,000 by 1798 thanks to the financial
turmoil begun in London, and could have ill-afforded to loose a vessel to the French
under those circumstances. M ost other merchant houses and partnerships in Baltimore
faced the same problems. It was for this reason that the Olivers counseled a friend to “lay

30 Baltimore Insurance Company Account Book, MHS.
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by untill you see how matters are likely to turn,” as “the times are alarming & the People
here seem disposed to do little or no business until a Change takes place.”31 The QuasiW ar had done relatively little to deter the city’s leading merchants, but the financial
troubles across the Atlantic had severely dampened their sense of adventure.
The added commercial difficulties posed by the French did not last very long in
any case. On April 27, 1798, Congress authorized the Navy to buy and refit merchant
vessels for active duty. The first two vessels purchased on May 3 included a Baltimore
ship named the Adriana, which the Navy re-christened Baltimore in honor of the city.
Within the next two months, the Navy transferred eight revenue cutters from the
Department of Treasury, purchased four more merchant vessels, and welcomed the
completed forty-four gun frigate United States to the fleet. Almost overnight, the new
nation possessed a naval force capable of sweeping the American coasts of molesting
corsairs.32 By early 1799, the tables had been fully turned on the French, as the
Americans took the offensive in the W est Indies. The most spectacular triumph came on
February 9 near the island of Nevis, when the Baltimore-built Constellation, under the
command of Captain Thomas Truxton, captured the French frigate L'lnsurgente. The

31 Robert and John Oliver to W. Wowry, March 10, 1798, Oliver Record Books, volume 3,
MS.626.1, MHS. Also see Gary Lawson Browne, Baltimore in the Nation, 1789-1861 (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980) 30, 92, and Bruchey, Robert Oliver, 187.
Editorials on June 18 and November 4, 1799, and August 18, 1800 in the Baltimore American
also show that the debts incurred during Panic, rather than the seizures in the Quasi-War, were
responsible for the city’s lackluster commerce.
32 The naval build-up also included several “presentation vessels” built through private
subscriptions. During the summer of 1798, Baltimoreans contributed over $100,000 toward the
completion of two eighteen-gun sloops of war. The ships were named Patapsco and Maryland,
and were delivered to the Navy in 1799. See Chapelle, The American Sailing Navy, 140-73;
Hagan, The Making o f American Sea Power, 42-53; Crawford and Hughes, The Reestablishment
o f the Navy, 7-11; and Frederick Leiner, “The Baltimore Merchants’ Warships: Maryland and
Patapsco in the Quasi-War with France,” Maryland Historical Magazine, 88 (1993), 261-84.
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victory proved especially sweet in the United States, as L ’lnsurgente had previously
taken several American prizes. Thanks to these efforts, insurance rates plummeted in late
1799, and returned to their 1796 levels by Spring 1800. The Quasi-War itself continued
for another year, but thereafter proved of very little consequence to American
commerce.33 The repercussions from the Panic did not dissipate as quickly as the French
threat.

C ontinued F rustrations
Like the city’s merchants, retailers were also among the first to feel the pinch of
the financial crisis. As early as October 1797, Samuel Brooke’s mother sensed that her
son’s economic frustrations would continue for some time. She wrote Samuel of having
“been much exercised about thy present situation,” and “wished [that] after I had parted
with thee that I had urged thy closing thy business in Baltimore as quick as possible.”
She feared that in the wake of the commercial downturn, her son’s shop would “not do to
procure a liveing.” She urged him to return to the countryside, and promised that if “thee
and Sally,” Samuel’s fiancee, “should accomplish your intended union,” the couple could
stay at the family’s farm. Knowing that her son might object, fearing that he would
become a burden, Samuel’s mother assured him that the newly-weds would certainly
pose no inconvenience. After all, Samuel still had “one cow to give milk and another for
33 Gardner Allen, Our Naval War with France (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1909), 84, 103, and
DeConde, The Quasi-War, 130. Neither President John Adams nor Benjamin Stoddert, a former
Georgetown merchant and the newly-appointed Secretary of the Navy, intended the American
offensive in the Caribbean to be an overture to a formal declaration of war. Both men considered
protecting commerce and defending the nation from invasion to be the only proper uses for the
Navy in a republic. See Robert Jones, “The Naval Thought and Policy of Benjamin Stoddert,
First Secretary of the Navy, 1798-1801,” American Neptune, 24 (1964): 61-69, and Robert Smith,
“Keeping the Republic: Ideology and the Diplomacy of John Adams, James Madison, and John
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beef,” and “with other things thee has laid in here I think thee might winter here without
being beholden to my body.”34 As the situation in Baltimore continued to deteriorate in
the autumn, Mrs. Brooke waited impatiently for her son’s decision. She didn’t have to
wait long. By Christmas, Samuel accommodated her wishes by quitting his business in
Baltimore and returning home.
While merchants and shopkeepers scrambled to save their businesses during the
summer of 1797, George Littig continued to enjoy a lively trade at his hat store on North
Gay Street.35 As an artisan selling primarily to locals, Littig benefited from the insulation
the household economy temporarily provided his shop from the international credit
crunch. Hard times descended soon enough. By spring 1798, the effects of the downturn
could be seen by walking down nearly any street in the city. Unlike Brooke, however,
Littig tried to muddle through the economic slump as best he could— at least for a little
while longer.
Surviving the lean years of the late 1790s proved very difficult, as the sales
figures for Littig’s hat shop illustrate. As seen in Figure 5-6, in 1798 and 1799, revenues
for January through May, the busiest season in the eighteenth-century urban economy,
did not keep pace with those o f 1797. The busy spring season began also ending sooner
and more definitively in the early summer months o f 1798-1799. Littig tried to
compensate for the “soft market” by making fewer expensive hats. The number of
“fashionable” hats thus declined in favor of heavy “castor” hats made from either beaver
Quincy Adams” (Ph.D., The College of William and Mary, 1997), 132-33, 139.
34 Mother [Mrs. Brooke] to Sammy [Samuel Brooke], October 15, 1797, Brooke-Hopkins
Letterbook, MHS.
35John Mullin, The Baltimore Directory, fo r 1799 (Baltimore: Warner and Hanna, 1799), 42.
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Figure 5-6

Monthly Revenues from Hat Sales at Littig's Store, 1797-1799
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or rabbit fur. Unfortunately, the strategy didn’t work, and revenues tumbled from £265
in 1797 to just £170 in 1798.36
Desperate to find a strategy that would save his business, George Littig switched
direction once again in 1799. Taking advantage o f the militia craze that swept Baltimore
during the Quasi-War with France, he decided to make more military hats. Although
Baltimore still faced hard times, Littig clearly hoped that customers interested in
purchasing military hats would do so regardless of the price. The gamble hinged on what
Littig perceived to be an inelasticity of demand for a specific product, and his instincts
proved correct. Unfortunately, even this ploy could not fully arrest his deteriorating
situation. The 6 percent decline in sales during 1799 proved less severe than the previous
year’s collapse, but Littig’s revenues had withered by 40 percent over the two disastrous
years. By early 1800, Littig’s efforts ended in failure as his hat store finally went out of
business.37
For many Baltimoreans, it seemed that only relief from across the Atlantic could
end the hard times. Rumors circulated almost continuously in these years about a
possible change in British policy. In January 1798, with commodity prices continuing to
plummet, the Baltimore Federal Gazette reported that “the cash and bullion at present in
the bank [of England] are . . . much above what they have been at any time since
September 1795.” Unfortunately for Baltimore’s anxious population, William Pitt’s
government still proved reluctant to make any policy changes. With no end in sight to
the credit crunch, the Gazette lamented that “the restrictions imposed upon payments”

36 George Littig Ledger, MS. 1657, MHS.
37 George Littig Ledger, MHS.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

252
would continue indefinitely. The prospect of relief peaked once again in February 1798
when the Gazette reported that “the bank was in such a state of affluence, as to be ready
to pay all demands on it in specie.” Wild stories circulated throughout Baltimore “that
the great inconvenience arising from the present scarcity of silver” had caused a great
agitation for coinage in London. For the moment, it appeared that Pitt’s government
might buckle under the pressure of public opinion. Once again, however, hope vanished
when the British government refused to yield and the restrictions continued.38
By winter 1799, many merchants, shopkeepers, and artisans found themselves
drowning in debts with little chance of rescue. Local credit had to be expanded in order
for many Baltimore firms to survive. Unfortunately, none of Baltimore’s three banks
proved even slightly helpful. Instead of placing the needs of the community first, the
bank directors decided to protect their own interests by contracting credit. The Baltimore
branch of the Bank of the United States had usually followed rather miserly policies in
extending credit, but it proved especially stingy during the Panic. The ratio between the
bank’s notes in circulation and its specie reserves between 1792 and 1800 was normally
rather low compared to other institutions. During the worst days of the crisis, however,
this ratio dropped to 0.96, which meant that the value of the bank’s notes in circulation
was actually less than the value of its specie reserves. The financial burdens produced by

38 Baltimore Federal Gazette and Baltimore Daily Advertiser, January 25, 1798, and February 20.
1798. The cautious approach by Pitt’s government turned out to be a prescient decision. The
Panic of 1797 marked the worst collapse of prices the Atlantic world faced during what David
Hackett Fischer has described as the long-term price inflation of the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth century. Fischer identified Paris in 1729 as the epicenter of this long-term increase in
prices. The inflation began slowly during the mid-eighteenth century, but emerged as a clearly
visible trend throughout the Atlantic world by the 1760s and 1770s. The trend continued until the
Panic of 1797-1798, which ushered in a temporary stabilization between 1801 and 1805. Prices
rocketed once again between 1805 and 1820 until they reached what Fischer called the “Victorian
equilibrium” of the nineteenth century. See Fischer, The Great Wave, 117-56.
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the banks’ tight-fisted policies proved too much for many firms, and in early 1800, many
of the city’s most prominent businesses finally cracked under the strain. Even Adrian
Valck, the W illinks’ agent in Baltimore, failed during these desperate months.39
Those who remained hopeful that a new year might bring an end to hard times
soon discovered otherwise. On August 22, 1800, the Federal Gazette reported what
those in Fell’s Point already knew: “we find an inflammatory bilious fever now exists— it
first made its appearance on the water next to the cove . . . and thence spread in various
directions” throughout the city. The “bilious fever” was yellow fever, the recurrent
scourge that had become an endemic problem for America’s seaport cities. Likely
transmitted by the aedes aegypti, a species of mosquito inadvertently brought from Africa
to America in the seventeenth century, yellow fever spread quickly in congested urban
spaces like Baltimore, which had an overall population density o f approximately 33,000
people per square mile in 1800. Public health officials in American seaports had battled
outbreaks o f the disease throughout the 1790s, but from mid August until late October,
the disease often reached epidemic proportions.40
The Federal Gazette attributed 1,197 deaths to the Yellow Fever outbreak of
1800, or nearly 5 percent of the city’s total population.41 Fell’s Point proved especially

39 Stuart and Eleanor Bruchey, Money & Banking in Maryland (Baltimore: Maryland Historical
Society, 1996), I, 15-16, and Browne, Baltimore in the Nation, 247 n.19.
40 Federal Gazette and Baltimore Daily Advertiser, August 22, 1800. For Baltimore’s struggles
against Yellow Fever see William Travis Howard, Jr., Public Health Administration and the
Natural History o f Disease in Baltimore, Maryland, 1797-1820 (Washington, DC: Carnegie
Institute, 1924), and Douglas Stickle, “Death and Class in Baltimore: The Yellow Fever Epidemic
of 1800,” Maryland Historical Magazine, 74 (1979): 282-299. For Baltimore’s population
density see Carole Shammas, ‘The Space Problem in Early United States Cities,” The William
and Mary Quarterly, 3d Ser., 57 (2000): 509.
41 An equivalent outbreak in Baltimore in 2000 would have claimed more than 30,000 lives.
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vulnerable to the epidemic. Its marshy areas provided excellent breeding grounds for
mosquitoes, and its population density likely exceeded 60,000 people per square mile,
making it easy for the insects to spread the disease rapidly.42 Public health officials, who
did not understand how the fever was contracted or how it spread, often blamed the
poverty and immorality of the disease’s victims. John Weatherbum, who lived through
several epidemics in Baltimore, concluded that yellow fever thrived “in those parts
inhabited by the lower order of the people, where cleanliness is not duly attended to, and
where their diet and drink is not of the most wholesome kind.” Due in part to this type of
prejudice, doctors were thus slow to address the needs of the working poor who made up
the majority of the Fell’s Point population. Yellow fever claimed approximately 15
percent of the residents in Fell’s Point in 1794, while nearly one in four succumbed
during an outbreak in 1797. Not surprisingly, half of those who died in Baltimore from
the disease in 1800 were from Fell’s Point, and almost 80 percent were located in the
least affluent area east o f Jones’ Falls.43

42 Federal Gazette and Baltimore Daily Advertiser, October 29, 1800, and Shanunas, ‘The Space
Problem in Early United States Cities,” 511-23. The 1800 census lacks a breakdown of
Baltimore’s population by ward, making it impossible to provide exact figures for the population
densities in different parts of the city. Using the 1798 Federal Direct Tax, however, Shammas
concluded that Baltimore’s population likely clustered into the settled areas of the city with
developed waterfronts, just as the populations in Philadelphia and New York did. Shammas
further observed that the average size of a houselot in Baltimore was 6,931 square feet, but the
average size of a houselot in Fell’s Point was only 2,504 square feet. In wards 4, 5, and 6 the
average was 2,604 square feet, and in wards 2 and 3, the average size was 2,148 square feet.
Based on the wards’ location long the waterfront and the smaller average sizes of their houselots,
they likely represented the most crowded parts of the city. In equivalent areas of Philadelphia
along the Delaware River waterfront, population densities ranged from 46,562 in the Dock ward
to 92,862 in the Chestnut ward. In New York, the equivalent areas included wards 1 through 5,
where population density ranged from 51,675 to 85,987. Assuming that the population densities
for specific parts of Baltimore were similar to equivalent areas of Philadelphia and New York, the
population density of Fell’s Point in 1800 likely exceeded 60,000, and may have ranged as high
as 90,000 people per square mile.
43 John Weatherbum Collection, MS.44, Letterbook #119, Milton S. Eisenhower Library, The
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In addition to the profound human tragedy caused by the weight o f so much
death, a yellow fever outbreak also represented an economic catastrophe for Baltimore.
Fearful that news o f an epidemic would provoke a mass exodus from the city, the editors
o f the Federal Gazette waited as long as possible before printing the report. With 15
people already dead and approximately 112 more infected by August 22, the editors
could delay no longer. Within days, hundreds of stores, workshops, and businesses
closed, and those who could afford to leave the city fled to the countryside. Baltimore’s
already beleaguered economy came to a virtual standstill. For laborers, the disappearance
of a substantial portion of the city’s employers made the increasingly dismal prospects
for earning a wage even worse. Unable to leave and disproportionately represented east
of Jones Falls, laborers also faced the worst of the epidemic itself. Their troubles
continued into the winter of 1800-1801, as the needs of families devastated by disease
and loss strained the city’s existing capacity to provide for the poor.44

T h e S e a r c h f o r A l t e r n a t iv e s

Without any sign of relief from across the Atlantic, only extraordinary measures
could keep the city from falling further into depression. Archibald Campbell, ironically
the former President o f the penurious Baltimore branch of the Bank of the United States,

Johns Hopkins University, Special Collections; quoted in Seth Rockman, “Working for Wages in
Early Republic Baltimore: Unskilled Labor and the Blurring of Slavery and Freedom,” (Ph.D.,
University of California at Davis, 1999), 54. For mortality figures, see Howard, Public Health in
Baltimore, 212-214, and Stickle, “Death and Class in Baltimore,” 284-88, 294-96. Stickle
counted 846 internments east of Jones’ Falls for August 20 through October 14, 1800, and only
235 internments west of Jones Falls for the same period. During each of the nine weeks of the
epidemic, internments were far greater east of Jones Falls.
44 Federal Gazette and Baltimore Daily Advertiser, August 22, 1800; Stickle, “Death and Class in
Baltimore,” 288-94; and Rockman, “Working for Wages,” 53-55,58-60.
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organized an “Association o f R elief’ in January 1800. This ad-hoc organization brought
together the few insurance companies, mercantile firms, and individuals unaffected by
the Panic in an effort to halt business failures. Campbell’s effort yielded impressive
results. In a letter signed by twenty-one firms and published in the Baltimore Federal
Gazette in January 1800, W alter Muschett’s creditors publicly declared that “the
management of [his] business should be left entirely to [him],” and “we make no doubt
but [Muschett] will be able to fully satisfy every claim . . . in a reasonable time.” Such
treatment caught the attention of neighboring Philadelphia, where the Gazette o f the
United States declared “the uniformly liberal disposition manifested by the merchants of
Baltimore, during the commercial embarrassment of that place, towards their brethren in
distress, reflects everlasting honor upon the city.” The newspaper marveled that it is
“rare to find a large body o f men influenced by generous considerations, where individual
interest, is immediately concerned; on the contrary, a scramble often takes place, each
creditor hoping to secure himself the largest share.”45
The “Association o f R elief’ provided only a temporary expedient. To meet the
city’s need for greater access to credit and further stimulate the city’s economy, the
M aryland legislature approved charters for seven new Baltimore banks between 1804 and
1812. The Union Bank of Maryland, the first of the new institutions, actually began
operating prior to receiving its state charter. Like other Republican-dominated banks of
the period, the Union Bank offered long-term paper that could be used as monetized
credit, rather than the short-term business paper used by merchants. The introduction of
this new medium of exchange helped satisfy a desperate need in Baltimore to
43 Baltimore Federal Gazette and Baltimore Daily Advertiser, January 21, 1800; and Gazette o f
the United States quoted in the Baltimore Federal Gazette, February 3, 1800.
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depersonalize “the relationship between debtor and creditor by giving the debtor[s] more
freedom” to meet their obligations.46
The expansion o f local credit solved the short-term problem of immediate debts,
but Baltimore still faced the prospect of recurring financial crises unless the city’s
dependence on the European markets could be broken. The hard times of the late 1790s
highlighted the vulnerability of the post-colonial economy, and illustrated the need to
supplement European trade in some fashion. Yet real change was slow to materialize.
Rather than abandon the post-colonial system altogether, many Baltimore merchants
favored further diversification of trade through the adoption of new commodities and the
extension of existing overseas markets, especially those in the West Indies and South
America.
Cotton provided a possible solution to Baltimore’s trade problems. Mark Pringle,
Robert Oliver, and several other Baltimore merchants recognized the potentially lucrative
export market in cotton, but Alexander Brown proved the most adept at tapping this
opportunity. A linen wholesaler who emigrated from Ballymena, Ireland during the late
1790s, Brown resumed his former trade upon arriving in Baltimore, announcing in the
Federal Gazette a “most complete assortment of 4-4 and 7-8 Irish linen . . . which will be
sold by the box or piece for cash or good acceptance within the city on usual credit.”
After 1803, however, he abandoned the linen trade, making changes to both the
commercial and financial aspects of his business. He began purchasing cotton from an

46 Browne, Baltimore in the Nation, 22-23, 31-32. In addition to the Union Bank of Maryland,
the Maryland legislature approved charters for The Mechanics Bank of Baltimore, The Marine
Bank of Baltimore, The Franklin Bank of Baltimore, The Commercial & Farmers Bank of
Baltimore, The Farmers & Merchants Bank of Baltimore, and The City Bank of Baltimore. See
Kelly, Shank, and Gordon, Money & Banking in Maryland, II, 153, 172, 183, 198, 224.
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agent in Savannah, Georgia for export to Liverpool, England, and quickly became
Baltimore’s most prosperous cotton merchant.47
Brown’s success was not wholly the result of the cotton trade. Unlike many
eighteenth-century merchants who gambled on bold “adventures” that produced either
enormous profits or dreadful losses, Brown represented a new generation of merchants
who avoided speculation, and invested their capital in enterprises that promised minimal
risk. Brown thus supplemented his cotton trade by acting as a brokerage house for
English bills of exchange. He bought bills drawn on tobacco exporters in Petersburg,
Virginia, and sold them to importers of English goods in Baltimore. As the British pound
sterling remained the chief exchange currency in trans-Atlantic trade during the
nineteenth century, the brokerage business in English bills produced a steady income.
The new endeavors proved quite profitable, and by 1810, Brown had increased his firm’s
capital to $121,000.48
Both the financial and commercial aspects of Brown’s business experienced
unprecedented growth after 1810. In that year, William, Alexander’s eldest son, removed
from Baltimore to Liverpool to establish a overseas branch of the business. The new,
although connected firm was called William and James Brown & Company. The new
house quickly became one of the largest dealers o f American cotton consignments in
England, and with a branch in Liverpool, Alexander Brown & Sons was now able to
draw English bills o f exchange directly. The new branch transformed the firm from a
47 Mark Pringle to Lubbock, Colt, and Co., February 14,1797, Mark Pringle Letterbook, MS.680,
MHS; Robert and John Oliver to Richard Forster, June 26, 1797, Oliver Record Books, volume 3,
MHS; and Federal Gazette and Baltimore Daily Advertiser, December 20, 1800.
48 Browne, Baltimore in the Nation, 92, and Edwin Perkins, Financing Anglo-American Trade:
The House o f Brown, 1800-1880 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975), 19-23.
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mere American brokerage into a full-fledged trans-Atlantic exchange dealer. The
Browns also began purchasing their own fleet of ships, beginning with the impressive
413-ton Armata, built in New York in 1810-1811. By 1820, the Browns’ capital had
risen to over one million dollars, making it one o f the largest mercantile companies in
America. By the 1830s, the financial services the Browns provided to merchants
engaged in trans-Atlantic trade were rivaled only by the Second Bank of the United
States.49
Coffee represented another alternative for solving Baltimore’s trade problems, but
the commodity proved an elusive solution to Baltimore’s trade problems. As coffee
exports declined after 1800, only those merchants willing to risk significant capital
profited from the trade. In 1802, it took Robert Oliver & Co. nine months to sell three
barrels of coffee at the deflated price of 20 or 22 cents a pound. By winter, they finally
decided to accept a loss of $1,270 by selling the remaining cargo at auction.50 Prices
rebounded after the Peace of Amiens in 1803, but remained volatile as merchants
continued to be wary of the constantly shifting diplomatic situation in the Atlantic.
Larger firms like the Olivers relied on insurance claims to avoid losses due to seizures,
but not every merchant was able to pay the spiraling rates. Others who paid their
premiums sometimes failed to receive compensation because the insurer became

49 Perkins, Financing Anglo-American Trade, 19-23. By the 1830s, the House of Brown’s capital
surpassed three million dollars, making it the largest mercantile company in the United States.
Also see John Kouwenhoven, Partners in Banking: An Historical Portrait o f a Great Private
Bank, Brown Brothers Harriman &. Co., 1818-1968 (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1968); John
Killick, “Risk, Specialization and Profit in the Mercantile Sector of the Nineteenth Century
Cotton Trade: Alexander Brown & Sons, 1820-1880,” Business History, 16 (1974): 1-16; and
Gary Lawson Browne, “Business Innovation and Social Change: The Career of Alexander Brown
after the War of 1812,” Maryland Historical Magazine, 69 (1974): 243-55.
30 Bruchey, Robert Oliver, 235-60.
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insolvent. Encumbered by high insurance costs, the threat o f seizures, and an irregular
supply o f the bean itself, coffee imports represented only a minor part of Baltimore’s
commerce until the 1820s.51
The continuing diplomatic tug-of-war between Great Britain and France made
further diversification in commodities and foreign markets a rather dismal prospect for
solving Baltimore’s economic frustrations. After the Peace o f Amiens in 1803, Napoleon
prohibited goods exported from any part of the British Empire to be imported to any port
under French control. The decree required American merchants to obtain a certificate of
origin from a French consul. The British reacted quickly. Under the so-called Rule of
1756, trade considered illegal during peacetime could not become legal during wartime if
carried by a neutral nation. American merchants had circumvented the British restriction
by conducting “broken voyages.” Although the practice was of questionable legality, it
received official sanction from the British Admiralty Court in the Polly decision of 1800.
In the Essex case of 1805, however, the Lords of Appeal reversed the judgement on
“broken voyages,” opening the floodgates to British confiscations of American shipping.
The Atlantic crisis steadily worsened over the next two years thanks to a series of British
and French decrees that effectively eliminated the legality of neutral trade altogether.
Seizures o f American ships increased steadily. Even worse, the British refused to
recognize American naturalization laws, and began impressing Americans. The most

51 Prior to 1812, coffee imports accounted for eleven percent of Baltimore’s South American
trade. After the South American Wars of Liberation in the 1820s, coffee became the principal
part of Baltimore’s trade with South America, and especially so with Brazil. See Frank Rutter,
South American Trade o f Baltimore (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1897), 1115, 23-35.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

261

celebrated episode o f this cavalier practice was the Chesapeake incident.52
On June 22, 1807, the U.S. Navy frigate Chesapeake left Hampton Roads,
Virginia on its maiden voyage under the command of James Barron. Once off the
Virginia Capes, H.M.S. Leopard confronted the Chesapeake, and the British captain
bluntly demanded that a boarding party be allowed to search the U.S. warship for four
alleged British deserters. Although the Royal Navy had impressed American citizens
before, the demand to board a neutral nation’s warship in international waters was neither
a right nor a policy embraced by the British government. This remarkable incident
therefore exceeded all precedent, and Captain Barron staunchly refused the British
demand. The Leopard then fired three broadsides into the Chesapeake, crippling the U.S.
vessel while killing three and wounding eighteen. A boarding party then searched the
Chesapeake and removed four sailors— three of whom were indisputably Americans.53
The outcry over Chesapeake incident precipitated the Jefferson administration to
adopt the Embargo and Non-importation Acts of 1807. These laws effectively closed
American commerce to the world, and over the next five years, the Jefferson and
52 James Zimmerman, Impressment o f American Seamen (New York: Columbia University Press.
1925), 11-29, 116-55; Anna Caulder, American Commerce As Affected by the Wars o f the French
Revolution and Napoleon (Clifton, NJ: Augustus M. Kelley, 1972), 61, 66, 79-91; Bradford
Perkins, Prologue to War: England and the United States, 1805-1812 (Berkeley; University of
California Press, 1961), 76-80, 104-06; Burton Spivak, Jefferson's English Crisis: Commerce,
Embargo, and the Republican Revolution (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1979),
31-102; and Smith, “Keeping the Republic,” 248-49,257-62.
53 The order to board and search the Chesapeake came from Vice Admiral George Berkeley, the
British commander of the North American station. Frustrated over deserters, especially in the
Hampton Roads area, the Admiral yielded to his baser instincts, and gave the order on June I,
1807. The British government recalled Berkeley after the incident, although the Admiral was
later given another command. See Donald Hickey, The War o f 1812: A Forgotten Conflict
(Urbana: University of Illinois, 1989), 17; Joseph Whitehouse, The Battle fo r Baltimore, 1814
(Baltimore: Nautical and Aviation Publishing Co., 1997), 5-6; and Spencer Tucker and Frank
Reuter, Injured Honor: The Chesapeake-Leopard Affair, June 22, 1807 (Annapolis: Naval
Institute Press, 1996).
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Madison administrations continued to follow commercial policies designed to cripple
British trade. Their efforts failed to win political concessions from the Parliament and
instead debilitated American commerce. U.S. exports plummeted from $108 million in
1807 to just $22 million in 1808, their lowest level in sixteen years. Imports dropped
from $139 million to $57 million, their lowest level in fourteen years.54 The frustrations
of the embargo period convinced the most steadfast merchants that further diversification
in overseas markets would not solve the republic’s problems. Even Robert Oliver
substantially withdrew from business after 1809, unwilling to negotiate the multiple
barriers created by the countless laws and varied economic frustrations imposed against
American commerce during these years. For the second time after the Revolution, the
neomercantilist economy had brought hardship and disappointment to the republic, and
the most stubborn proponents of overseas trade realized that Americans could no longer
rely exclusively on foreign trade as their sole source o f prosperity.

54For the Jefferson administration’s reaction to the Chesapeake incident see Spivak, Jefferson's
English Crisis, 68-71, 103-229; Steven Watts, The Republic Reborn: War and the Making o f
Liberal America, 1790-1820 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), 239-42;
Tucker and Reuter, Injured Honor, 189-206; and Smith, “Keeping the Republic,” 261-76. For the
decline in American trade after the embargo, see Historical Statistics o f the United States, II, 886.
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CHAPTER SIX
INTO THE BACKCOUNTRY

As early as November 1799, when the economic repercussions of the Panic of
1797 were still unfolding, an editorial in the Baltimore American urged the business
community to move away from overseas trade and adopt a new direction for Baltimore’s
economy. The paper urged “every friend to the Republican interest. . . to encourage out
home manufactures as much as possible, and to consume as little as he can of the British.
By purchasing their goods we increase the revenue o f that country, and thereby aid the
foes of liberty.” The clarion was also raised by other newspapers. The Federalist editors
o f the Baltimore Federal Gazette embraced the idea of economic independence by
expansion of the domestic market in August 1800, when they too urged the business
community to redirect Baltimore’s economy away from the Atlantic economy and
towards the opportunities in the American W est.1
Calls for domestic market development, improvements in American
manufacturing, and more economic independence were not uncommon in the crisis
preceding the American Revolution, nor in the years following the war. Yet advocates of
this approach had previously been drowned out by the supporters of the neomercantilist
approach. With the clouds of economic despair still looming above the city, however, the
clarion had finally found receptive ears. In the twenty years after the hard times of the
1790s, the city’s merchants and artisans, through both public and private means, worked
1Baltimore American, November 4, 1799, and Baltimore Federal Gazette, August 18,1800.
263
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to expand Baltimore’s market connections to the backcountry. The development of a
return trade and the overall growth of the backcountry trade after 1800 represented a
major moment of transition for the American economy, from the Atlantic-oriented,
commerce-driven, neomercantilist economy o f the late eighteenth century to a westernoriented, vastly expanded domestic market economy in the early nineteenth century. In
1800, the idea of a national market, or even an integrated regional one, was still just a
vision. Yet over the next two decades, that vision slowly began to take shape with
profound consequences for both the household economy and the prevailing social order.
In contrast to earlier, isolated examples of individual entrepreneurship, the
renewed interest in the backcountry encouraged a broad range o f merchants and artisans
to expand their commercial ties with the countryside. The question that remained
unresolved was which backcountry would prove most enticing to Baltimore’s merchants
and artisans. Competition promised to be especially fierce in the mid-Atlantic.
Merchants and artisans in Philadelphia and New York to the north, and Alexandria and
the new Federal City to the south, vied with those in Baltimore for a share o f the return
trade to the backcountry.
The booming populations of Kentucky, Tennessee, and North Carolina did not go
unnoticed by coastal merchants like John Peter Spies. The owner o f a comb manufactory
in Baltimore, an importer o f goods from Bremen, Bordeaux, and Havana, and a reseller
o f Maryland tobacco, Spies embodied the city’s entrepreneurial spirit. He looked
primarily to markets in the upper South to sell his wares, dealing directly with customers
in urban areas of Virginia. Yet most o f his transactions involved customers living
hundreds o f miles away in Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, and North Carolina. For these
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customers, especially those in rural areas, Spies operated in much the same way that
merchants conducted overseas trade, by relying on business partners who served as
agents and by selling goods on short-term credit. The approach had shortcomings,
however, for merchants and artisans looking to expand their backcountry connections.
Building a reliable network o f business associates took time, and often proved a risky
way o f doing business. Bad debts could accumulate very quickly, and as early as 1806,
Spies counted more than 150 people as “doubtful debtors” who owed him nearly
$14,000. By 1818, this number had swelled to almost 200 people, and exceeded
$23,500.2 Spies proved adept at avoiding the pitfalls o f the trade, and became a leading
figure in Baltimore’s commercial ties to the South. For most Baltimore merchants and
artisans, however, markets in the upper South remained largely out-of-reach. Profits
could be enormous, but unless someone had a knowledge of the territory and type of
credible business connections that Spies possessed, the trade was simply too risky.
The Ohio River Valley, which included parts of western Pennsylvania and
western Virginia, as well as the new states of Kentucky and Ohio, represented the
ultimate prize for many coastal merchants and artisans. Numbering no more than
100.000 rough-and-ready settlers at the end of the Revolution, the region’s population
likely exceeded 400,000 by the turn of the century. More important, this growth
continued at an even faster pace over the next twenty years. In 1810, Kentucky’s
population alone surpassed 400,000. By 1820, Kentucky and Ohio each accounted nearly
600.000 people, and settlements had spread into Indiana and Illinois. The population of
the entire Ohio Valley likely surpassed 2 million, which meant that one in five Americans

2 [John Peter] Spies Ledger, MS.785, MHS.
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lived there.3 Despite its enormous potential, the area suffered from the same drawbacks
as markets in the upper South. Few could safely take advantage of the trade until
significant transportation and banking connections were forged later in the nineteenth
century. The value of trade with the Ohio Valley between 1800 and 1820 should not be
underestimated or dismissed, but most of the commerce remained in the hands o f a
relatively small elite. Discovering dependable business connections required time, and
most Baltimoreans faced an immediate need to supplement their traditional mercantile
pursuits.
Building connections to the Ohio River Valley and the markets of the upper South
represented long-term goals, and at the tum of the nineteenth century, most merchants
and artisans needed a short-term solution to their economic woes. The lower Potomac
River Valley to the south represented the closest area for expansion, but it held limited
potential. The region encompassed five Maryland counties, including St. Marys, Charles,
Calvert, Prince George’s, and Montgomery, as well as most of northern Virginia
extending westward to the Shenandoah Valley. This area held potential political
advantages for Baltimoreans, as most of the region, including the Potomac River itself,
laid within Maryland’s borders. Competition from Alexandria and Washington also
promised to be weaker than Baltimore’s northern neighbors would likely provide.
Unfortunately, population growth stagnated after the Revolution, and Baltimore’s
merchants had already assumed much o f the area’s tobacco and wheat trade in the 1780s

3 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics o f the United States:
Colonial Times to 1970 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), I, 26-29, 3236.
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and 1790s.4
Unlike the struggling Maryland counties to the south, the farms and towns of
western Pennsylvania to the north were ideally suited for immediate market expansion.
Western Pennsylvania experienced a surge in population growth and wealth in the two
decades after the American Revolution, providing a burgeoning market for dry goods and
luxury items. Baltimore had served as an entrepot for farmers in the Susquehanna
Valley, so many merchants already possessed business connections that could be
developed further. Although a few merchants like Spies grew wealthy thanks to trade
with the south or the west, the majority of the city’s residents looked to the north to forge
market connections in the twenty years after the Panic o f 1797.
The expansion of competition in the backcountry was accomplished largely
through the introduction or expansion of three capitalist devices. First, artisans and
merchants in coastal cities launched intensive marketing campaigns in backcountry
newspapers. The advertising dollars spent by Baltimoreans actually represented the
largest source of revenue for many Pennsylvania newspapers. Second, merchants and
bankers created favorable credit terms and exchange rates for backcountry residents as an
inducement to secure their trade. Third, artisans and merchants poured thousands of
dollars into the construction of turnpikes to maintain market connections to backcountry
farmers and shopkeepers. Baltimore’s reach into the backcountry was greatly extended,
but most of these efforts were designed to integrate existing markets into rather than
create new ones. In other words, Baltimoreans took advantage of their existing
connections with western Pennsylvanians to augment the city’s share of commerce within

* See the discussion in chapter three.
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the mid-Atlantic and develop new avenues of commerce.

O v e r l a pp in g H in t e r l a n d s

Since the late seventeenth century, Pennsylvania’s backcountry had been
contested ground between Marylanders and Philadelphians. Not surprisingly, the contest
for this hinterland continued into the nineteenth century when expansion of the return
trade to the backcountry became a renewed priority for merchants and artisans in both
cities. Ethnicity and religious affiliation proved important in this competition only at the
individual level. Scots-Irish retailers favored doing business with Scots-Irish
wholesalers, German farmers preferred buying goods from German importers, Catholic
settlers tended to buy from Catholic merchants, and Quaker shopkeepers were more
likely to trust their fellow Quakers. Yet neither the Philadelphia nor the Baltimore
business community enjoyed an aggregate commercial advantage in the backcountry for
ethnic reasons. Although the ethnic make-up o f Baltimore differed in many important
ways from that of Philadelphia, the diversity of ethnic settlements in the Pennsylvania
backcountry tended to neutralize any potential advantages to either city on this basis.
Scots-Irish and German sectarians represented the majority of the population in
western Pennsylvania, and both Philadelphia and Baltimore contained a significant
number of both ethnic groups. Baltimore merchants built on commercial ties they had
previously forged with German settlers in Frederick County, Maryland, while
Philadelphia merchants cultivated their long-standing connections to farmers and
shopkeepers in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania. Merchants from both ports contended
for the German trade in York County by advertising in the York Gazette, the town’s
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primary German-language newspaper, but neither Baltimore nor Philadelphia merchants
had a clear advantage in this ethnically diverse county.3
Philadelphia had a larger Quaker population than Baltimore, but most western
Pennsylvania Quakers had their regional meeting in Baltimore, not Philadelphia.6
Baltimore had a greater Catholic population than Philadelphia, but there were rather few
Catholics in western Pennsylvania. In a letter to the Bishop John Carroll in 1800, Dmitri
Gallitzin, a Russian-born missionary, claimed that “the country is amazing fertile, most
entirely inhabited by Roman Catholicks, and so advantageously situated with regard to
market t h a t . . . it will be a place of refuge.” Although a ringing endorsement of western
Pennsylvania’s prospects, Gallitzin’s claims were enormously exaggerated. Catholics
were a small minority in western Pennsylvania in the early nineteenth century, and many
found the Susquehanna Valley particularly inhospitable. Upon his arrival in
Northumberland County in May 1796, Father Patrick Lonergan, an Irish missionary, held
out great promise for the construction of a chapel. He wrote of having “high hopes from
the respectable people o f different religious opinions” that the project would succeed. By
January 1797, however, Lonergan was petitioning Bishop Carroll for relief. The
beleaguered priest felt besieged by his neighbors, lashing out at them as “a reprobated
clan of infamous Scots-Irish, superior in all kind o f wickedness only in a superlative
degree to the most celebrated, hostile convicts.” Although Patrick Campbell of

5 York Gazette, September 30, 1796, October 14, 1796, and October 21, 1796.
6 After 1790, the Philadelphia yearly meeting included Pennsylvanians living east of the
Susquehanna River, as well as the residents of Delaware and Maryland’s Eastern Shore.
Baltimore’s meeting included Pennsylvanians living west of the Susquehanna River, as well as
residents of Maryland’s Western Shore, and Fairfax County, Virginia. See Phebe Jacobson,
Quaker Records in Maryland (Annapolis: Hall of Records, 1966).
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Chambersburg did not display the same level of hostility, he was still pessimistic about
the prospects o f the Catholic Church in his town. Writing on behalf of the church
trustees to Bishop Carroll in 1804, Campbell lamented that “we have many [congregates]
but they are of the Poorer sort and constantly in the way o f Emigrating.”7 Any potential
advantage Baltimore may have possessed thanks to Bishop Carroll’s location soon ended
as well. After 1808, Philadelphia became a separate diocese, ending the Baltimore
diocese’s jurisdiction in Pennsylvania. Baltimoreans and Philadelphians thus found it
difficult to cashier their religious affiliations into any significant commercial advantages.
Geography, rather than religion or ethnicity, shaped the contest for the return
trade to Pennsylvania’s backcountry. Few Baltimore merchants attempted to compete for
a share of the market east o f the Susquehanna River. The high costs and risks associated
with the intense marketing and turnpike construction that was required to win the return
trade from Pennsylvania convinced Baltimore investors to carefully target their dollars.
Philadelphia’s geographic advantages and long-standing ties to the eastern Susquehanna
Valley thus persuaded the majority of Baltimore’s merchants and artisans to forgo any
direct challenges to the Quaker city’s hegemony over the area. There were, of course, a
number of exceptions. John Close, a merchant-shopkeeper in Mechanicsburg and
Harrisburg, traded with more than a dozen Baltimore merchants between 1800 and 1818.
Close purchased sugar, tea, rum, and wine in Baltimore, as well as many dry goods that
were available in Philadelphia. His receipt of July 25, 1812 revealed a purchase o f oil
cloths, silk stockings, ribbons, waistcoats, and silk caps totaling $122.95 from A.
7 Father Dmitri Gallitzin to Bishop John Carroll, February 9, 1800, folder 8A-N2; Father Patrick
Lonergan to Bishop John Carroll, May 5, 1796, folder 5A7, and January 24, 1797, folder 5A9;
and Father Patrick Campbell to Bishop John Carroll, March 16, 1804, folder 2F7, all in the
Archives of the Archdiocese of Baltimore.
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Karthaus of Baltimore, and a later receipt of July 2, 1818 showed a $175.49 purchase for
“casimere, silk,” and other textiles from the Baltimore firm Meredith and Mummer.
Close proved exceptional, however, as most Baltimore merchants and artisans largely
ignored the eastern Susquehanna Valley. The experience of John Forrester was more
typical of residents in Dauphin County. Between 1807 and 1809, he purchased coffee,
brandy, molasses, sugar, chocolate, and snuff exclusively from Philadelphia merchants
and shopkeepers. All these commodities, and especially snuff, were readily available in
Baltimore.8
The experience o f George Youse, a whiskey distiller in Dauphin County, provides
a clear example of how Baltimoreans refused to cultivate any significant commercial
connections east of the Susquehanna even when one o f the region’s more entrepreneurial
residents gave them every opportunity to win his commerce. In 1809, Youse built a brick
stillhouse and purchased 200 bushels of com and rye valued at over £70. He began
distilling whiskey shortly thereafter, and on December 22, he paid George Garman
£1.13.0 to transport his first consignment to Baltimore. Initially, Youse divided his
consignments between Baltimore and Philadelphia, demonstrating his desire to find the
most profitable market. The first consignment was small, amounting to only two barrels,
or 66 gallons. On December 26, Youse sent his next consignment o f 227 gallons to
Philadelphia, and then sent a third consignment of 348V4 gallons to Baltimore. On
January 13, 1810, he paid Abraham Facklen £12.14.7Vi for hauling 50914 gallons of
whiskey to both Baltimore and Philadelphia, but made no accounting for what percentage

8 John Close Account Book, Business Records Collection, MG.2, n, B, Pennsylvania State
Archives, and Forester Family Papers, MG. 153, folder 4, Dauphin County Historical Society.
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went to each city.9 Baltimore’s whiskey merchants clearly had the chance to secure
Youse’s trade, but within a month of the sale o f his fourth consignment, the backcountry
distiller decided that Philadelphia would be his primary market. From late January
through August 1810, Youse sent only one of his 28 consignments to Baltimore. He
shipped 21 whiskey consignments to Philadelphia, amounting to 5,177 gallons, and
entered six transactions for local sales, amounting to 6 barrels, or approximately 200
gallons. Philadelphia thus accounted for 85 percent o f the trade, while Baltimore’s share
fell short of 15 percent. What happened?
Freightage costs can not account for Youse ultimately favoring the Philadelphia
market. He paid roughly a £1 per 40 gallons of whiskey for hauling to either port.
Merchants in both cities offered competitive prices for whiskey, so Youse did not base
his decision on the potential for profits. His accounts do not reveal to whom he sold his
whiskey, but his decided prejudice for the Philadelphia market suggests that
Philadelphia’s merchants cultivated better business relationships with him than did
merchants in Baltimore. Despite Youse’s proven ability to succeed as a whiskey distiller,
his location in the eastern Susquehanna Valley made him an uninticing commercial
prospect to Baltimoreans. The city’s merchants and shopkeepers likely believed that
while producers like Youse demonstrated a willingness to trade in the short-term, heroic
efforts would have been needed to keep them from eventually gravitating to the
Philadelphia market in the long-term. The records fall silent on the precise answer to this
question, but the behavior of the Baltimore firm Timanus and Company, which
specialized in the backcountry flour and whiskey trades exemplified the attitude. Over a

9 George Youse Papers, MG.240, Dauphin County Historical Society.
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three-year period, the company purchased flour valued at $145,202, and whiskey worth
almost $75,000. Their success was due in part to their extraordinary number of
backcountry connections, including several with Pennsylvanians living west of the
Susquehanna. David Moreland, a farmer in York County, accounted for 10 transactions
over two years worth $1,402. He also purchased fish worth $608 and “sundries” worth
$2,481 over the same two-year period. Cumberland County’s James Rodgers sent one
shipment of flour worth $57, as well as 6 shipments of whiskey worth $918. Yet
Timanus and Company never bought a single consignment of whiskey from any
Pennsylvanian living east of the Susquehanna—a pattern of commercial behavior
repeated by most Baltimore merchants and artisans.10

T he M arketing R ev o lutio n
The first step in winning the backcountry trade in western Pennsylvania was to
blanket local newspapers with advertisements. Baltimoreans hoped that these ads would
help entice some of the return trade away from Philadelphia merchants and artisans.
Once a stable market emerged in a particular county, more extensive investments could
be made, including turnpike and canal construction. The strategy demonstrated a very
modem, capitalist sensibility. According to modem microeconomic theory, when “the
relative advantages o f a particular good or brand are not very great,” as was the case with
Philadelphia’s transportation connections to settlers west of the Susquehanna River,
“advertising may play a very important role” in shaping consumer preferences.11 In the
10Timanus and Company Ledger, MS.830, MHS.
11 Edwin Mansfield, Microeconomics: Theory / Applications, 6th ed. (New York: W.W. Norton,
1988), 78.
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absence of any significant price differences or differences in non-market factors,
including personal attention given to customers and the accessibility o f markets, the
visibility o f the producer often proves the deciding reason in consumer decisions. Direct
advertising in backcountry newspapers thus provided Baltimoreans with a needed
advantage in capturing western Pennsylvania’s retail trade.
Much of the literature on the market revolution has ignored newspapers as
instruments of social and economic change, because historians o f early American
newspapers have largely ignored the study of advertisements. Historian Michael
Schudson dismissed advertisements as mere window dressing, “like the cover of a book
or magazine— one turned to the inside to find the content of the paper.” In his recent
study of the “character and content” of colonial newspapers, David Copeland also
excluded advertisements altogether as a subject of interest.12 The standard interpretation
of early American newspapers holds that until the advent of the “penny press” in the
1830s, newspapers were primarily vehicles for political partisanship. There is no doubt
that the disputes between Federalists and Republicans shaped the development of early
American newspapers, and Baltimore’s press proved little different in this regard. The
polemics launched by Baltimore’s arch-Federalist Alexander Hanson against his
Republican foil William Pechin may not have reached the acrimonious pitch that Fenno
and Freneau displayed in the Philadelphia press, but the political barbs exchanged in the
12Michael Schudson, Discovering the News: A Social History o f American Newspapers (New
York: Basic Books, 1978), 14, and David Copeland, Colonial American Newspapers: Character
and Content (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1997). Also see Willard Beyer, Main
Currents in the History o f American Journalism (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1927); Alfred
McClurg Lee, The Daily Newspaper in America (New York: Macmillan, 1937); Dan Schiller,
Objectivity and the News: The Public and the Rise o f Commercial Journalism (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1981); and Carol Sue Humphrey, The Press o f the Young
Republic, 1783-1833 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996).
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Baltimore press did not lack intensity. Nevertheless, an exclusive focus on the political
content o f early nineteenth-century newspapers obscures the broader truth that editors
designed newspapers primarily as tools of mercantile development.13
Early nineteenth-century advertisements were unsophisticated by modem
standards, lacking the glitz and panache of a Madison Avenue campaign. Few provided
illustrations of any kind, and none of them offered catchy jingles, memorable phrases, or
colorful metaphors. Advertisements in the first dailies did not address many of the basic
elements of consumer decision-making upon which ad agencies focused after 1900,
including need recognition, alternative evaluation, and how to deal with post-purchase
consumer anxiety.14 Instead, the earliest ads presented basic commercial information in a
concise and somewhat ordinary manner, falling well short of a “general saturation” of
“product images or the wholesale transfiguration of products into psychological props”
that theorists of mass culture claim modem marketing achieved.15 Yet to expect

13 Several studies do recognize the importance of newspapers as tools of early mercantile
development, and are worthy of note. See especially Ronald Hoffman, ‘The Press in Mercantile
Maryland: A Question of Utility,” Journalism Quarterly, 46 (1969): 536-44; Allan Pred, Urban
Growth and the Circulation o f Information: The United States System o f Cities, 1790-1840
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973), 20-77; Alvin Gouldner, The Dialectic o f
Ideology and Technology: The Origins o f Grammar, and the Future o f Ideology (New York: The
Seabury Press, 1976), 91-124; Roxanne Zimmer, ‘The Urban Daily Press: Baltimore, 1797-1816”
(Ph.D., University of Iowa, 1982); Richard L. Bushman, “Shopping and Advertising in Colonial
America,” in Cary Carson, Ronald Hoffman, and Peter J. Albert, eds.. O f Consuming Interest:
The Style o f Life in the Eighteenth Century (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1994);
and David Rawson, “‘Guardians of Their Own Liberty’: A Contextual History of Print Culture in
Virginia Society, 1750 to 1820” (Ph.D., The College of William and Mary, 1998), 333-430.
14For a microeconomic perspective on the development of advertising, see Monle Lee and Carla
Johnson, Principles o f Advertising: A Global Perspective (New York: Haworth Press, 1999), 8593, 117-21.
15John Styles, “Manufacturing, consumption, and design in eighteenth-century England,” in John
Brewer and Roy Porter, eds., Consumption and the World o f Goods (New York: Routledge,
1993), 540-42. The literature on mass culture theory is vast. See especially Mary Douglas and
Barron Isherwood, The World o f Goods: Toward an Anthropology o f Consumption (New York:
Basic Books, 1979); Richard Wightman Fox and T. Jackson Lears, eds.. The Culture of
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twentieth-century marketing outcomes for early nineteenth-century newspapers hauls
contemporary social theory through the unfamiliar terrain o f the early republic. In his
study o f the evolution of advertising, Julian Simon demonstrated “a strong relationship
between the extent of advertising in an economy and the level of development of the
economy.” 16 An advertiser’s objectives in a backcountry weekly or urban daily in 1800
were different from those of a modem mass media campaign, thus early American
newspapers must be analyzed within the context of the early nineteenth century, when the
regional market economy was in its infancy. The rather modest scope of the
advertisements, relative to twentieth-century standards, should be expected given the
extent of market development in the early republic. The purpose was not productidentification within a mature capitalist system, but the extension or creation of markets
in a nascent market economy.
Although backcountry weeklies and urban dailies served distinct purposes,
advertisements in both types of papers functioned as agents of social and economic
change. Daily newspapers acted primarily as producer tools of mercantile elites rather
than a consumer good for mass society or a political vehicle for partisan rhetoric. Onehalf to three-quarters of a daily newspaper’s total column inches consisted of
advertisements and other commercial information. The primary audience for these
advertisements, and by extension the newspaper, was the urban mercantile community.
Consumption: Critical Essays in American History, 1880-1980 (New York: Pantheon Books,
1983); Robert Root, The Rhetoric o f Popular Culture: Advertising, Advocacy, and Entertainment
(New York: Greenwood Press, 1987); Stuart Ewen, All Consuming Images: The Politics o f Style
in Contemporary Culture (New York: Basic Books, 1988); and Richard Tedlow, New and
Improved: The Story o f Mass Marketing in America (New York: Basic Books, 1990).
16Julian L. Simon, Issues in the Economics o f Advertising (Urbana: University of Illinois Press,
1970), 167.
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At six to nine dollars per year for a subscription, a daily newspaper may have been
unaffordable for most of Baltimore’s skilled laborers. For the city’s merchants and
artisans, however, access to reliable, current commercial information often proved the
difference between success and failure. Editors thus presented often fragmentary
commercial details, realizing that their intended audience possessed enough knowledge
about the market to interpret and use the abstracted information.17
The weekly newspaper served a different function, and Baltimoreans were at the
forefront o f expanding their commercial use during the early nineteenth century. By
advertising extensively in the backcountry press, Baltimoreans turned many of
Pennsylvania’s weekly newspapers into marketing tools designed to effect consumer
behavior. Instead of becoming a producer tool of the mercantile elite, like the urban
daily, the backcountry weekly became an instrument of market development itself.
Ultimately, Baltimoreans who advertised directly in the backcountry press hoped to
transform their city from an entrepot into the principal city of a regional market.
Effective marketing in backcountry newspapers faced several problems. Unlike
the generalized commercial information that editors often included in Baltimore’s daily
newspapers, advertisements represented the only way Baltimoreans could present
commercial information in the backcountry press. The prospective audience for a
backcountry paper presented another difficulty. Although many Baltimore dailies
boasted a readership that extended throughout Maryland, the majority of their subscribers
consisted o f reasonably affluent white Baltimore men who worked as either merchants or
artisans in the city. Editors could therefore cater to a specific group of people who were
17 Zimmer, ‘The Urban Daily Press,” 3,26. Also see Pred, Urban Growth, 20-77; and Gouldner,
The Dialectic o f Ideology and Technology, 91-124.
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known to them. Together, editors and readers formed a “public sphere” in which all
participants understood the context of the information provided within a daily newspaper.
In the case of the backcountry weeklies, advertisers needed to create an altogether new
“public sphere” that invited the participation of backcountry farmers, shopkeepers, and
merchants.
The use o f the term “public sphere” as it specifically relates to advertising is
based on the work o f Jurgen Habermas, who warned that “to the extent that the press
became commercialized, the threshold between the circulation o f a commodity and the
exchange of communications among the members of the public was leveled.” In other
words, the moment when an editor or publisher began producing a newspaper itself as a
commodity, where the primary intent was to sell as many newspapers as possible
regardless of its content, the newspaper ceased to be a functional instrument of the public
sphere. Baltimore advertisers used backcountry newspapers for commercial reasons, but
the newspapers themselves were only used as tools for communicating commercial
information. The weeklies were not commodities for a mass market like the later “penny
press,” and thus pass Habermas’s test of whether or not “the publishers procured for the
press a commercial basis without, however, commercializing it as such.” Habermas
continued that “a press that had evolved out of the public’s use of its reason and that had
merely been an extension of its debate remained thoroughly an institution of this very
public.” Even if the ‘debate’ was itself commercial in nature, the newspaper remained
“effective in the mode o f a transmitter and amplifier, no longer a mere vehicle for the
transportation o f information but not yet a medium for culture as an object of
consumption.” When Baltimoreans advertised in Pennsylvania weeklies, they created a
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public sphere “that in general characterized a private people functioning as a public.’' 18
The conventional style o f the advertisements allowed Baltimoreans to include
backcountry readers in a new and extended “public sphere.” When Samuel Frey, a
grocer, placed an ad in The York Recorder announcing the movement of his store’s
location in Baltimore, he directed the announcement to “the Borough and County of
York,” presenting the information as if he were simply letting his neighbors know what
he was doing. Frey continued “that he means to move his store from his Ware house, on
Cheapside Wharf, to a house near the com er of Market and Howard Streets.” 19 No
further directions are provided. If Frey had emphasized the distance between his store
and York, he would have erased the illusion of familiarity created in the presentation.
The advertisement thus succeeded in inventing a new “public sphere” by including both
Samuel Frey and the residents of York County as members of the same community—
albeit a largely imagined community stretched over several hundred square miles.
York County emerged as a natural area of interest for the Baltimore business
community’s advertisements. Merchants from both Philadelphia and Baltimore placed
ads in English-language York newspapers in the 1790s, but the pattern of the marketing
campaigns shifted after 1800. Between 1789 and 1799, only three Baltimore firms and
three Philadelphia firms advertised in the Pennsylvania Herald and York General
Advertiser. Samuel Smith offered “fine and coarse s a l t . . . near head of Market Street
18Jurgen Habermas, “From the Journalism of Private Men of Letters to the Public Consumer
Services of the Mass Media: The Public Sphere as a Platform for Advertising,” in Thomas
Burger, trans.. The Structural Transformation o f the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category o f
Bourgeois Society (Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press, 1991; orig. 1962), 181-96. It is interesting to
note that when the “penny press” finally commodified newspapers in the 1830s, all sense of a
public sphere was indeed lost. See Richard Sennett, The Fall o f Public Man (New York: W.W.
Norton, 1992), 3-150.
19 The York Recorder, April 2, 1800.
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[Baltim ore]. . . lower than it is sold at any other store.” A Baltimore dentist promoted
his services on Gay Street, and George Eichelberger proclaimed the opening of his
tobacco manufactory on Water Street.20 None of these early Baltimore advertisements
catered to the dry goods trade. In contrast, Philadelphia merchants offered brass,
ironmongery, cutlery, German goods, and books. The content of the advertisements
demonstrated that York County residents continued to sell their commodities in
Baltimore and buy dry goods in Philadelphia prior to 1800.21
For the eight years after 1800 in which there is a complete run of The York
Recorder, thirteen Baltimore firms and only three Philadelphia firms appeared. The
relatively small number of firms concealed a sharp increase in the volume of
advertisements placed by Baltimore’s business community. In 1800, direct Baltimore
advertisements in The York Recorder amounted to only 6 percent of the total number of
advertisements in the newspaper. Combining the direct advertisements placed by both
Philadelphia and Baltimore merchants, the seaports accounted for only 15 percent of the
total advertisements. By 1804, however, the beginning of the Baltimore marketing blitz
was apparent. The city’s share of advertisements in The York Recorder reached 21
percent, or an increase of nearly fourfold in just four years. Advertisements by Baltimore
firms also appeared in nearly every issue establishing a continuous economic presence for
the city’s business community in York County.
Unlike their advertisements of the 1790s, Baltimoreans focused on the dry goods

20 Pennsylvania Herald and York General Advertiser, December 14, 1791, September 18, 1793,
and June 13, 1798.
21 Pennsylvania Herald and York General Advertiser, November 20, 1792, December 4, 1793,
and July 19, 1797.
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trade with several artisans contributing. The Baltimore company of Schaeffer and Miller
announced that they had “erected a Chocolate Manufactory, at No. 76 Cumberland Row,”
and the booksellers Magill and Cline advertised new stationery available at No. 224
Market Street. Michael Lee, a Baltimore druggist, advertised medicines for sale. Other
Baltimore advertisements offered German and London blistered steel, iron rods, “Russian
bristles,” “plaister of Paris,” grindstones for weaver’s shops, and groceries. More
traditional commodities also received advertising space, including sugar, coffee, Spanish
hides, wine, “Jamaica Pimento,” “Canada Musk-rat skins,” salt, and fish. In Cumberland
County, Baltimore firms ignored Kline’s Carlisle Weekly Gazette through 1797. This
changed in 1798 when James Fletcher of Baltimore advertised a variety of commodities.
Thereafter, Baltimore merchants and artisans heavily patronized the Carlisle Gazette.22
That Baltimore’s merchants and artisans would patronize major backcountry
newspapers like The York Recorder or the Carlisle Gazette may not be surprising. The
extensiveness o f Baltimore’s marketing campaign is demonstrated by the city’s patronage
of many minor backcountry newspapers as well. In Gettysburg, direct advertisements by
Baltimore merchants began appearing in The Adams Centinel after 1805. In
Chambersburg the Democratic Republican and Pennsylvania Advertiser claimed an even
smaller readership than The Adams Centinel, but the modest scope of the newspaper
heightened the visibility of each advertiser. In a three-year period from 1815 to 1817,

“ The York Recorder, January 29, 1800, September 30, 1801, June 16, 1802, June 6, 1804, June
13, 1804, April 14, 1810, April 21, 1810, August 4, 1810, November 3, 1810, May 4, 1811, and
November 9, 1811. By comparison, Philadelphians advertised a mill-stone manufactory, books,
and drugs. See The York Recorder, September 17, 1800, June 23, 1802, and May 4, 1803. For
Carlisle, see Judith Ridner, ‘“ A Handsomely Improved Place’: Economic, Social, and GenderRole Development in a Backcountry Town, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, 1750-1810” (Ph.D., The
College of William and Mary, 1994), 296-303.
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only five Baltimore firms advertised in the Democratic Republican, but they accounted
for almost one-third of the total advertising in the newspaper (a higher percentage than in
The York Recorder.) As with the larger backcountry papers, the Baltimore firms offered
an assortment o f dry goods, including “Spanish hides," calf skins, slaughter hides,
tanner’s oil, sole, pump, rigging and skirting leathers, saddles, cutlery, brasswares,
hardware, buttons, fine teas, wines, and groceries. James Lee advertised his “Western
Hotel” on Howard Street in Baltimore, and three Chambersburg shopkeepers advertised
goods imported from Baltimore.23
Among the six Chambersburg shopkeepers who made no direct reference to
Baltimore in their advertisements, two very likely received their merchandise from the
Maryland port. P. Muthwell and Company, Confectioners, on Front Street,
Chambersburg, advertised a combination of sugar, molasses, shad, herring, and especially
“West Indies fruit.” Accounting for Baltimore’s active trade in fish with backcountry
merchants, and the port’s extensive ties to South America, this eclectic list of
commodities strongly suggests a Maryland connection. Josh Hershberger, the other
Chambersburg shopkeeper, appeared prominently in the Timanus and Company ledger.
Although he recorded no sales in flour or whiskey, Hershberger purchased over $300
worth o f fish, $74 worth o f salt, and $1,771 in sundry merchandise from the Baltimore
firm between 1817 and 1819.24
Although western Pennsylvanians did not forsake the Philadelphia market as a
23 Democratic-Republican and Pennsylvania Advertiser (Chambersburg), November 7, 1815, July
22, 1816, and May 12,1817. The Baltimore goods imported by Chambersburg shopkeepers
included groceries, hardware, Queensware, liquors, shad, herring, coffee, and sugar.
11 Democratic Republican and Pennsylvania Advertiser (Chambersburg), June 17, 1816, and
Timanus and Company Ledger, MHS.
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source o f dry goods, the use of backcountry newspapers as marketing tools had effected
consumer behavior in the region. According to historian Judith Ridner, many people
“turned more frequently to Baltimore as the new center o f economic dynamism in the
mid-Atlantic.” At James W est’s Baltimore store in 1800, for example, both small
Carlisle retailers like George Cart, and major Carlisle merchants like John Hughes,
William Drevish, and William Moore began purchasing dry goods. Cart bought £97.18.7
worth o f “fine blue cloth, white cassimere, flannel, coating, handkerchiefs, pins, button
molds, buttons, and rose blankets” from West. Hughes and Drevish became minor
patrons, but Moore bought extensively. A few Baltimore firms had even established
brand recognition for their products. Thomas Paul, a Baltimore chemist and druggist,
faced a growing problem with products that claimed either to be his medicinal oil or to
perform like it. He issued a warning to the York County public “not to purchase any oil
that may not be offered as Paul’s Patent Columbian Oil, that does not bear the true
characteristic.” Only the Patent Columbian Oil sold by Doctor John Love of Baltimore
was authentic.25
Baltimore firms benefited immensely from the expanded backcountry trade.
Between May 1816 and October 1819, Shippensburg’s Christopher Owe consigned 37
shipments of whiskey totaling $7,361.33, and two shipments of flour worth $344.37 to
the Baltimore firm o f Timanus and Company. Owe also made six purchases of fish
worth $264, and on two occasions took loans amounting to $900 from Timanus and
Company. Although the ledger did not reveal if Owe patronized Philadelphia firms too,
the size and regularity of his trade with Timanus and Company suggested an exclusive
25 Ridner, ‘“ A Handsomely Improved Place’,” 300-03, and The York Recorder, January 29, 1800,
April 2, 1800, September 30, 1801, June 16, 1802.
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connection with Baltimore. For three years, and with little variation, Owe sent a monthly
shipment of whiskey to the Maryland city worth an average $198.95. Three other
Shippensburg residents, including Adam Snoddy, William Richard, and Stephen
Culbertson, patronized Timanus fourteen times for coffee, salt, and sundries coming to
almost $1,300. The trade from the western Susquehanna Valley to Baltimore included
more than just wheat flour and whiskey after 1800. William Adams, a York shopkeeper,
made 59 transactions for bar iron with Baltimore agent Joseph Arthur between 1807 and
1809.26
Unlike Baltimore’s commercial expansion into the lower Potomac River Valley in
the 1780s, which stunted economic development in the region, the growth of the
backcountry trade did not undermine economic development in western Pennsylvania.
There were three reasons for this. First, Pennsylvanians benefited from the presence of
two major seaports competing for their trade. In the Potomac Valley, merchants and
artisans in Alexandria, Georgetown, and the fledgling District of Columbia failed to make
significant market connections throughout the region despite family and religious ties to
farmers and shopkeepers in southern Maryland. As a result, southern Maryland became a
backwater hinterland of one seaport, Baltimore. Second, western Pennsylvanians were
dedicated to splitting their retail trade between the Philadelphia and Baltimore after 1800.
York shopkeepers did not announce the arrival of goods from either port with any
regularity, and York County remained a divided hinterland through the Civil War.
Residents in Carlisle also divided the sale of their agricultural produce between
Philadelphia and Baltimore after 1800. According to Ridner, Carlisle’s “residents paid
26 Timanus and Company Ledger, MHS, and William Adams General Store Account Book, BR-7.
Historical Society of York County.
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greater attention to boosting the town’s ability to serve as a viable and economically
diverse service center for the county and region,” which helped the town avoid becoming
an economic satellite o f either eastern seaport.27
The western Susquehanna Valley also possessed a more diverse social structure in
1800 than much o f the lower Potomac Valley. In St. Marys County, Maryland, the
percentage o f households primarily engaged in agriculture exceeded 85 percent in 1800.
The paucity of local businesses allowed Baltimoreans to dominate the county’s retail and
commodity trades. Increasingly, the county’s planters relied on Baltimore for almost all
their manufactures. In western Pennsylvania, however, 30 to 50 percent o f the rural
inhabitants were already non-farmers as early as 1800. In towns like Carlisle, over 90
percent o f the population worked in non-agricultural occupations. This diversity, coupled
with the inhabitants’ active desire to balance local development with regional interaction,
helped western Pennsylvanians avoid complete dependence on the seaports while
integrating their economy into the regional market.28

17 Ridner, ‘“A Handsomely Improved Place’,” 274. Also see Bayly Ellen Marks, “Rural
Response to Urban Penetration: Baltimore and St. Mary's County, Maryland, 1790-1840,"
Journal o f Historical Geography, 8 (1982): 113-14; Jo N. Hays, “Overlapping Hinterlands: York,
Philadelphia, and Baltimore, 1800-1850,” The Pennsylvania Magazine o f History and Biography,
116 (1992): 295-321; Paul Doutrich, “The Evolution of an American Town: Yorktown,
Pennsylvania, 1740-1790” (Ph.D., University of Kentucky, 1985), 115, 146-161; Jane Garrett,
“Philadelphia and Baltimore, 1790-1840: A study of Intra-Regional Unity,” Maryland Historical
Society, 55 (1960): 1-13; and Gregory Nobles, “Breaking into the Backcountry: New Approaches
to the Early American Frontier,” The William and Mary Quarterly, 3d ser., 46 (1989): 641-70.
28 Marks, “Rural Response to Urban Penetration,” 118; Ridner, “‘A Handsomely Improved
Place’,” 159-65, 191-93,226; and Lee Soltow and Kenneth Keller, “Rural Pennsylvania in 1800:
A Portrait from the Septennial Census,” Pennsylvania History, 49 (1982): 25-39.
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B a n k s a n d C r e d it

Just as important as the marketing campaign in backcountry newspapers were the
liberal credit arrangements and reduced discounts on backcountry bank notes that
Baltimore merchants and artisans offered to western Pennsylvanians. It was not
uncommon for a Baltimore firm to offer credit for up to six, twelve or even eighteen
months on large cargoes. This kind of practice was common in the specie-poor colonial
period, but such liberal terms existed in very few places after 1800. Indeed, many
Philadelphia merchants openly criticized the Baltimore practice. Charles Buck took
special note of loose credit arrangements made by German mercantile houses in
Baltimore, which he considered “altogether wild and would give but little credit to the
Germans, if I would give further details of the ruinous consequences which occurred.”
Western Pennsylvanians saw matters differently. After two decades of hardship
following the Revolution, in which backcountry farmers and shopkeepers had groaned
under the harsh conditions set down by Philadelphia creditors, the Baltimoreans’ liberal
credit arrangements seemed inspired.29
Liberal credit terms made the difference with William Moore of Carlisle. In
1803, Moore declared that “in consequence o f a late arrangement made with one amongst
the first mercantile Houses in Baltimore [James West], he [was] enabled to sell his goods
from 5 to 10 per cent cheaper than” in Philadelphia. The arrangement proved profitable
29 Charles N. Buck, Memoirs o f Charles N. Buck: Interspersed with Private Anecdotes and Events
o f the Times from 1791 to 1841 (Philadelphia: Walnut House, 1941), 55. For a discussion of how
the often harsh terms set down by Philadelphia creditors combined with the fiscal and monetary
policies of state and federal government to worsen the hard times of the 1780s and 1790s in
Pennsylvania, see Terry Bouton, “‘No wonder the times were troublesome:’ The Origins of Fries
Rebellion, 1783-1799,” Pennsylvania History, 67 (2000): 21-42. Although Bouton’s article
primarily focuses on economic conditions and causes of rebellion in Bucks, Berks, and
Northampton Counties in southeastern Pennsylvania, his conclusions are instructive for
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for Baltimore merchant James West. Between 1802 and 1804, M oore’s purchases of
fabric, silk, gloves, pewter, and ivory combs alone totaled more than £20O.30 Not all
arrangements ended as pleasantly. Charles Poor’s letterbook revealed that many York
county residents contracted debts to Baltimore creditors, and eventually lost their entire
estate. In a letter to William Stansbury of Baltimore dated April 28, 1817, Poor enclosed
a note from J. C. Kleins o f the York company Bishop and Kleins, to the order of William
Stansbury for $278.97. Poor feared that Stansbury would “think I did not do well in
taking a Note,” but assured his Baltimore contact that “it was the best that could be done
at the time.” By June 1817, Kleins “made up his mind to transfer all his property, except
what the sheriff holds, to Trustees for the benefit of his Creditors generally and that he
has written his Creditors in Balto [Baltimore] to that effect.”31 The experience of Bishop
and Kleins not withstanding, Baltimore’s business community was renowned for its
liberal credit terms in the early nineteenth century.
Reduced discounts on western bank notes provided another means by which
Baltimore merchants and artisans sought to increase their share of the backcountry retail
trade. As historian Charles Sellers argued, the “banks’ contribution to the takeoff of a
capital-hungry economy can hardly be exaggerated.” By providing “an ample circulating
medium” of bank notes, they threw off the yoke of the old specie-poor economy.
Numbering ju st 29 nationwide in 1800, the number of banks in the republic surpassed

Pennsylvania as a whole.
30 Ridner, ‘“ A Handsomely Improved Place’,” 300-03.
31 Charles Poor to William Stansbury, April 28, 1817, June 25,1817, and June 30,1817, in
Charles Poor Letterbook, BR-99, Historical Society of York County.
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200 by 1815.32 However, the flurry of new bank notes provided only limited utility to
backcountry residents trading with merchants and artisans in coastal cities. Although city
banks normally traded their notes at face value with notes drawn on banks in other major
cities, notes drawn on backcountry banks were heavily discounted. This practice arose
due to the poor lines of communication in the early nineteenth century as it was
impossible to know at the time of a transaction whether or not the western bank on which
the notes were drawn was still in business. To hedge their risks, coastal merchants and
artisans accepted western paper at large discounts, effectively devaluing the currency.
This practice rendered trade increasingly less profitable for farmers or retailers in the
western parts o f the backcountry.
To gain a competitive advantage in western Pennsylvania, Baltimoreans
sometimes pegged their exchange rates for western paper lower than what Philadelphians
typically offered. In Chambersburg, one Baltimore firm advertised that merchandise
would be sold “at reduced [rates] for WESTERN BANK PAPER.”33 By offering reduced
prices on merchandise for transactions completed using western bank notes was the
equivalent of trading backcountry notes at par or close to it. This made trading with
Baltimore more profitable than trading with Philadelphia for backcountry retailers and
farmers. O f course, Baltimoreans who offered these arrangements risked the possibility
o f accepting large amounts o f worthless bank paper, but they hoped the potential for a
more lucrative trade outweighed the increased risks. As transportation links to the
32 Charles Sellers, The Market Revolution: Jacksonian America, 1815-1846 (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1991), 45, and Curtis Nettels, The Emergence o f a National Economy, 17751815 (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 338.
33 Democratic Republican and Pennsylvanian Advertiser (Chambersburg), March 5, 1816, March
19, 1816, July 29,1816, and May 12,1817.
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backcountry steadily improved during the nineteenth century, communication improved
too, and thus merchants and artisans accepted more and more western bank notes at face
value.

T h e T u r n p ik e C r a z e

The Pennsylvania legislature soon struck back at the commercial challengers from
Baltimore. The early success of the Lancaster Turnpike encouraged eastern
Pennsylvanians to extend the state's road improvement program to preserve
Philadelphia’s backcountry trade. Better transportation links meant reduced freightage
costs for backcountry farmers as well as Philadelphia merchants and artisans, and so the
city’s business community invested heavily in turnpike construction. The 62-mile-long
Lancaster Turnpike, completed in 1794 at a staggering cost of $465,000, provided the
first link in Pennsylvania’s network. The much shorter Lancaster and Susquehanna
Turnpike, completed in 1803, provided the second. Together, these roads secured the
trade of the eastern Susquehanna Valley for Philadelphia. Beginning in 1803, the
Pennsylvania legislature created a number of additional turnpike companies designed to
connect the Philadelphia market more firmly to western Pennsylvania. Once the plan was
fully implemented, turnpikes would connect Philadelphia to Pittsburgh, effectively
leaping over Baltimore and capturing the trade o f both western Pennsylvania and the
Ohio River Valley beyond.34
The creation o f state-chartered turnpike companies represented a new step in
American transportation, as governments resigned direct control over road building along
MJoseph Durrenberger, Turnpikes: A Study o f the Toll Road Movement in the Middle Atlantic
States and Maryland (Cos Cob, CT: John Edwards, 1968), 51-52.
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major routes to private companies. The construction of these new roads required
enormous financial commitments, but Americans proved eager to invest. By 1800 there
were 72 profit-seeking turnpike companies in the Northeastern United States. By 1810,
this number had multiplied into the thousands. Albert Gallatin, the Secretary of the
Treasury under President Jefferson, reported to Congress that “the general utility of
artificial roads and canals, is at this time so universally admitted, as hardly to require any
additional proofs.” By 1820, Americans had invested $30,000,000 in turnpike
construction, and built over 10,000 miles of improved roadway.35
Despite the extraordinary efforts needed to finance and build the nation's first
turnpike system, the importance of these new roads in the growth of the market economy
after 1800 is a vastly underrated topic in the American historical imagination. Since the
publication of George Taylor’s landmark 1951 study on the transportation revolution,
historians have traditionally dismissed turnpikes as financially disastrous and of
questionable utility in establishing new markets.36 Taylor pointed out that of New

35 Report o f the Secretary o f the Treasury [Albert GallatinJ on the Subject o f Public Roads and
Canals (New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1968; orig. 1808), 5. Also see Robert Heilbroner and
Aaron Singer, The Economic Transformation o f America: 1600 to the Present, (New York:
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1984), 91-92; and Jeremy Atack and Peter Passed, A New Economic
View o f American Historyfrom Colonial Times to 1940, 2d ed., (New York: W.W. Norton,
1994), 148.
36 There are exceptions. At the beginning of the twentieth century, new highway construction for
automobiles aroused historical interest in the nation’s first turnpike craze a century earlier.
Donald C. Jackson provides a good overview of these works in “Roads Most Traveled: Turnpikes
in Southeastern Pennsylvania in the Early Republic,” in Judith A. McGaw, ed., Early American
Technology: Making & Doing Thingsfrom the Colonial Era to 1850 (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1994), 200-01. Several more recent studies also recognize the importance
of turnpikes in early nineteenth-century market development. See especially James Weston
Livingood, The Philadelphia-Baltimore Trade Rivalry, 1780-1860 (Harrisburg: Pennsylvania
Historical and Museum Commission, 1947), 1-54; Charles Alexander Williams, “The History and
Operations of the Pennsylvania Turnpike System” (Ph.D., University of Pittsburgh, 1954); Robert
Hunter, ‘Turnpike Construction in Antebellum Virginia,” Technology and Culture, 4 (1963):
177-200; and Daniel Jones, The Economic and Social Transformation o f Rural Rhode Island,
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England’s 230 turnpikes built before 1820, only five or six covered their costs, and of
these, none yielded sufficient dividends to justify the opportunity costs of the invested
capital. Other historians have condemned turnpikes as poorly surfaced roads, little
different from common roads of colonial America that were “virtually useless as avenues
of commerce.” Canals and railroads are seen as successful transportation innovations
because these improvements spurred the “development of bond markets” and helped
create trade where it previously did not exist.37 Discounting the importance of turnpikes
also suggests that the transportation revolution as a concept must be pushed well into the
nineteenth century. Charles Sellers actually identified the completion of the Erie Canal in
1825 as the true beginning of the transportation revolution, and concluded that by the
1840s, not the 1810s, “a northeastern sectional economy was integrating the
port/hinterland economies.”38
The characterization o f early nineteenth-century turnpikes as poorly surfaced
roads, little different from ruddy colonial roads, is a much-repeated historical myth.
When building the new turnpikes of the early nineteenth century, designers addressed
many o f the problems that plagued travelers on the older colonial roads. Surveyors paid
greater attention to a road’s elevation, which proved critical to haulers pulling

1780-1850 (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1992). It should also be noted that since the
early 1970s, historians of eighteenth-century Great Britain have placed considerable importance
on the role of turnpikes in the creation of the market economy and the economic integration of
England and Scotland. See especially W.I. Albert, The Turnpike Road System in England, 16631840 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), and Eric Pawson, Transport and
Economy: The Turnpike Roads o f Eighteenth Century Britain (London: Academic Press. 1977),
265-339.
37 George Rogers Taylor, The Transportation Revolution, 1815-1860, (New York: Harper and
Row, 1951), and Atack and Passell, A New Economic View. 144, 148-54.
38 Sellers, The Market Revolution, 43.
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increasingly larger loads over ever-greater distances. Albert Gallatin reported that “the
general principles of improved roads” included “diminishing the angle of ascent, which
ought not to exceed, whenever practicable, 3 degrees and a half, and under no
circumstances five degrees.” Stumps and other impediments normally left in older
roadways were removed, while ditches and drains were added “to prevent the injury
caused by standing water.” Instead of a unimproved road surface, crushed stone or gravel
ten to eighteen inches thick was laid down to create a stable, weather-resistant surface.
The preferred types of stone included granite or flint, and if these materials were
unavailable, quartz or blue lime stone. Unlike colonial roads, turnpikes could withstand
heavy traffic. Building and then maintaining these thoroughfares proved costly.
Quarrying, transporting, crushing, and laying these improved road beds produced most of
the expense associated with turnpikes, whose cost could run upwards o f $15,000 per
mile. For most o f Maryland’s major through ways, costs averaged between $7,000 and
$10,000 per mile.39 Despite the financial burden, however, many companies along major
routes sustained a constant vigil over the repair and upkeep o f these roads. In April 1815,
the directors o f the York and Maryland Line Turnpike Company recognized “the present
unprofitable circumstance o f the road” and resolved to abolish the salaries of the
company’s president and managers. Nevertheless, they decided in August “to take up a
loan for the use o f the Company” to finish repairs on the road, and authorized William
Cole and Joseph Townshend to borrow up to $3,000 for that purpose. As the
superintendent of the road had estimated the cost of repairs at only $1,000, the generous
amount of the loan suggests a real desire to insure that the repairs be completed in a
39 Report o f the Secretary o f the Treasury, 60-61, 63. Also see Jackson, “Roads Most Traveled,”
206-15.
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timely fashion.40
The improvements in road design clearly set the new turnpikes apart from earlier
roadways. A letter from Baltimore’s John Gibson to his wife in 1816 illustrates the ease
that Marylanders traversed the Maryland and Pennsylvania backcountries along the new
turnpikes. Gibson wrote that he “arrived at Reisters Town about 1/2 past 6 o ’clock with
scarcely any fatigue to any o f our party.” Compared to the experience of earlier travelers,
who complained o f being severely bruised at the end o f a journey, Gibson’s comment is
illuminating. He evidently took a more leisurely pace than freighting wagons, taking an
early breakfast and “indulging ourselves 2 o r 3 hours at Winchester before arriving at
“this well known spot” at 7 o ’clock. Gettysburg did not enter the national consciousness
until the Civil W ar battle in 1863, yet this town was already a “well known spot” to
Gibson in 1816. He concluded that “tomorrow we design continuing our journey as far
as Chambersburg, 36 miles, and will if every thing should proceed favourably move on
steadily till we reach Bedford 100 miles further.” He expected to find mail from his wife
awaiting him in Bedford too, as “the mail travels so much faster than we do.”41
Beyond the issues involved with road construction, several historians have
questioned the usefulness and effectiveness of turnpikes because of their limited
influence on financial markets and questionable profitability. There is no reason why the
creation o f a bond o r stock market should rank as an important consideration in whether
or not a transportation innovation should be deemed successful. Even the direct
40 York and Maryland Line Turnpike Company Accounts, MS.934, Historical Society of York
County.
41 John Gibson to Mrs. Gibson, June 16, 1816, Grundy-Gibson Papers, MS. 1294, MHS, and
James Callender, The American Annual Register, or, historical memoirs o f the United States for
the Year 1796 (Philadelphia: Bioren and Madan, 1797), 36.
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profitability of a turnpike, whether based on its operational costs, tells collected, or
dividends issued to investors, may not be an adequate measure o f its economic value.
The lack o f financial returns on his turnpike stocks did not stop Baltimore merchant
Frederick Hammer from buying almost 700 shares in various turnpike companies
between 1805 and 1817, totaling over $13,000. Hammer was not an uninformed
investor. In the same period he also purchased nearly 400 shares of stock in banks,
manufacturing and insurance companies, and kept a detailed accounting of his portfolio.
His accounts for November 22, 1817 showed the total purchase price for all bank stocks
at $17,851.36 with a current value of $20,363.86. His dividends on all bank, insurance
and manufacturing stocks between 1800 and 1817 totaled over $9,000. Yet Hammer
made little effort to account for the value of his turnpike stocks, and his total dividends
on these stocks amounted to only $4,000 over twelve years.42
The reason why Hammer continued to pour money into turnpike company stocks
was to benefit his own trade with the backcountry. As a leading merchant in Baltimore’s
trade with Germany, he found a ready market for retail goods among the German
speaking settlers in western Maryland and Pennsylvania. Over 75 percent of his turnpike
investment was in the Baltimore and Reisterstown and Baltimore and Fredericktown
lines, which connected Baltimore to the Maryland and Pennsylvania backcountry. These
turnpikes helped reduce his transport costs, and thus Hammer made up for the lack of
dividends or stock appreciation by helping reduce his overhead costs. Frederick
Hammer’s investment history helps demonstrate that the only relevant criteria upon
which to judge the success o f a turnpike is the extent to which it reduces transportation

42 Frederick Hammer Account Books, volume 1, MS.423, MHS.
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costs and augments commerce relative to the expenses incurred by its upkeep.
Companies like the York and Maryland Line, which governed major backcountry
routes, maintained level, superior roads that successfully reduced wagon hauling rates by
as much as 50 percent, effectively doubling the size of a seaport city’s commercial
hinterland. Charles Sellers pointed out, however, that even with such impressive results,
transport costs still remained too great “for high-weight-to-value commodities such as
grain.” Other historians have extended this argument, observing that at a mere 80 miles,
transport costs for wheat exceeded 50 percent of the commodity’s market price in 1815.
Such measures are largely meaningless for Baltimore, which was already an entrepot for
western Pennsylvania grain by the 1760s. Unlike New England, where bringing
backcountry produce to a seaport was an important function o f a turnpike, Baltimore’s
merchants did not need to rely on improved roads to make the grain trade profitable.
Instead, Baltimore’s turnpikes were built to bring retail goods to the backcountry, and
Sellers and other historians agree that a 50 percent reduction in transport costs did open
the countryside to consumer goods brought at lower cost from coastal cities. For
merchants like Frederick Hammer, turnpikes were crucial in capturing western
Pennsylvania’s return trade.43
After 1803, Pennsylvania legislators realized that the Lancaster Pike and its
extensions, which effectively ended the threat of Baltimore competition in the eastern
Susquehanna Valley, ironically provided a conduit from the troublesome Maryland city
into the heart o f western Pennsylvania. Continued turnpike construction along a southern
route benefited Baltimore as much as Philadelphia, and thus the legislature approved

43 Atack and Passed, A New Economic View, 148-49, and Sellers, Market Revolution, 41.
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construction of several turnpikes along a northern line arching away from Baltimore. To
this end, the Downingtown, Ephrata, and Harrisburg Turnpike, or Horseshoe Pike, was
patented in 1803. Longer than the Lancaster Pike by a little more than five miles, it
provided the first leg o f the Pittsburgh Pike, connecting Philadelphia to Pittsburgh by way
o f Harrisburg. No Maryland roads connected to it, and it provided a way of keeping
Baltimore’s merchants from using Pennsylvania’s internal improvements to their own
commercial advantage. The Pennsylvania legislature approved charters for nine more
turnpike companies along the northern route. When finally completed, the Pittsburgh
Pike stretched 353 miles, cost over $2,000,000 to build, connected ten separate turnpikes
together, and linked Trenton and Philadelphia in the east, with Pittsburgh and
Steubenville, Ohio in the west. The scope of the titanic building program clearly
demonstrated the intent of the Pennsylvania government to insure that the backcountry
trade remained squarely anchored at Philadelphia.44
In order to encourage as much traffic towards the Pittsburgh Pike as possible, the
Pennsylvania legislature also patented the Lancaster, Elizabethtown and Middleton
Turnpike in 1804. This road provided a more northern route away from Baltimore for
travelers who wished to cross the Susquehanna River by way o f Lancaster. Finally,

44 Livingood, The Philadelphia-Baltimore Trade Rivalry, 53, and Durrenberger, Turnpikes, 56.
U.S. Route 30 follows the basic path of the original Lancaster Pike. Pennsylvania Route 322
traces the basic path of the original Downingtown, Ephrata and Harrisburg Pike. The east-west
section of the present-day Pennsylvania Turnpike, which forms the beginning of Interstate 76,
follows the basic path of the original Pittsburgh Pike. The ten corporations that made up the
original Pittsburgh Pike included the Frankford and Bristol Turnpike, the Philadelphia and
Lancaster Turnpike, the Lancaster, Elizabeth and Middletown Turnpike (taking the route west by
northwest), the Middletown and Harrisburg Turnpike (taking the route due north), the Harrisburg,
Carlisle, and Chambersburg Turnpike (returning the road system south, to a parallel with
Philadelphia), the Chambersburg and Bedford Turnpike, the Bedford and Stoystown Turnpike,
the Stoystown and Greensburg Turnpike, the Greensburg and Pittsburgh Turnpike (again, taking
the route northwest), and the Pittsburgh and Steubenville Turnpike.
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instead of patenting a road leading north from either York or Harrisburg into the Upper
Susquehanna Valley, the legislature authorized the construction of the Centre Turnpike.
A magnificent seventy-five-mile road patented in 1805, it connected Philadelphia with
Reading, and then went directly across the state to Sunbury on the Susquehanna River.45
The Maryland assembly took full advantage of Baltimore’s proximity to
Pennsylvania’s roads when crafting Maryland’s own turnpike system. By comparison to
Pennsylvania’s massive projects, Maryland’s 1804 building program included four rather
small turnpikes linking Baltimore to its northern and western hinterland. Despite their
limited size, these four turnpike companies insured Baltimore’s merchants and artisans of
a firm grip on western Pennsylvania’s trade. The Baltimore and Frederick Turnpike
provided the first link. An extension of this road connected Frederick to Elizabeth Town,
which was renamed Hagerstown after 1814. A spur from Hagerstown crossed the
Pennsylvania state line and connected with roads leading to Chambersburg, PA. The
second link in the Cumberland Turnpike, which continued west from Hagerstown and
connected with the eastern terminus of the federally-financed National Road at
Cumberland, Maryland. This network of roads connected the western Maryland
backcountry as well as the Chambersburg market to Baltimore.46
The Baltimore and Reisterstown Turnpike, which forked at Reisterstown to the
northwest o f Baltimore, was the third link. It had two spurs leading into Pennsylvania.
The first connected to Pennsylvania’s Hanover and Maryland Line Turnpike, patented in
45 Livingood, Trade Rivalry, 43-47. For a different perspective on Pennsylvania’s developmental
strategy for its backcountry, see Carl Lechner, “The Erie Triangle: The Final Link Between
Philadelphia and the Great Lakes,” Pennsylvania Magazine o f History and Biography, 116
(1992): 59-85.
46 Baltimore and Frederick Turnpike Company Records, volume 1, MS.46, MHS.
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1808. From Hanover, produce could be sent directly to and from Carlisle in Cumberland
County. The second spur lead directly to Gettysburg in Adams County. Finally, the
Baltimore and York Town Turnpike lead directly north from Baltimore and connected
with Pennsylvania’s York and Maryland Line Turnpike, patented in 1807. The York
Town Pike and the Reisterstown Pike provided Baltimore’s transportation links to the
western Susquehanna Valley.47
Although most of Pennsylvania’s new turnpikes were patented before
Baltimore’s, Maryland completed its connections first. The fast completion of the
Maryland roads owed in part to their relatively smaller size, and to the concerted effort
made by Baltimore’s business community in financing their construction. Roads leading
to the Pennsylvania-Maryland state line would have proved of limited utility, however, if
the completion of corresponding turnpikes linking western Pennsylvania to the state line
had been delayed. To make sure these projects were finished in a timely fashion,
Baltimoreans invested heavily in the Pennsylvania turnpike companies which benefited
the Maryland market. The limited scope of the Maryland projects, which required far
less capital than the longer Pennsylvania roads, made such a strategy possible.
The York and Maryland Line Turnpike accounts provide an excellent example of
this kind of targeted investment. Four prominent Baltimore merchants and four
Baltimore insurance companies were among the ten largest stockholders in this
Pennsylvania turnpike in 1814. Robert Oliver led all individual investors with twenty
shares. William Patterson held ten shares, Baltimore mayor James Calhoun held eight
shares, and Robert Gilmor & Son held eight shares. What is far more interesting is that
X1 York Town-Baltimore Turnpike Company Minute Books, volume 1, MS.52, MHS, and
Baltimore and Reisterstown Turnpike Company Accounts, MS.50, MHS.
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several Baltimore insurance companies easily ranked as the largest controlling interests in
the turnpike company. The Union Insurance Company owned more than a one-hundred
shares, the Maryland Insurance Company was close behind with ninety-five, the Marine
Insurance Company owned ninety shares, and the Chesapeake Insurance Company held
thirty-six shares. Between them, the top three insurance companies actually held a
majority interest in the York and Maryland Line Turnpike, and the eight Baltimore
investors amongst the top ten owned a total of sixty-seven percent of the company. By
pooling resources in insurance companies and using them like investment houses,
Baltimore’s less affluent investors reduced their risk and insured a large voting block in
the York and Maryland Line Turnpike Company. This use of the insurance companies is
perhaps the clearest manifestation of a community-wide, or corporate effort by
Baltimore’s merchants to expand the city’s hinterland into the Pennsylvania backcountry.
The York and Maryland Line was not the only Pennsylvania transportation project
usurped by Baltimore’s business community. The York and Conewago Turnpike, a
separate company which also connected York to the Maryland Line, was “supported by
Maryland funds and had a Baltimore man as its president.”48
By 1809, Baltimoreans had substantially completed their turnpike connections to
western Pennsylvania, while most of the new roads leading to Philadelphia remained
under construction. During a trip into the western Susquehanna Valley, Joshua Gilpin, a
Philadelphia resident and great supporter of internal improvements, fretted that “the roads
from Baltimore are numerous so that the whole produce o f this country goes direct to that
town & not to Philadelphia.” A note o f admiration shaded his concerns, as he
48 York and Maryland Line Turnpike Company Accounts, MS.934, Historical Society of York
County, and Livingood, Trade Rivalry, 49.
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commended “the zeal with which Marylanders are improving the carriage from this
State.” Ultimately, however, he feared “that the produce o f this part of [Pennsylvania]
will undoubtedly centre in Baltimore” rather than Philadelphia. Gilpin’s uneasiness had
merit. Flour inspections at Baltimore topped 530,000 barrels in 1811, a fifty percent
increase over its average of 350,000 barrels inspected between 1800 and 1810. Unlike
New York, Philadelphia, or Alexandria, Baltimore experienced a steady growth in flour
inspections immediately following the W ar of 1812, and remained the nation’s leading
flour port until 1827.49
Philadelphia’s business community needed to take action quickly, and appealed
once again to the state government for help. In an unprecedented action, the
Pennsylvania legislature appropriated $825,000 in 1811 for the improvement of roads and
bridges. For the first time, public money would be spent to support a turnpike company.
In an obvious attempt to shore up the western trade against any further Baltimore
encroachments, the legislature mandated that the northern route away from Baltimore
receive top priority. Consequently, the Pittsburgh Pike was given $350,000 of the
appropriation.50
Despite vast allocations of public resources and the best efforts of the
Pennsylvania legislature to devise a road system that would isolate Baltimore, tapping
western Pennsylvania’s markets proved relatively easy for the M aryland city. Baltimore
49 Joshua Gilpin, “A Tour from Philadelphia in 1809,” Pennsylvania Magazine o f History and
Biography, 50 (1936): 169; Jared Sparks, “Baltimore,” North American Review, 20 (1825): 122;
and Niles’ Weekly Register, June 7, 1828, April 4, 1829, July 24, 1830, and March 26, 1831. The
completion of the Erie Canal in 1825 helped vault New York quickly past Baltimore as the
nation’s leading center for flour inspection. By 1830, New York inspected one-third more flour
than the Maryland port, although Baltimore remained considerably ahead of either Philadelphia
or Alexandria.
50 Durrenberger, Turnpikes, 48.
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had geography on its side, and the Maryland legislature took full advantage of this good
fortune. Baltimore’s roads reached Carlisle first when the Hanover and Carlisle Turnpike
was completed in 1812, and when Pennsylvania completed its connection to Bedford by
way of the Chambersburg and Bedford Turnpike, the route proved as advantageous to
Baltimoreans as to their eastern rivals.51 Originally conceived as part of the Pittsburgh
Pike, and thus a means o f the circumventing Baltimore, the strategy backfired when the
turnpike linking Harrisburg to Chambersburg was not completed until 1818.
Baltimoreans established their connections by 1815, as a spur off the Baltimore and
Reisterstown Turnpike led directly to Gettysburg, and the Hagerstown extension of the
Baltimore and Frederick Turnpike led directly to Chambersburg. Baltimoreans thus
benefited from a state-of-the-art turnpike system in the backcountry paid for in large
measure by Philadelphia merchants and the Pennsylvania legislature. Smaller, cheaper,
and smarter, the Maryland turnpike system played a significant role in helping integrate
Baltimore into the Pennsylvania backcountry’s burgeoning markets.

T r a n s f o r m a t io n s

If the success of a turnpike is measured by whether or not it created new markets,
then collectively, Baltimore’s turnpike links to the western Susquehanna Valley must be
considered a failure. In this region, turnpikes only proved effective in augmenting the
retail and export trades in markets that Baltimoreans had previously secured through
marketing and liberal credit terms. However, the new turnpike links to the Susquehanna
Valley did facilitate a vastly increased volume of trade to and from Baltimore, which is
31 Pennsylvania Senate Journal, vol. 1821-22, Report of the Committee on Roads, Bridges, and
Inland Navigation.
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just as important to the development of a regional market as the creation of trade in
places where it did not previously exist. In this regard, Baltimore’s turnpike links to the
western Susquehanna Valley made an important contribution to the integration of the
mid-Atlantic region.
In a few places, however, Baltimore’s turnpikes succeeded brilliantly by
establishing new markets for the city’s merchants and artisans— specifically, in the
Juniata Valley and the mountainous regions of western Pennsylvania. Although a less
populous area than the Susquehanna Valley, the Juniata Valley maintained a number of
significant business establishments. William Reynolds of Bedford purchased over $6,000
in merchandise and sold almost $8,700 worth of whiskey to Baltimore’s Timanus and
Company between 1817 and 1819.52 From the Baltimore firm’s perspective, Reynolds
alone accounted for one-eighth of their total supply of whiskey, and one-half of the
whiskey arriving from Pennsylvania. From the Pennsylvania side of the trade, the
regularity of shipments indicated an exclusive connection to the Baltimore market. The
enormous size o f this trade also suggests that Baltimore merchandise found a very loyal
market in Bedford County.
Lewis Mytinger, a merchant shopkeeper in Huntingdon County, established a
triangular trade involving Pittsburgh, Baltimore, and Alexandria, Pennsylvania. Bom
Johan Ludwig M eittinger in Lancaster County, Mytinger married Catherine Cleckner in
Carlisle and then left the Susquehanna Valley to pursue a career in trade. His firm,
Mytinger and Crawford, purchased bar iron forged locally in Huntingdon County, and
then sold it to W illiam Porter and George Anshultz in Pittsburgh. Using the profits from

52Timanus and Company Ledger, MHS.
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the iron trade, the firm then shipped butter and whiskey to Baltimore where they bought
dry goods and manufactured products.53 During the rest of the year, Mytinger and
Crawford operated a store Alexandria, Pennsylvania where they sold Baltimore
merchandise to residents o f Huntingdon County. In a later business, Mytinger operated a
store with his son, George Mytinger, in neighboring Waterstreet, Pennsylvania.
Although no entries for either Pittsburgh or Baltimore appeared in the later accounts, an
identical trade pattern emerged to the one seen previously at the store in Alexandria. It
thus seems probable that the Mytingers continued this triangular trade.54
Further to the west in Fayette County, the New Geneva General Store occupied an
important place in connecting the county to a larger regional network. This business,
which included another store at Smithfield, Pennsylvania, imported merchandise from
Baltimore, sold part of it in Fayette County, and reshipped part of it to the Pittsburgh firm
o f Cromwell and Dobbin. The New Geneva Store also acted as a financial clearing house
for transactions between Cromwell and Dobbin, Andrew and John Oliphant, and Albert
Gallatin.55 In May 1818 alone, the store paid seven Baltimore firms, (including the
Meredith and Mummer firm active in the Harrisburg trade with John Close,) a total of
$3,089.36 for “sundry” merchandise. In August, September and October, the store added
an additional $1,748.16 in Baltimore merchandise to their inventory. Unlike the

53 Mytinger and Crawford Account Book, C2.34, Huntingdon County Historical Society. On
June 18 and July 16, 1808, the company sent 171 3/4 pounds of butter and eight barrels of
whiskey to Baltimore. They returned from Baltimore with £195.17.5 worth of merchandise in
June, and £918 worth of merchandise in July.
54 Lewis Mytinger and George Mytinger, Waterstreet Account Book, C4.27, Huntingdon County
Historical Society.
55 New Geneva General Store Day Book, MSS.58, The Historical Society of Western
Pennsylvania.
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Mytinger operation, the Geneva Store did not establish a triangular trading network. By
acting as a middleman in the dry goods trade and a quasi-bank for Fayette County
residents, however, the store did effectively secure the area for the Baltimore market.
Philadelphia merchants and artisans were not wholly absent from the region.
Thanks to the Pittsburgh Pike, Philadelphians seemingly dominated the retail trade in
Westmoreland County, located immediately to the east of Pittsburgh. Between 1803 and
1805, five o f the ten shopkeepers appearing in Greensburg’s The Farmers Register
advertised the arrival of goods from Philadelphia. None of the shopkeepers mentioned
merchandise from Baltimore. In addition, two Philadelphia firms advertised directly, and
a notice appeared concerning the dissolution of the Philadelphia partnership of George
Thompson and Enoch Price.56 For this kind of advertisement to be worth publishing in a
Greensburg newspaper, the firm must have carried a number of outstanding accounts
with local residents; otherwise, notice of the dissolution could have been handled by
personal communication. Thompson and Price’s notice suggests that the Philadelphia
business community was well established to the Westmoreland market.
In Pittsburgh itself, a more balanced split emerged between Baltimore and
Philadelphia. In The Pittsburgh Mercury between 1811 and 1816, two shopkeepers
advertised Baltimore goods, two advertised Philadelphia goods, and one offered goods
from both cities. Seven Philadelphia firms advertised directly, while only one
advertisement from a Baltimore firm appeared.57 Both Baltimore and Philadelphia

56 They included Harry Weaver, Jr., John Wells, David Marchland, Thomas Hoge, and M. P.
Cassily. The Farmers Register, December 17, 1803, February 25, 1804, August 13, 1804, and
November 30,1804, December 21, 1804, and April 12, 1805.
57 For the Baltimore connections, see The Pittsburgh Mercury, September 26, 1811, October 15,
1812, April 1,1813, July 22,1813, and November 4,1813. For the Philadelphia connections, see
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merchants tried to strengthen their commercial ties by establishing partnerships in
Pittsburgh and setting up their own warehouse operations. The emerging market proved
important enough for the Baltimore firm of A. J. and E. Lewis and to waive any
additional price increases to cover freightage, and sell merchandise at Baltimore prices.
Philadelphia druggists Speakman and Say took a different approach to courting
Pittsburgh interests. They announced that “having established a drug and chemical
warehouse in Pittsburgh, and taken Samuel Pettigrew [of Pittsburgh] into partnership,”
they hoped “to sell at the lowest Philadelphia prices, with the addition of carriage
expenses only.”58 Pittsburghers would have to pay for freightage, but they could also be
assured that the Philadelphia firm of Speakman and Say shared its profits with local
merchants.
The Pittsburgh firm o f Cromwell and Dobbin imported Baltimore goods through
Fayette County, but Philadelphia’s infiltration of the Monongahela Valley is immediately
evident from the ledgers of William Foster and Ebenezeer Denny’s store.59 In 1807 and
1808, Denny and Foster received all o f their merchandise directly from Philadelphia
firms, with the exception o f six purchases made with Chambersburg merchants. Their
acquisitions included brushes, groceries, coffee, sugar, tobacco, medicine, stationary, and
other goods readily available in both Baltimore and Philadelphia. It is possible that the
Chambersburg sales included some Baltimore merchandise, but the six transactions only
amounted to $299.64. In their fifty-five transactions with eighteen different Philadelphia
The Pittsburgh Mercury, January 11,1812, July 15, 1813, March 23, 1814, May 11, 1814, May
18, 1814, August 10, 1814, April 20, 1816, and June 22, 1816.
58 The Pittsburgh Mercury, May 27, 1813, and June 10,1813.
59 Ebenezeer Denny (1761-1822) also served as Pittsburgh’s first mayor.
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firms, Denny and Foster acquired over $12,000 worth o f merchandise and commodities
from the eastern metropolis. Simon Gratz represented their most significant commercial
link, providing over $2,300 in coffee, sugar, and groceries.60
Unlike the Susquehanna or Juniata Valleys, which adopted complimentary roles
in what Allan Pred described as the “intricate, crisscrossing economic relationships”
between small towns and metropolises, Pittsburgh became an urban center in its own
right. By 1810, Pittsburgh’s mercantile community had also established its own
commercial networks in Kentucky and throughout the Ohio-Mississippi River Valley
system down to New Orleans.61 Merchants and artisans from New York, Cincinnati,
Louisville, and New England recognized the importance of the emergent city, and
patronized Pittsburgh newspapers as frequently as their Baltimore and Philadelphia
counterparts. In 1812, Pittsburgh’s B. Bowen and Company offered textiles “direct from
the New England factories.” In 1817, the Louisville, Kentucky firm of Allen and Grant,
as well as the Cincinnati firm Jeremiah Neave and Son, placed advertisements in The
Pittsburgh M ercury.61 The Baltimore-Philadelphia trade rivalry certainly continued in
the Monongahela Valley, but it played a secondary role in a larger story.
The renewed interest in developing the backcountry during the early nineteenth
century produced significant economic change for both rural Pennsylvania and urban

60 Ledger of Denny and Foster, 1807-1808, Denny-O’Hara Family Papers, MSS.51, The
Historical Society of Western Pennsylvania.
61 Pred, Urban Growth, 2. Also see Solomon Buck and Elizabeth Buck, The Planting o f
Civilization in Western Pennsylvania (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1939), 288-317;
Reginald Horsman, The Frontier in the Formative Years, 1783-1815, (Albuquerque: University
of New Mexico Press, 1975), 154-162; and R. Eugene Harper, The Transformation o f Western
Pennsylvania, 1770-1800 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991).
62 The Pittsburgh Mercury, October 29, 1812, May 11, 1816, and June 22, 1816.
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Baltimore. The tremendous surge in marketing, the extension o f credit, and the
construction of turnpikes in the backcountry after the Panic of 1797 fundamentally
altered the lives o f western Pennsylvanians. The expansion of Baltimore’s hinterland
also helped break the city’s dependence on foreign markets. Overseas commerce
remained a fundamental part of Baltimore’s economy throughout the nineteenth century,
but the city never again proved as vulnerable to price shocks from Europe. Instead of
simply being an entrepot for backcountry grain, Baltimore emerged as a market center for
a developing regional economy. The competition sparked between Baltimore and
Philadelphia for the backcountry trade continued for decades, integrating both cities into
an emerging mid-Atlantic economy, and transforming the post-colonial system into the
early national economy— one dedicated to internal improvements and market
development. The transformation would exact a toll on the traditional social order,
however, and its effects would not be limited to the backcountry.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER SEVEN
THE URBAN TRANSITION

From the Potomac to the Monongahela, retail goods flooded into backcountry
shops, agricultural output expanded, and new roads stretched across the countryside after
1800. In Baltimore, the impressive growth of the backcountry trade helped end the hard
times o f the late 1790s and launched a new era of economic expansion. The degree and
scope of the changes overtaking the mid-Atlantic region could be seen as part of a market
revolution, the interpretive construct that has recently dominated much of the scholarship
on the early republic. Yet the term m arket revolution may obscure more than it explains
the social and economic changes taking shape in the early-nineteenth century. First, the
surge o f economic activity in the backcountry did not create markets where none had
previously existed. Baltimore had long-served as an entrepot for these farms, connecting
the backcountry to the Atlantic economy. The difference in the nineteenth century was
the new focus on marketing, transportation innovation, and credit reform to secure
backcountry markets rather than those overseas. The eighteenth-century economy
primarily focused on commerce in the Atlantic world; the nineteenth-century transition
heralded an economy that gravitated more and more to the backcountry and the American
West.
The creation of a regional market did not always produce the same social and
cultural consequences in rural and urban America. In western Maryland and western
Pennsylvania, as in most other parts of the backcountry, economic expansion did not
result in a rapid transformation of either the mentalite or their traditional social order of
society. With the exception of a few urbanized communities, like Lancaster, York,
308
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Carlisle, and Frederick, the market revolution precipitated only halting social evolution in
rural America. Most farmers and rural households continued to produce for both the
family farm and the market, preserving what historian Richard Bushman referred to as
the porous boundary between household and market production which characterized the
“composite farm” of colonial America.1
The persistence of composite farms owed in part to a deliberate strategy by
backcountry farmers. By maintaining a subsistence base of production, farmers partially
insulated themselves against market fluctuations. This became increasingly important as
the market economy expanded, and thus most rural Americans continued to favor
“competency” rather than profit, and reciprocal local exchanges rather than market
competition. Composite farms continued to dominate American agriculture throughout
the nineteenth century, encouraging an evolutionary process of social change. “In short,”
according to historian Christopher Clark, the development “of rural capitalism was
defined, not by the adoption of any one particular set of practices, but by the accretion of
a series of distinctive forms and organizations that,” over a period which spanned
decades, “added up to the creation of capitalism in the countryside.”2

1Richard Bushman, “Markets and Composite Farms in Early America,” The William and Mary
Quarterly, 3d ser., 55 (1998): 364. The literature on the porous nature of the rural British
American economy is vast. See especially Carole Shammas, “How Self-sufficient was Early
America?,” Journal o f Interdisciplinary History, 13 (1982): 247-72; Rona Weiss, “Primitive
Accumulation in the United States: The Interaction between Capitalist and Noncapitalist Class
Relations in Seventeenth-Century Massachusetts,” Journal o f Economic History, 42 (1982): 7782; Bettye Hobbs Pruitt, “Self-sufficiency and the Agricultural Economy of Eighteenth-Century
Massachusetts,” The William and Mary Quarterly, 3d ser., 41 (1984): 333-64; Daniel Vickers,
“Competency and Competition: Economic Culture in Early America,” The William and Mary
Quarterly, 47 (1990): 3-29; Allan Kulikoff, “Households and Markets: Toward a New Synthesis
of American Agrarian History,” The William and Mary Quarterly, 3d ser., 50 (1993): 342-55; and
Daniel Vickers, Farmers and Fishermen: Two Centuries o f Work in Essex County,
Massachusetts, 1630-1850 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994), 206-19.
2 Christopher Clark, The Roots o f Rural Capitalism: Western Massachusetts, 1780-1860 (Ithaca:
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The contrast between the effects of the market revolution on rural America and its
effects on the city could not have been any more dramatic. In urban America, the
creation of a new regional market economy acted like a catalyst, arousing a frenzy of
entrepreneurial activity that redirected and accelerated the sluggish changes of the post
colonial period into a sweeping transformation of the city’s social structure. Unlike the
methodical creation of capitalism in the countryside, the urban transition occurred with
deliberate speed as artisans and merchants scrambled to take advantage of the new
economy.
The emerging urban-rural dichotomy in the early nineteenth-century mid-Atlantic
presents a wide gulf between the effects of market expansion on the countryside and on
the city. If the seaports and the backcountry were intimately dependent on each other to
achieve economic growth, and cultural changes in both areas were intertwined, it is not
immediately clear how such drastic differences could have been sustained.
Contemporaries did not find the urban-rural dichotomy disconcerting, or even unusual.

Cornell University Press, 1990). 15, 17. The classic statements on the pre-capitalist mentalite of
rural Americans include James Henretta, “Families and Farms: Mentalite in Pre-Industrial
America,” The William and Mary Quarterly, 3d ser., 35 (1978): 3-32, and Daniel Vickers,
“Competency and Competition: Economic Culture in Early America.” The literature on the often
halting progress of capitalist social change in nineteenth-century rural America is substantial. See
especially Steven Hahn, The Roots o f Southern Populism: Yeoman Farmers and the
Transformation o f the Georgia Upcountry, 1850-1890 (New York: Oxford University Press,
1983); Steven Hahn and Jonathan Prude, eds., The Countryside in the Age o f Capitalist
Transformation: Essays in the Social History o f Rural America (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1985); Joan Jensen, Loosening the Bonds: Mid-Atlantic Farm Women, 1750-1850
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986); Wayne Franklin, A Rural Carpenter’s World: The
Craft in a Nineteenth-Century New York Township (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1990);
Allan Kulikoff, The Agrarian Origins o f American Capitalism (Charlottesville: University Press
of Virginia, 1992), 13-99; Michael Merrill, “Putting ‘Capitalism’ in Its Place: A Review of
Recent Literature,” The William and Mary Quarterly, 3d ser., 52 (1995): 315-26; and Christopher
Clark, “Rural America and the Transition to Capitalism,” in Paul Gilje, ed., Wages o f
Independence: Capitalism in the Early American Republic (Madison: Madison House, 1997), 6579.
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For Adam Smith, rural and urban areas did not, after all, share the same social structures.
In An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes o f the Wealth o f Nations, Smith argued that
“the nature o f agriculture. . . does not admit of so many subdivisions of labour, nor o f so
complete a separation of one business from another, as manufactures.” As a result, “it is
impossible to separate so entirely, the business of the grazier from that of the comfarmer,” whereas “the spinner is almost always a distinct person from the weaver.” The
consequences for the social order of each area were quite clear. The “impossibility of
making so complete and entire a separation of all the different branches of labour
employed in agriculture” meant that “the improvement o f the productive powers of
labour in this art [agriculture], does not always keep pace with their improvement in
manufactures.” The classic model of the household economy familiar to urban
Americans never really existed in the countryside according to Smith, and thus rural
Americans avoided most of the wrenching changes that transformed cities during the
early republic.3
Ironically, Marxist theory has built on Adam Smith’s observations of the ruralurban dichotomy. Since the mid-nineteenth century, farmers have represented a tangled
definitional problem for marxist analysis of class struggle. As independent producers
who own the means o f production, farmers appear to be proto-capitalists. On the other
hand, farmers also engaged in class struggles with wealthy magnates and greedy
creditors, which suggests they be classified as part of the proletariat. To solve this riddle,
Erik Wright proposed a theory of contradictory class locations, arguing that farmers may
be located in “more than one class simultaneously,” and may be both dominant and
3 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes o f the Wealth o f Nations, ed. R.H.
Campbell, A.S. Skinner, and W.B. Todd (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1981), 1 ,16.
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subordinate, exploiter and oppressed. According to Wright, fanners “make complex
interclass alliances, tying themselves to capitalists, hoping to join that class, or to workers
to regulate capitalist property.” How farmers would then fit into a class revolution is
somewhat byzantine, but Wright’s theory does recognize that traditional marxist class
divisions between capitalists and workers must be abandoned when studying farmers.4
W right’s analysis largely agrees with Smith’s— the household economies of urban and
rural areas did not share the same social structure.
Allan Kulikoff adopted Wright’s idea of contradictory class locations to help
explain the market transition in rural America. Kulikoff argued that small, independent
farmers resisted the loss o f their economic freedom, demonstrating a “capitalist social
formation” that had yet to achieve full class separation. ‘T o determine when an area
became capitalist,” Kulikoff argued, “one needs to look at the broader society, beyond the
farm community.” This brings the question back to the seaports, where the
transformation was well under way. A sweeping market revolution in the cities
corresponded to the creation of a capitalist social formation in the countryside; the lack of
parallel social evolution in rural and urban America should not discount the degree of
change experienced in urban areas. This formulation helps explain why the advent of
capitalist class relations on farms trailed so far behind the expansion o f the markets in the
backcountry. Unlike the countryside, Baltimore completed the transition to a new
capitalist order within a single generation. Given the lack of parallel social evolution
between the two areas, it is not difficult to see how an urban-rural dichotomy either

* Erik Wright, Classes (London: Verso, 1985), 37-51, 124-126.
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emerged or continued for so long.5

E a r l y I n d u s t r ia l iz a t io n

The cornerstone of the urban transition was the growing divergence between
manufacturers and traditional artisans. This incipient capitalist class did not appear
overnight. In response to social and economic changes on both sides of the Atlantic
during the latter half of the eighteenth century, the meaning of the word manufacturer
had been slowly evolving. By the 1790s, a manufacturer increasingly referred to
someone who operated a large-scale operation and pursued production for a regional
market, rather than someone who operated a small workshop and produced goods and
services for the local economy. The earlier meaning placed manufacturers squarely
within the tradition o f the household economy; the new meaning redefined manufacturers
as capitalists interested in expanding domestic production to reach beyond the immediate
community.6 By taking advantage of the burgeoning backcountry trade and avidly
pursuing market production, manufacturers quickly became the most dynamic part of the
republic’s economy. They included aggressive entrepreneurs like John Peter Spies, who
sought to cash in on the new opportunities in the backcountry, and others who were
simply afraid of loosing their businesses if they did not adapt to changing circumstances.
Although not all o f these would-be magnates succeeded, those who did represented the
vanguard of an industrial class that eventually dominated American society.7

5 Kulikoff, The Agrarian Origins o f American Capitalism, 7-33.
6 For the evolution of the word manufacturer during the eighteenth century, see the discussion in
chapter four.
7 Richard Stott, “Artisans and Capitalist Development,” in Paul Gilje, ed., Wages o f
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Before 1800, limited access to new technologies hindered the establishment of
manufactories as much as the lack of a regional market.8 Thus in a few industries, the
increased availability o f mechanized processes in the early nineteenth century proved just
as important as the expansion of the backcountry trade. Grain millers were among the
first to benefit from the convergence o f these trends. After O liver Evans revealed the
details o f his automated grain milling process in his 1795 book, The Young M illwright
and M iller’s G uide, millers began employing his technology without paying him any
royalties. The frequency of these offenses led Evans to raise his license fees from $30 to
$300, and renew his U.S. patent in 1804 under the revised Federal Patent Law of 1800.
The new law gave him exclusionary rights over both the use of the machinery specified
in the patent as well as all similar machinery designed for the same purpose. He hoped
that these actions would stem the tide of mill-owners using his technology without a
license, but the measures proved ineffective, particularly in Baltimore. Believing he had
no other choice, Evans issued a stem public warning in May 1808 to all Baltimore millers
that legal action would be taken against them if they continued to use his technology
without a license.9 The strong-armed tactics did not have the desired effect. Instead of
bowing to pressure, Baltimore’s merchant-millers decided turn the tables on Evans by
challenging the legal validity o f his patent.
Independence: Capitalism in the Early American Republic (Madison: Madison House, 1997),
101- 02 .
8 See the discussion in chapter four.
9 Baltimore Federal Gazette and Daily Advertiser, May 30, 1808, and Greville Bathe and
Dorothy Bathe, Oliver Evans: A Chronicle o f Early American Engineering (Philadelphia:
Historical Society of Pennsylvania, 1935), 189. For the most thorough study of the early U.S.
patent system, see Carolyn Cooper, Shaping Invention: Thomas Blanchard’s Machinery and
Patent Management in Nineteenth Century America (New York: Columbia University Press,
1991).
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The U.S. Circuit Court for the Maryland District heard the case of Oliver Evans v.
Samuel Robinson on December 3, 1811. At the core of the Baltimore plaintiffs’
argument was that Baltimore miller Jonathan Ellicott had actually invented the automated
grain conveyer, a fundamental part of Evans’s process. The court disagreed, and found in
favor of Evans. Unsatisfied with the outcome, Baltimore’s millers turned to Congress,
and enlisted Thomas Jefferson in their cause. Their 1813 “Memorial” to Congress
stressed the importance o f Ellicott’s conveyer, argued that Evans’s process produced no
more flour than other machinery, and that the savings on labor no longer produced higher
revenues.10 Jefferson’s letter supported the idea that Ellicott had invented the conveyer,
and that Evans had only added an automated “hopper-boy.” O f course, Jefferson did not
explain why, as Secretary of State, he had approved Evans’s patent in the first place, and
this omission certainly did not help the plaintiffs’ case. Finally, the millers claimed that
“the capacity to manufacture flour had outstripped the supply of grain to the extent that
farmers used the competition among millers to inflate the price of wheat.” 11 The
“Memorial” proved unconvincing. Like the Circuit Court, Congress sided with Evans,
denying the millers’ petition on January 6,1814. Evans’s patent remained in effect until
1818.
The struggle over patent rights and royalties did not retard the spread of
automated grain milling in the mid-Atlantic, however, or keep Baltimore’s millers from
vastly expanding their operations between 1800 and 1812. Industrialization proceeded
10 George Terry Sharrer, “Flour Milling and the Growth of Baltimore, 1783-1830” (Ph.D.,
University of Maryland, College Park, 1975), 80-83, and Memorial to Congress o f Sundry
Citizens o f the United States Praying Relieffrom the Oppressive Operation o f Oliver Evans’s
Patent (Baltimore: J. Robinson, 1813).
11 Sharrer, “Flour Milling,” 81.
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with vigor along the Jones and Gwynn’s Falls on the outskirts of the city, and grain
milling was not the only industry that benefited from early mechanization. After
Jefferson’s Embargo in 1807, Baltimore’s first significant textile factories appeared. The
embargo halted the import of many vital textile imports, and in 1808, the Maryland
legislature responded by incorporating the Union Manufacturing Company. With more
than 300 investors paying $50 per share for its stock, and a capitalization of one million
dollars, it was easily the largest of the new operations in Baltimore. It was soon followed
by two more cotton factories near Baltimore: the Washington Cotton Manufacturing
Company, incorporated in 1809 with a capitalization of $100,000, and the Powhatan
Cotton Mills, built by Nathan Levering in 1810. The embargo certainly encouraged the
industry, but many consumers decided that they actually preferred domestic textiles. This
proved especially the true for American-made cotton duck, which quickly replaced the
imported linen duck that sailmakers had used as canvas to make ships’ sails. The profits
made on American textiles convinced others to capitalize on the expanding domestic
market. The Athenian Society of Baltimore, which was modeled after the Domestic
Society of Philadelphia, built a warehouse to receive and sell American-made textiles on
commission. Between 1809 and 1812, sales by the Society jumped from $17,608 to
$80,893.12
Compared to the immense cotton factories in New England, like those on the
Merrimack River and the Boston Manufacturing Company in Lowell, Massachusetts,

12William Bagnall, The Textile Industries o f the United States, Including Sketches and Notices o f
Cotton, Woolen, Silk, and Linen Manufactures in the Colonial Period (New York: Augustus M.
Kelley, 1971), I, 325-26; Victor Clark, History o f Manufactures in the United States (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1929), I, 549; and Gary Lawson Browne, Baltimore in the Nation, 1789-1861
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981), 55.
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Baltimore’s enterprises were relatively modest in size, specialized in particular products,
and employed a more balanced workforce of men and women. Baltimore’s largest
factories were also state-chartered corporations financed by merchant subscriptions,
rather than patriarchal businesses dominated by individual merchant families. Although
quite different from the more celebrated New England enterprises, Baltimore’s cotton
mills were typical o f early American textile industrialization in the mid-Atlantic.
Throughout Maryland, Delaware, Pennsylvania, and New York, smaller, specialized
mills and somewhat larger, state-chartered companies employing a more gender-balanced
workforce were common.13
Mechanization proved vital to the growth of several industries, but the overall
importance of technological improvement in early American industrialization can be
easily exaggerated. Historian Jeanne Boydston has pointed out that “large factories and
extensive mechanization were not the hallmarks of early industrialization” in the United

13 The clear divergence between mid-Atlantic and New England patterns of industrialization
during the early nineteenth century continued until the Civil War. As late as 1850, women still
outnumbered men in both cotton and wool mills throughout New England by two or three to one.
In mid-Atlantic states, women barely outnumbered men in cotton mills, and men significantly
outnumbered women in wool mills. The average number of employees per cotton factory by state
ranged as high as two or three-hundred employees in New England, while in the mid-Atlantic, no
state recorded an average of more than one-hundred employees per cotton mill. Similar trends
appeared for wool mills. For these divergent patterns of industrialization in the mid-Atlantic, see
Anthony Wallace, Rockdale: The Growth o f an American Village in the Early Industrial
Revolution (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972); Bruce Laurie, Working People o f Philadelphia,
1800-1850 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1980); Mary Ryan, Cradle o f the
Middle Class: The Family in Oneida County, New York, 1790-1865 (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1981); Philip Scranton, Proprietary Capitalism: The Textile Manufacture at
Philadelphia, 1800-1885 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Cynthia Skelton, The
Mills at Manayunk: Industrialization and Conflict in the Philadelphia Region, 1787-1837
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); and Lynda Fuller Clendenning, "The
Early Textile Industry in Maryland, 1810-1850,” Maryland Historical Magazine, 87 (1992): 25166.
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States, and this was certainly true in Baltimore.14 Most of the available technologies
before 1820 required fast streams to drive water-powered machinery, and these
innovations, while important to the growth of the region, could not be widely adopted in
a city. Few o f the city’s handicraft producers achieved notable levels o f mechanized
production until to the introduction of steam engines into urban factories in the 1820s.
Thus almost all of the mechanized operations established in Baltimore before 1820 were
located outside the city’s limits in the countryside of Baltimore County. According to the
1810 manufacturing census, Baltimore City contained twenty-four different industries
which manufactured products worth $1,890,300, but none “should really be classified as
a factory-production industry; they var[ied] more in relation to the degree of skill
involved in each process than they [did] by the level of rationalized and mechanized
production.”15 As in the late eighteenth century, the substitution of mechanical devices
for laborers was not a important distinction between artisans and manufacturers in the
early nineteenth century. Both groups were largely comprised of handicraft producers.
It may be difficult in the early twenty-first century to imagine a manufacturer as a
handicraft producer who employed a mix of free and unfree workers. Today, the word
manufacturing conjures images of immense, mechanized factories filled with scores of
wage earners. Certainly when comparing Henry Ford’s Red River automobile plant to an
early handicraft manufactory, it is tempting to fold all handicraft producers into one

14Jeanne Boydston, Home and Work: Housework, Wages, and the Ideology o f Labor in the Early
Republic (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 58. Also see Jonathan Prude, “Capitalism.
Industrialization, and the Factory in Post-Revolutionary America,” in Gilje, ed.. Wages o f
Independence, 81-100, and Stott, “Artisans and Capitalist Development,” 104.
15Tench Coxe, A Statement o f the Arts and Manufacturers o f the United States o f America, fo r
the Year 1810 (Philadelphia: A. Comman, Jr., 1814), and Browne, Baltimore in the Nation, 57.
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omnibus occupational category and set them apart from the owners of mechanized
factories. For studies o f the early nineteenth century, however, it is important to make
the distinction between manufacturers and artisans, even though nearly all members of
each group were handicraft producers. The close association between the words
mechanization and manufacturing developed later in the nineteenth century. Andrew
Ure, a political economist writing in the 1830s, noted that “manufacture is a word, which,
in the vicissitude of language, has come to signify the reverse of its intrinsic meaning.”
Instead o f referring to handicraft production, the word manufacture “now denotes every
extensive product of art, which is made by machinery, with little or no aid of the human
hand; so that the most perfect manufacture is that which dispenses entirely with manual
labour.” Unmechanized manufactories represented “imperfect” examples of
industrialization according to Ure, but he still placed them in the same category with
other manufacturers who benefited from mechanized production.16
Blending the meanings of the words m echanization and manufacturing before the
mid-nineteenth century veils the complex historical transition which began in the waning
16 Andrew Ure, The Philosophy o f Manufactures, Or, An Exposition o f the Scientific, Moral, and
Commercial Economy o f the Factory System o f Great Britain (London: Charles Knight, 1835), 1.
Frederich Engels’s outline of the industrial revolution, which emphasized the substitution of
technology for handicraft production, provided the earliest rationale for ignoring differences
between handicraft producers. In the twentieth century, David Landes’s influential definition of
the industrial revolution renewed the emphasis on the substitution of mechanical devices and
inanimate power for human labor. See Frederick Engels, The Condition o f the Working Class in
England, trans. Institute of Marxism-Leninism, Moscow (Chicago, 1984; orig. Leipzig, 1844),
37,42, and David Landes, The Unbound Prometheus: Technological Change and Industrial
Development in Western Europe from 1750 to the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1969), I. More recently, historians of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe have
challenged the notion of substitution as untenable, and have questioned whether or not
mechanization was the central theme of the Industrial Revolution, at least prior to 1850. See
especially Raphael Samuel, “Mechanization and Hand Labour in Industrializing Britain,” and
Christopher Johnson, “Patterns of Proletarianization,” in Lenard Berlanstein, ed.. The Industrial
Revolution and Work in Nineteenth-Century Europe (New York: Routledge, 1992), 26-43, 81101.
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years of the eighteenth and early years of the nineteenth century. It ignores the real
differences between artisans and manufacturers, and creates the myth that artisans
maintained a middling status throughout a pre-industrial Jeffersonian period, loosing their
sense o f identity and occupational integrity during an industrializing Jacksonian era.
With the distinction between artisans and manufacturers blurred, one scholar concluded
that “social historians,” who “look for change instinctively . . . would be disappointed
with early national Baltimore, whose social structure budged hardly at all.” !? That largescale mechanization fundamentally altered the workplace in the later nineteenth century
is undeniable, but a focus on technological differences between early and later
nineteenth-century production encourages the classification o f all non-mechanized
workplaces as pre-industrial and non-factory. As Jonathan Prude has argued, such
restrictive nomenclature ignores the heterogeneity of manufacturing in the early republic,
and ignores the real socio-economic changes that transformed the handicraft trades in the
early nineteenth century. Extensive mechanization may have provided the most efficient
way for prospective manufacturers to achieve greater production and productivity, but it
proved the least frequent way too.18
In the absence of wide-scale mechanization, the real difference between
traditional artisans and manufacturers was how each group envisioned the division of
labor and the social organization of the workplace. Manufacturers ceased to look upon
their workers, whether free or unfree, as part o f a family or household operation, and tried

17 Charles Steffen, The Mechanics o f Baltimore: Workers and Politics in the Age o f Revolution,
1763-1812 (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1984), 12.
18 Prude, “Capitalism, Industrialization, and the Factory,” 81-100, and Boydston, Home and
Work, 58,100.
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through various means to squeeze as much labor from them as possible. Few summarily
discontinued the use of apprentices or enslaved workers in favor of wage laborers, and
instead invented new ways of minimizing the costs associated with existing workers to
maximize productivity and profits. Customary rights and traditional relationships
between masters and workers were demolished, crippling the deferential bonds within the
workplace— one of the hallmarks o f the household economy.
Political economists in the early nineteenth century were the first to note the
importance o f the division of labor in the transition from workshop to manufactory. In
his discussion of economic value, David Ricardo addressed the relative importance of
“fixed and circulating capitals” of equal and unequal proportions in determining labor
and production costs. Fixed capital referred to any capital o f a durable nature;
machinery, buildings and equipment are the most common forms. Circulating capital
referred to any capital that requires rapid reproduction; investment in labor is the most
common form. This may seem a rigid division, but Ricardo went to great length to
demonstrate that the division is “not essential. . . the line of demarcation cannot be
accurately drawn,” and that the effects of different proportions of fixed and circulating
capital varied considerably from trade to trade. Ricardo favored mechanization, but
warned that the key to greater productivity was not always to sink as much capital as
possible into machinery. Fixed capital that is “not of a durable nature . . . [and] will
require a great quantity of labour annually to keep it in its original state of efficiency”
would increase the cost of production, and thus the relative cost of labor, rather than
decrease it. The division o f labor, rather than a particular balance between fixed and
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circulating capital, was the real key to greater productivity.19
In 1835, Charles Babbage, a professor of mathematics at Cambridge University
with an interest in the economies of machinery and manufacturing, cautioned prospective
manufacturers on the limitations of mechanization. The principal difference between
making and m anufacturing was that “the former refers to the production a small, that
latter to that of a very large number o f individuals.” Compared to the division of labor,
technological considerations were of relatively minor consequence in manufactories.
Machinery may help achieve greater levels of production, but Babbage cautioned that if a
m aker wished to become a manufacturer, “he must attend to other principles besides
those mechanical ones,” and focus on the division of labor came first. Those who blindly
adopt machinery may find themselves in dire straits, for in Babbage's estimation, “there
is . . . no trade or profession existing in which there is so much quackery, so much
ignorance o f scientific principles . . . as is to be met with amongst mechanical
projectors.” Although the word manufacturer was increasingly defined by mechanized
production, the division o f labor rather than the degree of technology is what separated
manufacturers from artisans as late as the 1830s.20
Just as Ricardo and Babbage cautioned prospective manufacturers against blindly
adopting machinery, a prospective manufacturer also needed to be very careful about
simply adding laborers to a workforce. Unskilled workers proved ineffective in most
trades until workshops either attained larger economies of scale, or effectively

19David Ricardo, The Principles o f Economy and Taxation (Rutland, VT: Charles E. Tuttle,
1911; reissued 1992; orig. 1817), 18-24.
20 Charles Babbage, On the Economy o f Machinery and Manufactures (New York: Augustus M.
Kelley, 1963; orig. 1835), 120-121,267.
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incorporated mechanized production. Only skilled workers could provide the immediate
productivity increases that most handicraft producers needed to compete for the
backcountry trade. Consequently, the percentage o f slaveholders among handicraft
producers increased from 14 to 19 percent between 1800 and 1810, and the average
annual number o f apprentices registered with the Orphans Court increased by 250
percent. Yet the number o f available skilled workers ultimately proved insufficient to
meet the needs o f an expanding urban economy, and many handicraft producers were
forced to supplement their workforces with greater numbers of unskilled wage earners.
The number of unskilled workers in Baltimore surged in the first two decades of the
nineteenth century, but they still remained a minority of the city’s laboring population as
late as 1820.21
Even when handicraft producers were able to limit the pool of potential laborers
to skilled workers, they still had to be careful about what types of workers to hire.
Choosing the right workers for a given trade proved a tricky business. Short-term versus
long-term prospects, available capital for expanding a workforce, seasonal demands of a
business, and the need for specific skills all figured into the decision process. No one
form o f labor proved satisfactory in meeting the needs of every handicraft producer
because the varied work regimens in each trade altered which form of labor proved most
beneficial, handicraft producers interested in expanding their workshops into
manufactories thus faced a labor quandary where the decision to hire or purchase

21 T. Stephen Whitman, Price o f Freedom: Slavery and Manumission in Baltimore and Early
National Maryland (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1997), 169 (Appendix A); Steffen,
The Mechanics o f Baltimore, 31 (Table 11); and Seth Rockman, “Working for Wages in Early
Republic Baltimore: Unskilled Labor and the Blurring of Slavery and Freedom’’ (Ph.D.,
University of California, Davis, 1999), 8-15.
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additional apprentices, journeymen, life slaves, term slaves, hired slaves, or white or free
Black wage earners was no longer a certain issue.22
The manufacturers’ propensity to use unfree labor may present as unsettling
interpretive problem for some scholars. Traditional marxist interpretations describe a
close association between the market economy and the dominance o f free labor; slavery
and other forms o f unfree labor belong to earlier historical epochs and are anathema to
the capitalist mode of production.23 As Eric Foner and Jonathan Glickstein have asserted,
however, early nineteenth-century Americans “employed a variety of criteria in setting
forth their concepts of truly free manual labor.” Although anti-slavery rhetoric
eventually suffused free labor ideology, the dichotomous relationship between slavery
and free labor only emerged in the 1850s as a response to the “wage slavery” critique of
northern factories. Most proponents of “free labor” in the early nineteenth century were
“strongly tolerant and protective o f chattel slavery.”24 The seeming contradiction rested
~ The expression “life slaves" refers to enslaved persons without a legal guarantee or a verbal
commitment from their slaveholders to manumission. The expression “term slaves” refers to
enslaved persons with either a verbal commitment from their slaveholders, or a written, legal
guarantee of manumission upon reaching a specified age. For a discussion of “term slavery” see
Christopher Phillips, ‘The Roots of Quasi-Freedom: Manumission and Term Slavery in Early
National Baltimore,” Southern Studies, 4 (1993): 39-66.
23 Many marxists now reject a determinist reading of history where society inevitably evolves
through set stages of development. Marx himself disclaimed the importance of determinism in a
draft letter to the editor of Otechestvenniye Zapiski in November 1877. Nevertheless, the idea
that different modes of production dominate different epochs of history remains an important
tradition in marxist thought. In the modem era, capitalism emerged as a mode of production
characterized, in part, by “a market where LABOUR POWER is bought and sold, the mode of
exchange being money wages for a period of time (time rate) or for a specified task (piece rate);
the existence of a market with the implied contractual relation contrasts with earlier phases of
slavery or serfdom [unfree labor].” See Tom Bottomore, ed., A Dictionary o f Marxist Thought
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983), 64, 335,458-460.
24 Eric Foner, “Free Labor and Nineteenth-Century Political Ideology,” in Melvyn Stokes and
Stephen Conway, eds., The Market Revolution in America: Social, Political, and Religious
Expressions, 1800-1880 (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1996), 99-127, and
Jonathan Glickstein, Concepts o f Free Labor in Antebellum America (New Haven: Yale
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on the centuries-old Western division between manual and mental labor which attached a
considerable stigma to the latter while uplifting the virtues o f the former. Instead of
dividing labor between free and unfree, early nineteenth-century Americans envisioned
all unskilled laborers in a broader intellectual category, believing that some form of
coercion was necessary to compel people to do degrading manual labor. Early
manufacturers thus continued to employ enslaved and apprenticed workers in an
emerging market economy without any sense of contradiction.25
Whether using free or unfree workers, manufacturers struggled to discover which
forms of labor best suited their needs in the new economy. Within each trade, those who
used different forms of labor did not fare equally well. Producers often switched between
different types o f labor in desperate, sometimes panicked attempts to increase their
workshops’ productivity. As uncertainty clouded these decisions, most types of laborers
vied for employment in nearly every handicraft industry well into the early 1820s. In
1805, William McCleary, a shoemaker, placed an ad in the Baltim ore Am erican offering
employment to five or six of journeymen. He then switched to apprenticed labor within a
few months, eventually taking on fourteen apprentices. Between 1808 and 1815, the
Union Manufacturing Company bound out more than 60 apprentices, and then switched
to employing wage earning girls. By 1820, wage earning girls outnumbered apprenticed
boys by a margin o f 104 to 16. At the Maryland Chemical Works, David McKim
University Press, 1991), 2, 12.
25 For the often uneven impact of markets, technology, and industrial change upon both labor and
handicraft production, see Raphael Samuel, “Workshop of the World: Steam Power and Hand
Technology in mid-Victorian Britain,” History Workshop, 3 (1977): 27-32; Michael Piore, Birds
o f Passage: Migrant Labor and Industrial Society (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1979), 35-43; and Charles Sabel and Theodore Zeitlin, “Historical Alternatives to Mass
Production: Politics, Markets, and Technology in Nineteenth-Century Industrialization,” Past and
Present, 108 (1985): 133-76.
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reduced the number of enslaved laborers from 42 percent of his workforce in 1827 to just
18 percent in 1832.26
A wrong choice of labor could produce a substantial increase in labor costs and
wipe out the additional revenues created by expanding production with a larger
workforce. Prospective manufacturers who invested in and then exploited the right forms
o f labor prospered. Those who invested poorly, or chose not to invest in labor at all, soon
found themselves struggling to maintain ownership of their shops. What form of labor
yielded the highest productivity at the lowest cost thus became the benchmark decision
around which entrepreneurs either succeeded or failed in the two decades after the Panic
of 1797.

U n f r e e L a b o r and I n d u s t r ia l iz a t io n

After the Panic of 1797 and the hard times that followed, the patterns of
apprenticeship in Baltimore shifted abruptly. Despite the attempt by the Maryland
assembly in 1793 to uphold customary practices and provide greater order to
apprenticeship, masters in several Baltimore trades began misusing the apprentice system
by treating their charges as if they were hired hands. Maryland lawmakers intended the
apprenticeship system to provide gainful employment for orphans, but this was only part
o f a larger social agenda. Baltimore’s system was supposed to bolster the city’s
traditional social order, promote social deference, and strengthen the household economy.
Instead, handicraft producers interested in market production transformed the Baltimore
County Orphans Court into a distribution center for cheap, bound labor. As early as
26 Baltimore American, April 6 and August 16,1805; Steffen, Mechanics o f Baltimore, 35; and
Whitman, The Price o f Freedom, 42, 187 n.82-83.
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1799, journeymen complained that master tailors lived “in a state o f luxury equal to men
o f the first rank,” building palatial homes and dabbling in commercial matters by
exploiting their apprentices. Meanwhile, the journeymen struggled to survive, many of
them “almost deprived of eye sight,” and in all cases their “constitution impaired” with
little prospect o f things ever improving.27
In many trades, the number of apprentices per workshop was steeply on the rise.
For example, three-quarters of Baltimore’s shoe makers who chose to use apprentice
labor employed only one or two in their shops, but one-third of all apprentices in the
shoemaking trade worked in sweatshops with at least five laborers. Manufacturers who
employed six, twelve, or twenty apprentices at a time gave little attention to them beyond
their productive use. It is unlikely that the Maryland Assembly intended these changes to
the apprenticeship system. As Charles Steffen observed, these practices “were cutting the
heart out o f the apprenticeship system while preserving its familiar form.” Thereafter,
apprenticeship distorted, rather then reflected traditional familial production, stretching
the idea of a “household” economy to the breaking point. With almost 2,000 apprentices
employed at any given time between 1800 and 1820 in all Baltimore trades, the former
benchmark o f the household economy became a critical institution in the transition to a
capitalist social order.28
William McCleary, one of Baltimore’s most prolific shoe makers, typified how
many manufacturers undermined the apprenticeship system. Soon after opening his
business at the com er of Water and South Streets in 1805, McCleary registered only three
27 Baltimore American and Daily Advertiser, June 8, 1799. For the 1793 law regulating
apprenticeship, see the discussion in chapter four.
28 Steffen, The Mechanics o f Baltimore, 29-32.
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apprentices with the Orphans Court. Within a year, he concluded that he would not be
able to compete against other shoemakers for the backcountry trade and subsequently
added eleven more apprentices over the next decade. Other shoe makers repeated this
pattern throughout the city. William Duncan had as many as fifteen apprentices, and a
half-dozen other shoemakers employed at least ten apprentices at any given time.
Prospective shoe manufacturers like McCleary and Duncan were not very numerous, but
their influence over laborers in the shoe trade and the production of shoes was
nonetheless profound. For at least a few of them, the strategy worked.29
Given the increased focus on limiting costs while expanding production, the
popularity of apprentice labor is easily understood. Children under the age of sixteen still
comprised about 40 percent o f the city’s population as late as 1820, and thus represented
the most ready form of labor in the city. Apprentices were also the least expensive form
of labor in the short-term, and were therefore an attractive alternative to almost any
handicraft producer. Not surprisingly, apprentices could be found working in almost
every Baltimore trade into the early 1820s.30 Despite the short-term benefits in the cost
o f labor, however, the use of apprentice labor also presented severe drawbacks. In the
long-term, apprentices were arguably the most expensive form of labor—especially if the
opportunity costs involved with guardianship are taken into consideration. Even more
than enslaved workers, apprentices were the least flexible form of labor in the early
republic. Once registered with the Orphans Court, apprentices could only be legally
discharged from their masters if the Court released both parties from their contractual
29 Steffen, The Mechanics o f Baltimore, 32-36.
30 Third Census of the United States: Population, Baltimore City, 1820, and Third Census of the
United States: Manufactures, Maryland, 1820, both at National Archives.
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arrangement. This invariably proved a messy process. Masters occasionally lodged
protests with the Orphans Court claiming that an apprentice’s bad behavior represented a
clear violation of contractual obligations. In the case o f Thomas Kelly, the Court agreed
with him that his apprentice was indeed “a very incorrigible boy,” and released Kelly
from his obligation.31 More often, apprentices lodged protests with the Court alleging
physical abuse by their masters. In the vast majority o f these cases, the Court ruled in
favor of the apprentices and released them from their masters’ custody. The Court
usually placed these unfortunates with another handicraft producer in the same trade as
their former master.
Due to the long-term drawbacks associated with employing them, additional
apprentices did not always represent the most effective way for handicraft producers to
increase their workforce. Many handicraft producers continued to favor apprentice labor,
but an important juxtaposition of interests needed to occur for increased numbers of
apprentices to be represent the best way to convert from household to market production.
In a few trades, such as shoe manufacture or cabinetmaking, apprentices could be trained
to work on particular tasks within the productive process where each step required
relatively little skill. Handicraft producers who produced goods in steady demand with
backcountry consumers, such as shoes and clothing, needed to increase their labor forces
as quickly as possible. The number o f apprentices in the clothing trades increased from
fewer than 100 registered per year with the Orphans Court between 1794 and 1800 to
more than 300 per year between 1811 and 1815. Apprentices registered to shoemakers

31 Petition Docket, July 1809 session. Criminal Dockets of the Court of Oyer and Terminer,
Baltimore City Criminal Court, Maryland Hall of Records, quoted in Steffen, The Mechanics o f
Baltimore, 29.
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increased by 250 percent over the same period. Those engaged in businesses that
supported the backcountry trade, such as coopers and wagon makers, also needed to
expand production. The number o f apprentices bound out to these trades substantially
increased as well.32
In trades requiring more highly skilled workers where the division o f labor could
not be as easily accommodated, such as bookbinding and clock manufacture, apprentices
were less highly concentrated. Unless a handicraft producer in one of these industries
could find an apprentice who already possessed some training, a new apprentice
represented a questionable investment. Unless they could be trained quickly, apprentices
would be ineffective in helping the workshop achieve greater levels of production in the
short-term. In these cases, apprentices did not represent the best alternative for
converting to market production, and those engaged in these trades did not invest as
heavily in apprentice labor. In trades where the backcountry trade either proved
relatively unimportant, such as construction and brickmaking, the demand for apprentices
was also not as great. The number of apprentices registered per year between 1811 and
1815 in the construction trades had only risen by 8 percent compared since the turn of the
century.33 Those who chose to employ apprentices in these trades likely did so because
their limited capital excluded the possibilities of either buying enslaved workers or
paying wages to free laborers.
When employing additional apprentices represented a poor choice o f labor
alternatives for increasing productivity, a prospective manufacturer could turn to either

32 Steffen, The Mechanics o f Baltimore. 31 (Table 11).
33 Steffen, The Mechanics o f Baltimore. 31 (Table 11).
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enslaved laborers or wage earners. This presumes, of course, that slavery represented a
viable labor alternative in an urban economy— an assumption that several historians have
dismissed. Many historians have argued that slavery proved either too expensive for
profit-minded urban entrepreneurs with easy access to an ever-expanding population of
immigrants, or that the urban slaveholder’s ambiguous control over his laborers created
excessive absenteeism and an unacceptable number of runaways. These problems,
supposedly unique to slavery, raised the cost o f employing enslaved workers, making the
institution untenable in cities. Other studies have suggested that slavery stunted
technological innovation, and by extension, the productivity gains that manufacturers
needed to compete in a market economy. This impediment created unacceptable
opportunity costs for manufacturers, rendering slavery untenable for any manufacturing
enterprise— urban or rural.34 The implication of all of these studies is clear: Baltimore’s
handicraft producers did not face hard choices regarding labor in the early republic; they
only needed to choose between apprentices and wage earners because enslaved labor was
34 Richard Wade, Slavery in the Cities: The South, 1820-1860 (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1964), 143-243; Eugene Genovese, The Political Economy o f Slavery: Studies in the
Economy and Society o f the Slave South (New York: Vintage Books, Random House, 1967), 22140; Barbara Jeanne Fields, Slavery and Freedom on the Middle Ground: Maryland During the
Nineteenth Century (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), 40-62; Robert Fogel and Stanley
Engerman, Time on the Cross: The Economics o f American Negro Slavery (New York: W.W.
Norton, 1989), 94-102; Robert Fogel, Without Consent or Contract: The Rise and Fall o f
American Slavery (New York: W.W. Norton, 1989), 107-111; and Charles Dew, “Slavery and
Technology in the Antebellum Southern Iron Industry: The Case of the Buffalo Forge.” in Ronald
Numbers and Todd Savitt, ed.. Science and Medicine in the Old South (Baton Rouge: Louisiana
State University Press, 1989), 107-26. Fogel and Engerman stressed that urban slavery declined
in Southern cities that had the largest in-migration of white immigrants, but emphasized the
importance of rural demand in the later antebellum period as another reason for urban slavery’s
decline. Slave labor became increasingly expensive because “cities had to compete with the
countryside for a supply of slaves whose growth was limited to the rate of natural increase.” This
made rural demand for slaves relatively “inelastic,” while urban demand proved relatively
“elastic” in the presence of an acceptable alternative. Ultimately, however, slave labor could not
compete with inexpensive immigrant wage labor in antebellum Southern cities. See Fogel and
Engerman, Time on the Cross, 102, and Fogel, Without Consent or Contract, 108.
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never a real option.
A plethora of studies have dismantled the notion that enslaved labor could not be
profitable in cities or manufacturing enterprises.35 T. Stephen Whitman’s analysis of
David and Richard McKim’s Maryland Chemical Works outside Baltimore is especially
instructive. Using the McKims’ meticulously detailed records, Whitman demonstrated
that the cost of employing wage laborers often exceeded the cost of using either hired
slaves, term slaves, or life slaves at the Chemical Works. Absentee rates were similar for
enslaved and wage laborers, and even when enslaved workers died suddenly or ran away,
which they did with some frequency, the cost of employing wage laborers could still
greater. Whitman also showed that “investment in advanced factory technology and
production setting may have been necessary in order to make slave labor profitable” at
the Chemical Works. Considerable investment may have been needed to render slavery
profitable, because “only heavy capital expenditures could ensure . . . full-time
operations.” If the Works “had been forced to shut down from time to time,” enslaved
labor “would have become less attractive.” Instead o f stunting technological change,
slavery may have encouraged David and Richard McKim to embrace it. Although
W hitman’s study of the McKims’ Chemical Works is limited in scope, detailing the
experience o f only one business owner, the evidence undeniably proves that historians
can no longer make categorical statements regarding the relative costs of wage and

35 See especially Robert Starobin, Industrial Slavery in the Old South (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1970); Claudia Dale Goldin, Urban Slavery in the American South, 1820-1860
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976); Fred Bateman and Thomas Weiss, A Deplorable
Scarcity: The Failure o f Industrialization in the Slave Economy (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1981), 157-63; and Midori Takagi, “Rearing Wolves to Our Own Destruction
Slavery in Richmond, Virginia, 1782-1865 (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1999),
16-37,71-96.
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enslaved labor.36
The demand for skilled labor helped boost the city’s enslaved population and
increased the number o f slaveholding artisans and manufacturers. The percentage of
handicraft producers who held enslaved workers rose from 33 to 35 percent between
1800 and 1810, and the percentage of the enslaved population held by them increased
from 23 to 33 percent over the same period. Handicraft producers also directly accounted
for one-third o f the net increase in Baltimore’s enslaved population between 1800 and
1810.37 Merchants and professionals continued to represent the majority of the city’s
36 Whitman, The Price o f Freedom, 39, 53-57. Using the McKims’ meticulous records, Whitman
calculated the cost for various forms of labor at the Maryland Chemical Works in 1828 and 1829.
In 1828, a wage laborer cost $4.50 per week, which yields a per annum cost of $234. A hired
slave, on the other hand, cost $159.42 per year, a term slave cost $138.12 per year, and a life
slave only cost $ 136.12 per year. Although two runaway slaves and the death of another made
the cost of life slaves and hired slaves rise dramatically in 1829, wage labor still remained a more
expensive alternative. In 1829, hired slaves cost $209.42 per year and life slaves cost $206.12.
Other studies have clearly demonstrated that slaveholders often embraced technological change.
See Joyce Chaplin, An Anxious Pursuit: Agricultural Innovation and Modernity in the Lower
South, 1730-1815 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993).
37 Whitman, The Price o f Freedom, 12, and Christopher Phillips, Freedom’s Port: The African
American Community o f Baltimore, 1790-1860 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1997), 20.
Without the chattel records for Baltimore, the artisans’ contribution to the net increase in the
city’s enslaved population must be estimated using census records and the city directories.
Whitman used name matching to identify the occupations of 645 of 991 slaveholders in the 1800
census. Of these, 210 worked in handicraft trades and held 522 enslaved people. Other
occupations, mostly merchants and professionals, accounted for 435 slaveholders who held 1,357
enslaved people. Thus, artisans and manufacturers held 27.8 percent of the enslaved population
for whom the occupations of the slaveholders can be identified in the 1800 census. For the 1810
census, Whitman identified the occupations of 325 slaveholders who worked in handicraft trades
and held 776 enslaved people. Other occupations, mostly merchants and professionals, accounted
for 612 slaveholders who held 1,792 enslaved people. Thus, artisans and manufacturers held 30.2
percent of the enslaved population for whom the occupations of the slaveholders can be identified
in the 1810 census. (See Whitman, The Price o f Freedom, 179 n. 11.) By extrapolation, if the
percentage of Baltimore’s enslaved population held by handicraft producers in 1800 was 27.7
percent, this amounted to approximately 790 of the 2,843 enslaved people actually listed in the
census for Baltimore City. If the percentage of Baltimore’s enslaved population held by
handicraft producers in 1810 rose to 30.2 percent, this amounted to approximately 1,411 of the
4,672 enslaved people actually listed in the 1810 census. Thus, the net increase between 1800
and 1810 in the number of enslaved people held by Baltimore artisans and manufacturers may be
estimated at 621, or 34 percent of the actual net increase of 1,829 for the city’s enslaved
population overall. The need for industrial labor thus directly accounted for over one-third of
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slaveholders, but this is not necessarily an indication that the majority of Baltimore’s
enslaved population worked outside the handicraft trades. James Price, a merchant and
the city’s largest slaveholders in 1798, owned twenty-eight slaves, including sixteen
enslaved men. Instead o f employing all these workers himself. Price and other
significant slaveholders likely hired them out. Slave hiring in Baltimore may not have
been as extensive a practice as in many antebellum Southern cities, but it had became
prevalent enough in the city by 1813 that Alexander Stuart and Jacob G. Smith ran slavehiring employment agencies. Detailed records for these agencies do not exist, and
without further documentation it is impossible to know with any precision what
percentage of enslaved workers held by merchants and professionals were actually hired
out to work in the handicraft trades. What can be concluded is that if artisans and
manufacturers employed only one-third of the nearly 3,000 enslaved people held by
merchants and professionals in 1810, then the majority o f the city’s enslaved population
would have been at work in artisans’ shops and other manufacturing enterprises.38
Women represented the majority o f Baltimore’s enslaved population, and this

slavery’s expansion in Baltimore between 1800 and 1810.
38 Federal Direct Tax of 1798, Baltimore City, MS.806, MHS (hereafter referred to as 1798
Baltimore Direct Tax), and The New Baltimore Directory and Annual Register; fo r 1800 and
1801 (Baltimore: Warner and Hanna, 1800), hereafter referred to as the 1800 Baltimore City
Directory. Christopher Phillips castes doubt on the extensiveness of slave hiring for industrial
purposes, and Claudia Dale Goldin observed that Baltimore possessed the lowest rates of slave
hiring of any city within the slave states. Nevertheless, T. Steven Whitman identified 70
slaveholders in the 1813 tax records whose unusual number of slaves “made them plausible
candidates to have engaged in slave hiring,” and both Alexander Stuart’s and Jacob G. Smith’s
agencies proved quite successful. According to T. Stephen Whitman, artisans and manufacturers
held 33 percent of the city’s enslaved population in 1810, while merchants and professionals held
over 60 percent. If one-third of the enslaved people in the latter category were hired out, and in
this way “added” to those in the former category, it would amount to a majority of the city’s
enslaved population. See Phillips, Freedom’s Port, 25; Goldin, Urban Slavery in the American
South, 8-10; and Whitman, The Price o f Freedom, 12, 14-15.
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demographic has encouraged the idea that slavery’s expansion in Baltimore owed more to
the demand for black servants as symbols of wealth than a need for industrial laborers. If
a real need had existed in the handicraft trades for enslaved labor, so the argument goes,
then enslaved men should have outnumbered enslaved women. This interpretation
overstates the case in two ways. First, if status display represented the major reason for
the expansion o f urban slavery, then slaveholding ought to have been skewed
significantly toward relatively wealthy people. T. Stephen W hitman’s assessment of the
1813 city tax records proved otherwise. At least one out of every eight people in every
decile of taxable wealth held at least one slave. That slaveholding proved a relatively
common practice suggests that slaveholding was a fairly ineffective sign of status and
urban affluence. Furthermore, the observation that women constituted the majority of
Baltimore’s enslaved population is not an indication that wealthy urbanites looking for
domestic laborers created most of the demand for enslaved workers. Not all enslaved
women toiled as laundresses, cooks, and domestic servants; a substantial number worked
in the trades, especially in tobacco manufacturing, bakeries, and cloth production.39
Studies of slavery’s long-term profitability and influence upon technology are
important in demonstrating the peculiar institution’s viability in cities and manufacturing,
and have contributed substantially to our understanding of slavery. Yet the scholarly
exchange on this subject sometimes misses the point for Baltimore’s handicraft
producers. From the perspective of a prospective manufacturer seeking to rapidly
39 Whitman, The Price o f Freedom, 18, 168. Christopher Phillips discovered a parity between the
sexes in the 1804 Baltimore tax assessment, the bills of sale and declarations registered in
Baltimore for 1787-1830, and the declarations of slaves brought to Baltimore for 1797-1830. He
then argued that “this parity suggests that slavery in Baltimore was never predominantly
industrial in character,” while “the size and gender patterns of slaveholding in Baltimore suggest
that most homeowners acquired slaves for household chores.” See Phillips, Freedom’s Port. 20.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

336
convert from household to market production, questions of any kind concerning the long
term represented secondary concerns. The short-term need to quickly expand production
without significantly increasing labor costs vexed almost every handicraft producer
struggling to remain independent. W hether or not enslaved laborers could immediately
accomplish these goals better than apprentices or wage earners was the only criteria upon
which decisions were made regarding the future of a workforce.
Fortunately for Baltimore entrepreneurs interested in acquiring enslaved workers,
the increased demand in the city conveniently dovetailed with slavery’s increasing
weakness in much of the rural Chesapeake. When the French tobacco market collapsed
in 1793, many farmers in Maryland and northern Virginia switched to wheat cultivation.
Although wheat did not require as many year-round workers as tobacco, historian Lorena
Walsh observed that many planters did not immediately reduce their labor force. The
shortage of strong draft animals in the Chesapeake complicated the switch to grain
production on Maryland’s Western Shore, requiring planters to initially rely upon
enslaved labor for ploughing during the 1790s. Many planters needed to dedicate more
land to pasture and hay, and learn how to grow forage. “Once they could count on
animal power,” however, “planters needed fewer hoe hands” and pared down their labor
force.40
The brief delay between the collapse of the tobacco market and the reduction of
the rural enslaved population brought the needs of the countryside into perfect

40 Lorena Walsh, “Rural African Americans in the Constitutional Era in Maryland, 1776-1810,”
Maryland Historical Magazine, 84 (1989): 338. Also see Edward Papenfuse, “Planter Behavior
and Economic Opportunity in a Staple Economy,” Agricultural History, 46 (1972): 297-311, and
Lorena Walsh, “Land, Landlord, and Leaseholder Estate Management and Tenant Fortunes in
Southern Maryland, 1642-1820 "Agricultural History, 59 (1985): 373-96.
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juxtaposition with the needs of the city. Northern Maryland planters proved very willing
to sell their chattels after 1800, and unlike the 1790s, when in-migration by slaveholders
from the Caribbean, Virginia, and the Middle States accounted for a substantial part of
the net increase of Baltimore’s enslaved population, the city’s handicraft producers
actively recruited skilled enslaved laborers from the countryside. The ample supply
helped keep prices relatively low prior to 1810. For “term slaves,” a boy o f 15-19 years
cost $193, and a young man of 20-29 only $236. Prices on those enslaved “for life” ran
much higher, but remained just within the reach of much of the artisan community prior
to the 1810s.41 These circumstances made acquiring enslaved workers inexpensive
enough to immediately and effectively compete against other forms of labor.
Notices consistently appeared after 1800 in Baltimore newspapers advertising
rural slaves for sale due to a lack of employment for them in the countryside. One planter
placed an ad for “AN ACTIVE NEGRO BOY, about thirteen years of age. Sold for no
fault but want of employment.” Another planter advertised for sale “A Likely Negro
Man, o f good character-sold for want o f employment.” Buyers in the city willingly
responded, and Baltimoreans ultimately purchased eight times as many rural slaves as
they sold to rural areas. The forced migration of enslaved African Americans to the city
had effectively drained the Maryland countryside of skilled laborers by the W ar of 1812.
Baltimore City accounted for almost half the net increase in M aryland’s enslaved
population between 1800 and 1810, and when Charles County and the city are excluded
from the Maryland totals, the rest of the state actually experienced a net loss in its

41 Whitman, The Price o f Freedom, 175.
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enslaved population of more than 900 people.42
Baltimore artisans and manufacturers who favored enslaved labor believed that
enslaved workers provided stability in their workforce. Wage earners frustrated
handicraft producers with constant turnover and their reluctance to work overtime
(usually at the same rate as regular pay). Apprentices were little better, typically
demanding that their masters observe the customary practices barring forced overtime.
On the other hand, enslaved laborers usually leapt at the opportunity to work “extras,”
either to earn cash or be awarded additional free time. This difference existed largely
because “extras” held out the chance for enslaved workers to build up savings that could
eventually be used to buy oneself out of slavery.43
Many handicraft producers also believed that enslaved workers, unlike wage
earners or apprentices, could be used continuously over long periods of time. Racist
theories concerning the innate ability o f African Americans to perform hard labor over
extended periods strengthened this idea. In Notes on the State o f Virginia, Thomas
Jefferson commented that African Americans appeared to tolerate heat better than whites,
and “seem to require less sleep. A black, after hard labour through the day, will be
induced by the slightest amusements to sit up till midnight, or later,” and still awake
42 Federal Intelligencer, and Baltimore Daily Gazette, April 2, 1800, and Baltimore American
and Commercial Daily Advertiser, September 27, 1804, cited in Phillips, Freedom’s Port, 17.
Maryland’s enslaved population increased from 107,703 in 1800 to 111,502 in 1810, for a net
gain of 3,799 enslaved African Americans. Baltimore’s enslaved population increased from
2,843 to 4,672, for a net gain of 1,829, or 48.1 percent of the total net gain for all of Maryland.
Charles County experienced a net increase of 2,877 between 1800 and 1810, climbing from 9,558
to 12,435. By excluding Baltimore City and Charles County from the Maryland totals, the
remaining counties experienced a net loss o f 907 enslaved African Americans between 1800 and
1810. Second Census of the United States: Population, Maryland, 1800, and Third Census of the
United States: Population, Maryland, 1810, both at National Archives.
43 Whitman, The Price o f Freedom, 39-57, and Jacqueline Jones, American Work: Four Centuries
o f Black and White Labor (New York: W.W. Norton, 1998), 211.
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“with the first dawn of the morning.” In an address to the American Philosophical
Society in 1787, Samuel Stanhope Smith, President of the College of New Jersey,
criticized many of the details of Jefferson’s racial ideas but echoed the basic arguments.
In particular, Smith agreed that African Americans seemed to tolerate heat better than
whites. He argued that such a physical characteristic “probably arises, in part, from the
superior thickness of the skin.” This alleged trait supposedly made African Americans
especially well suited to severe physical exertion. Perhaps unwittingly, Jefferson and
Smith provided slavery advocates with arguments in defense of the peculiar institution.
Although later ethnologists rejected these theories in the mid-nineteenth century,
Baltimore’s handicraft producers had absorbed these racist sentiments by the end of the
eighteenth century. In a 1798 petition to the Baltimore City Council, Baltimore’s
brickmakers claimed that “if any of you gentlemen have been at our brickyard, you have
no doubt observed four black Men for one white man . . . because of the extream hard
labor.”44
Artisans and manufacturers engaged in trades that required laborers to work
continuously over sustained periods of time tended to favor enslaved laborers over
apprentices o r wage earners. Typically, these were trades where the product was both in
great demand and possessed a high inelasticity of demand. Producer goods were more
likely to fall into this category than finished goods, and thus tanners and curriers proved
twice as likely to be slaveholders as cordwainers, shoemakers, and glovers. The same
**Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State o f Virginia, ed. William Peden (New York: W.W.
Norton, 1972), 139, and Samuel Stanhope Smith, An Essay on the Causes o f the Variety o f
Complexion and Figure in the Human Species, ed. Winthrop Jordan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1965), 169. The brickmakers’ 1798 petition is cited in Lee Nelson,
“Brickmaking in Baltimore, 1798,” Journal o f the Society o f Architectural Historians, 18 (1959):
33-34.
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dichotomy held true for brickmakers and bricklayers, as well as ironmakers and
blacksmiths. If the capital requirements for the trade were also low, then a relatively high
percentage o f the trade’s practitioners were likely to be slaveholders. This was the case
with ship carpenters, where the percentage of slaveholders increased from 23 to 32
percent between 1800 and 1810. In trades where capital requirements were relatively
high, however, only the wealthiest practitioners were usually slaveholders. This was the
case with blacksmiths, among whom the percentage of slaveholders only increased from
15 to 18 percent between 1800 and 1810.45

T he R ise o f t h e M anufacturers
Discovering when the transition from artisan to manufacturer occurred is a tricky
subject. Barring an extraordinary moment of clarity giving rise to a revelation in a diary
or letter, the moment when an individual handicraft producer made the transition is nearly
impossible to document. Over time, the absence of familial associations in the urban
workplace yielded new understandings between employers and employees. These
understandings eventually calcified into observable practices. During the 1820s, for
example, David and Richard McKim calculated the cost of each worker in their alum
manufactory down to the cent. Although they valued workers able to perform multiple
tasks, the McKims did rely on a division of labor, and made nearly month-by-month
changes in their workforce based exclusively on their laborers’ productivity. They paid
no attention to the spiritual condition o f their workers, developing their workers’ skills, or
training their workers to become independent producers themselves. Motivated solely by

45 Whitman, The Price o f Freedom, 19, 167-169 (Appendix A).
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minimizing costs and maximizing profits, all the McKims’ labor decisions came down to
the bottom line.46
The manner in which the McKims handled their workforce demonstrates that they
were manufacturers by the 1820s. Unfortunately, it does not establish the point in time
when they first breached the boundary between artisan and manufacturer. The McKims’
business practices were the culmination of a process which began years before. Yet part
of that process was a cultural, rather than an economic one. Changes in the division of
labor involved immediate social consequences for the workplace, and an artisan’s
decision to abandon customary practices was in this way less a business decision than it
was a cultural determination— a psychological divide that an individual needed to cross.47
To recover that point in time, we can upon cultural signs rather than account books, and
one such cultural artifact was the growing prevalence of the term m anufacturer in city
directories. By the 1790s, as historian Laura Rigal has demonstrated, Americans began
to attach special meaning to the word as a “quintessentially intermediate” form between
artisanal and “fully industrial” production. Americans used the manufactory as a
metaphor for the transformation of the republic into both an industrial and a federal
union. In parades, portraits, poetry, museums exhibits, and autobiography, Americans
explored their own roles in the transformations through “the myriad productive processes

46 T. Steven Whitman, “Industrial Slavery at the Margin: The Maryland Chemical Works,”
Journal o f Southern History, 59 (1993): 31-62.
47 Many postmodernists have focused considerable attention on the idea that psychological
divides, rather than material or political changes, provide a better understanding of change over
time, especially between historical periods. These “divides” represent conscious moments of
transition giving rise to new understandings of the world and sharply distinctive worldviews. See
especially Albert Borgmann, Crossing the Postmodern Divide (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1992), 20-47.
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o f American manufacturing.”48 The steadily increasing use of the term m anufacturer in
early nineteenth-century city directories may then be treated as a cultural sign of the
urban transition— one capable of tracking the rise of the manufacturing class from its
infancy to its maturation.
As with any occupational group, not every manufacturer would have been
accounted for in the city directories. Further limiting the number o f manufacturers under
analysis to those who explicitly described themselves by the term provides an even more
conservative estimate o f their numbers and growing influence in the early republic.
Many handicraft producers who could legitimately be called manufacturers continued to
identify themselves by traditional occupational titles, such as “maker” or “smith,” well
into the nineteenth century. For example, none of Baltimore’s more significant
shipwrights ever identified themselves by the term. The city directories do not contain a
single reference to a “ship manufacturer.” Thus, all of the city’s shipwrights fall into the
category of traditional artisans according to the above methodology. Yet Joseph
Despeaux, the French-born refugee from St. Domingue who operated a ship yard on
Fell’s Point, was in no sense a traditional artisan.
Much like the McKims, Joseph Despeaux bought and sold labor as a commodity.
He used eight slaves as the base for his workforce throughout most o f the 1790s and early
1800s. When he received a large contract, he hired additional enslaved laborers as
caulkers, and when his yard was not as busy, he hired out his own enslaved laborers to
other shipwrights. By 1812, however, Despeaux was taking full advantage of the
division o f labor through targeted employment of wage earners. Although whites and
48 Laura Rigal, The American Manufactory: Art, Labor, and the World o f Things in the Early
Republic (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 12,17,21.
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African Americans, enslaved and free, continued to work side-by-side in the shipyard,
Despeaux did not compensate his workers at the same rates. Skilled white carpenters
made approximately $2.00 per day, free white caulkers made $1.50 per day, and enslaved
caulkers made only $1.25 per day. An assortment of day laborers, who included women
as well as African Americans, enslaved and free, were paid less than $1.00 per day for
unskilled work.49
Handicraft producers in nearly all trades hired day laborers and enslaved workers,
but the scale, use of, turn-over, and diversity of labor at Despeaux’s yard demonstrates an
understanding of the division of labor. This distinguishes his operation from those of
traditional artisans. Despeaux, and many others who bought and sold labor as a
commodity, could thus be deemed manufacturers. Yet excluding him does serve an
important purpose. By limiting the manufacturers under analysis to those who explicitly
identified themselves by the term in the city directories, it is possible to avoid becoming
entangled in a definitional morass over who is, and who is not, a manufacturer. This
conservative methodology undoubtedly undercounts the actual number o f manufacturers
in the city. Yet it also insures that the conclusions reached below, which point to a
substantial expansion in the number of manufacturers and their wealth, in both relative
and absolute terms, are not exaggerated claims.
In the immediate wake of the Panic of 1797, the success of the new class of
manufacturers was not readily apparent. Only 3 percent o f the city’s handicraft producers
identified themselves as manufacturers, and they controlled just 4Vi percent of all the
taxable property o f the city’s handicraft producers. This should not be surprising;

49 Despeaux Account Book, MS.294, MHS.
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Baltimore was still mired in the hard times that followed the Panic of 1797, the idea of
expanding the backcountry trade was just beginning to win converts, and none of the
transportation, marketing, or financial instruments used to secure that trade were yet
implemented. Although some of Baltimore’s artisans were probably flirting with the idea
of expanding production through a reorganization of labor, few had actually chosen at
this point to pursue that path.50
The various commercial frustrations following the Panic o f 1797 provided the
conditions in which the new class of manufacturers flourished. They produced a flood of
cheap goods that found ready markets in the burgeoning backcountry retail trade. Yet the
continuing importance of the urban market should not be overlooked. Between the Panic
o f 1797 and the W ar of 1812, manufacturers also wrested a significant part of
Baltimore’s local trade away from urban artisans. They accomplished this by selling
their products directly to customers, and indirectly, by selling their products to various
retailers. The commercial nexus forged between manufacturers and retailers led to a
revolution in the distribution of goods within the city. Throughout the eighteenth
century, shopkeepers and grocers usually bought and sold farm produce from farmers and
imported merchandise from merchants. Artisans produced and sold domestic goods, and
provided services typically not available from grocers and shopkeepers, such as repair
work. Retailers and artisans thus seldom competed against each other. With the rise of
50 1800 Baltimore City Directory and 1798 Baltimore Direct Tax. Although property tax records
only reveal forms of landed wealth, including buildings and livestock, and ignore most forms of
mercantile and manufacturing wealth, such as stocks, ownership of vessels and machinery,
manufacturers were more likely than artisans to own these other, hidden forms of wealth. It thus
seems safe to assume that the disparity in wealth revealed by the property tax records is a
conservative statement of the economic differences between the two groups. Thus the schism
may have been greater in 1798, but the marginal difference would have been repeated in the 1812
and 1818 tax records as well. Thus the tax on property alone can provide a reasonable basis for
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the manufacturers, however, retailers saw an opportunity to increase profits for
themselves by challenging the artisans’ dominance over the local market. By reselling
inexpensive goods produced by manufacturers, they steadily increased their share of the
city’s local trade at the expense of traditional artisans.
George Littig, a hatter who opened a store on North Gay Street in 1796, was
caught in the midst of the urban retailing revolution. Like most eighteenth-century
artisans, Littig initially received nearly all his revenues by selling directly to the public
from his own shop. Unlike most artisans, Littig lavished considerable personal attention
on his customers. Instead o f simply entering the customer’s name and the amount of a
sale, he faithfully recorded the type of hat purchased, for whom it was intended, and what
relation that person had to the customer. Littig’s richly detailed ledger offers a portrait of
a handicraft producer busily engaged in his trade and aware of each patron’s needs. He
could tell from his ledger which o f his patrons bought hats only for family members, and
those who were more likely to buy hats as gifts for friends. Littig could thus tailor his
production to best fit his customers’ needs, and a few of his dedicated customers
rewarded his attentiveness by loyally returning to his shop year after year to make all of
their headware purchases. Between April 1796 and April 1797, for example, John
Osborn, a cordwainer, bought seven hats for five different people, including three hats for
himself, and four others for a journeyman, a blacksmith, a friend, and a member of his
family. Richard Jones, another loyal customer, returned nine times over three years to
buy four hats for himself and eight hats for his sons, Thomas and Richard.31

comparison between these occupational groups.
51 George Littig Ledger, MS. 1657, MHS.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

346
By early 1797, retailers took notice o f Littig’s success and began buying his hats
for sale in their own stores. Although Littig continued to be attentive to individual
shoppers, he thereafter relied upon sales to retailers for most of his business. This proved
increasingly true during the troubled years o f 1797-1799, as seen in Figure 7-1. Although
a few individuals patronized Littig’s store in the wake of the Panic, his sales to
individuals steadily declined from over £83 in 1796 to £51 in 1798, and amounted to only
£21 in 1799. While sales to individuals slid by 75 percent over two years, Littig’s sales
to retailers fell by only 30 percent. In fact, Littig’s sales to retailers actually increased
slightly in 1798 and 1799. By the turn of the century, the North Gay Street hatter relied
upon sales to retailers for almost 90 percent of his revenues.52
Littig typified the pattern of most handicraft producers after 1800. Steady
revenue hinged on the ability to sell to local retailers. Direct sales to the public formed a
second, less critical part of a handicraft producer’s income. The retailing revolution in
the city thus slowly transformed the distribution of goods within Baltimore to favor
retailers and manufacturers. Between the expansion of markets in the backcountry and
the retailing revolution in the city, manufacturers vaulted from obscurity to prominence
in just a few years. The percentage o f manufacturers among the city’s handicraft
producers more than doubled by 1812, and manufacturers possessed, on average, twoand-a-half times the assessed property of traditional artisans. The manufacturers’ success
also proved enormously beneficial to grocers and shopkeepers, whose property
assessments also rose appreciably after 1800.S3

52George Littig Ledger, MHS.
53 Fry's Baltimore Directory fo r the Year 1812 (Baltimore: B.W. Sower, 1812), hereafter referred
to as 1812 Baltimore City Directory, and Baltimore Property Tax Records, 1812, RG.4#1,
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Figure 7-1
Distribution o f Revenues at Littig's Store, 1797-1799
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The vast majority of manufacturers were men, but a few entrepreneurial women
identified themselves as manufacturers as well. As early as 1800, a Mrs. Miltenberger
appeared in the city directory as the owner of a leather manufactory in Fell’s Point. In
1812, there were two manufacturers who could be positively identified as women: Ann
Rutledge, who ran a brush manufactory at 80 North Howard Street, and Catherine Paul,
who owned an umbrella and oil cloth manufactory at 217 Baltimore Street. By 1819,
Paul was still in business, though she had moved to 4 North Liberty Street. The 1819 city
directory also listed Mary Ashwell, who ran a comb manufactory at 8 North Gay Street.
Baltimore’s wealthiest businesswoman was Madame Jeanne de Volunbrunn, the owner of
a cigar and snuff manufactory at 35 Harrison Street. In 1818, her property was assessed
at $1,402, twice the city’s average, and well within the top 20 percent of all the city’s
property owners.54 She had come to Baltimore by way of New York, where she had been
at the epicenter of what historian Shane White has called New York City’s first “full
blown black riot.” A slaveholder and allegedly the owner of a brothel, Volunbrunn was
planning to remove twenty enslaved African Americans from New York City to the
South in 1801. Rumors of her plan swirled about New York, rousing the ire of the city’s
Haitian immigrant community. On one evening, a mob of nearly 250 threatened to
destroy Volunbrunn’s house and murder all those inside before the city’s watch forcibly
dispersed the crowd. Volunbrunn left New York and removed to Baltimore, where she

microfilm reel 83, BCA.
54 1800 Baltimore City Directory; 1812 Baltimore City Directory; The Baltimore Directory,
corrected up to June, 1819 (Baltimore: Richard Matchett, 1819), hereafter referred to as 1819
Baltimore City Directory; and Baltimore Property Tax Record, 1818, RG.4 #1, microfilm reel 85,
BCA (hereafter referred to as 1818 Baltimore Tax Record).
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employed twenty-two enslaved workers in her business.55
By 1812, manufacturers were beginning to dominate handicraft production in
Baltimore. Although they continued to represent less than 10 percent of the city’s total
handicraft producers, their average assessed property, as seen in Figure 7-2, was twice the
city’s mean, and two-and-a-half times that o f traditional artisans. The manufacturers’
share of the handicraft producers’ total assessed property had also rocketed from 4'/2 to
17 percent between 1798 and 1812. By the Panic of 1819, manufacturers possessed on
average three times the assessed property o f a traditional artisan. The manufacturers’
prominence in the city’s handicraft community reflected the eclipse of the artisans as the
preeminent group in urban manufacturing, and their growing dominance over Baltimore’s
industrial future.56
A few manufacturers, like cloth producer Abraham Falconer, had even extended
their enterprises to include an export trade in American-made goods by the 1810s. After
the war with Britain, Falconer maintained a steady correspondence with his brother in the
West Indies, confirming and discussing the company’s exports from Baltimore to Cuba
and Jamaica, as well as New Orleans and Buenos Aires. The Falconers’ success paid
significant social dividends for the family, as Abraham served as the Grand Master of the
Lodge o f Baltimore’s Corinthian Order of Masons.57 Because of the vastly increased
wealth and prestige that manufacturers like Falconer possessed, it is appropriate to stop
55 Shane White, Somewhat More Independent: The End o f Slavery in New York City, 1770-1810
(Athens, GA: The University of Georgia Press, 1981), 144-145; Timothy Gilfoyle, “Strumpets
and Misogynists: Brothel ‘Riots’ and the Transformation of Prostitution in Antebellum New
York,” New York History, 68 (1987): 48-49; and Whitman, The Price o f Freedom, 23.
56 1819 Baltimore City Directory and 1818 Baltimore Tax Record.
37 Abraham H. Falconer Papers, MS.345 and MS.345.1, volume one, MHS.
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Figure 7-2
T raditional A rtisans and M anufactures in Baltim ore, 1798-1819
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Sources: The New Baltimore Directory and Annual Register; fo r 1800 and 1801 (Baltimore: Warner and Hanna, 1801); Fry's
Baltimore Directory fo r the Year 1812 (Baltimore: B. W. Sower, 1812); The Baltimore Directory, corrected up to June 1819
(Baltimore: Richard Matchett, 1819); Federal Direct Tax, Baltimore City, 1798, MS.807, Maryland Historical Society;
Baltimore City Property Tax Records, 1812 and 1818 (microfilm), Baltimore City Archives.
Notes: O f the 1,270 artisans listed in the 1800 city directory, 351 were identified in the 1798 Federal Direct Tax. Of the 43
manufacturers listed in the 1800 city directory, 14 were identified in the 1798 Federal Direct Tax. O f the 871 artisans listed in
the 1812 city directory, 178 were identified in the 1812 property tax records. Of the 71 manufacturers listed in the 1812 city
directory, 18 were identified in the 1812 property tax records. Every other page of the 1819 Directory was examined. Of the
1,178 artisans drawn from the 1819 city directory, 496 were identified in the 1818 property tax records. O f the 75
manufacturers drawn from the 1819 city directory, 42 were identified in the 1818 property tax records. The city's mean
assessed property per capita was $1,114 in 1798, $341 in 1812, and $850 in 1818.
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referring to them under the same broad category with traditional artisans. Manufacturers
entered a new social category, no longer laboring in workshops or directly managing
workers. Their daily routines now involved bookkeeping, investment strategies,
marketing schemes, and business deals. They had ceased to be workers in any way and
had become part of the city’s business elite as fully developed urban professionals. Their
political, economic, and cultural interests were no longer those of the artisans, but those
of the capitalists.58

58 For an especially instructive essay on the interests of early capitalists, see Stephen Marglin,
“What Do Bosses Do? The Origins and Functions of Hierarchy in Capitalist Production,” The
Review o f Radical Political Economics, 6 (1974): 60-112. Marglin argued that most early
capitalists made changes in production to ensure greater profits for themselves, rather than to
intentionally promote productivity. These admittedly different interests were, however, rather
closely interwoven together in practice.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
SHADOWS OF THE HOUSEHOLD ECONOMY

April 10 promised to be a busy day at George Lightner’s tinsmith shop. Elijah
White stopped in to settle his account for ten dollars, and another customer settled an
account for twenty-three dollars and fourteen cents.1 O f course, neither transaction
involved the exchange o f goods and services on that day. In much the same way that
American artisans had done business for more than a century, Lightner had extended
short-term credit to his customers, allowing them to purchase goods and services on
account. Transactions like these were common in the eighteenth-century; what made the
transaction between Lightner and Elijah White curious is that it took place in 1813. With
the expansion o f the backcountry trade and the concurrent rise of the manufacturers in the
city, one might have assumed that the traditional economy winked out of existence at the
turn of the nineteenth century. The daily bustle o f activity at George Lightner’s shop
suggests otherwise.
The persistence of the household economy into the nineteenth century should not
be surprising. Unlike political revolutions, where one form of organization can
immediately yield to another, economic and social revolutions usually develop over time
and typically displace rather than replace previous institutions. As Fernand Braudel
observed, “revolution in the sense of upheaval or overthrow of an existing society” is not
a useful concept in the study of economic and social change unless the idea of revolution
also encompasses “the opposite sense meaning reconstruction'' According to Braudel,
“rapid and slow change are inseparable” in social and economic revolutions, “For no
1George Lightner Account Book, MS.l 173, MHS.
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society exists which is not tom between the forces working to preserve it and the
subversive forces— whether perceived or not— working to undermine it.” Because short
term economic upheavals and long-term social reconstructions are invariably intertwined,
the co-existence of divergent forms of economic organization has been a relatively
common occurrence in the long history of capitalism.2
Braudel’s theory finds an easy application in early-nineteenth-century America.
The expansion o f the backcountry trade embodied the upheaval of the revolutionary
process. Newspapers were transformed into tools for backcountry marketing, new
turnpikes stretched across the countryside, and manufacturers surged in both numbers and
wealth. The slow transformation of Baltimore’s social structure, however, embodied the
idea of a long-term social reconstruction. As Braudel warned, explaining the latter
presents the more significant challenge for historians because the contours of a long-term
social reconstruction are usually murky and may become easily blurred. This was
certainly true for Baltimore. George Lightner’s dealings appear little different from the
activities o f his colonial predecessors, and in almost every Baltimore neighborhood,
similar business practices remained a part of everyday life. As late as 1819, traditional
artisans accounted for over 90 percent of the city’s handicraft producers and a majority of
the city’s working people labored in shops with no more than five workers.3 At first
glance, it seems that Baltimore’s social structure was little different than in the colonial
period. However, closer inspection of the handicraft community reveals a different story.

2 Fernand Braudel, The Perspective o f the World, vol. m. Civilization and Capitalism, trans. Stan
Reynolds (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), 537-538.
3 The Baltimore Directory, corrected up to June, 1819 (Baltimore: Richard Matchett, 1819),
hereafter cited as 1819 Baltimore Directory.
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As manufacturers increased production and sold an ever-greater volume o f goods
to retailers, traditional artisans like George Lightner were being slowly crowded out of
the urban market. The total number of artisans in the city remained high, but small shops
like Lightner’s faced dwindling revenues. To insure the survival of their businesses,
traditional artisans were ultimately forced to reduce labor costs, and this altered the
relationship between artisans and their laborers in a variety of ways. The social
reorganization of the city’s workshops had profound implications for the nature o f work
in the city, the long-term prospects for artisans’ shops, and the nature of gender relations
within the urban household. By 1819, only the threadbare structures of the traditional
eighteenth-century economy still survived. Thus while exchanges like those between
Elijah White and George Lightner continued, they represented shadows of the household
economy. Like Prospero performing his final magical act in Shakespeare’s The Tempest,
such scenes were soon to be lost forever.

T roubled W or k sh o ps

The image of the down-trodden artisan is a familiar one in the literature on
nineteenth-century America. As Richard Stott observed, “artisan historians [collectively]
portray capitalism as having a strongly adverse effect on craftsmen.” Their “sympathies
are clearly with mechanics” whom they claim were “victimized by the onset of an
exploitative, impersonal, market system.” This stereotype is worth questioning.4

4 Richard Stott, “Artisans and Capitalist Development,” in Howard Rock, Paul Gilje, and Robert
Asher, eds., American Artisans: Crafting Social Identity, 1750-1850 (Madison: Madison House,
1997), 101-102. Although most artisan historians have traditionally argued that craftsmen
struggled against capitalism, they have often disagreed over the nature of the struggle. Marxists
and “old labor historians” believe that artisans struggled for materialist reasons against market
expansion. Marxist interpretations usually focus more on the plight of factory workers, however.
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Certainly there were many artisans who realized that the manufacturers had an advantage
in capturing the backcountry trade, but consciously refused to change their own
workshops in order to compete. However, other artisans fully embraced and benefited
from the new regional market, and it was these artisans who formed the core o f the newly
emergent manufacturers. There were other divisions in the handicraft community too.
Some artisans believed that the expansion of the backcountry trade and the subsequent
rise of the manufacturers had little affect on their lives and livelihoods, while others
proved unwilling or unable to acknowledge what was happening around them. These
varied experiences can not be easily bundled together into a single orderly narrative of
exploitation by an impersonal market system. Instead of casting artisans as victims, and
thereby removing agency from them, a more productive approach is to ask how artisans
confronted the development of manufactories.
As late as 1819, more than half of the city’s artisans continued to ply their trades
without direct competition from manufacturers. The adoption of the division of labor
occurred haphazardly, and manufactories did not emerge in every handicraft industry.
The 1800 Baltimore directory cataloged sixteen different types of manufactories that
produced, among other products, shoes, combs, tinware, snuff, soap, and candles. Thus
shoemakers, combmakers, tinsmiths, tobacconists, and soap and candlemakers faced
and sometimes vilify the labor leaders championed by the “old labor historians.” The “new”
labor history of the 1970s and 1980s emphasized the cultural milieu of the workplace, and placed
a premium on the idea of “artisan republicanism.” According to this approach, artisans fought
against the market revolution for ideological, rather than materialist reasons. For the Marxist
approach, see Philip Foner, History o f the Labor Movement in the United States, 7 volumes (New
York: International Publishers, 1947-1987). For the “old” labor history, see John Commons, et.
al., History o f Labour in the United States, 4 volumes (New York: MacMillan, 1918-1935). For
the “artisan republicanism” approach, see especially Charles Olton, Artisans fo r Independence:
Philadelphia Mechanics and the American Revolution (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press,
1975), and Sean Wilentz, Chants Democratic: New York City & the Rise o f the American
Working Class, 1788-1850 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984).
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direct competition from manufacturers. Yet throughout the city as a whole, only 16
percent o f Baltimore’s handicraft producers worked in industries where manufactories
existed. After 1800, the expansion of the backcountry trade helped create more than twodozen new types of manufactories. New establishments produced harnesses, hats,
textiles, cabinets, piano fortes, earthenware, mill stones, paint, varnish, wire, glue, whips,
and a bewildering array o f other goods. By 1812, more than 40 percent o f the city’s
artisans worked in industries where manufactories existed. After this point, the
percentage o f artisans in direct competition with manufacturers leveled off.3
Manufactories typically did not emerge in handicraft industries where significant
technological advances did not occur, a further division of labor would not have resulted
in greater productivity, or the expansion of the backcountry trade had little direct
importance. The brickmaking industry exemplified all three trends.6 Just north of town
near Ridgely’s Delight, at the brickyards owned and operated by Henry Nagle and John
Allbright, the process o f turning clay and water into fired bricks continued in much the
same way as it had during the colonial period. When temperatures warmed each spring,
Nagle and Allbright hired wage earners, usually enslaved African Americans, to do a
range o f arduous tasks. Colonial brickmakers had long ago worked out an effective

5 The New Baltimore Directory and Annual Register; fo r 1800 and 1801 (Baltimore: Warner and
Hanna, 1800), hereafter cited as 1800 Baltimore Directory; Fry’s Baltimore Directory fo r the
Year 1812 (Baltimore: B.W. Sower, 1812), hereafter cited as 1812 Baltimore Directory; and 1819
Baltimore Directory.
6 Plastering was another good example of a trade that fit these trends. The traditional methods of
plastering persisted until the advent of prefabricated materials in the late nineteenth century, and
plasterers relied upon the local construction market rather than the backcountry trade for their
livelihood. Plasterers had also worked out a flexible system for the application of the material
that emulated a division of labor. See Harley McKee, Introduction to Early American Masonry:
Stone, Brick, Mortar and Plaster (Washington, DC: National Trust for Historic Preservation,
1973), 81-89.
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division of labor for brickyards that organized laborers into gangs of four workers, each
with an assigned task. A “wheeler” shoveled clay into a large pit in the ground where a
“temperer” used his feet to compress water into the clay. When the mixture of clay and
water was smooth, an “off-bearer” removed it from the pit and placed it onto wooden
tables. A “moulder” then placed lumps o f clay into a wooden m old to fabricate the
individual bricks. The “off-bearer” then removed the mold from the table and popped the
soft brick out of the mold and onto a raised bed of sand to dry. On a fair day,
brickmakers expected each gang to make 44 rows of bricks with 53 bricks per row, or a
total o f 2,322 bricks per day. After the bricks dried for a week on the mounds, the gang
moved the bricks them to a shed where they would continue drying for six more weeks.7
The first bricks of the season would have been ready for firing in the kiln in April.
As many as 20,000 bricks could be fired at one time. Although the entire work gang
assisted in stacking and preparing the bricks in the kiln, this step also required the
attention of the master brickmaker. The bricks had to be placed only a finger’s width
apart in the kiln to allow heat to draft upwards. Setting the bricks too close or too far
apart resulted in bricks being over-fired or under-fired.8 The kiln would then be sealed
and allowed to fire for six consecutive days, twenty-four hours per day. Members o f the
work gang needed to feed wood into the kiln to keep the fire burning around the clock,

7 John Allbright Account Book, MS. 12, and Henry Nagle Account Book, MS.2052, both at MHS.
The process of brickmaking is outlined in “Rules to be observed by the hands employed in the
brickmaking business, Revised and amended at a meeting of the following Master Brickmakers,
in & near the City of Baltimore, published for the mutual benefit of those concerned,” February
23,1802, in Early American Imprints, 2d ser.. No. 1804.
8 If a firing went well, about half the bricks would be fired properly and most of the rest would be
under-fired. Under-fired bricks typically appeared orange or pinkish in color instead of red, but
they were still usable for the interiors of walls. Over-fired bricks usually appeared bluish or
purplish in color and were normally unusable.
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and by the end of the sixth day, the kiln reached temperatures exceeding 1,800 degrees
Fahrenheit. Other members o f the work gang used this time to scrub the drying shed,
remove the dust, and if necessary, clean the pit. On the seventh day, the Are was allowed
to bank, and a week later, the gang unloaded the bricks, removed the plating from the
kiln, and cleaned out crumbs o f broken bricks in the kiln.9 Barring mechanization of the
brickmaking process, any further division of labor would not have been productive.
Thanks to the city’s booming housing market in the years following the
Revolution, local construction needs rather than an expanding backcountry trade
propelled the brickmaking industry. Due to their weight, bricks had a terrible weight-tovalue ratio and were thus unsuitable for the backcountry trade. Within the city, however,
the brick trade was quite profitable. Without direct competition from manufacturers in
their industry, change was seemingly unnecessary. However, manufacturers in other
industries had a propensity to hire enslaved African-American workers to do long-term
repetitive work. Thus brickmakers and other artisans who traditionally hired enslaved
workers competed with manufacturers in other industries for these laborers. Thanks to
the ballooning number of different types of manufactories, each with their own specific
labor needs, other areas o f the city’s labor market were similarly affected. Thus artisans
who never faced competition from manufacturers for sales, nevertheless faced
competition from manufacturers for laborers. With the possibility of ballooning labor
costs, artisans across the city eventually had to rethink the social organization of their
workplaces whether or not manufactories emerged in their trades. Many artisans realized
that this type of indirect competition represented a challenge, but those who proved
9 “Rules to be observed by the hands employed in the brickmaking business,” in Early American
Imprints, 2d ser., No. 1804.
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unable, unwilling, or believed it unnecessary to adapt to the changing labor market
ultimately suffered economic setbacks.
The need to reduce costs prompted Baltimore’s brickmakers to instigate changes
in their trade. In February L802, Nagle, Allbright, and eleven other Baltimore-area
brickmakers agreed to amend the terms governing the use and employment of workers at
their brickyards. In addition to enumerating the specific responsibilities of each member
of a work gang, the brickmakers agreed on a long series of penalties for workers who
failed to adequately perform specific tasks. If a worker were absent without leave, and
the gang allowed rain to wash over drying bricks, the worker paid a fine of 41/2 cents per
row of bricks. The fine would be deducted from the workers’ wages. If one day’s
production were ruined, the worker would have to pay for 44 rows of bricks, or a fine of
$ 1.98— the equivalent of 3 or 4 days’ wages. If a gang failed to produce 44 rows of
bricks on a fair day, they paid V2 cent for every row they were short. Failure to
adequately scrub the drying shed cost 1 cent per row, failure to gather the dust cost I2l/z
cents per load, and failure to properly remove the dust cost an additional 6 cents per load.
Failure to help cover the kiln cost H Vi cents per load, and failure to remove the plating
from the kiln after a firing cost 6 cents per every 9 inches of plating. The list of penalties
dragged on still further to cover almost every area o f work at the brickyard.10
Baltimore’s brickmakers did not adopt monetary penalties for workers because of
sloughing output at their brickyards. Production at John Allbright’s brickyard had
swelled from less than 800,000 bricks delivered in 1791 to more than W* million bricks
per year by the late 1790s— an increase o f more than 50 percent. In 1802, Allbright’s

10 “Rules to be observed by the hands employed in the brickmaking business.’’
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brickyard began delivering bricks as early as January.11 Nor were such regulations
necessary because of changes in the types of laborers used at brickyards. Colonial
brickmakers had used enslaved laborers and some had even used convict laborers. Yet
none of these brickmakers had ever felt the need to set down a Dickensian set of
regulations. Instead, the brickmakers’ compact was designed to accomplish three
interconnected goals.
First, by agreeing on a common set o f penalties, the brickmakers contrived to
reduce labor costs without cutting their workers’ standard wage. This was important
because manufacturers could afford to pay competitive wages to enslaved workers, and if
brickmakers arbitrarily cut wages, they would not have been able to compete against the
manufacturers for those workers. Second, by reducing their labor costs, brickmakers
maximized the productivity o f their brickyards. This insured that their brickyards
remained profitable even when retail prices on commodities increased faster than
wholesale prices on building materials, or the local demand for new housing slackened.
This proved extremely important between 1802 and 1814 when retail prices increased
nearly 50 percent, while wholesale prices on building materials increased only 25
percent. Both price indices fell between 1815 and 1819, but wholesale prices on building
materials fell all the way back to their 1802 level, while retail prices remained 7 percent
higher in 1819 compared to 1802.12 Third, by discovering a common way to reduce labor
costs, the brickmakers colluded to prevent competition in their industry, thus helping

11John Allbright Account Book, MHS.

12U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics o f the United
States: Colonial Times to 1970 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), n.
201-2, 211.
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prevent the emergence of a brick manufacturer with a dozen kilns. The structure o f the
old household economy thus survived at the brickyards, but the brickmakers’ compact
ended the traditional or preindustrial ethos of the trade. Brickmakers did not become
manufacturers, at least not in way the word was defined in the early nineteenth century,
but they ceased to be artisans in the traditional eighteenth-century sense too. The rise of
the manufacturers thus compelled changes in workshops across the city whether or not
artisans in a particular trade were forced to compete against manufacturers for sales.
For the more than 40 percent of Baltimore’s artisans who did face direct market
competition from manufacturers, the image o f the down-trodden artisan struggling
against elite manufacturers fit perfectly. No single artisan can adequately represent the
multiplicity o f experiences that shaped even these beleaguered handicraft producers. Yet
the experiences of George Lightner, a tinsmith whose 1812 tax assessment of $70 placed
him in the bottom 30 percent of Baltimore’s property owners— the median for
Baltimore’s traditional artisans— personified the struggles that many handicraft producers
faced in the first decades of the nineteenth century.13
In many ways, tinsmiths were an archetypal occupation of the traditional
household economy. German tinsmiths had instituted few changes in their trade since the
sixteenth century. They handed down their molds, templates, and forms from one
generation to the next, and the tools used in the eighteenth century were essentially the
same as those in use since the late middle ages. This traditional ethos carried over first to
Great Britain and then to the American colonies in the early eighteenth century. Use of
these tools required some skill, thus tinsmiths relied on apprentices and journeymen for
13 Baltimore Property Tax Records, 1812, RG.4 #1, microfilm reel 83, BCA (hereafter cited as
1812 Baltimore Tax Record).
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the skilled laborers the trade demanded. Workers needed to learn to use a variety of
“mallets, molds, anvils, shears, snips, punches, chisels, tongs, swages, calipers, and
soldering irons.” With a standard set of hand tools, master tinsmiths made an array of
pots, pans, graters, ladles, cutters, scoops, measures, molds, kettles, dishes, lamps,
candlesticks, and trays among other household items. The tinsmith’s shop also contained
a small charcoal stove for heating irons and producing varnishes and solders. Work at the
stove required skill because the varnish mixture was extremely flammable and the lead in
the solder gave off a noxious bluish haze when heated. Tinsmiths produced their wares
for the local market and did not specialize in the production of a single product.14
Tinsmithing emerged in the American colonies during the early eighteenth
century because o f the consumer rage for tinplated wares. The process of tinplating
likely originated in Bohemia in the fourteenth century, and was known in Germany by
the late 1500s. The trade reached England in 1667, when Andrew Yarranton, who had
spent the previous two years in Saxony learning the tinplating trade from the Germans,
returned to his native country. A commercial market for tinplate emerged in England by
1700, and soon after the demand for tinplated wares spread to the British colonies across
the Atlantic. The bumish o f the finished metal, its light weight, and its strength made
tinplate appealing to American consumers. In the wake of the Revolution, demand for

14 Shirley Spaulding DeVoe, The Art o f the Tinsmith: English and American (Exton, PA: Schiffer
Publishing, 1981), 10, 59, and Jeanette Lasansky, To Cut, Piece, & Solder: The Work o f the Rural
Pennsylvania Tinsmith, 1778-1908 (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press,
1982), 8,24-25. Lasansky added that a European-based set of American hand tools also included
“the beakhom-, blowhom-, bottom-, creasing-, double seaming-, elbow-, hatchet-, needlecase-,
and square stakes; circular shears and nippers; coffeepot and colander-, creasing-, elbow-, and
square panswedges; grooving tools; hasp-, hollow-, oval-, and solid punches; bumping or raisingriveting-, and small pepper-box hammers; and rivet sets and headers,” as well as two American
innovations, “the hollow punch” and variety of “swedges.” See Lasansky, To Cut, Piece, &
Solder. 7-8.
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tinware surged even more. Tinsmithing subsequently followed a similar path to many
other handicraft industries in the early republic. To meet the increased demand, tinsmiths
needed to rethink their use of labor, and tinplating manufactories appeared in Baltimore
as early as 1800.15
As in other handicraft industries, the tinsmith trade continued to rely on skilled
laborers rather than wide-scale mechanization. The most extensive technological
innovations in the trade during the first decades o f the nineteenth century were the
machine tools introduced by Calvin Whiting and Eli Parsons of Dedham, Massachusetts.
The most important of Whiting’s and Parsons’s inventions included circular shears, a
burring machine, a setting down machine, a wiring machine, and a rolling machine which
clamped to the end of a workbench and allowed workers to hand-crank tin sheet over
wire. Master tinsmiths had hand-hammered sheet metal before the introduction o f the
rolling machine. The machine tools enabled less-skilled workers to fashion forms more
precisely and in one-fourth the time compared to traditional methods, but the means of
production remained a handicraft process. Whiting’s and Parsons’s inventions did not
automate the production o f tinware. Furthermore, most tinsmiths were unable to take
advantage o f the innovations. Unlike Oliver Evans, who publicized the details o f his
invention, thus enabling other to copy the process without paying royalties, Whiting and
Parsons were far more prudent. Tinsmiths had to purchase the patent rights in order to
15DeVoe, The Art o f the Tinsmith, v-vii, 9-10, 125-26, and Lasansky, To Cut, Piece, & Solder, 4,
15. Early nineteenth-century American tin manufactories produced tinware, not sheet metal, and
were therefore in direct competition with tinsmiths. Until the end of the nineteenth century, the
United States continued to import almost 100 percent of its rolled tin from Great Britain and the
British Empire. The process of producing the sheet metal was not overly complicated. The most
significant reason for the lack of a domestic sheet metal industry was the apparent lack of any
significant tin deposits in the United States. At the end of the nineteenth century, when extensive
tin deposits were discovered in Virginia, South Dakota, and California, a domestic sheet metal
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use the machine tools. Wide-scale distribution of the technology did not begin in earnest
until Seth Peck, a Massachusetts tinsmith, purchased the patent rights in 1816 and began
manufacturing the machine tools themselves. True mechanization did not emerge until
the mid-nineteenth century, when steam processes and die-stamping were first
introduced.16
A traditional tinsmith, with or without machine tools, could individually perform
all the required to produce a range of finished tinware products, but the production of
tinware was especially well-suited to the division of labor in a manufactory. A master
tinsmith hammered sheets of tin around forms, templates, and molds, creating the basic
shapes for the tinware. Apprentices or journeymen would then use files to smooth the
edges of the seams and joints. Tinware cannot be welded, and thus semi-skilled workers
soldered the joints and seams with a heated mixture of half-tin, half-iron. The tinware
could then be left uncoated, it could be planished to achieve a high gloss, or it could be
japanned for protection and decoration. “Japanned ware” imitated the lacquered finishes
of imported Asian goods, and city directories included listings for “japanners,” or skilled
workers who specialized in this stage of the process.17 Japanners made a basic English
varnish by dissolving asphaltum, a residue of coal tar, gum resins, and amber in a heated
mixture o f linseed oil, alcohol, and turpentine. Tinware was dipped in the varnish and
left to dry in a charcoal oven for several hours. The japanners could then paint designs
industry finally emerged. See Lasansky. To Cut, Piece, and Solder, 18-19.
16 DeVoe, The Art o f the Tinsmith, 133-140, and Lasansky, To Cut, Piece, & Solder, 7-9.
17 Asian lacquer, or rhuslack, had three problems: contact with skin caused severe dermatitis, it
came from a tree in the sumac family, rhus vemicifera, that was not native to either Europe or the
Americas, and the Asian process of lacquering was extraordinarily elaborate. Consequently,
English tinsmiths adopted varnishes to mimic the finishes on imported lacquered products.
DeVoe, The Art o f the Tinsmith. 99.
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and decoration on the tinware before the final coat o f clear varnish was applied. For
“planished ware,” the tinsmith hammered the sheet metal itself with a broad-faced mallet
before creating the forms. After the solderer fitted the joints together, a semi-skilled
worker used a jew eller’s cloth to polish the tinware to a glossed finish, giving it a silvery
surface. A manufactory might also employ unskilled workers, but they would have been
used in a limited capacity to clean up the scraps of tin, solder drippings, and file shavings
from the floor, clean the charcoal oven, and keep the various molds, templates, forms,
and wire organized on the shop’s wall.18
Tinsmiths like Lightner who either could not or did not take advantage of a
division of labor confronted stiff competition from the new tin manufactories. Reducing
costs became a necessity, and Lightner faced his most pressing challenge during the
winter months. Not long after the first frost descended upon the city each year, traffic in
the harbor began to taper off. When the weather turned especially cold, commerce
sometimes ceased altogether. In January 1784, George Johonnot complained to his
brother Frank that “we have experienced as cold a season” in Baltimore “as the worst of
‘79,” and discouraged a sale of mackeral from Daniel Sargent of Boston. Johonnot
explained to Sargent that trade with both the Eastern and Western Shores was “finished
on account o f the ice,” and thus “the demand for goods is not so great.” John
Weatherbum recalled a particularly oppressive winter in 1805 when “our navigation was
shutt by the frost from 3rd January to the 26 F ebruary. . . This made a long winter, which
was injurious to commerce and oppressive to the poor.” It was so cold in mid-February

18Devoe, The Art o f the Tinsmith, 62,99-121, 165-66.
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1817 that the inner harbor actually froze over.19
Without commercial traffic during the winter, the local economy shuddered to a
near standstill. Artisans were accustomed to seasonal slowdowns and overcame the lack
of economic activity between December and March with vigorous sales at other times
during the year. Yet with manufacturers encompassing an ever-greater percentage of the
city’s local market after 1800, artisans could no longer be sure that sales during the
spring, summer, and autumn would balance deficits incurred during the winter. For many
troubled shops, the need to control costs during the winter loomed as the most urgent
concern. To meet the challenge, an increasing percentage of the city’s artisans hired
wage earners on a part-time basis. Unlike apprentices and enslaved workers for whom
employers had a legal obligation o f support during the winter months, wage earners could
be dismissed from service at almost any time.
As early as 1808, George Lightner made the switch to using part-time wage labor.
On July 19, he contracted William Stewart for three months at nine dollars per month to
“do all faithfull Labour and obey all Lawful Commands.” When Stewart’s contract
expired in October, no new agreement was drawn up. Instead, Stewart worked on an
intermittent basis for Lightner and thus his wages varied wildly from month-to-month, as
seen in Figure 8-1. In November, he received nearly fourteen dollars. During the winter,
when business at the shop came to a near halt, Stewart received a grand total of just

19 Johnson, Johonnot & Co. to Frank [Francis Johonnot], January 17, L784, and Johnson,
Johonnot & Co. to Daniel Sargent, January 2, 178[4], both in Johnson, Johonnot & Co.
Letterbook, MS.498, MHS; John Weatherbum to sister [Hannah], March 23, 1805, John
Weatherbum Collection, MS.44, Special Collections, Milton S. Eisenhower Library, The Johns
Hopkins University, quoted in Seth Rockman, “Working for Wages in Early Republic Baltimore:
Unskilled Labor and the Blurring of Slavery and Freedom,” (Ph.D., University of California,
Davis, 1999), 188; and Baltimore American, February 17, 1817.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Figure 8-1

William Stewart's Monthly Wages between February 1808 and July 1809
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thirteen dollars over four months. Many of these payments were likely not made in cash.
In Lightner’s ledger, entries made during the summer listed the amount of each payment
to Stewart with the notation “cash for self.” During the winter, however, several
notations appeared with the notation “cash at sundry,” “cash for mother,” and “cash for
shoes.” The distinction may indicate that Lightner paid Stewart in goods rather than
wages, or that Lightner allowed Stewart to purchase shoes and sundries on Lightner’s
account, and these purchases were then counted as wages paid. Either way, Lightner
clearly limited his costs during the winter by employing Stewart on a part-time basis.
Assuming a six-day workweek, Stewart’s contract for nine dollars per month yielded an
average wage rate of approximately 34'/2 cents per day. Between December and March,
Stewart’s average daily wages amounted to approximately 12V2 cents per day, thus saving
Lightner almost $23 in labor costs over the four-month period.20
For many artisans, the possibility of achieving the savings Lightner realized in the
winter of 1808-1809 was the primary attraction of using part-time wage labor.
Employing wage earners instead o f apprentices or enslaved labor presented long-term
costs. The tinsmith trade required skilled workers, yet Stewart was unskilled. Over the
course of the year. Stewart likely gained some training and increased his productivity,
but he left the shop after a year. Lightner made no further notations in his ledger for
Stewart beyond July 1809, and instead hired a new wage earner, James Davis, at the rate
of nine dollars per month. The records do not reveal whether or not Davis knew anything
20 George Lightner Account Book, MHS. The calculations for the daily wage rate are based upon
the worker’s total compensation divided by the total potential number of workdays in the given
period, assuming a six-day workweek. For example, the contract for July 19 to October 19, 1808
included exactly 13 weeks, or 78 possible workdays. At $9 per month, the total compensation
amounted to $27, and thus an average daily wage of 34.6 cents per day. All subsequent
calculations for daily wage rates will be based on a standard workweek of six days.
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about working in a tinsmith’s shop, but most unskilled laborers would not have possessed
any prior training in a particular artisan’s trade. Thus Lightner was faced with the
necessity of training a new person, and the productivity of the shop would have lagged.
Retention o f skilled workers was a recurrent problem, and the practice of hiring a
succession o f unskilled workers guaranteed that Lightner would never realize the
productivity gains that manufacturers achieved. Employing apprenticed or enslaved
labor would have solved this problem, but it would have also cost Lightner more in the
short-term. During the period when Stewart worked part time, including the winter
months, his average daily wage rate was actually higher than his wages would have been
under a contract. When the port roared back to life in the spring and early summer,
Stewart received nearly ten dollars in April, almost thirty dollars in May, and just over
twenty dollars in July. His compensation for June amounted to just two dollars, but his
average monthly wages between April and July exceeded fifteen dollars per month. For
the nine months in which he worked part-time, Stewart earned approximately 38 cents
per day. Thus if Lightner had kept Stewart under contract at nine dollars per month, the
equivalent of a wage rate of 34Vi cents per day, Stewart would have earned just $108 for
the year, instead, Stewart received a grand total of $115.86 for the year, or an average
wage rate of 37'/i cents per day.21
The difference of nearly eight dollars between Stewart’s actual compensation and
his potential compensation under a contract would have been enough, under wage rates
that Stewart received, to hire a second worker for three weeks. Lightner was unwilling to
take this route, because the increasing competition from manufacturers created enough

21 George Lightner Account Book, MHS.
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uncertainty about the local market to make the prospect of employing wage earners under
contracts appear too risky. Artisans like Lightner thus adopted a pay-as-you-go approach
to minimize the risk o f paying too much for labor during hard times. Others because they
could not afford to maintain unfree laborers during the winter months. Yet by sacrificing
long-term needs for the sake o f short-term expediency, small shops atrophied in the new
economy. The strategy maximized the risk of paying too much for labor during good
times, and undercut any possibility that a workshop could realize productivity gains in the
long-term. For Lightner, however, lost productivity was at best a secondary concern to
reducing costs in a competitive economy.
Whether he was hired part-time or under a contract, Stewart’s wages were
extremely poor compared to the wages that wage laborers received working for
manufacturers. At Joseph Despeaux’s shipyard in Fell’s Point, skilled workers received
between $1.25 and $2.00 per day. One of Despeaux’s carpenters could have equaled
Stewart’s annual wage compensation in less than eight weeks. At Ellicott’s Mills on the
Patapsco River, fifteen miles southeast of Baltimore, new adult hands at the Union
Manufacturing Company only received $2.00 per week to start, or the equivalent of 33
cents per day. Wages quickly increased, however, to the standard wage o f $3.00 per
week, or 50 cents per day. Those who worked the spinning mules earned $8.00 to $12.00
per week, or $1.33 to $2.00 per day. In the city, journeymen cordwainers earned $3.00
for each pair of finished boots. A typical worker was able to complete three pairs per
week, and after paying the expenses for materials, journeymen thus earned approximately
$8.50 per week, or a wage rate of $1.42 per day. Journeymen tailors made $7.00 per
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week, or $1.17 per day.22 George Lightner’s struggles forced him to pay William Stewart
less than half that amount, and yet he was still unable to achieve the productivity gains
that Despeaux and other manufacturers realized.
Even when compared to other unskilled workers, Stewart’s average wage rate was
still not competitive. In 1809, the city paid a standard wage of $1.12'/i per day for work
on the mudmachine dredging the harbor. It would have taken a mudmachinist just three
months to earn as much as Stewart received over an entire year. Work on the
mudmachine paid more than most manual labor jobs, and the continuous need to dredge
the harbor created a constant demand for workers that existed in few other places in the
city. The same was not true of other industries. At the Maryland Chemical Works,
David and Richard McKim typically paid free wage laborers $4.30 for a six-day
workweek, or the equivalent of 75 cents per day. An unskilled worker at Joseph
Despeaux’s shipyard also earned at least 75 cents per day, and John Allbright and Henry
Nagle paid enslaved workers approximately 50 to 75 cents per day to work at their
brickyards. If the winter months are excluded, Stewart’s average wage rate as a part-time
worker amounted to 58 cents per day, making his wages competitive with the more
poorly paid workers at the city’s brickyards. Stewart’s compensation was also on par
with what it cost the McKims to maintain enslaved laborers at their chemical works. The
total cost for term slaves, including maintenance costs, capital depreciation, capital

23 For wages at Joseph Despeaux’s shipyard, see Joseph Despeaux Account Book, MS.294, MHS,
quoted in Charles Steffen, The Mechanics o f Baltimore: Workers and Politics in the Age o f
Revolution, 1763-1812 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1984), 41-42. For wages at the
Union Manufacturing Company, see Isaac Briggs Papers, MS. 147, MHS, quoted in Lynda Fuller
Clendenning, ‘The Early Textile Industry in Maryland, 1810-1850,” Maryland Historical
Magazine, 87 (1992): 262. For wages of journeymen cordwainers and tailors, see Steffen, The
Mechanics o f Baltimore, 214, 221.
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opportunity, taxes, and property loss resulting from deaths or runaways, came to
approximately 40 cents per day. Workers enslaved for life cost approximately 40 and 65
cents per day, and hired enslaved workers cost approximately 50 to 65 cents per day.23
Part o f the reason for the disparity between Stewart’s wages and those of other
workers arose from differences in the nature of the work in each handicraft trade. The
specific tasks workers performed at Henry Nagle’s and John Allbright’s brickyards, or
the M cKims’ Chemical Works were quite different from those Stewart completed at
Lightner’s shop. Yet these differences can be exaggerated, and it is unlikely that the
disparity in wages rested entirely with differences in the work required in each trade. In
each case, employers relied on workers to do physical, repetitious labor. At times, work
at a brickyard, a chemical works, or a tin shop could prove extremely hazardous, and
injuries were common to workers in all three trades. Another reason for the disparity was
the difference between the employers. The McKims employed a calculated division of
labor designed to maximize productivity whereas Lightner relied on traditional methods.
In comparison to the brickmakers, tinsmiths had faced withering competition from
manufacturers since at least the turn of the century. Not surprisingly, the wages Lightner
could afford to pay Stewart amounted to a portion of what the brickmakers paid most of
their workers. Not every laborer worked for a struggling artisan, and those hired by
Henry Nagle, John Allbright, Joseph Despeaux, and the McKims clearly received better
23 For wages of the mudmachinists, see Rockman, “Working for Wages,” 121. For wages at the
McKims’ Maryland Chemical Works, see Maryland Chemical Works Account Book Collection.
MS.547.2, MHS, quoted in T. Stephen Whitman, The Price o f Freedom: Slavery and
Manumission in Baltimore and Early National Maryland (Lexington: University Press of
Kentucky, 1997), 54-56. For wages at Despeaux’s yard, see Joseph Despeaux Account Book.
MS.294, MHS, quoted in Steffen, The Mechanics o f Baltimore, 41-42. For wages of workers at
the city’s brickyards, see John Allbright Account Book and Henry Nagle Account Book, both at
MHS.
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wages than Stewart. Yet Lightner’s struggles did recur in many trades throughout the
city, and this suggests that Stewart’s meager wages may not have been uncommon
throughout the city.
Regardless o f their employer, most laborers faced steadily worsening economic
circumstances in the early nineteenth century. During the early 1790s, the nominal
average wage rate for an unskilled urban laborer rose from SO cents to $1.00 per day.
Prices also increased steadily, but the rate of increase did not exceed the growth in wages.
Unskilled workers experienced an increase in their real wages, or spending power.
Beginning in the late 1790s, the average wage rate stagnated at about $1.00 per day,
where it remained for decades. Yet real wages continued to climb in the years
immediately surrounding the turn of the century because prices fell in the wake of the
Panic of 1797.24 Most workers would not have been able to take full advantage of the
real increase in wage rates between 1797 and 1802, because they would have likely
worked fewer days during the economic downturn.
When the hard times ended and commerce rebounded after the Peace of Amiens
in 1802, prices also began increasing. By the W ar of 1812, they had risen almost 50
percent. Wage rates continued to stagnate throughout the city thanks to the artisan
community’s need to control costs. Rising prices combined with stagnant wages meant
that real wages declined steadily. As seen in Figure 8-2, the spending power of a dollar
in 1814 was worth just 68 cents compared to its value in 1802. The real wage rate for a
worker earning 75 cents per day amounted to just 60 cents in 1814 compared to 1802.
Even the mudmachinists, who received higher compensation than most other wage

24 Historical Statistics o f the United States, I, 163, 205,211.
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Figure 8-2
Three-Year Moving Averages for Real W ages, 1800-1819
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earners, suffered from the price inflation. Their standard wage rate o f $1.1214 per day did
not increase to $1.25 until 1815.25 With retail prices rocketing upward, however, a wage
o f $1.1214 per day was worth only 91 cents in 1814 compared to 1808. Real wages
finally improved after 1815 when prices finally began to fall, but in the previous twenty
years, whether a worker was employed by a manufacturer, by an artisan competing
against manufacturers, or by an artisan who did not face such competition largely did not
matter. No matter whom they worked for, wage-earning Baltimoreans faced precipitous
declines in their real income through the War of 1812.

Beleaguered H o useholds
The declining fortunes of small workshops meant a loss of real income for
artisans and the wage earners who worked for them. With revenues at artisans’ shops
falling, and workers’ real wages declining, families had to find new ways to supplement
household income or invent new methods of saving on household expenses just to
maintain the status quo. Fortunately, the revenues of an artisan’s shop and the wages
earned by workers were not the only sources of income for eighteenth-century families.
The household economy was based upon a gendered division o f labor in which wives
contributed significantly to the family’s income.26
Employment in traditional handicraft trades provided only a few women with a
significant source of income, and the city directories reveal that the percentage of women
engaged in business did not change significantly between 1800 and 1819. Women
23 Historical Statistics o f the United States, I, 163,205, 211, and Rockman, “Working for
Wages,” 121.
26 For the gendered division of labor in the household economy, see the discussion in chapter one.
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consistently represented just W i to 2 percent of all Baltimore artisans throughout this
period. The distribution o f trades in which women participated also remained steady.
Traditional artisans, of whom mantua makers and milliners were the predominant trades,
accounted for IS percent o f all non-widowed women with occupations listed in the 1800
city directory, and 11 percent of those listed in the 1819 directory. Grocers, shopkeepers,
and other retailers consistently represented 19 to 21 percent of non-widows, and the
percentage of women in teaching positions remained relatively constant. Although the
percentage of women operating boarding houses and inns fell from 23 percent to 2
percent between 1800 and 1819, the directories likely undercount the number of women
who rented out a single room or two.27 Like their male counterparts, women in
traditional handicraft trades also faced declining revenues.
Ironically, the rise o f the manufacturers sometimes boosted the amount of income
wives and children could earn. The expansion o f Baltimore’s textile industry is an
excellent example of this trend. The Embargo of 1807 spurred the establishment of
textile manufactories, and the number of mills in and around Baltimore increased from 11
to 18 between 1810 and 1820. Unlike the New England establishments, where employers
followed either the Waltham or Fall River plan and hired mostly young women to operate
the spinning machines, Maryland manufacturers mostly hired children. O f the 501
workers employed at textile manufactories in and around Baltimore in 1820, 366 were
children, mostly girls, 98 were adult men and only 37 were young women. The Union
Manufacturing Company epitomized this trend, employing 104 girls, 16 boys, 10 men,

27 1800 Baltimore Directory; 1812 Baltimore Directory; and 1819 Baltimore Directory.
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and no women in 1820.28
In a society steeped in the tradition o f apprenticeship, the idea of employing
children was not objectionable. Quite the opposite, Hezekiah Niles, publisher of the
influential and nationally distributed newspaper Niles Weekly Register, applauded the use
o f young girls in manufactories as a brilliant way of “transmuting some useless substance
into pure gold.” Children's wages varied based upon age at the Union Manufacturing
Company with the youngest (seven to nine years old) receiving as little as 75 cents per
week, a wage rate o f just l2 ‘/2 cents per day. Those who remained under continual
employment received $2.25 per week, or 37Vi cents per day, by the time they reached the
age of twelve.29 Over the course o f a year, a child could thus augment household income
by as much as $30 to $90.
Adult women also benefited from the expansion of the textile industry through the
1820s. The invention of the spinning jenny, the water frame, and the spinning mule
provided a mechanized way to turn cotton and wool fiber into thread and yam, but a
workable power loom to produce finished cloth was not introduced until the 1830s. Until
then, manufacturers relied on outwork where seamstresses and weavers produced
finished cloth from the manufactured yam and thread. The number o f seamstresses listed
in the city directories quadrupled between 1800 and 1819, which suggests that many
women in Baltimore were able to supplement the household’s income with wages earned
from outwork. Wages varied depending on the type of outwork, but in general,
manufacturers paid women rather poorly. In the early 1820s, a seamstress earned 6V* to
28 Clendenning, “The Early Textile Industry in Maryland,” 252, 262.
29 Niles Weekly Register, June 7,1817. For wages of children as textile workers, see Isaac Briggs
Papers, MS. 147, MHS, quoted in Clendenning, “The Early Textile Industry,” 262.
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12V6 cents for each finished pair of pantaloons.30 Assuming that a housewife could stitch
together 3 pairs of pantaloons per day, six days per week, she would have earned $1.12V4
to $2.23 per week. At this pace, a seamstress could have augmented her household’s
income by as much as $40 to $90 per year, but such a pace was not sustainable. The
availability of outwork was both erratic and seasonal, and few women received outwork
every week of the year. Actual earnings from outwork usually fell well short of potential
earnings, and women who relied solely on these wages for their subsistence faced
grinding poverty.
At times, outwork occurred closer to home. Beginning in the 1780s, shoemakers’
wives began spinning flax into shoe thread and sewing together leather uppers for shoes.
The latter process came to known as shoebinding. Unlike other types of outwork,
shoebinding by wives reduced the family’s need for cash expenditures rather than
increase the household’s income through wage earnings. After 1810, shoebinding
gradually became a part-time wage-earning occupation for women outside shoemaking
families. Prior to 1810, however, a wife’s activities as a shoebinder proved important to
both her household’s income and the competitiveness of her husband’s shop.31
Domestic service represented another area of employment that women looked to
for supplementary income. From 1800 through the 1820s, however, enslaved African

30 J. Morgan, The Manufacturer’s Book o f Wages and Workpeople’s Companion (Baltimore: RJ .
Matchett, 1825), quoted in Rockman, “Working for Wages,” 169-71.
31 Mary Blewett, ‘The Sexual Division of Labor and the Artisan Tradition in Early Industrial
Capitalism: The Case of New England Shoemaking, 1780-1860,” in Carol Groenman and Mary
Beth Norton, eds., “To Toil the Live Long Day”: America’s Women at Work, 1780-1980 (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1987), 35-46. Patterns of work in the mid-Atlantic shoemaking trade
paralleled changes occurring in New England. See John Commons, “American Shoemakers,
1648-1895: A Sketch of Industrial Evolution,” Quarterly Journal o f Economics, 24 (1909): 3984.
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Americans dominated most areas o f domestic service. A few Irish and German
immigrant women gained employment as laundresses, cooks, and house servants, but
almost 95 percent of those who advertised in newspapers for employment in these
occupations were African Americans, mostly enslaved. The position of child’s nurse was
the only major domestic occupation where whites represented a significant minority in
the first quarter o f the nineteenth century. Racial stratification in domestic service largely
disappeared after 1830, and historian Stephanie Cole observed that “over the years, any
housekeeper perusing the ads would have noticed a substantial change.”32
The racial divide in domestic service is not surprising. Occupations associated
with slavery, and African Americans generally, carried a racial stigma that encouraged
whites to accept only certain types of domestic employment. African Americans
depended on these racist assumptions to limit the labor pool for domestic service jobs.
Thus a race-specific separation of domestic service tasks emerged— a hierarchy of labor
imposed by the workers themselves. This racial divide was reinforced by the actions of
the Baltimore Orphans Court. In border cities like Baltimore, 60 percent o f African
American apprentices, including 47 percent of African American boys, were tracked into
domestic service jobs. Only 15 percent of all whites, and less than 2 percent of white
boys, were steered in the same path. With the exception of nurses, domestic service
occupations presented limited opportunities for white women trying to supplement
household incomes during the first decades o f the nineteenth century.33
The need to supplement household income, and the difficulty o f finding
32 Stephanie Cole, “Servants and Slaves: Domestic Service in the Border Cities, I800-L850”
(Ph.D., University of Florida, 1994), 60, and Appendix A.
33 Cole, “Servants and Slaves,” 59-96, and Appendix B.
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reasonable ways to accomplish this in the city, placed enormous strains on a woman’s
available time. Stitching together clothing for wages did not replace cooking, cleaning,
and laundering, working in a husband’s shop, looking after her own children, producing
home manufactures for the household, and all the other tasks traditionally expected of a
wife and mother. To create the additional time needed to do outwork or domestic
service, women had to substantially increase the productivity of housework. This proved
especially difficult after the Revolution because women often had to invest more, rather
than less time doing traditional household tasks.
The demands o f Republican Motherhood expanded the amount of time women
needed to dedicate to child rearing.34 The growing demands on mothers came at a time,
however, when working-class women and the wives of artisans could least afford to
invest greater amounts of time and energy in child rearing. Women also spent more time
shopping. During the colonial period, husbands often accepted food and goods as
payment or wages, and otherwise did a significant amount of the family’s purchasing.
After the Revolution, as the cash-based economy steadily advanced, wives assumed
greater responsibility for the family’s shopping. A wife’s ability as a prudent consumer
played an increasingly greater role in determining whether or not a household’s income
would meet its expenses.35
Women also spent more time cooking. Despite the introduction of the cooking
stove, which was supposed to be a labor-saving device, the growing popularity of white
34 See the discussion in chapter four.
35 Jeanne Boydston, Home and Work: Housework, Wages, and the Ideology o f Labor in the Early
Republic (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 103. For the expansion of traditional
housework after the Revolution, also see Annegret Ogden, The Great American Housewife: From
Helpmate to Wage Earner, 1776-1986 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1986), 3-32.
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bread made from superfine, or white flour meant that women dedicated more time to
baking than they had during the colonial period. During the colonial period, husbands
typically ground rye or wheat every few days to make flour, or they took the grain in
small quantities to the local grist mill. Once ground into flour, rye and wheat deteriorate
quickly. White, or superfine flour, was deprived o f both wheat germ and bran, and thus
did not deteriorate as quickly. Prior to the Revolution, white flour was expensive because
it could not be produced at home, and grist mills were unable to produce much of it.
After the introduction of Oliver Evans’s automated milling process, and its widespread
reproduction after 1795, the merchant-mills outside Baltimore produced white flour in
bulk, and at a fraction o f the previous cost. This eliminated a burdensome chore for
husbands, who had previously ground grain into flour themselves, or hauled it to the grist
mill. Yet baking white bread took longer than making combread, griddle cakes, or
colonial quick-breads, and the switch meant that wives spent far more time in the kitchen.
This was especially true in middle-class homes, where, according to Ruth Schwartz
Cowan, white bread became a symbol of class status in the early nineteenth century.36
With the mills along the Patapsco at the epicenter of industrialization in the flour-milling
industry, Baltimore’s wives faced this trend earlier than most. O f course no one was
forcing Baltimoreans to bake white bread, but as John Stuart Mill once pointed out, the
social pressure o f the masses can often be far more coercive than even the actions of
dictatorial governments.
In the wake o f the Revolution, there was indeed more work for mother.
Strangely, however, most commentators believed exactly the opposite was true in the
36 Ruth Schwartz Cowan, More Workfo r Mother: The Ironies o f Household Technologyfrom the
Open Hearth to the Microwave (New York: Basic Books, 1983), 46-63.
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early republic. Public recognition o f the value o f housework had wavered throughout the
late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but the transformation of housework into a
leisure activity took on greater urgency in the wake of the Revolution. Feminist
reformers who hoped to advance the cause of women’s education, contributed to this
view. Although the article was not published until 1790, Judith Sargent Murray argued in
1779 that “every requisite in female economy is easily attained,” and thus women should
have ample time to follow intellectual pursuits. The attitude that housework was not
time-consuming developed further in the wake of early industrialization. By the 1830s,
writers referred to housework in pastoral terms, such as duties, offices, or chores that
required no labor to be completed. Cooking, cleaning, and other domestic work were
“labors of love” rather than work.37
Advancing economic inequality also contributed to the what historian Jeanne
Boydston has called the “pastorialization of housework.” During the colonial period,
yeoman farmers, artisans, shopkeepers, wage earners, and even professionals relied upon
a gendered division of labor to meet the cash needs of the household. In the nineteenth
century, wives’ earnings remained important only to working-class families. As
Boydston demonstrated, the cash value of housework by a poor woman, which equaled
approximately $300 per year in 1860, often surpassed the value o f her husband’s
earnings. In middle-class families, women had additional opportunities to make money
by taking on boarders or engaging in home manufactures. The cash value of housework
could easily increase to $700 or even $1,000 per year, and as a supplement to the income

37 Boydston, Home and Work, 9-11, 142-60. Murray quoted in Mary Beth Norton, Liberty’s
Daughters: The Revolutionary Experience o f American Women, 1750-1800 (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1980), 252.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

379
of a beleaguered artisan, a wife’s earnings could still make a significant contribution to
the household’s income.38 As early as 1819, however, a typical manufacturer in
Baltimore possessed nearly three times the amount of assessed property as an average
artisan. Assuming that this disparity reflected differences in income between
manufacturers and artisans, a manufacturer’s wife who earned as much as $1,000
contributed a much smaller portion to the household’s income in percentage terms than a
poor woman who earned just $300. If a manufacturer or a merchant earned as much as
$5,000 per year, their wives’ earnings could easily be dismissed as inconsequential. The
rise of the manufacturers thus contributed to the growing belief in the relative
worthlessness o f housework as an economic activity.
The pastorialization of housework in the nineteenth century led to social and
political pressure to remove women from the labor market and the marketplace. As a
result, many of the traditional sources o f income available to women in the eighteenth
century were less available in the nineteenth century. Many women had traditionally
relied upon huckstering, or reselling produce on the streets they earlier bought at market,
to provide cash for their families. In 1816, however, the City Council passed an
ordinance that forbid hucksters to peddle goods on the streets without a license. The law
carried a stiff fine, and in May, four women, each of whom had been fined $1.58 for
unlicensed huckstering, petitioned the City Council for a special dispensation under the
law. They argued that without a “mechanical trade, no manufacturing faculty, [and] no
stock,” they could “obtain no employment” other than huckstering. If “they must be
fettered from possible industry,” they felt sure that the almshouse would be their only

38 Boydston, Home and Work, 132-60.
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remaining recourse. The City Council rejected the petition, insuring that a traditional
source of income for many families would disappear.39 The ban on huckstering meant
that in addition to searching for ways to supplement their husbands’ falling incomes,
adjusting to the increased amounts of housework, and accommodating the new demands
of Republican Motherhood, many women had to find ways to cover shortfalls in their
own cash earnings. For many families, this was simply asking too much.
Even if detailed household accounts existed, it is impossible to determine by how
much wives’ contributions to household income changed in the early republic. As
Boydston argued, much o f “the cash value of housework was embedded in the
collectivity of the family.”40 This remained true in the early nineteenth century. What
could be analyzed on a monetary basis— sale of vegetables in the streets or at market,
wages earned from outwork or domestic employment— was ultimately subsumed in the
husband’s income under the laws of coverture. As husbands combined their earnings
with those of other family members to convert cash into property, the subsequent records
generated by taxes on that property obliquely reveal differences in total household
income over time. Yet there is no way to distinguish between the different family
members’ contributions in the eventual acquisition of that property. W hat can be
determined is that in artisan families, the wife’s earnings likely increased as a percentage
o f the household’s income, but the family as a whole was unable to prevent an overall

39 Ordinances o f the City o f Baltimore (Baltimore: Warner, 1816), ordinance 12, and “Petition to
Baltimore City Council,” 1816, item 327, Baltimore City Archives, both quoted in Seth
Rockman, “Women’s Labor, Gender Ideology, and Working-Class Households in Early Republic
Baltimore,” in Explorations in Early American Culture, supplemental issue of Pennsylvania
History, 66(1999): 174.
40 Boydston, Home and Work, 134.
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decline.
Between 1798 and 1818, the average artisan’s assessed property declined by more
than one-third relative to the city’s mean, from 91 percent of the city’s mean in 1798 to
just 57 percent in 1818. As seen in Figure 8-3, the decline in artisans’ assessed property
was apparent in every strata o f wealth. In 1798, artisans were almost evenly distributed
throughout the tax record. By 1812, however, the majority o f Baltimore’s artisans were
in the bottom half of the city’s assessments, and those in the bottom 40 percent had
increased from 39 to 48 percent of all artisans. On the other end of the economic scale,
artisans among the wealthiest 20 percent of property owners declined from 18 to 11
percent. By 1818, the artisans’ fortunes had worsened still further. Just 7 percent were
among the wealthiest 20 percent of the city, two out o f every three artisans were in the
bottom half of the city’s assessments, and a majority were in the bottom third.41
It is difficult to determine whether or not working-class families fared better. The
average assessment for laborers listed in the city directories was 43 percent of the city’s
mean in 1798, and 37 percent in 1819.42 This suggests that working-class households
coped with the transformation of the city’s economy better than middle-class families,
but the city directories and property tax records do not provide a comprehensive portrait
of the working class. Laborers as a percentage of the occupations listed in the directories
fluctuated wildly, and many working-class families never appeared on tax roles because

41 1800 Baltimore Directory; Federal Direct Tax of 1798, Baltimore City, MS.806, MHS
(hereafter cited as 1798 Baltimore Direct Tax); 1812 Baltimore Directory; 1812 Baltimore Tax
Record; 1819 Baltimore Directory; and Baltimore Property Tax Record, 1818, RG.4 #1,
microfilm reel 85, BCA (hereafter cited as 1818 Baltimore Tax Record).
42 1800 Baltimore Directory; 1798 Baltimore Direct Tax; 1819 Baltimore Directory; and 1818
Baltimore Tax Record.
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Figure 8-3
Property Distribution for Baltimore Artisans, 1798 and 1812
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they fell below the minimum requirements for taxation. However, there is reason to
suspect that working-class families were able to at least hold the line on household
income despite a decline of 50 percent in real wages between 1802 and 1814. Workingclass women and the wives of laborers were less devoted to the idea of Republican
Motherhood, did far less shopping because their households lacked the resources, did not
spend more time baking white bread because their households did not have cooking
stoves, and were more likely to take on employment doing domestic service.43 If these
families were able to maintain their household income, it happened through the efforts of
wives extending the scope of housework in response to the changes brought about by
early industrialization.
Many rural farm households coped with industrialization better than did most
urban households. Farmers responded to the expansion of the backcountry trade by
preserving a traditional subsistence-base of production, creating an urban-rural
dichotomy in the effects of market expansion. Likewise, farm wives were able to tum the
traditional patterns of housework on a farm more to their advantage in the wake of
industrialization. Rural households engaged in outwork more frequently than did urban
ones, often because many of the earliest manufactories required fast-running streams and
were therefore located in the countryside. Because rural households tended to be larger
than urban ones, farm wives could also rely on servants and children to do more of the
traditional housework. This created the time needed for needlework. Farm households
were also more likely to engage in household production. Few urban households owned
43 Boydston, Home and Work, 77-93. In poor families, mothers had litde time to supervise older
children, a prerequisite of Republican Motherhood. See Nancy Cott, “Eighteenth-Century Family
and Social Life Revealed in Massachusetts Divorce Records,” Journal o f Social History, 10
(1976): 28-29.
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cows, and fewer still made their own butter. Yet Baltimore’s population rocketed from
13,000 in 1790 to 62,000 in 1820, and the growing number o f city dwellers provided a
ready-made market for farm products. In the early nineteenth century, many midAtlantic farm women like Martha Ogle Forman of northern Maryland took advantage of
the booming urban market and specialized in the production of butter. In 1816, she sent
her first consignment of butter to Baltimore, and a few years later wrote that “we now
make more butter than we know what to do with.”44 Through methods such as these,
farmer-husbands and their wives were able to preserve the household economy at a time
when urban families saw the traditional order slipping away. The lack of parallel social
evolution between the urban and rural areas was thus evident in the lives of both men and
women in the cities and on the farms.

T r a n s f o r m in g E t h o s

The prevailing ethos o f the household economy fostered customary rights and
mutual obligations in which deference was the defining characteristic. Yet this ethos
could not survive if the city’s beleaguered workshops and households no longer
embraced the deferential bonds needed to support it. The demand for ever-greater levels
of efficiency and productivity erased any hope of that support, and thus the severe
distress o f the household economy had a withering effect on Baltimore’s traditional social
order. Institutions that successfully checked social conflict between artisans and laborers
44 W. Emerson Wilson, Plantation Life at Rose Hill: The Diaries o f Martha Ogle Forman, 18141845 (Wilmington, DE: Historical Society of Delaware, 1976), 181. For rural outwork, see
Boydston, 93-97, and Christopher Clark, The Roots o f Rural Capitalism: Western Massachusetts,
1780-1860 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), 184-91. For the mid-Atlantic butter
business, see Joan Jensen, Loosening the Bonds: Mid-Atlantic Farm Women, 1750-1850 (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), 79-113.
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during the 1790s, like the Mechanical Society and the Carpenters’ Society, dissolved
after 1800. All vestiges of traditional, deferential bonds within the city’s workplaces
were subsequently wiped away. Political quarrels between the city’s mercantile and
mechanic interests, which had been settled through discourse during the 1790s, became
disputes without resolution after 1800. Baltimore’s troubled workshops, once the
backbone of traditional society, became centers of working class agitation in the urban
transition.45
As artisans struggled against the rise of the manufacturers to maintain the
independence o f their shops, a wave of strikes swept the city in the first decade of the
nineteenth century. Journeymen in numerous trades had been denied any wage increases,
and many were suffering due to skyrocketing prices for retail goods in the city. The
journeymen tailors threatened to strike for higher wages in 1805, and did so in 1808.
Journeymen carpenters threatened a strike in 1806, journeymen cordwainers went on
strike in 1809 and 1810, and journeymen printers likely went on strike in October 1810.
Given the strong objections of republican lawmakers to unions and strikes, the public
reaction was predictable. The city’s shoemakers formed the United Master Shoemakers
to oppose the efforts of the journeymen, and the Baltimore Criminal Court indicted the
leaders o f the Union Society of Journeymen Cordwainers in 1809 for criminal
conspiracy. With few exceptions, all semblance of solidarity within the handicraft trades
was gone.46

45 The Mechanical Society dissolved in 1800, and the Carpenter’s Society ceased active
operations by 1806. Other artisan societies shared similar fates. See Steffen, The Mechanics o f
Baltimore, 172-73, 212.
46 Steffen, The Mechanics o f Baltimore, 209-227.
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Artisans also faced challenges from within their own ranks that renewed their
struggles with the city’s mercantile interests in a new way. During the 1790s, the
controversy over the city’s charter focused the political attention of artisans and
merchants alike. Artisans were not satisfied with the 1797 Charter, and charter reform
remained an important issue after 1800. Yet the growth of banks, and their prospective
role in shaping the city’s economy and society, emerged as the more important concern.
During the 1790s, banks had been modeled after the Bank of the United States, focusing
on the concerns of the mercantile community and insuring merchant dominance by
setting enormously high prices for ownership of bank stock. The banks’ exclusivity had
been a concern for artisans prior to the Panic of 1797, though not a major one. After the
credit crunch at the turn of the century and the miserly behavior of the city’s banks during
that crisis, however, artisan interest grew quickly for a bank that would cater to the needs
of the handicraft community by discounting bank notes offered by artisans. In 1806, a
small number of artisans met to draw up articles of incorporation for such a bank.47 The
problem, which became evident almost immediately, was that the handicraft community
was now clearly divided between traditional artisans and the new manufacturers— and the
interests o f these two groups o f handicraft producers were not the same.
A group of artisans calling themselves the Phalanx Society outlined a constitution
for the bank that favored the interests of the traditional artisans 48 Their vision for the
bank appeared in Hezekiah Niles’s Baltimore Evening Post, and promoted a bank with a
47 Baltimore American, May 20, 1806.
48 The Phalanx Society included Joshua Ennis, Thomas Sheppard, Nathaniel Hynson, Jr., Edward
Hagthorp, Thomas Worrell, Thomas Tinker, Hosea Johns, William MConkey, Richard Shipley,
Robert Edwards, James Martin, James Potoer, and William Edwards. See Baltimore Evening
Post, May 19, 1806.
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capitalization of one million dollars. Each share o f bank stock was priced at $23, but “no
person or persons, bodies corporate or otherwise, shall be permitted to subscribe on the
first day . . . for more than 50 shares.” The limit was set to prevent ownership of the bank
falling into the hands of a few wealthy stockholders. Regardless of the number of shares
a stockowner possessed, the maximum number of votes was set at twenty to insure that
artisans remained an important voting block within the bank. The Board of Directors
included eighteen directors of whom at least twelve had to be “practical mechanics,
artificers or handicraftsmen.” The use of the language is interesting because the Phalanx
Society deliberately avoided the using the word manufacturer, in essence lumping
merchants and manufacturers together as a distinct group apart from “all practical
mechanics, artificers, and handicraftsmen, and the middling and poorer classes of the
community, not being stockholders.”49 The Phalanx Society clearly believed their
interests were distinct from those of the manufacturers.
A second group, comprised of manufacturers, drew up an alternative constitution
for the prospective bank. Their constitution appeared in Leonard Yundt and Matthew
Brown’s Federal Gazette, which was not surprising. Until the publication of Alexander
Contee Hanson’s Federal Republican began in 1808, Yundt and Brown’s Federal
Gazette was the voice of the Federalist cause in Baltimore. Even though many of
Baltimore’s manufacturers were themselves Jeffersonian Republicans, the Federalists had
associated themselves with the interests o f manufacturers since Hamilton’s advocacy of
manufactories in the 1790s. The Federal Gazette was therefore an appropriate venue for

49 Baltimore Evening Post, May 14, 1806.
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the manufacturers to outline their vision for the bank.50
Like the Phalanx Society’s proposal for the bank, the manufacturers’ proposal set
the bank’s capitalization at one million dollars and a share price at $25. However, the
manufacturers’ proposal set much higher limits on the num ber of votes an individual
shareholder could have. The Phalanx Society’s proposal provided one vote for any
number of shares between one and fifty, five votes for those with 50-100 shares, ten votes
for 101-150 shares, fifteen votes for 151-200 shares, and twenty votes for those with 200
or more shares. Obviously, the manufacturers’ proposal favored wealthier stockholders.
In the Phalanx Society’s proposal, a stockholder with 49 shares had only one vote, and a
stockholder with 99 shares had only five votes. In the manufacturers’ version, a
stockholder with 49 shares had 14 votes, and one with 99 shares had 21 votes. The
manufacturers’ proposal also stipulated that nine of the fifteen members on the Board of
Directors would be “practical mechanics or manufacturers,” thus making handicraft
producers an established majority.51 If just two of the nine members of that established
majority were manufacturers, however, they could side with the other six members o f the
Board and place the remaining seven traditional artisans in the minority. Manufacturers
would thus become the swing votes, and by extension, be able to direct the affairs of the
50 For a discussion of the political leanings of Baltimore’s newspaper editors, see Roxanne
Zimmer, “The Urban Daily Press: Baltimore, 1797-1816” (Ph.D., University of Iowa, 1982), 87122.
51 Baltimore Federal Gazette, May 31, 1806. Voting rights of shareholders appeared in Article V
of the Phalanx Society’s proposal, printed in Baltimore Evening Post, May 14, 1806, and Article
II of the manufacturers’ proposal, printed in Baltimore Federal Gazette, May 31, 1806. The
manufacturers’ constitution provided that “For one share, and not exceeding two shares, one vote
each; for every two shares above two and not exceeding ten, one vote; for every four shares above
ten and not exceeding thirty, one vote; for every six shares above thirty and not exceeding sixty,
one vote; for every eight shares above sixty and not exceeding one hundred, one vote, and for
every ten shares above that number, one vote; but no person or persons, body politic or otherwise,
shall be entitled to a greater number than thirty votes.”
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institution.
The fight over the Mechanic’s Bank proved much more bitter than those over the
city charter in the late 1790s. In the Evening Post, “Anti-Shaver” lashed out against the
manufacturers proposed as the Bank’s Directors, calling them “notorious harpies who
prey upon the very blood o f men” whose “business may be compared to a sun o f iniquity
around which his satellites revolve.” When an artisan, or “a person whom this system o f
villains has marked for one of its victims,” offers a note, they are either turned down or
forced to pay a “heavy shaving interest” instead of “a legal one.” In another piece
written for the Evening Post, “An Examiner” complained that the interests of artisans
were distinct from those o f the manufacturers. The former “must assert their own rights
and maintain their own interests,” for the latter “may find it convenient to their [own]
interests to accommodate the rich and add to the oppression of the oppressed.” The
manufacturers’ proposed constitution made no provisions “even for how long a time a
man must have been a practical mechanic previous to his election as a director; whether
for two years or for two hours . . . or whether a mechanic, who ceased to be a mechanic
twenty years ago.” Despite the protests, the manufacturers’ constitution was adopted.52
The troubles of the household economy encouraged many artisans to quit their
failing shops and adopt a new occupation. George Littig is a prime example of this trend.
He struggled during the economic downturn after the Panic of 1797 to save his hat shop
12 For “An Examiner,” see Baltimore Evening Post, June 6, 1806. For “Anti-Shaver,” see
Baltimore Evening Post, July 1, 1806. Charles Steffen adds that the year after the adoption of the
manufacturers’ constitution, the directors began requiring “practical mechanics” to have been at
their trade for the three years, and at least one year preceding the election. (Steffen, The
Mechanics o f Baltimore, 201.) By still allowing “manufacturers” to stand forelection, however,
the directors’ actions really amounted to a limitation on the number of “practical mechanics” that
qualified for the Board rather than a way of increasing the number of artisans who served on the
Board.
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on North Gay Street, but when it became clear that revenues were not likely to rebound
soon, Littig closed his store and turned to a new line o f work. Based on the evidence of
his account books, Littig was literate, possessed good communication skills, and
demonstrated a penchant for details— the perfect occupational skills for a tax collector.
In 1800, he started his new career as a revenue officer for the customs house, working on
the docks collecting tariff dues on imported goods. He was evidently rather good at his
job, spending the next decade working at the customs house. Unfortunately, Littig’s
personal financial situation may have deteriorated. His property valuation for the 1798
Direct Tax was $910, which was double the city’s median assessment and placed Littig in
the top one-third of all city property owners. In 1812, his assessment was just $79, or a
little more than half the city’s median assessment. The assessment also placed Littig in
the bottom one-third of all city property owners. O f course, as a tax collector himself,
Littig may have been clever enough to liquidate most of his taxable property after 1800
and transfer the bulk of his wealth into bank deposits, stocks, and bonds— assets that
remained out o f the reach of tax collection in the early nineteenth century. Without
detailed lists o f depositors and stock holders for the city’s various banks, insurance
companies, and other corporations, however, it is impossible to determine whether or not
Littig outfoxed his fellow tax collectors.53
Littig was not the only artisan to shift from handicraft production to working for
government. The beginning of the 1804 city directory listed 62 people working in
government positions, not including those serving on the City Council. The occupations
for 27 of these people were listed in earlier city directories, and more than 40 percent of
53 1800 Baltimore Directory; 1798 Baltimore Direct Tax; 1812 Baltimore Tax Record; and 1812
Tax Record.
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them had been artisans.54 For some, the move to government service was very natural.
Samuel Davis, Christian Slimmer, and George Hall had all been carpenters before
becoming Inspectors o f Lumber. For others the change was more abrupt. Frederick
Sumwalt, a blacksmith, became the Superintendent of Pumps for the Western District.
Thomas Roberts, a cordwainer, became one of two Commissioners of the Streets, and
Alexandre Russell, a calico printer, became a wood corder. Artisans were especially
well-suited for these jobs. Most had to keep account books at their shops, and were
therefore prepared to do the bookkeeping required in these positions. As artisans, they
had interacted with the public on a regular basis, and were therefore known, and in most
cases, already trusted members of the community. Government positions were limited,
but many other artisans took similar jobs in the business community as accountants,
clerks, and bookkeepers. The rise of the manufacturers and the consolidation of wealth
among merchants provided a growing market for those able to keep a proper account

54 There were actually 63 government positions listed in the front of the 1804 Baltimore city
directory, including the Harbor Master, the Clerks of the Markets, the Superintendents of the
Pumps, Powder Magazine, and Chimney Sweeps, the Commissioners of the Streets, the
Inspectors of the revenue, flour, butter and lard, staves and headings, salted provisions, and
lumber, the Custom House officers, the constables, the hay weighers, and the wood corders.
Peregrine G. Browning served as both a constable and as the Clerk of Hanover Street Market,
thus only 62 people were cross-referenced against the 1799, 1800, and 1802 city directories. This
yielded 48 matches, and of these, 21 were listed in the same government position they held in
1804. For example, John Johnson, one of the two Superintendents of [Chimney] Sweeps,
appeared in the 1802 directory as a master of sweeps. He did not have a specified trade in the
1799 directory, and he did not appear at all in the 1800 directory. Others like George Matthews,
the Inspector of Salted Provisions, appeared in all 4 directories with the same government job.
The previous occupations of the remaining 27 people included 11 artisans, 6 merchants, S
grocers, 3 innkeepers, one clerk, and one sea captain. See John Mullin, The Baltimore Directory,
fo r 1799 (Baltimore: Warner and Hanna, 1799), hereafter cited as 1799 Baltimore Directory;
1800 Baltimore Directory; Cornelius William Stafford, The Baltimore Directory, fo r 1802
(Baltimore: John W. Butler, 1802), hereafter cited as 1802 Baltimore Directory; and James
Robinson, Baltimore Directory, fo r 1804 (Baltimore: Warner and Hanna, 1804), hereafter cited as
1804 Baltimore Directory.
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book.55
Other artisans joined the ranks of the wage earners, but it is difficult to determine
how many took this path. City directories did not provide comprehensive listings of the
city’s laborers, and the laborers who did appear were typically employed as riggers,
carters, draymen, brick layers, or other specific occupations. Very few were listed with
the ubiquitous designation “laborer,” thus relatively few of the laborers who worked in
the city’s shops and manufactories ever appeared in the directories. The available
evidence, which can only paint a blurry picture of the shift from handicraft production to
wage labor, suggests that relatively few artisans made the transition to wage labor in the
early nineteenth century.
O f the 109 people designated as “laborers” in the 1802 city directory, only 22
previously appeared in either the 1799 or 1800 directories. Nine o f the identified
laborers, or 41 percent, had been artisans, but the small number o f matches between the
directories (20 percent) challenges the reliability that statistic. Among other wage
earners, the percentage of former artisans was markedly lower. O f the 209 riggers,
draymen, seamen, caulkers, carters, porters, stevedores, stage drivers, and bricklayers in
the 1802 city directory, 81 previously appeared in the 1799 or 1800 city directories. O f
these, 49 had been wage earners, usually in the same occupation. Only 11, or just 13V6
percent, had been artisans.56 Thus the available evidence suggests that artisans and wage

55 1799 Baltimore Directory; 1800 Baltimore Directory; and 1802 Baltimore Directory. Similar
changes occurred in Utica, New York where the number of clerks rose by more than 13,500
percent between 1817 and 1860. See Mary Ryan, Cradle o f the Middle Class: The Family in
Oneida County, New York, 1790-1865 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), Table B4.
56 1799 Baltimore Directory; 1800 Baltimore Directory; and 1802 Baltimore Directory.
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earners occupied two different levels of Baltimore’s social strata, and that relatively few
individuals crossed over from one side to the other. A minority of the city’s artisans
joined the ranks of the wage earners, and ex-artisans represented only a small percentage
of the city’s working class. The bulk of the city’s laborers did not emerge from the ranks
o f the handicraft producers, and artisans did not endure what one historian called “the
irreversible proletarianization o f the mechanic class.”57 Instead, newly arrived
immigrants, housewives, and those who had been apprenticed, indentured, or enslaved
were the most important segments of the urban population making the transition to wage
labor.
Despite all the troubles of the household economy, most of the city’s artisans
clung to their traditional way of life in the hope of recapturing their earlier economic
independence. Their shops were becoming an increasingly marginal part of the urban
economy, but as late as 1819, artisans still represented more than 33 percent of all the
occupations listed in the city directory. George Lightner, who continued to ply his trade
57 Charles Sellers, The Market Revolution: Jacksonian America, 1815-1846 (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1991), 25. The theory that the “proletarianization” of artisans led to the rise of
the American working class is also advanced in Sean Wilentz, “Artisan Origins of the American
Working Class,” International Labor and Working Class History, 19 (1981): 1-22, and Bruce
Laurie, Artisans into Workers: Labor in Nineteenth-Century America (New York: Noonday
Press, 1989). Recent scholarship on the working poor has helped debunk the “proletarianization”
thesis by stressing the differences between the experiences of artisans and unskilled laborers. See
especially Billy Smith, The “Lower Sort": Philadelphia's Laboring People, 1750-1800 (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1990); Rockman, “Working for Wages,” 15-30; and Jacqueline Jones,
American Work: Four Centuries o f Black and White Labor (New York: W.W. Norton, 1998),
255-58. Scholars focusing on women’s history and African American history have also helped
debunk the “proletarianization” thesis by pointing to the importance of female and African
American wage earners in early industrialization. See especially Alice Kessler-Harris, Out to
Work: A History o f Wage-Earning Women in the United States (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1982); Leslie Harris, “Creating the African-American Working Class: Black and White
Workers, Abolitionists and Reformers in New York City, 1785-1863” (Ph.D., Stanford
University, 1994); Jeanne Boydston, “The Woman Who Wasn’t There: Women’s Market Labor
and the Transition to Capitalism in the United States,” Journal o f the Early Republic, 16 (1996):
183-206; and Sonya Rose, “Class Formation and the Quintessential Worker,” in John Hall, ed..
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as a tinsmith into the 1820s, was among them.58
For many artisans, the decision to fight back or to quit their businesses was only a
partial answer to the distresses they faced. With the prevailing ethos of traditional
society vanishing quickly in the early nineteenth century, many Baltimoreans turned to
religion to fill the void, and were subsequently swept up in the Second Great Awakening.
This was not the first, nor was it the last religious awakening in America. As William
McLoughlin argued, religious revivals have occurred whenever traditional social patterns
deviated so far from their accepted norms that the society’s prevailing ethos was no
longer intelligible. What represented the ideal was so far removed from the reality of
people’s lives that individuals in that society were no longer able to sustain a common
understanding of what constituted reasonable social, political, or economic behavior. In
such times, revivals provide a way for those with a religious leaning to accommodate the
radical social changes sweeping society. Artisans and workers, who relied heavily on
religion as a source of moral legitimacy, were thus especially susceptible to revivalism in
times of extreme distress.59 Between the troubled workshops and beleaguered

Reworking Class (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 133-66.
co

1819 Baltimore Directory. Two excellent case studies of artisans struggling to retain their
economic independence are Gary Komblith, “Becoming Joseph T. Buckingham: The Struggle for
Artisanal Independence in Early-Nineteenth-Century Boston,’’ and William Pretzer, “From
Artisan to Alderman: The Career of William W. Moore, 1803-1886,” in Rock, Gilje, and Asher,
eds., American Artisans, 123-34, 135-52.
59 William McLoughlin, Revivals, Awakenings, and Reform: An Essay on Religion and Social
Change in America, 1607-1977 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 12-23.
McLoughlin builds his argument based on the anthropological methodologies developed in
Anthony F.C. Wallace, “Revitalization Movements,” American Anthropology, 58 (1956): 264-81,
and Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation o f Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973), chapters 4-5.
As Geertz himself pointed out, however, the true starting point for connecting social distress to
religious revivalism is really Emile Durkheim, The Rules o f Sociological Method (Glencoe, IL:
Free Press, 1950; orig. 1938). On the historic connection between artisans and religion, see
Herbert Gutman, “Protestantism and the American Labor Movement: The Christian Spirit in the
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households, the early nineteenth century was such a time.
The Second Great Awakening embodied numerous evangelical traditions, and
offered no single religious agenda. Instead, the awakening defined a period in which
revivalism spread slowly through the United States and evolved over time and space.
During the early 1790s, Methodist and Free-Will Baptist itinerants swept through
backcountry Kentucky and Tennessee organizing massive camp meetings and
establishing churches. When the revival spread to New England in the late 1790s,
however, most conservative yankees rejected the camp meeting as overly enthusiastic.
Some, like Timothy Dwight, the President of Yale College, even fought a rear-guard
action against revivalism and tried to reinvigorate the older Calvinist agenda. The
revivalists in New England were not as interested in establishing new churches as they
were in changing the old. When the Second Great Awakening came to Baltimore, the
leaders o f the revival in Maryland’s largest city embraced the massive camp meetings
and revivalism of the frontier, and shared the New England revivalists’ interest in
evangelizing the community as a whole.60
On September 24, 1803, the Methodist Episcopal Baltimore Annual Conference
conducted a massive camp meeting fifteen miles northwest of the city on the Reister’s
Gilded Age,” American Historical Review 72 (1966): 74-101; Paul E. Johnson, A Shopkeeper’s
Millennium: Society and Revivals in Rochester, New York, 1815-1837 (New York: Hill and
Wang, 1978), esp. chapters 1-3; and Ronald Schultz, “God and Workingmen: Popular Religion
and the Formation of Philadelphia's Working Class, 1790-1830,” in Ronald Hoffman and Peter
Albert, eds.. Religion in a Revolutionary Age (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia,
1994), 125-55.
60 On the varied nature of the Second Great Awakening, see Charles Keller, The Second Great
Awakening in Connecticut (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1942); Whitney Cross, The
Burned-Over District: The Social and Intellectual History o f Enthusiastic Religion in Western
New York, 1800-1850 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1950), 3-55; John Boles, The Great
Revival, 1787-1895 (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1972); and McLoughlin, Revivals,
Awakenings, and Reform, 98-140.
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Town Road. The meeting, which lasted three days, did not introduce Methodism to
Baltimore. In 1784, Francis Asbury broke with the Church of England and formed the
American Episcopal Methodist Church in Baltimore. Asbury became the church’s first
bishop actively participated in the later revival. By 1800, Methodists were already
Baltimore’s largest Protestant denomination, representing about 20 percent of city’s
Protestants. Instead, the camp meeting on Reister’s Town Road helped ignite religious
enthusiasm in Baltimore, inspiring the converted to conduct their own town meetings, or
smaller versions of the camp meeting, when they returned to the city. A second massive
camp meeting in October 1806 produced more than 500 conversions according to one
observer. The repeated camp meetings helped keep the fires of religious enthusiasm
burning and sustained a period of revivalism that lasted for much of the decade. The
revival helped the Methodists attract greater numbers of Baltimoreans to their churches.
By 1810, there were approximately 4,500 Methodists in Baltimore, or nearly a third of all
the city’s Protestants.61
The Methodists advanced the ideas of free will and universal salvation, and
stressed the importance o f evangelizing all parts of the community. Anyone could be
saved simply by committing themselves wholly to Christ. By the 1830s, revivalists like
Charles Finney of New York and Lyman Beecher o f Boston had transformed the idea of
universal salvation into a rationale for universal moral reform, and recast evangelical
Protestantism as the religion of the emerging middle class. This represented the final
stage o f the revival. At the turn of the nineteenth century, the revival was a powerful

61 Terry Bilhartz, Urban Religion and the Second Great Awakening: Church and Society in Early
National Baltimore (East Rutherford, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1986), 85-94,
157.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

396
organizing force for working people and artisans.62
In Baltimore, Protestant artisans and laborers gravitated to the Methodists and
Baptists (although the latter never amounted to more than 4 percent of the city’s
Protestants). Baltimore’s Presbyterians warmed to the idea of employing revivalist
strategies to boost church attendance, but never fully embraced the revival. As a result,
Presbyterians stagnated as a percentage o f Baltimore’s churchgoing population. The
city’s Episcopalians rejected the Methodists’ enthusiastic approach. James Bend, the
rector of Baltimore’s St. Paul’s Episcopal Church, found it bewildering how a Methodist
“cannot think it compatible with Christian duty to give up ranting, noise, and other
follies.” Methodists, Baptists, and other revivalists paid little attention to such
complaints. By 1830, Methodists outnumbered Episcopalians in Baltimore by more than
two to one.63
The troubled workshops and beleaguered households of early national Baltimore
demonstrate how the rise of the manufacturers eventually undermined the household
economy. The political tussles between artisans, laborers, and manufacturers, the shifts
in Baltimore’s occupational structure, and the rise of Methodism in the city are all
illustrative that a change in ethos occurred. Yet none of these examples provides an

62 The idea of stages to the awakening is outlined in Wallace, “Revitalization Movements,” 26481. For the connection between early artisanal and labor activism and evangelical Protestantism,
see Jama Lazerow, Religion and the Working Class in Antebellum America (Washington, DC:
Smithsonian Institution Press, 1994), 3-17, 26-34, 130-150, and Steffen, The Mechanics o f
Baltimore, 253-75. For the connection between evangelical Protestantism and middle-class
moralism, see Johnson, A Shopkeeper’s Millennium, 4-8,95-136; Cross, The Burned-Over
District, 211-38; and Christine Stansell, City o f Women: Sex and Class in New York, 1789-1860
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 66-67.
63 Bend quoted in Francis Beirae, St. Paul’s Parish: A Chronicle o f the Mother Church
(Baltimore: Hom-Shafer, 1967), 54-55. For the distribution of church attendance by occupational
group in Baltimore, see Bilhartz, Urban Religion, 158-160.
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opportunity to peer into the mentalite of the city and evaluate how far the market
revolution had, in Paul’s Gilje’s words, “crept into the consciousness” of Americans.64
To what extent did the old ethos o f deference and mutual obligation yield to a new ethos
guided by market sensibilities? In the long, violent summer of 1812, the answer to that
question began to take shape.

64 Paul Gilje, “The Rise of Capitalism in the Early Republic,” in Gilje, ed., Wages o f
Independence, 2.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER NINE
THE BALTIMORE RIOTS

Through the grating of his prison cell, John Thompson could see the rioters swing
their hatchets against the door of the cell opposite his. As they hacked through the
wooden barrier, John Hall, another witness to the scene, remembered Thompson calling
out it is “a pity they should kill those poor devils instead of us . . . you are at the wrong
door— here we are.” The taunt worked, and the rioters’ fury quickly turned toward
Thompson’s and Hall’s cell. Once the rioters were through the door, however, they were
surprised to see Captain Daniel Murray inside, brandishing a gun at their heads. Hall
recalled Murray’s warning: “my lads, you had better retire; [otherwise] we shall shoot
some of you.” For what seemed an interminable moment, the shadows of the rioters’
hatchets and Murray’s pistol danced silently on the wall as both sides glared at each
other. When Thompson and Murray finally rushed the door, blood soon choked the city’s
streets.1
By 10 o ’clock on the evening of July 28, 1812, a dozen people were dead and
many others wounded in the worst riot that Baltimore or any other city in the republic had

1Narrative of John Hall, Maryland Gazette, September 3, 1812. The Baltimore Riots of 1812
have received extensive treatment from historians. See especially Grace Overmyer, ‘The
Baltimore Mobs and John Howard Payne,” Maryland Historical Magazine, 58 (1963): 54-61;
Frank Cassell, ‘The Great Baltimore Riot of 1812,” Maryland Historical Magazine, 70 (1975):
241-59; Donald Hickey, “The Darker Side of Democracy: The Baltimore Riots of 1812,”
Maryland Historian, 7 (1976): 1-20; Paul Gilje, “The Baltimore Riots of 1812 and the
Breakdown of the Anglo-American Mob Tradition,” Journal o f Social History, 13 (1980): 54764; Charles Steffen, The Mechanics o f Baltimore: Workers and Politics in the Age o f Revolution,
1763-1812 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1984), 243-50; Paul Gilje, “‘Le Menu Peuple’ in
America: Identifying the Mob in the Baltimore Riots of 1812,” Maryland Historical Magazine,
81 (1986): 50-66; Donald Hickey, The War o f 1812: A Forgotten Conflict (Urbana: University of
Illinois Press, 1989), 56-71; and Paul Gilje, Rioting in America (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1996), 60-63.
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ever witnessed. The mob’s brutality astounded the American public, which was not
accustomed to the idea o f a large number of people being killed during a riot. This
expectation may seem remarkable to twenty-first-century sensibilities, which remain
haunted by the barbarous images of the twentieth century’s deadly riots. In 1917,48
people died in the riot in East St. Louis. In 1965, the arrest o f an African American
motorist in the Watts section of Los Angeles led to six days of rioting and the deaths of
34 people. In the long summer of 1967,68 people died in riots in Detroit and Newark
alone. The idea o f a peaceful and orderly riot thus seems a contradiction. Yet in the
eighteenth-century, riots typically involved small, disciplined groups that advanced
recognizable political agendas by humiliating an individual, destroying symbols, or
demolishing property. Injuries were common, but few people died.2 In a typical mob
action, rascals were burned in effigy, or were themselves tarred and feathered. Yet no
eighteenth-century mob ever decided to tar and feather someone and then set the actual
person ablaze— as was the case with John Thompson outside the Baltimore City Jail.
Several historians have described the more orderly riots of the eighteenth-century
as part of the “Anglo-American mob tradition.” This type of rioting had a long history on
both sides o f the Atlantic.3 In America, the march of Pennsylvania’s Paxton Boys in

2 Paul Gilje has calculated that for the entire period between 1701 and 1765, only 19 people died
in riots throughout America. Gilje’s figures exclude the 20 Indians murdered by the Paxton Boys
in 1763. See Gilje, Rioting in America, 25. For the 1917 and 1967 riots, see Report o f the
National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, intro. Tom Wicker (New York: Bantam
Books, 1968), 115, 162,217. This report was the product of a special commission created by
President Lyndon B. Johnson on July 29, 1967 to investigate the reasons for recent deadly riots in
American cities. The commission was headed by Illinois Governor Otto Kerner, and thus the
media dubbed the commission’s findings as the “Kemer Report.”
3 My understanding of the “eighteenth-century Anglo-American mob tradition” is based in part
on Max Beloff, Public Order and Popular Disturbance, 1660-1714 (London: Oxford University
Press, 1938); George Rudd, The Crowd in History: A Study o f Popular Disturbances in France
and England, 1730-1848 (New York: Wiley, 1964); Gordon Wood, “A Note on the Mobs in the
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1764, the destruction o f Governor Thomas Hutchinson’s house in Boston in 1765, the
Boston Tea Party in 1773, and the burning o f the Peggy Stewart in Annapolis in 1774
were all examples o f this mob tradition. Riots of this type never achieved complete
political legitimacy in America, but their ritualized nature inspired relatively little fear.
Thomas Hutchinson, himself a victim of a riot, once commented that riots do not seem to
“strike the mind with so much abhorrence as some other offenses do.”4
Eighteenth-century authorities lacked the use o f organized police forces, thus
crowd control relied on the mob’s recognition of a deferential social order. When
officials confronted a mob, either the mayor, the magistrates, or the constables addressed
the rioters directly, literally reading the Riot Act them. By actually reading the act,
officials were able to use their personal prestige and position to convince the mob to
American Revolution,” The William and Mary Quarterly, 3d ser., 23 (1966): 635-42; Jesse
Lemisch, “Jack Tar in the Streets: Merchant Seamen in the Politics of Revolutionary America.”
The William and Mary Quarterly, 3d ser., 25 (1968): 371-407; Pauline Maier, “Popular Uprisings
and Civil Authority in Eighteenth Century America,” The William and Mary Quarterly, 3d ser.,
27 (1970): 3-35; E.P. Thompson, ‘The Moral Economy of the English Crowd,” Past and Present,
51 (1971): 76-136; Pauline Maier, From Resistance to Revolution: Colonial Radicals and the
Development o f American Opposition to Britain, 1765-1776 (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1972), 348; E.P. Thompson, “Patrician Society, Plebeian Culture,” Journal o f Social History, 7 (1974);
Paul Gilje, The Road to Mobocracy: Popular Disorder in New York City, 1763-1834 (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1987), 3-95; Thomas Slaughter, “Crowds in EighteenthCentury America: Reflections and New Directions,” Pennsylvania Magazine o f History and
Biography, 115 (1991): 3-34; and Gilje, Rioting in America, 1-60.
4 Hutchinson quoted in Bernard Bailyn, The Ordeal o f Thomas Hutchinson (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1974), 84-85. The best account of the Paxton Boys may be found in
George Franz, Paxton: A Study o f Community Structure and Mobility in the Colonial
Pennsylvania Backcountry (New York: Garland, 1989). The Paxton Boys did murder twenty
Conestoga Indians in 1763, but this presaged their march on Philadelphia in 1764. Upon reaching
the outskirts of the city, the mob met with Benjamin Franklin, Mayor Thomas Willing, and
Attorney General Benjamin Chew, and agreed to seek proper legal redress for their grievances.
For a discussion of the destruction of Thomas Hutchinson’s house, see Bailyn, The Ordeal o f
Thomas Hutchinson, 35-38. For the Boston Tea Party, see Alfred Young, The Shoemaker and the
Tea Party: Memory and the American Revolution (Boston: Beacon Press, 1999), 42-45. For an
account of the burning of the Peggy Stewart, see Ronald Hoffman, A Spirit o f Dissension:
Economics, Politics, and the Revolution in Maryland (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1973), 133-38.
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disperse. Eighteenth-century artisans and journeymen respected the traditional social
hierarchy and usually responded to these demands. As long as the riot remained orderly,
however, most officials provided enough time for the mob to finish tearing down a
building or burning someone in effigy. In England, mobs had the tacit approval to
continue their activities for more than an hour after the Riot Act was read. In America,
mobs were usually allowed to finish their work and disperse quietly without interference
from the mayor, the magistrates, or the militia.5
If rioters either refused to disperse or became disorderly, the mayor could call
upon the militia for help. This last option was used sparingly because the militia could
not always be relied upon to muster. Even when the militia did muster, officials often
found it difficult to convince them to use force against members of their own community.
When the militia agreed to fight, the use of force threatened what E.P. Thompson called
the “credibility of the gentry and magistracy.” The “reassertion of paternalistic
authority” thus remained the preferred means of controlling an eighteenth-century mob.6
The gruesome events at the Baltimore City Jail demonstrated that the corporatism
which defined eighteenth-century rioters and riot control had been indeed been swept
away. Although the immediate catalyst for the riot at the Jail was the preceding five
weeks o f civil disturbances in the city, and a melee the previous day on Charles Street the
previous day, the cause o f the unprecedented violence was the long-term reconstruction
of the city’s traditional social order. The rise of the manufacturers had already compelled
artisans to make far-reaching changes in workshops throughout the city, fundamentally

5 Beloff, Public Order and Popular Disturbances, 136-37, and Gilje, Rioting in America, 20-24.
6 E.P. Thompson, “Patrician Society, Plebeian Culture,” 404.
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undermining the household economy. The seeds of conflict lurked in the shadows of
Baltimore’s alleys, and the mob only required an excuse for chaos to burst onto the city
streets. The riots help reveal the fault lines in the city’s social structure, providing an
opportunity to peer into the mentalite of the city whereby the often blurry contours of
Baltimore’s long-term social reconstruction become clearer. By analyzing the rioters’
actions and those of the authorities who tried, sometimes half-heartedly, to stop the
violence, as well as the commentaries of witnesses to the violence and those who later
condemned it, an answer begins to take shape to the most elusive question: to what the
extent had the market revolution “crept into the consciousness” o f Americans in the early
republic?7

T he F ed era l H il l R io t o f 1807
As late as 1807, the Anglo-American mob tradition and traditional methods of
crowd control continued to function in Baltimore as they had during the eighteenth
century. This is evident from the conduct of the mob during a riot on Federal Hill that
year. The Chesapeake-Leopard incident had united most Baltimoreans behind the
Jefferson administration. Two days after the attack on the American warship, a town
meeting of more than 3,000 people condemned the British outrage. Militia units began
mustering and war had become an acceptable policy. Any treasonable activity risked the
vengeance of the mob, and in the midst of this charged political atmosphere, Aaron Burr,
who was already under indictment in New York and New Jersey for the murder of

7 The question was posed by Paul Gilje in “The Rise of Capitalism in the Early Republic,” in Paul
Gilje, ed., Wages o f Independence: Capitalism in the Early American Republic (Madison:
Madison House, 1997), 1-2.
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Alexander Hamilton, was indicted for treason against the United States. Burr had
allegedly plotted with General James Wilkinson, the military governor o f the Louisiana
Territory, to establish Louisiana as a separate nation. Wilkinson then betrayed Burr,
arresting the former Vice President for leading an armed force down the Ohio River.
Although Burr was a Republican, two of Baltimore’s leading Federalists, Robert Goodloe
Harper and Luther Martin, agreed to defend him against the charge. Chief Justice John
Marshall presided over the trial in Richmond, Virginia. After Harper and Martin won
Burr’s acquittal, however, the Baltimore mob waited patiently for the lawyers’ return to
the city.8
In late October, Martin returned home, accompanied by Aaron Burr himself.
Republican frustrations with the jurists’ audacity surfaced quickly. On November 2,
Captain Leonard Frailey marched the Patriot’s Volunteer company to M artin’s house on
Charles Street where they played the rogues’ march as they passed by. On November 3,
the Republican newspaper Whig printed “An Earnest Proposal,” calling upon “the young
men o f Baltimore” to “confer a mark o f distinction” on Martin “with a suit of tar and
feathers.” Baltimore’s mayor, Thorowgood Smith, himself a Federalist, worried about
the mob’s intent. That afternoon he took the unusual step of assembling his constables
and asking General John Strieker to assemble the militia’s cavalry. Captains Samuel
Hollingsworth and William Barney, the son of the naval hero, Joshua Barney, agreed to
assemble their men, but Captain James Biays of the Fell’s Point Troop of Light Dragoons
8 Aaron Burr is second only to Benedict Arnold in the rogues’ gallery of the founding fathers, but
a number of historians have recently sought to rescue the reputation of the Third Vice-President,
particularly on the questions of Burr’s duel with Hamilton and his alleged treason in 1807. See
especially Arnold Rogow, A Fatal Friendship: Alexander Hamilton and Aaron Burr (New York:
Hill and Wang, 1998), and Roger Kennedy, Burr, Hamilton, and Jefferson: A Study in Character
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).
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believed that “no mischief would be done by the people,” and refused to assemble his
men.

9

By late afternoon, a mob had gathered at Fells Point and began parading effigies
of Martin and Burr on carts, north through Old Town and then west to Jones Falls.
Smith’s constables were unable to stop the mob from crossing Jones Falls into Baltimore
Town, and because the mob had officially defied public authority, at this point the parade
became a riot. Yet Smith was reluctant to order the cavalry to intervene because the
procession continued in an orderly manner without incident. Hoping that Biays would
carry political favor with the mob because of his refusal to muster, Smith convinced him
to try and lead the procession away from Luther Martin’s house. Biays agreed and
successfully led the mob around the Basin to Federal Hill where the effigies of Martin
and Burr were finally set ablaze.10
The procession from Fells Point and the reaction of the local government on
November 3 provided a near-textbook example of a traditional eighteenth-century
American riot. Biays’s personal ability to take command over the rioters were clear signs
that the Anglo-American mob tradition had survived into the nineteenth century.
Although The Whig had urged Baltimore’s young men to tar and feather Luther Martin,
the mob opted instead to bum him in effigy. A symbol, rather than a person, was
therefore the target of the mob’s vengeance. When confronted by the constables at Jones
Falls, the mob ignored the order not to cross into Baltimore Town, but remained peaceful.
9 Baltimore American, November 19, 1807; Baltimore Whig. November 3, 1807; and Baltimore
Federal Gazette, November 4, 1807.
10 Part of the mob actually turned down Charles Street, and coming to Martin’s house, began
throwing rocks at it. Biays doubled back, however, and was able to convince the crowd to rejoin
the rest of the procession. See Steffen, The Mechanics o f Baltimore. 232-34.
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Mayor Smith considered using the militia, but in a fashion typical to eighteenth-century
crowd control, opted instead to use the mob’s deference for James Biays as a means of
containment. The mob reacted positively to Biays’s position, indicating their recognition
o f the prevailing social order, and the subsequent bonfire recalled the Boston tradition of
parading and then burning effigies of the Pope on November 5— appropriately just two
days after the Baltimore mob had paraded the effigies o f Martin and Burr from Fells
Point to Federal Hill. Despite the economic upheaval, the urban transition had not yet
transformed the city’s traditional, deferential social order. The continued pressure of
manufactories on workshops, and the renewed commercial frustrations following the
Embargo o f 1807 accelerated the breakdown of the household economy. The city’s
deferential social order, which was intimately linked to the household economy, was
therefore being slowly undermined, and by 1812, Baltimore was poised for a major
conflagration.

T h e R io ts o f 1812
In the wake o f the 1807 Federal Hill riot, Alexander Contee Hanson, a young
Federalist zealot, established the Federalist Republican. Hanson’s newspaper specialized
in character assassinations and the shrillest Federalist rhetoric, and won the immediate
disdain and resentment o f the city’s Republican majority. A harbinger of the troubles
ahead occurred in 1809 when the Republican-dominated Baltimore militia sought to court
martial Hanson, then a lieutenant in a volunteer company, for one of his rancorous
editorials. The effort failed in court, but the incident demonstrated that the upstart
Federalist publisher had already worn down much of the patience of Baltimore’s
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leadership just two years after his arrival in the city.11
The brewing animosities between Republicans and Hanson bubbled over after
Congress declared war on Great Britain on June 18, 1812. The declaration o f war was
not a unanimous vote, and the split in the Congress reflected the disunity of the American
nation. Nowhere was this disunity more evident than in Maryland, where the
Congressional delegation split by a margin of six to three. In Harford County, in
northern Maryland, government authorities could not accommodate all those who wished
to join the militia and the army. A new regular army unit commanded by Colonel
William Winder, and funded in part by Baltimore Republicans, needed to be created.12 In
Montgomery County, in southern Maryland, the public greeted the declaration of war as a
menacing and foolhardy decision. Hanson was one of the most outspoken of
Montgomery County’s critics.
On June 20, two days after Congress declared war, the Federalist Republican
publicly condemned the action, calling it “unnecessary,” “inexpedient,” and showing the
“marks o f undisguised foreign influence.” Hanson declared that “we will never breath
under the dominion direct or derivative of Bonaparte.” 13 Federalists had been claiming
for months that the movement towards war was the work of Irish immigrants and
Napoleon Bonaparte, who were together trying to drag the United States into conflict
with the British to serve their own ends. Federalists frequently criticized President James
Madison as a “dupe” to Napoleon. Many Republicans at Fells Point wanted to make an
11 Baltimore American and Daily Advertiser, February 2, 1809.
12Joseph Whitehome, The Battle fo r Baltimore, 1814 (Baltimore: Nautical & Aviation Publishing
Company of America, 1997), 16.
13Baltimore Federalist Republican, June 20, 1812.
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example out o f Jacob Wagner, Alexander Hanson’s partner. A crowd o f several hundred
met at M yer’s Gardens, and discussed plans to clothe W agner in a terrapin shell, sheep
skins, and a pair o f homs. The use of the terrapin shell indicates the traditional nature in
which the 1812 riots began. Maryland had strict laws against tar and feathering people,
and the m ob’s avoidance of these tactics demonstrates their intent to conduct extralegal,
though not necessarily criminal, actions.14 These plans soon changed, however, and the
mob decided instead to tear down the house on Gay Street where the Federalist
Republican was published.
Instead of acting immediately against the Gay Street property, the mob waited
two more days, until the evening of June 22, 1812. Although it may be coincidental, this
date marked the fifth anniversary o f the Chesapeake incident in 1807. That the mob
waited until the anniversary suggests an overt political agenda in keeping with the AngloAmerican mob tradition. The subsequent behavior of the mob clearly reveals the
persistence of that tradition in the early evening o f June 22, when a group of laborers and
young mechanics gathered outside the Gay Street property. A few witnesses to the riot
later referred to as “boys,” implying that they were young teenagers or even younger.
Yet in their depositions to the special commission set up by Maryland’s House of
Delegates, John Diffenderfer claimed to have seen no boys present on Gay Street, and
William Barney and Samuel Hollingsworth claimed that the early rioters were mostly
14Deposition of William Gwynn, in Report o f the Committee o f Grievances and Courts o f Justice
o f the House o f Delegates o f Maryland, on the Subject o f the Recent Riot in the City o f Baltimore
(Annapolis: Jones Green, 1813), 22. Hereafter, citations of depositions from the report of the
Committee of Grievances will be abbreviated as RCG and followed by the page number. This
citation would appear as “Deposition of William Gwynn, RCG, 22.” Also see Deposition of
Thomas Kell, RCG, 138; Deposition of Edward Johnson, RCG, 174; and Deposition of John
Owen, RCG, 292-96. On the symbolism of the rioters’ behavior, see Gilje, “The Baltimore Riots
of 1812,” 560 n. 19.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

408
comprised o f laborers and young mechanics. Taking into consideration the subsequent
orderly behavior o f the mob, the latter observations provide the most plausible
explanation o f the rioters’ identities.15
The attack on the property “commenced before dark,” with the mob “throwing
stones at the house.” Captains James and Samuel Sterrett’s militia “had sufficient
influence” over the rioters “to drive them off, and induce the men to withdraw,” but the
mob soon reassembled with greater numbers and purpose.16 Just after dark, the mob
began pulling down the house. According to William Gwynn, a prominent Federalist
publisher who assumed ownership of Baltimore’s Federal G azette the following year,
“the work o f the destruction [was] performed with great regularity and but little noise.”
Gwynn described the work as being ritualistic, with approximately thirty to fifty rioters
“constantly employed in destroying the property,” and another three to five hundred
spectators “in the street near the office” who did nothing to aid the local authorities in
stopping the riot.17
M ayor Edward Johnson soon arrived on the scene, and according to Charles
Burrall, the Federalist postmaster in Baltimore, “pressed forward into the crowd,

15 Deposition of James Hutton, RCG, 147; Deposition of Edward Johnson, RCG, 163; Deposition
of James Sterrett, RCG, 199; Deposition of John Diffenderfer, RCG, 222; Deposition of William
Barney, RCG, 253; and Deposition of Samuel Hollingsworth, RCG, 336.
16 Deposition of Dennis Nowland, RCG, 185; Deposition of James Sterrett, RCG, 199; and
Deposition of Samuel Sterrett, RCG, 202.
17 Deposition of William Gwynn, RCG, 21. Although one witness claimed that a thousand
spectators were in the streets, Gwynn’s estimates represent a consensus in the testimonies
provided to the committee, and may be taken as accurate. See Deposition of David Geddes.
RCG, 50; Deposition of Janies Biays, Jr., RCG, 144; Deposition of Dennis Nowland, RCG, 185;
Deposition of Samuel Sterrett, RCG, 202; Deposition of George Steuart, RCG, 214; Deposition of
John Diffenderfer, RCG, 222; Deposition of Andrew Boyd, RCG, 223; Deposition of John Owen,
RCG, 292; and Deposition of Samuel Hollingsworth, RCG, 335-36.
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remonstrating against their conduct.” 18 The mayor was quickly rebuffed by one of the
rioters, who said, “Mr. Johnson, I know you very well, no body wants to hurt you; but the
laws of the land must sleep, and the laws of nature and reason prevail; that house is a
Temple o f Infamy, it is supported with English gold, and it must and shall come down to
the ground!” 19 The workmanlike conduct o f the demolition, and the exchange with the
mayor underscored the guiding force of the Anglo-American mob tradition in this earliest
stage of the riot. The rioter knew the mayor, and despite a veiled threat, treated him with
respect. That the rioters refused to stop their activities immediately should not be taken
as a lack of deference, because rioters on both sides of the Atlantic expected officials to
allow a riot to continue for a short period as long as the activities o f the rioters remained
orderly.
The composition of the mob during the early evening also highlighted the AngloAmerican mob tradition. Although a few immigrants, most notably the French druggist
Philip Lewis, and a number o f individuals from outside the city were among the most
boisterous rioters, the majority of the mob were natives of the city. Only one witness,
Samuel Sterrett, believed that immigrants and outsiders represented the majority of the
mob, and he made his claim on the basis of overheard dialects, not direct identification.
Seven other witnesses, including several Federalists, professed to have some idea of the
composition of the mob, and all of them stated that there was a mix of immigrants and
native-born Americans, or that the native Baltimoreans outnumbered all others.
18 Deposition of Charles Burrall, RCG, 1S3. Judge John Scott also made a half-hearted attempt to
stop the riot. See Deposition of John Scott, RCG, 119-20.
19Deposition of John Worthington, RCG, 242. The story is confirmed in Deposition of Edward
Johnson, RCG, 160-61; Deposition of James Sterrett, RCG, 199; and Deposition of Samuel
Hollingsworth, RCG, 336, 344-45.
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According to William Gwynn, “many of them, from their dress, appeared to be of the
middle class o f society.”20 Paul Gilje identified fifteen of the rioters in the dockets of the
Court of Oyer and Terminer, and Gilje’s analysis lends weight to the accuracy of
Gwynn’s observation over Sterett’s. At least nine of the fifteen leaders could be
considered mechanics o r retailers. These rioters likely represented the leadership of the
mob at Gay Street. Six of the fifteen appeared in 1813 tax record and averaged $427 in
assessed property, and their residential distribution placed four in Old Town, three in
Baltimore Town, two in Fell’s Point, and one from Annapolis, Maryland. The strong
percentage of natives among the rioters, as well as numerous mechanics, shopkeepers,
and grocers, and people from the center of the city provides very strong evidence that
politics alone motivated this mob.21
By midnight on June 22, the mob finished the demolition o f W agner’s house on
Gay Street and most of the rioters dispersed. In the Anglo-American mob tradition, the
rioting should have ended at this point, but in the early morning hours o f June 23, parts of
the mob scattered throughout the city, continuing the violence. Throughout the night,
rioters claimed to be searching for Jacob Wagner, the co-publisher of Federal

20 Deposition of Samuel Sterrett, RCG, 202. For those who did not believe that immigrants
represented a majority of the rioters, see Deposition of William Gwynn, RCG, 21; Deposition of
Dennis Nowland, RCG, 18S; Deposition of Andrew Boyd, RCG, 223; Deposition of William
Barney, RCG, 253; Deposition of John Owen, RCG, 292; Deposition of Christopher Raborg,
RCG, 322; and Deposition of Samuel Hollingsworth, RCG, 336.
21 Gilje assumed that those identified in the court dockets represented an accurate cross section of
the mob. With fifteen of the thirty to fifty rioters appearing in the court records, this is a probably
a safe assumption for this particular riot. In later the later riots that summer, however, those
charged with a crime represent such a small percentage of the rioters involved, that it is safer to
assume that the court dockets represent an accurate cross section of the mob’s leadership only.
Gilje also assumed that all those charged in the Court of Oyer and Terminer actually participated
in the riot whether or not they were eventually convicted of a crime. See Gilje, “‘Le Menu
Peuple’,” 53, 57,65 n.39.
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Republican. This ostensibly political reason suggests that a consistent anti-Federalism
continued to guide the m ob’s actions. Wagner’s brother-in-law, Christopher Raborg,
feared that violence against the family might occur that night. He arrived at W agner’s
father’s house in time to see a group of rioters demand to search the property. Raborg
testified that there had been a “mixture of foreigners and natives among the rioters” on
Gay Street, indicating that he was not predisposed to believing all rioters were
immigrants. Yet he was certain that the leader who demanded entrance to W agner’s
father’s house was “from his appearance and d ialect. . . a new imported Irishman.”
Between 2 and 3 o ’clock in the morning, this Irishman finally gained entrance to
W agner’s father’s house, and being satisfied that Jacob Wagner was not inside, departed
without making further trouble.22
Towards midnight, Robert McClellan, a shoemaker, warned Captain James
Sterrett that some members of “the mob intended to attack the bank” on Second Street in
downtown Baltimore “after they had destroyed the office” of the Federal Republican.
The information proved correct, and just after midnight, a mob assembled outside the
bank on the pretense that they believed Wagner to be hiding inside. Through the efforts
of Andrew Boyd and Doctor John Owen, who “addressed the mob,” and “induced them,
after some time, to withdraw,” the property was saved.23
Despite the incidents at Wagner’s father’s house and the bank, most rioters were
not really interested in finding Wagner, and a consistent anti-Federalism was not in
evidence during the early morning hours of June 23. Charles Burrall saw “a considerable

22 Deposition of Christopher Raborg, RCG, 322-23.
23 Deposition of James Sterrett, RCG, 199.
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number of people march up St. Paul’s Lane,” and halt “opposite the office o f the Federal
Gazette," Baltimore’s moderate Federalist newspaper. Burrall heard that “the word was
given to attack,” but others among the mob “called out no, no!” The mob subsequently
abandoned the idea of demolishing the property and Burrall heard no more from them
that night.24 Yet a man named Prior on Fish Street was harassed by the mob, allegedly
for having a sign on his business with the words “From London.” W illiam Gwynn
believed, however, “that the private animosity of some of his neighbors had induced them
to excite the mob to attack.”25 Another part of the mob also dismantled a brig in the
harbor that night, allegedly because it contained cargo destined for the Duke of
Wellington’s army in Spain.26 Rioters articulated political reasons for the attempted raid
a bank, the assault on a shopkeeper, and the destruction of shipping on Baltimore’s
wharves. Yet when the mob had the opportunity to act against a target for purely
political reasons, as in the case of the threat to the Federal Gazette, they did not act.
When politics was a contributing factor to violence, it was rooted in ethnic and
religious antagonisms rather than anti-Federalism. Parts of the mob attempted to tar and
feather several persons, among them Alexander Wiley, who, according to James Sterrett,
“who was twice forced to leave his residence in Gay Street” that night.27 Samuel Sterrett
added that the mob claimed Wiley had assisted the editors of the Federal Republican,
“which was not true, and this being explained to them particularly by the gentleman who
employed Wiley,” they initially dispersed. The mob regrouped later that night, however,
u Deposition of Charles Burrall, RCG, 154.
25 Deposition of William Gwynn, RCG, 22.
26 Deposition of John Scott, RCG, 120.
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and attacked Wiley anyway, demonstrating that the alleged connection between Wiley
and the Federalists was earlier used as a mask for the mob’s real motivation. James
Sterrett testified that the mob which attacked Wiley was “principally composed of
Irishmen who were after him,” which suggests that the assault was actually rooted in
ethnic and political antagonisms among the Irish.28
The disintegration of the mob into small, chaotic, and violent pieces accelerated
the following day. The homes and property of Robert Goodloe Harper and John Oliver
were rumored to be threatened, and the homes of Charles Smith and James Heath were
violated by the mob. A house on Federal Hill was pulled down, and rumors surfaced
during the afternoon that a mob would attack the home of a Mr. Hutchins in Old Town
for comments he made about George Washington. Allegedly, Hutchins had offered a
toast in which he proclaimed “Damnation to the memory of Washington and all who
espouse his cause.”29 The mob supposedly reacted to this toast as a pro-Federalist
statement against the declaration of war, but for Baltimore’s Republicans to have jumped
to such a conclusion is not credible. Generally, Republicans would have been more
likely to recognize an anti-Federalist message in a toast condemning W ashington’s
memory, because the Federalists venerated Washington as a symbol of an “Augustan
age” lost in the Jeffersonian ascendancy.30 More specifically, Alexander Contee Hanson

27 Deposition of James Sterrett, RCG, 200.
28 Deposition of Samuel Sterren, RCG, 203.
29 The quote is from the Deposition of George Steuart, RCG, 2 IS. For the rumors against Harper
and Oliver and the attacks against Smith’s and Heath’s houses, see Deposition of William
Gwynn, RCG, 22-23; Deposition of David Geddes, RCG, 51; Deposition of John Scott, RCG,
120-21; Deposition of Nixon Wilson, RCG, 149; and Deposition of Edward Johnson, RCG, 16166.
30 Linda Kerber, Federalists in Dissent: Imagery and Ideology in Jeffersonian America (Ithaca:
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was, in addition to being the editor o f the Federal Republican, the president of the
Baltimore chapter o f the Washington Benevolent Society, an association founded in
Boston that acted in Maryland as a front organization for the Federalist Party. The
Society sponsored overtly partisan celebrations on George Washington’s birthday,
rendering any confusion in Baltimore over the political meaning o f imagery associated
with George Washington rather difficult to believe.31
Thanks to advance warning, Mayor Johnson averted a riot at Hutchins’s house by
arriving before the mob and taking possession of the door. The mayor dispersed the
initial crowd o f forty or fifty rioters by leading them away from the house. Upon his
return, however, an even larger crowd numbering in the hundreds had assembled. In
order to control the situation, the mayor allowed several members o f the mob to search
the house. Finding that Hutchins had already fled, the mob subsequently disbanded.
Remnants o f the Anglo-American mob tradition are evident from Johnson’s interaction
with the Old Town mob, yet “before this assemblage was completely dispersed, Mr. John
Diffenderfer informed” the mayor that “a few gentleman, having heard of the riot, had
armed themselves, and were probably on their way.”32 Johnson quickly departed Old
Town to intercept Samuel Hollingsworth and two other horsemen who were armed to the
hilt. The mayor was able to convince them to return home, but the eagerness on the part
o f Baltimore’s elite to confront a riot with force significantly departed from custom.
According to William Gwynn, M ayor Johnson still clung to the traditional belief that
Cornell University Press, 1970), 4-8, 10.
31 Cassell, “The Great Baltimore Riot of 1812,” 243.
32 Deposition of Edward Johnson, RCG, 162. Also see Deposition of William Stewart, RCG, 6162, and Deposition of George Steuart, RCG, 215.
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“persuasion would be more effectual than force in dispersing mobs,” but others had
already graduated to a more typically modem response.33
By the morning of June 24, the mob began to direct its violence against the city’s
African American population, forgoing even the mask of attacking Federalists to gain
political legitimacy. James Briscoe, who was among the very few free African
Americans who owned multiple properties in the city, became an easy target. Briscoe
had allegedly made controversial comments of some nature, but what he actually said, if
indeed he said anything at all, was unclear. M ajor John Abel believed that the mob was
under the impression that Briscoe “made declarations in favour of the British, and had
declared he would be a king himself.” Yet another witness believed that the mob was
under the impression that Briscoe had declared “if all blacks were of his opinion, they
would soon put down the whites.”34 In the end, it did not really matter to the mob what
Briscoe had said; the rumor alone provided the rioters with all the excuse they needed,
and over the next few days, the mob engaged in a campaign o f racial harassment against
African Americans, both free and enslaved, beginning with Briscoe’s two houses.
Briscoe had informed Abel of the threat to his property the night before the attack,
giving Judge John Scott an entire day to take care of any legal formalities associated with
calling out the militia. However, the judge ordered Abel not to assemble his troops until
a warrant could be produced for the drumm er who actually made the threat against
Briscoe’s house. This action conveniently delayed the militia from assembling until early
evening, and by the time Abel’s troops arrived, it was too late to prevent the mob from
33 Deposition of William Gwynn, RCG, 23.
34Deposition of John Abel, RCG, 307, and Deposition of Nixon Wilson, RCG, 149. Also see
Deposition of Edward Johnson, RCG, 160-63.
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demolishing Briscoe’s house. Not satisfied with destroying just one house, the mob then
proceeded to demolish Briscoe’s property next door where his daughter lived. Judge
Scott’s inability to produce a legal warrant before dusk may have been the result of poor
timing, but it may have been a deliberate strategy to prevent the militia from assembling.
Without Abel’s interference, the mob’s fury would be directed against Briscoe and the
African American community, and subsequently, away from affluent Baltimoreans’
homes.35
Attacks against African Americans continued with threats to the African
American church on Sharp Street, and assaults against a free African-American man
named Remier, and an enslaved man held by Mr. R.W. Watts. While only four people
were charged with a crime in the destruction of James Briscoe’s house and in the beating
o f Remier, the beating of an enslaved man earned eight indictments from the Court of
Oyer and Term iner and the immediate attention of the town leadership.36 Mayor Johnson
concluded that the “the treatment received by the blacks,” or at least the property of
slaveholders, “rendered it indispensable to adopt measures for their protection.” The
violence might not have ended if not for a change in the weather, “it raining excessively
hard,” and this, according to Mayor Johnson, allowed cooler heads to prevail.37 A troop
o f horse under Colonel James Biays was subsequently called out the following day to
parade the streets, and peace was finally restored.
35 Deposition of John Abel, RCG, 307; Deposition of Nixon Wilson, RCG, 149; and Deposition of
John Scott, RCG, 120-21.
36 For the threat to the African American church, see Deposition of John Hargrove, RCG, 179;
Deposition of Nixon Wilson, RCG, 149; and Deposition of Dennis Nowland, RCG, ISS. For the
indictments, see Gilje, “‘Le Menu Peuple’,” 59.
37 Deposition of Edward Johnson, RCG, 162-63.
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Into July, many of Baltimore’s affluent families remained nervous. Samuel
Hollingsworth remarked that “many Gentlemen in the City think it expedient to keep
their Houses well armed.”38 Hollingsworth’s admission is revealing; the perceived threat
was specific to the city’s gentlemen without further reference to Federalists and
Republicans. If party tensions had been the primary cause o f the rioting that started after
midnight on June 23, it would have been unlikely that Federalists and Republicans would
have peacefully participated together during the July 4th observances, by which time the
city was again at peace. One historical account of the riots suggested that almost every
night after the Gay Street Riot, from late June until late July, the mob continued to roam
Baltimore’s streets, but there is no evidence either in the court records or in the
depositions o f witnesses to support this claim.39 John Hargrove, a Republican and the
City Registrar, commented that “the peace of the city was restored, and he dreaded the
consequences” o f another riot. Colonel James Biays, the Republican commander of the
Fell’s Point Dragoons, commented that the restoration of Hanson’s newspaper “would
produce another riot.” From these comments it is clear that Wilson and Biays believed
the mob to not have been a threat in early and mid-July.40
Alexander Hanson remained unsatisfied with the outcome o f the Gay Street riot.
Contrary to the wishes o f many Maryland Federalists, he intended to return to Baltimore
under arms, and re-establish the offices o f the Federal Republican in a house rented to
Jacob Wagner at No. 45 Charles Street. A few hot-tempered Federalists, including John
38 Thomas and Samuel Hollingsworth to Levi Hollingsworth, July 1, 1812, Hollingsworth Papers,
Historical Society of Pennsylvania.
39The claim is made in Gilje, “The Baltimore Riots of 1812,” 551.
40 Hargrove and Biays are quoted in Deposition of Dennis Nowland, RCG. 187-88.
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Hanson Thomas, the Federalist leader in Frederick County, supported Hanson’s scheme.
One Federalist, Colonel John Lynn, went even further to recommend that Hanson recruit
“a full quantity o f gallant men to defend” the house on Charles Street, and that the men
be armed with muskets, buckshot, bayonets, hatchets, and tomahawks. Lynn assured that
he would him self “join those gallant spirits, going on that noble enterprise,” but when the
time came just a few days later, he did not go to Baltimore.41
Hanson recruited a dozen people to help defend the house, and John Howard
Payne, a twenty-year old actor from New York City for whom Hanson was a benefactor,
rode through the countryside to muster additional support. Generals “Light Horse” Harry
Lee and James Lingan, both of whom were Revolutionary W ar heroes, also arrived in
Baltimore to join Hanson on the night of July 26, 1812. On the moming of July 27,
Hanson had the latest edition of his newspaper circulated throughout the city. Although
the paper had been printed in Georgetown, it carried the address o f the Charles Street
house, and criticized the local government for its failure to prevent the June 22
demolition o f the Gay Street office.42 Lee hoped that the house’s armaments would only
be needed in the most unlikely circumstances, but Hanson’s brash decisions to antagonize
the populous and let them know exactly where to find him suggests that he wanted a
fight. During the moming and early afternoon, numerous Federalists from Baltimore
joined Hanson, and by late afternoon, almost thirty armed men were prepared to defend

41 Cassell, ‘The Great Baltimore Riot of 1812,” 244-46; John Hanson Thomas to Alexander
Contee Hanson, July IS, 1812, in Baltimore American, August 8, 1812; and John Lynn to John
Hanson Thomas, July IS, 1812, in Baltimore American, August 8, 1812.
42 Federal Republican, July 27,1812.
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No. 45 Charles Street from the mob.43
A number of Baltimore officials had advance warning of Hanson’s activities, and
could have acted to preserve the peace before the m ob’s arrival. On the afternoon of the
twenty-seventh, at least four people related concerns over the security of the Charles
Street property either to Mayor Johnson or to the City Registrar, John Hargrove. The
residents included Mrs. White, the owner of the Charles Street property that Jacob
Wagner had rented and then turned over to Alexander Hanson, Mrs. W hite’s son Peter
White, Dennis Nowland, and Richard Heath, a Federalist and a Major in the Fifth
Baltimore Regiment under the command of Joseph Sterrett. Hargrove expressed almost
no concern about the situation on Charles Street when Nowland confronted him. He
promised to “inform the M a y o r . . . [as] soon as he had shut up the office and eat a bit of
dinner.” Hargrove finally informed Johnson of the report late that afternoon as the mayor
was making preparations to take his sick child into the country. The mayor “doubted
there would be an attack,” and repeated the same line to Mrs. White, Peter White, and
Richard Heath before leaving the city.44 During the riots in late June, Johnson had been
quick to react when property was threatened, and his actions earlier in the summer make
his cavalier attitude on July 27 very troubling. He may have honestly believed that no
attack would occur, but it seems highly unlikely that his political instincts would have
been that far off.
The preparations on Charles Street began drawing a crowd in the late afternoon.

43 Cassell, “The Great Baltimore Riot of 1812,” 245-46; Overmyer, “The Baltimore Mobs and
John Howard Payne,” 54-57; and Deposition of John Howard Payne, RCG, 14-18.
44 Deposition o f Peter White, RCG, 69-71; Deposition of Edward Johnson, RCG, 164; Deposition
of John Hargrove, RCG, 179-80; and Deposition of Dennis Nowland, RCG, 187-88.
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The distribution o f the Federal Republican that morning clearly attracted the first of
those who showed up in the streets. Dennis Nowland observed “a num ber of boys, of
various sizes, in number o f twelve or fifteen . . . and a few men in the middle of the street
encouraging the boys.” Violence ensued in the early evening when the boys began
throwing rocks and bricks at the doors and windows of the house. Nowland approached
the men “and begged o f them to make the boys desist,” because the house belonged to a
widow. One of the men replied “no, Hanson, the damn’d tory is our object, and we will
have him.” Nowland pleaded that “this was not the way to get him,” but his words had
little effect. Inside the house, Hanson was already prepared to throw caution to the wind
and attack, but General Lee gave strict orders not to fire at the crowd. Instead, Ephraim
Gaither, one o f the defenders of the house, launched a stove plate out the second-floor
window that hit Nowland, cutting off part o f his left foot. Nowland later recounted that
the injury “was so severe as to prevent me from walking, and I was carried home.”45
As the mob steadily increased in size, the defenders of the Charles Street house
decided to take action. In an attempt to scare off the mob, General Lee gave the order to
those on the second floor o f the house to fire over the heads of the crowd. Surprised by
the gunfire, many members of the mob momentarily backed off, but it was at this point
that the French druggist Thaddeus Gale decided to lead a rush the front door. Along with
several other rioters, Gale made it to the entrance hallway as far as the staircase when the
defenders of the house opened fire. Gale was killed, and two other rioters were badly
injured.46 After Gale’s death, several Justices of the Peace circulated through the crowd,

45 Deposition of Dennis Nowland, RCG, 188.
46 Narrative of Otho Sprigg, Maryland Gazette, August 27, 1812; Deposition of William Gwynn,
RCG, 26-21-, Deposition of William Steuart, RCG, 64; and Deposition of Richard Magruder,
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trying with little success to calm the situation. Entreaties were also made by several
concerned citizens to General John Strieker, whose house at 15 South Charles Street was
easily within earshot of the events down the block. Strieker was the commander of the
Baltimore Brigade, but he refused to act unless two magistrates signed an order legally
calling out the militia.47 Meanwhile, the violence continued to escalate.
Between nine and ten o ’clock, the defenders o f the house fired additional shots
from a second-floor window in an attempt to scare off the mob and clear the streets. The
shots were aimed over the rioters’ heads; unfortunately, one of the blasts accidently
struck John Williams, a stonecutter who had been standing across the street as an idle
spectator.

48

The deaths of Gale and Williams enraged the mob, and several defenders

tried to escape their wrath by fleeing the house. Several of these hapless deserters were
quickly apprehended and beaten. Although none of the escapees from the house were
killed in these actions, many could have been if not for the timely intervention of family
members who pleaded for their lives.49
By midnight, after two deaths and many members of both the mob and those in
the house were wounded, General Strieker finally received written authorization from
RCG, 75.
47 Deposition of Peter White, RCG, 73; Deposition of Richard Magruder, RCG, 75-77, 83;
Deposition of Dennis Magruder, RCG, 117; Deposition of John Scott, RCG, 121; and John
Strieker Letterbook, MS.789, Maryland Historical Society.
48 John Williams was identified as the slain spectator in the Deposition of William Stewart, RCG,
61. Williams’s occupation is listed in Fry’s Baltimore Directory for the Year 1812 (Baltimore:
B.W. Sower, 1812).
49 John Stone saved Andrew Boyd from being beaten, Thomas Buchanan saved Rufus Bigelow
from being beaten, Isaac Caustin saved Samuel Hoffman, from being hanged, and James Heath
escaped cleanly. See Deposition of Peter White, RCG, 72; Deposition of John Stone, RCG, 98;
Deposition of Thomas Buchanan, RCG, 102; Deposition of John Scott, RCG, 121; Deposition of
Nixon Wilson, RCG, 150-51; and Deposition of Isaac Caustin, RCG, 317.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

422
two magistrates to call out the militia. By this point, the mob had grown to over sixhundred, most of whom were engaged in rioting, and many of whom were “much
intoxicated.”50 The general chaos of the scene stood in marked contrast to the
workmanlike demolition of the Gay Street office a month before. Strieker ordered out
only one troop of cavalry, commanded by his nephew, Major William Barney. Barney
approached the mob but failed to persuade them to desist. Unwilling to attack, the major
placed his cavalry between the mob and the house and waited for the city officials to
arrive.51
By three in the morning, Mayor Johnson had returned to the city, and together
with General Strieker and Judge John Scott, organized the surrender of Hanson’s
Federalists. At seven o ’clock, the militia formed a hollow square in which the Charles
Street defenders were protected from the mob while being conveyed to the Baltimore
City Jail for their own protection. Despite an armed escort and the combined authority of
Johnson, Strieker, and Scott, violence against the defenders was barely contained. As the
procession continued to the Jail, Major Barney’s cavalry needed to constantly fend off
rioters attempting to break the square, and one rioter, whom Barney recognized as an
Irishman, even accosted the major directly. The city officials and their prisoners
managed to reach the Jail without further casualties, and the crisis was momentarily
abated.52
50 Deposition of James Hutton, RCG, 147; Deposition of William Barney, RCG, 266; Deposition
of Middleton Magruder, RCG, 305; and Deposition of John Abel, RCG, 308-10.
51 Deposition of David Geddes, RCG, 51; Deposition of William Barney, RCG, 260; and Henry
Lee, A Correct Account o f the Baltimore Mob (Winchester, VA: John Heisel, 1814), 8-12.
52 Deposition of William Gwynn, RCG, 27; Deposition of Nixon Wilson, RCG, 150-51;
Deposition of Henry Gaither, RCG, 192-97; Deposition of Andrew Boyd, RCG, 235-36;
Deposition of William Barney, RCG, 260-72; and Deposition of Richard Dorsey, RCG, 339-40.
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On the afternoon o f July 28, the mob reassembled at the Jail. The prisoners inside
became increasingly apprehensive about their safety as the day progressed, despite the
assurances o f Mayor Johnson that they would be protected. Otho Sprigg decided to save
himself by moving to a different cell and being lodged with common criminals. General
Strieker gave orders for several hundred militia to muster, but by late afternoon, only
twenty to thirty troops had convened.53 With no cavalry blocking their way, and the
prisoners inside being unarmed, the mob rushed the jail and forced the door.
The rioters at the Jail vastly outnumbered the prisoners, and Thompson and his
cellmates stood little chance of escaping. From his hiding place inside the Jail, Otto
Sprigg, who had fired the first shot at the Charles Street riot, could see General James
Lingan fall to his knees and beg for his life. The general had neither pulled the triggers
on the guns that killed Williams and Gale, nor had he given the order to fire on the mob.
None of that mattered. The mob held him and the other prisoners responsible for the
deaths, and paid little attention to the general’s desperate pleas for mercy. Sprigg could
only watch as the mob viciously clubbed, kicked, and stabbed Lingan in the chest until
the old soldier slumped over.54 David Geddes, a witness to Lingan’s murder,
remembered John Mumma, a butcher, glowering over Lingan’s lifeless body and snarling
“Look at the damn’d old tory General.” Geddes could scarcely believe the words.
Lingan was a hero of the Revolutionary W ar who survived imprisonment aboard one of
53 Narrative of Otho Sprigg, Maryland Gazette, August 27, 1812; Narrative of John Thompson,
Maryland Gazette, August 20, 1812; Deposition of Joseph Sterrett, RCG, 124; and Deposition of
Edward Johnson, RCG, 168-70.
54 Narrative of Otho Sprigg, Maryland Gazette, August 27, 1812. Alexander Contee Hanson
reported that Lingan did not die immediately, but succumbed from stabbing wounds several hours
later. See Alexander Contee Hanson, “An Exact and Authentic Narrative of the Events Which
Took Place in Baltimore on the 27th and 28th of July Last,” in Interesting Papers Illustrative of
the Recent Riots in Baltimore (Baltimore, 1812), 38-39.
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the notorious British prison barges in Wallabout Bay off Brooklyn. Geddes found the
butcher’s comments “shocking to the feelings of humanity.” Yet there was Mumma,
spitting the words at the old general who did not survive this brutal assault by the
Baltimore mob.55
Just a few feet away from Lingan, another rioter thrust General “Light Horse”
Harry Lee against a wall and pummeled the general until he collapsed onto the ground.
Lee was a renowned cavalry officer who, like Lingan, had served in the Revolution with
distinction. Yet his reputation did not prevent the rioters from thrusting pen knives into
his face, slashing and stabbing him until he went unconscious from the pain. The mob
then dragged Lee’s seemingly lifeless body outside the Jail and tossed him onto a bloody
pile of dead and dying prisoners. Unlike Lingan, Lee survived the brutal actions of the
mob, but he had been struck so many times in the face with such fury that he never fully
recovered from his injuries.56
M ayor Johnson hurried to the steps in a vain attempt to disperse the mob, but the
rioters protested against his interference. One barked at the mayor, “you dam n’d
scoundrel don’t we feed you, and is it not your duty to head and lead us on to take
vengeance for the murders committed.”57 The contrast to the comments made during the
Gay Street riot o f June 22 are striking. From his statement, the rioter clearly knew who
the mayor was, but displayed no respect for him or his duty to uphold the laws. Several

53 Deposition of David Geddes in RCG, 53.
56 Lee, A Correct Account o f the Baltimore Mob; Narrative of John Thompson, Maryland
Gazette, August 20, 1812; Narrative of Otho Sprigg, Maryland Gazette, August 27, 1812; and
Narrative of John Hall, Maryland Gazette, September 3, 1812.
57 Deposition of Edward Johnson, RCG, 170.
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gentlemen quickly pulled the mayor away from the scene to save his life.58 Once inside
the jail, the mob displayed the unbridled cruelty that led to stabbing death of General
James Lingan, and the vicious beating of General “Light Horse” Harry Lee.
Several prisoners made it outside, but they quickly ran into a throng of angry
rioters in the streets. John Hall later wrote that he was seized by “two rough looking
men” who “tore my shirt leaving my bosom bare.” Hall was beaten and tossed onto the
bloody pile of victims from which he could see “several of my friends knocked down and
their blood scattered all over the pavement.”59 One of them was Thompson, who had
been struck from behind and tumbled down the stairs of the Jail into the streets. He was
seized by half-a-dozen rioters, beaten, and then dragged away to be tarred, feathered, and
lashed. Thompson later reported that several rioters also wanted to gouge his eyes out
and others wished to break his legs with an iron bar. The rioters ultimately decided to set
him ablaze. Thompson was able to put out the flames by rolling himself on the ground.
He was subsequently carried off by calmer heads to the Bull’s Head Tavern where he was
encouraged to reveal the identities of all those people who had been in the house on
Charles Street the day before. Not surprisingly, Thompson broke down and provided
several names.60
After some time, Dr. Richard Hall intervened, and pronounced that most of the
prisoners were dead and that the others would soon die of their wounds. The latter claim
was not true, but Hall hoped that this declaration would encourage the mob to disperse.
58 Deposition of Lemuel Taylor, RCG, 44-46; Deposition of William Merryman, RCG, 112;
Deposition of Edward Johnson, RCG, 170; and Deposition of Charles Robinson, RCG, 190.
59 Narrative of John Hall, Maryland Gazette, September 3, 1812.
60 Narrative of John Thompson, Maryland Gazette, August 20, 1812.
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His words did not have the intended effect. For some time the rioters debated hanging or
burning the bodies, or possibly throwing them all into the Jones Falls. Eventually the
rioters decided to let Hall have the bodies for dissection. After the mob had gone, Hall
and other doctors moved quickly to save the lives of those badly wounded.61
Even after the surviving Federalists had removed from the city, rioters continued
to roam Baltimore’s streets. On the pretense of searching for copies of the Federal
Gazette, some rioters approached the post office. Although General Strieker proved
reluctant to act against the mob when it seemed the primary target of their violence were
Hanson and the Federalists, he moved decisively on July 29 to stop the violence from
spreading any further. Strieker finally called out the entire Baltimore Brigade to protect
the post office, and ordered a cavalry charge to disperse the mob. For the next several
days, armed militia patrolled the city to insure no additional rioting occurred.62

C o n seq u en c es

and

M e a n in g s

In the wake o f the Baltimore riots, commentators around the republic condemned
the barbarity of the mob. The death of General Lingan in particular represented an
especially appalling episode, and reactions to it were swift and scathing. In an address
honoring Lingan’s death, George Washington Parke Custis of Arlington bemoaned the
republic’s loss of innocence, and as George W ashington’s grandson, he garnered a
national audience. Custis lamented that in the wake o f the riots, “even sanguinary France
now cowers to our superior genius in iniquity.” He further bemoaned that France “is no

61 Narrative of John Hall, Maryland Gazette, September 3, 1812.
62 Cassell, “The Great Baltimore Riot,” 258.
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longer supreme in sin,” and “my soul sickens at the thought.” The Boston Repertory
went even further to suggest that Baltimore “now contains within itself the fiery materials
of its own destruction.” The riots foreshadowed a dismal future for the city, which, the
Repertory predicted, “will continue to break out in eruptions of anarchy and crimes.”63
The Baltimore riots in 1812 indeed marked the breakdown of the “Anglo-American mob
tradition,” and signaled the beginning of a transition to the more bellicose and deadly
rioting of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Baltimore earned the nickname
“mobtown,” a pejorative term that would trail the city for more than a generation. Yet
contrary to the prognostication of the Boston Repertory, Baltimoreans would not be alone
in experiencing this more virulent type of rioting— they were simply the first.64
Federalists around the country decried what they claimed was the inevitable result
of Republican radicalism, and used the incident to gain political advantage. Alexander
Contee Hanson was elected to Congress from Montgomery County, and was later elected
to the U.S. Senate from Maryland. More important, the October 1812 elections returned
a Federalist majority to the Maryland House of Delegates which immediately launched an
inquiry into the recent riots in Baltimore. The major focus of this highly politicized
investigation by the Federalist-dominated House was to answer whether or not the city’s
63 George Washington Parke Custis, “An address occasioned by the death of General Lingan, who
was murdered by the mob at Baltimore: Delivered at Georgetown, September 1, 1812,” (Boston,
1812), and Interesting Papers Illustrative o f the Recent Riots at Baltimore (Baltimore, 1812?), 25.
64 Gilje, Rioting in America, 65-68. For the new, more violent form of rioting that replaced the
Anglo-American mob tradition, see especially Adrian Cook, The Armies o f the Streets: The New
York City Draft Riots o f 1863 (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1974); Michael
Feldberg, The Philadelphia Riots o f1844: A Study in Ethnic Conflict (Westport, CT: Greenwood
Press, 1975), and The Turbulent Era: Riot and Disorder in Jacksonian America (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1980); Thomas Slaughter, Bloody Dawn: The Christiana Riot and
Racial Violence in the Antebellum North (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); Gilje,
Rioting in America, 60-116; and David Grimsted, American Mobbing. 1828-1861: Toward Civil
War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

428
predominantly Republican leadership had acted responsibly during the riots to protect the
city’s Federalists. The questions were therefore directed more toward the actions of
public officials and the rioters themselves than toward the underlying causes o f the
violence.
The most conspicuous example of the committee’s political agenda was the
twenty-fourth question. It specifically asked whether or not the deponent knew of any
officials who were guilty of misconduct, and was used to solicit responses concerning the
conduct of General W illiam Stansbury, a Republican who arrived at the Jail just before
the mob burst through the doors to attack the prisoners inside. General Strieker, not
Stansbury, was the commander of the Baltimore Brigade, and Stansbury had no power to
call out the militia. Thus the focus on Stansbury’s conduct served little purpose other
than to embarrass the city’s Republicans by trying to connect Stansbury’s actions or
inactions to the mob’s savagery. Several witnesses testified that Stansbury addressed the
mob and had said “the persons in the house in Charles-Street, were all a set of rascals,
and ought every man o f them to have perished.” Further, that “if he [Stansbury] had been
present, he would have been the first man to have fired the gun [cannon]. . . in defiance
of the civil authority.”63 Such language provided tacit approval for an attack against the
Jail, but with one exception, none of the deponents indicated that the general’s words had
an effect on the rioters, one way or the other. The mob did not require the approval of a
Republican general to proceed. Other witnesses defended Stansbury’s conduct. John
65 Deposition of John Worthington, RCG, 47. Worthington’s rendition of Stansbury’s conduct
was supported in large part by Robert Long, Elias Green, John Dougherty, William Smith, and
William Merryman. See Deposition of Robert Long, RCG, 89; Deposition of Elias Green and
John Dougherty, RCG, 97; Deposition of William Smith, RCG, 100; and Deposition of William
Merryman, RCG, 109-12. Two other witnesses disagreed with Worthington’s testimony. See
Deposition of Isaac Dickson, RCG, 87, and Deposition of John Schultz, RCG, 127-31.
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Wooden and Abraham Hatten testified that far from inciting violence, Stansbury had
entered the Jail to help defend General Lee.66
The ostensibly political focus o f the House investigation ignored any direct
questioning o f witnesses about the underlying causes o f the riot. The committee believed
that “private revenge sought its gratification under the imposing garb o f zeal against
reputed enemies o f their country.” As the committee was only interested in ascertaining
the causes of what it believed to be political intolerance, and whether or not the city’s
officials took appropriate actions to maintain the peace, acts which seemingly “attempted
to gratify . . . embittered passions” did not hold any interest for them.67 Thus much of the
disjointed, sporadic, and often irrational actions o f the rioters were omitted in the official
report.
The House Federalists were not alone in limiting the focus o f the inquiry into the
riots. Eager to shift blame onto Hanson and his Federalist comrades, Baltimore
Republicans also dismissed lawlessness which seemingly had no direct connection to the
publication o f the Federal Republican. Although Edward Johnson, Baltimore’s
Republican mayor, testified that “a number of inferior disturbances took place, confined
to the Irish alone,” and that he feared repercussions against African Americans and
shipping on the city’s docks, he maintained that “I have never believed that a spirit of
insubordination to the civil authority existed” in Baltimore. In his mind, “the late
unhappy disturbances in the city, are certainly to be traced to the violent and
inflammatory publications in the Federal Republican news-paper, which produced a

66 Deposition of John Wooden, RCG, 142-43, and Deposition of Abraham Hatten, RCG, 137.
67 Introduction, RCG, 3.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

430
general spirit o f indignation.”68 Despite the political focus by Federalist and Republican
officials in the House investigation, many of the depositions by the committee’s
witnesses did not overlook the “private” acts that contributed to much of the violence.
Testimony concerning these actions reveals more about the reasons for the violence than
either the members o f the House committee or the mayor were willing or able to face.
Samuel Sterett, a leading Federalist and militia captain, was politically
predisposed to blaming Republicans for the violence. Yet he remarked that rioters
seemed to use the word ‘T ory” as a “cant term . . . which was the signal for insult and
violence.” The varied “terror and consternation” that “many respectable persons” faced
that night seemed to appear from multiple directions; the mob was a “many headed
monster.”69 What Sterret had noticed, and had trouble articulating clearly, was that the
mob used the pretense o f political action to mask social and economic causes for their
violence; the riots on Gay Street in June and Charles Street in July provided the political
cover for rioters to act on a multitude o f grievances and disaffections.
Frustration over lagging economic opportunities, rather than anti-Federalism,
helps explain why many rioters abandoned their attacks on supposedly Federalist targets
after the Gay Street riot and began assaulting African Americans and their property. On
June 23, affluent Baltimore residents fueled the idea of a possible uprising by African
Americans. M ayor Johnson received “many reports . . . of threats and imprudent
observations o f the black population, by some o f the most respectable inhabitants” of the
city. Samuel Sterrett also testified that “in the midst of all this anarchy and confusion,

68 Deposition of Edward Johnson, RCG, 177.
69 Deposition of Samuel Sterrett, RCG, 203.
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alarms were raised of a conspiracy among the negroes, hostile to the whites.”70 At best,
these fears arose from a legitimate concern that the almost continuous rioting o f the past
thirty-six hours would encourage a rebellion. At worst, wealthy Baltimoreans
manipulated the racism of the mob to deflect attention away from themselves.
Once the specter of an uprising was raised, rioters quickly turned against African
Americans. Rising prices and stagnant wages between 1802 and 1812 meant that times
were hard for Baltimore’s working people, and much of the city’s white working poor,
including the substantial population of Irish and German immigrants in Baltimore, were
in competition against African Americans for employment. Many o f the city’s
manufacturers and artisans preferred hiring African-American laborers, both free and
enslaved, over white wage earners, adding to the city’s racial divide. The relative
segregation o f the city’s immigrants to the most peripheral parts o f the city also likely
contributed to white wage earners’ sense of economic disadvantage. Unlike African
Americans, who did not congregate into segregated neighborhoods until the 1820s,
immigrants were already geographically isolated as early as 1812.71 As seen in Figure 91, Baltimore Town, the wealthiest area of the city, accounted for 51 percent of the city’s
residences in 1812. Yet only 33 percent of the city’s immigrants lived in Baltimore

70 Deposition of Edward Johnson, RCG, 163. Also see Deposition of Samuel Sterrett, RCG, 205.
71 Christopher Phillips, Freedom's Port: The African American Community o f Baltimore, 17901860 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1997), 103-09; Joseph Garonzik, ‘The Racial and
Ethnic Make-up of Baltimore Neighborhoods, 1850-1870,” Maryland Historical Magazine, 71
(1976): 392-402; and D. Randall Beime, “The Impact of Black Labor on European Immigration
into Baltimore’s Oldtown, 1790-1910,” Maryland Historical Magazine, 83 (1988): 331-45. The
trend towards residential segregation of Free Blacks in Baltimore closely parallels trends in
Philadelphia and New York City. See Gary Nash, Forging Freedom: The Formation o f
Philadelphia’s Black Community, 1720-1840 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988),
165-68, and Shane White, Somewhat More Independent: The End o f Slavery in New York City,
1770-1810 (Athens, GA: The University of Georgia Press, 1991), 172-76.
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Figure 9-1
Population by Neighborhood, 1812

Area of the City

Number of Assessed
Residencies

Percentage of
Population

Baltimore Town

351

50.8%

Old Town

126

18.2%

Fells Point

90

13.0%

Federal Hill

28

4.0%

Western Precincts

97

14.0%

CITY TOTALS

692

100.0%

Sources: Fry's Baltimore Directory fo r the Year 1812 (Baltimore: B.W. Sower. 1812),
and Baltimore City Property Tax Records, 1812 (microfilm), Baltimore City Archives.
Notes: O f the 2,741 individuals listed in the 1812 tax records, the residencies o f 692 were
identified in the 1812 City Directory.
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Town. Almost a third o f lived in either Federal Hill or the western precincts, compared
to just 14 percent of the city’s overall population. The location o f so many immigrants
away from Baltimore Town isolated them from the most lucrative area of the city.72
The composition of the rioters who targeted African Americans in June clearly
shows that they came from the most marginal parts of the city— socially, economically,
and geographically. Paul Gilje could not locate any of the sixteen rioters charged with
assaulting Blacks could in Baltimore Town, few could be called mechanics, only three
appeared in militia rolls, and just one, who was assessed at $50, could be found in the tax
records. All o f those charged were either journeymen or laborers, unlike the rioters on
Gay Street, or those who participated in any o f the riots during the rest of the summer,
where at least one artisan or shopkeeper was present.73 For these workers, the merest hint
of a conspiracy served as adequate reason for the rioting against African Americans on
June 24.
The publication of the Federal Republican a month later certainly raised agitation
within the city, but the reappearance o f Hanson’s newspaper was the chief motivation for
only a very few people who participated in the subsequent riot on Charles Street. Early
in the evening of July 27, Thomas Wilson, editor of the Republican newspaper Sun, stood
outside the Charles Street house and urged the mob on to violence. Just a few hours
before, Wilson’s chief concern was that merchant Nathan Tyson planned to load a ship
with flour for the British troops in Spain. The editor’s agenda that evening was clearly
72The average wealth of residents in Baltimore Town was $5 LI, in Old Town was $332, in the
western precincts was $278, in Federal Hill was $180, and on Fells Point was only $150. 1812
Baltimore City Directory, and Baltimore Property Tax Records, 1812, RG.4 #1, microfilm reel
83, BCA.
73 Gilje, “*Le Menu Peuple’,” 59,62-63.
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political, as was that of Baptist Irvine, the editor of the rival Republican newspaper The
Whig. These men probably desired nothing more than the destruction o f the house and
the physical humiliation of those inside, but they can not be considered leaders in this
riot. The other members of the mob did not recognize who they were, and there is no
evidence that the mob grew thanks to premeditated or orchestrated action by
Republicans.74
John Howard Payne, the twenty-year old New York actor that Hanson patronized,
rode all over Old Town and Fells Point that night and discovered that “everything was
tranquil.” Arriving back at Charles Street, he found the streets “in commotion.” Joel
Vickers, who lived on the main street leading from Fells Point into Baltimore Town,
“saw no unusual collection o f people” moving from the Point towards Town, “and [he]
was the whole night at home.” Levi Hollingsworth, a Federalist, believed that “the
proceedings at Charles-street were, during the night, almost unknown at Fells Point,” and
other witnesses reported that very few inhabitants from Fells Point were present in the
streets.75
Reasons other than the publication of the Federal Republican may have
contributed to the mob’s swelling numbers on July 27. Before dusk, William Barney
stopped by the home of Thomas Jenkins, which was next door to the Charles Street house
occupied by Hanson’s Federalists. Barney spent “a few minutes” conversing with
Jenkins when “a negro came out of the W agner’s house with a pitcher in one hand, and a

74 Deposition of Richard Heath, RCG, 58; Deposition of Dennis Nowland, RCG, 188; and
Deposition of John Stone, RCG, 98.
75 Deposition of John Howard Payne, RCG, 16; Deposition of Joel Vickers, RCG, 41; and
Deposition of Levi Hollingsworth, RCG, 333. Also see Deposition of Lemuel Taylor, RCG, 46.
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[sword] cane in the other.” After surveying the assembling mob, the unidentified
African-American man allegedly said, “there they stand by two’s, and by three’s, but
damn them, let them come, we are ready for them.” The statement surprised Barney,
who turned to Jenkins and said “do you hear what that damn’d negro says?” Barney then
left without making any attempt to disperse the growing crowd.76
The exchange between Thomas Jenkins and Major Barney suggests that race may
have been more of a motivation in this riot then observers realized. As was the case in
June with the attack against James Briscoe’s houses, the threat to the African American
church, and the assaults against several other African Americans, even the rumor of the
African-American man’s words in front of the house would have been enough to incite
violence. If rumors of the exchange spread, many of the city’s white, disenfranchised,
working poor would have been moved to action—just as the rumors of Briscoe’s speech
had led to violence against his houses and other African Americans. There is ultimately
no way to tell, because the House committee investigating the riots never asked the
question. Yet the composition of the mob assembling outside 45 Charles Street lends
some weight to the idea.
By midnight on July 27, between three and five thousand rioters were in the
streets. As the depositions by Payne, Vickers, and Hollingsworth demonstrated, the mob
did not come across Jones Falls from Fells Point or Old Town, nor did they come from
Baltimore Town. This means that the rioters must have arrived from either the western
precincts or Federal Hill where a large percentage of Baltimore’s poor immigrants
resided— a possibility that is reinforced by the testimony o f witnesses to the riot and the

76 Deposition of Thomas Jenkins, RCG, 169.
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identities o f those rioters appearing in the court dockets. Unlike the descriptions of the
mob at the Gay Street Riot on June 22, witnesses to the Charles Street Riot testified that
the mob consisted primarily o f immigrants, especially Germans and what one witness
called “low” Irish.77 Whether immigrant or American-born, however, a significant
percentage of the mob was white, poor, and disenfranchised. O f the twenty-eight rioters
listed in the dockets of the Court of Oyer and Terminer for rioting on Charles Street, only
six appeared in the militia rolls, none were assessed at more than $100 in the tax records,
and only two had residencies in Baltimore Town. Most of the rioters were tinmen,
plasterers, and carters— members of the working class often in direct competition with
African Americans for jobs.78
The rioters’ struggles to fire a cannon on the evening of July 27 further
underscores the evidence from the tax records, militia rolls, and city directories as to the
Charles Street mob’s composition. A few rioters led by a carter named Jones had left the
scene and returned with a cannon. Nobody in the mob seemed to knew how to fire the
weapon, nevertheless, John Gill, a tailor, climbed on top of the gun to prevent anyone
from trying. Another man named Long put his finger over the touch hole and said “no
person should prime it or fire it, unless he was stronger than himself.” That none of the
rioters knew how to fire the cannon suggests that few members of Baltimore’s militia
companies were present, and reinforces the idea that most of the rioters were poor,
disenfranchised wage earners who likely possessed little interest in the political
77 Deposition of Lemeul Taylor, RCG, 46; Deposition of Thomas Kell, RCG, 138; Deposition of
Edward Johnson, RCG, 177; and Deposition of William Barney, RCG, 264.
78 Gilje, ‘“Le Menu Peuple’,” 54-56. Gilje identified George Benner as one of the rioters, but
Peter White testified that he encountered “a man who is in the employ of George Benner.” See
Deposition of Peter White, RCG, 71. It thus seems unlikely that Benner himself was at the riot.
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predispositions o f Hanson and the other Federalists within the house. By contrast, the
tailor John Gill fit the profile of a politically-aw are rioter in the Anglo-American mob
tradition, but in the Charles Street riot, Gill joined those who sought to contain or stop the
violence.79
Although race may have been a motivating factor in the riot, other rioters appear
to have been motivated by a more general sense of economic disaffection. After General
Strieker ordered out the militia to contain the violence, he further recommended to Major
Bamey that the troops remove their regalia. Strieker knew that several rioters had
already harassed at least one genteelly dressed spectator, and Strieker feared that they
might attack Barney’s troops if they wore anything which might identify them as affluent.
If anti-Federalism or racism alone animated the mob, such a suggestion would never have
been made. Barney’s troops were entirely white, and Bamey himself was a Republican
running for city office. Strieker’s recommendation clearly demonstrates that the General
recognized an economic motivation in the Charles Street riot. Bamey complied,
removing his white feather and Society of the Cincinnati emblem, and had his Hussars
remove their white feathers too.80
The evidence from the House investigation demonstrates the highly conflicted
nature o f the Baltimore riots and the multiple causes for the rioters’ actions. Anger at
Hanson and his Federalist opposition to the war angered a number o f rioters, but racial
and ethnic tensions and economic disillusionment provided motivations for other
members of the mob. The only consistent trend among the various rioters was a universal

79 Deposition of Nixon Wilson, RCG, 150-51.
80 Deposition of John Howard, RCG, 233.
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lack o f respect for the city’s officials and their attempts to reestablish order through
traditional eighteenth-century methods of crowd control. No matter what their particular
grievance, rioters no longer possessed a strong sense of deference for traditional
authority. Without this, officials proved nearly powerless to stop the activities o f the mob
even when the militia was called out. Deferential bonds relied on a traditional social
structure, and in the city, this required a stable household economy. The rise of the
manufacturers had undermined that economy, and the actions of the Baltimore rioters
demonstrates that by 1812, the traditional deferential social order had also finally
collapsed.
Despite the breakdown of the Anglo-American mob tradition, the market
revolution had not fully entered the consciousness of Americans. Unlike rioters in the
Jacksonian period, the Baltimore rioters displayed an extensive range of motivations.
Violence against African Americans occurred, but none of the mob actions in 1812 could
be called a race riot. Although many rioters attacked symbols of wealth and affluence,
none of them made specific demands about poor relief, employment, or better wages.
Although violence between Irish factions and political opponents occurred, the Baltimore
rioters did not exhibit the polarization of a Jacksonian-era election riot. Although much
o f the violence was due to the material condition of the rioters, none of rioters actually
made that explicit connection.
The polyvocality of the Baltimore rioters in 1812 demonstrates that the working
people o f the city had not yet developed into a coherent working class with a clear sense
of class consciousness. Boundaries between race and class, and coerced labor and wage
earning remained fluid, obfuscating any consistent working class politics in the early

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

438
decades o f the nineteenth century. The riots thus show that the transition from a
traditional eighteenth-century social structure to the archetypical social divisions of a
capitalist society were not yet complete. Although the long-term reconstruction of
American society was well underway, the market revolution had not yet been made fully
part of Americans’ consciousness.
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EPILOGUE
FREDERICK DOUGLASS'S BALTIMORE

At first, everything seemed to be going well. William Gardner, one of the master
shipwrights at Fells Point, has a contract to build two men-of-war for the Mexican
government. The ships had to be delivered on time, so the yard was busy and confusing,
especially for young Frederick Douglass. Nineteen and newly apprenticed as a caulker,
Douglass was "called a dozen ways in the space of a single minute" by carpenters rushing
to get planks sawed, timber moved, or pitch heated. There was plenty of work to be
done, leaving little time for the workers to focus on anything other than the tasks at
hand— or so Douglass thought. He remembered that at first, white and black carpenters
worked side-by-side, and that "all hands seemed to be well satisfied" with the
arrangement. Then, "all at once, the white carpenters knocked off, and said they would
not work with free colored carpenters." Their reason was "that if the colored carpenters
were encouraged, they would soon take the trade into their own hands, and poor white
men would be thrown out of employment." The protest did not end there. Taking their
lead from the white carpenters, some o f the white caulkers began harassing the black
caulkers. Douglass was singled out. Having recently been savagely beaten by a
plantation overseer, he was unwilling to be treated in a degraded manner. When he
resisted, four white caulkers went after him "armed with sticks, stones, and heavy
handspikes." One hit Douglass in the head with a brick and viciously kicked him in the
face when he fell to the ground. The white carpenters soon descended on the scene,
many crying out "kill the damned nigger! Kill him! Kill him!" Douglass realized that
his life would certainly be lost if he did not take flight at that moment. He knew that "to
439

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

440
strike a white man is death by Lynch law,—and that was the law of Mr. Gardner's ship
yard." Indeed, this was the law throughout the city.1
The protest at Gardner's shipyard and the attack on Douglass revealed a much
sharper division between African Americans and whites in Baltimore than had previously
existed. A perceptible shift in race relations had occurred since the riots of 1812. In the
heat of that long summer, both those who engaged in violence and those who sought to
contain it had great difficulty articulating why the riots happened and against whom the
violence was primarily intended. Although African Americans were attacked, they were
not specifically and consistently targeted. Although most of the rioters were poor, having
suffered a decade of stagnating wages and rising prices, there were also many middling
artisans among those involved. Although many rioters used the pretense of political
action to mask social and economic frustrations, others were genuinely interested in
tarring and feathering Federalists. Race, class, and politics were all motivations for
violence in the summer o f 1812, and the lines between these motivations were blurred.
At Gardner's shipyard, things were different. The white carpenters consciously identified
their grievances as economic, linked those concerns directly to racial division, and made
no attempt to cloak their reasons as political. The white caulkers believed their interests

1Frederick Douglass, "Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, An American Slave, Written
by Himself," in Henry Louis Gates, ed., The Classic Slave Narratives (New York: Signet, 1987),
311-13. The term "Lynch law” refers to an extra-legal summary judgement against someone that
leads to violence. According to the Oxford English Dictionary Online, the origins of the term are
in dispute. The most likely origin dates from 1782, when the Virginia Assembly indemnified
Charles Lynch, a Justice of the Peace, for having allegedly fined and imprisoned suspected
loyalists in 1780 without proper authority. It is also possible that the term is derived from
"Lynche's Creek,” a meeting place for South Carolina Regulators in the late 1760s. During the
nineteenth century, the term increasingly came to be identified with racial violence, usually
white-against-black. See "lynch law," Oxford English Dictionary Online, Oxford University
Press, 2002 <http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/0013...2878&p=l&d=l&sp=l&qt=l&ct=0
&ad=l> (March 7,2002).
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were identical to those o f the white carpenters, thus consolidating all white workers at the
yard against the yard's black workers regardless of their status. And this time, African
Americans were clearly the targets of violence.
The racial and class divisions apparent to Frederick Douglass on the Baltimore
docks in 1836 had been present in 1825 when he first arrived in the city. Not the
Douglass took much note of them at the time. As an eight-year-old child recently
removed from the brutality of a plantation and newly installed as a house servant in the
city, Douglass was understandably more concerned about getting along with the other
people in the house than in taking careful note of social and economic relationships in
Baltimore. From his youthful vantage, it appeared that "a city slave [was] almost a
freeman compared with a slave on a plantation." It seemed that city slaves enjoyed "a
vestige o f decency" compared to life in the fields.2 Indeed, this may have been a fair way
to compare enslaved life in Baltimore and Talbot County, Maryland during the 1820s.
Term slavery and delayed manumission had already transformed Baltimore’s African
American community at that point. The free black population had already eclipsed the
enslaved population, and the city was quickly approaching the point at which African
Americans who were bom free would outnumber those who had been emancipated. Yet
the success o f the city's African Americans in achieving freedom from bondage was
tempered by the upswing in racial animosity that resulted from the market revolution. As
the riots o f 1812 demonstrated, the turn from an Atlantic-oriented economy to one
focused on developing the domestic economy and advancing market connections into the
backcountry had contributed substantially to increasing degree o f racial and class division
in the city. In the decade after the riots, those divisions calcified, producing the
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Baltimore that Frederick Douglass witnessed first as a child and then as a young man
running to save his life. In Frederick Douglass's Baltimore, the boundaries between race
and class and coerced and wage labor were no longer fluid. Instead, a cohesive white
working class with a matured sense o f racism had emerged, and African Americans were
geographically segregated and economically marginalized. The market revolution had
fully crept into the American consciousness, and the long-term social and economic
reconstruction o f American society from the colonial through the postcolonial to the early
national was finally complete.

2 Douglass, "Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass," 275.
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